

# Networks of Faith and Politics: Exploring Santri Electoral Behavior in Central Java Elections 2024

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## Abstract

The presence of Islamic boarding school students (santri) in Indonesia's political history holds substantial significance, not merely due to their growing demographic weight but also because of their strategic influence and pivotal roles in the last three national elections. Santri function not only as active voters but also as critical components of electoral coalitions and, in some cases, as candidates themselves. This study employs survey to 1,076 santri in Central Java during 2024. Participants comprised individuals who had attended and resided in Islamic boarding schools (pesantren). Findings indicate that family members and religious leaders exert a strong influence on santri's political engagement. A majority of santri report still relying on family networks and religious authorities as primary reference points when selecting their preferred candidates. Furthermore, the majority of santri are affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organization, which remains a dominant institutional force within Indonesia's Muslim community. However, the alignment between santri and formal political parties, especially Islamic political parties, remains relatively fluid, with only a minority holding formal party membership or sustained political affiliations. This suggests that while religious identity shapes political values, party loyalty among santri is neither uniform nor necessarily strong.

**Keywords:** Santri, Pesantren, Voting behavior, Nahdlatul Ulama, election

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## Introduction

The term "santri" is widely used in political analysis in Indonesia. The definition of santri varies according to evolving social dynamics. Linguistically, there are at least four opinions regarding the origin of the word santri. First, it comes from the Sanskrit "sastri," meaning literacy. Second, it comes from the Javanese "cantrik," meaning someone who always follows a teacher where the teacher lives (Madjid, 1997; 21-22). Third, the term "santri" comes from the Indian "shastri," meaning someone who knows the sacred books of Hinduism or a scholar of Hindu scriptures. Fourth, the term comes from the Tamil language, meaning a teacher of the Koran (in Dhofier 1982: 18).

Referring to the term "santri" as those who study Islam, Zuhri emphasizes the goal to be achieved. Santri are those who study Islam, whether traveling to places near or far, with the intention of practicing their knowledge and disseminating it. If one studies Islam merely for the sake of knowledge, one is not worthy of being called a santri. The knowledge gained from one's teacher serves as a pattern for shaping the mental attitude and character of the santri (Zuhri, 2001: 181-182).

The broader meaning of santri as devout Muslims has long been used by many researchers. Geertz (1960), for example, used the term santri to distinguish it from abangan and priyayi in Java. Santri are a group that pays close attention to Islamic doctrine and transcends traditional ritual aspects, like abangan. Santri apply Islamic doctrine to their daily lives. In social organization, a sense of community is paramount, a community of believers who constantly repeat the Prophet's

words, perform prayers, and read the Quran. Politically, santri aspirations are embodied in Masyumi and NU, the political parties. In the educational system, pondok or pesantren serve as traditional schools for santri led by a kiai, while the existence of langgar (small mosques) and mosques serve as local santri communities (Geertz, 1960: 126-130).

During the New Order era, the configuration and concept of santri (Islamic students) broadened. The phenomenon of new santri (neo-santri) emerged as a distinct form of santri from the old santri (Islamic students). While old santri were connected to established Islamic groups, both traditionalist and modern, and Islamic parties, neo-santri tended to separate themselves from both. They acquired political education during their university years. Neo-santri represent the middle class, viewing Islam more in terms of substance and function, rather than symbols or a literal understanding of texts. They later played a role in the formation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, or ICMI). (Anwar, 1995: 128-133) With this broadening of meaning, the label "santri" became fluid and could be applied to any Muslim who felt or was perceived as a devout Muslim. The title "santri" was no longer confined to those who studied at Islamic boarding schools.

As the influence of social media, particularly in urban areas, has grown, the term "new santri" has emerged, referring to ustadz (Islamic teachers) who have a large following, despite not necessarily being trained or having a background in religious knowledge (Saat and Burhani, 2020: 4). The presence of social media has driven a shift in religious authority, which


was previously limited to groups of people who have received religious education, mastered religious knowledge, and are recognized by society as competent in religious matters, has shifted to those who have access and resources to social media, directly and indirectly establishing themselves as new religious authorities, in this case ustadz and the like (Lailiyah, 2025).

There is no definitive data on the number of santri in Indonesia, either in the narrow sense or in the broader sense. According to data from the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs, the number of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in Indonesia in 2025 will be 42,391, with a student population of four million. Central Java is one of the provinces with the largest number of Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia, reaching 3,719 in 2023 and 5,231 in 2025 (a total of 520,000 students).

Sociologically and historically, Central Java is also a province with a significant number of santri, and they dominate in several regions. This is also reflected in the vote share of Islamic parties closely associated with santri. Under these conditions, understanding the political behavior of santri is crucial.

Data collection for this study was conducted through a survey of 1,076 respondents who identified themselves as santri). Data collection took place during the 2024 election period.

### Santri as voters' background



Respondents in this study were those who had studied at Islamic boarding schools. However, not all completed their education. While 52% of students did not complete their education at Islamic boarding schools, 48% had attended and completed their studies at Islamic boarding schools.

Completing Islamic boarding school education in this era is often associated with formal education. For example, if a student attends junior high or high school and also boarding at an Islamic boarding school, they are considered to have completed their education at the boarding school after three years. If a student attends a boarding school for both junior high and high school, they have completed six years of study at the boarding school. However, if a student only boarded and did not attend formal school, the duration depends entirely on the student, their parents, and the boarding school administrator. For example, if a student attends an Islamic boarding school solely to memorize the Quran or recite the yellow text, the student's guardian, the student themselves, and the administrator will be the deciding factor. Often, the administrator has the most power to determine how long a student can pursue Islamic education at the boarding school. To this day,

we can still find many Islamic boarding schools implementing this system.

Research results show that the distribution of student respondents is across all regencies/cities in Central Java, with the following distribution:

Table 1. City distribution

| No | City            | Freq | %    |
|----|-----------------|------|------|
| 1  | Banjarnegara    | 22   | 2,0  |
| 2  | Banyumas        | 22   | 2,0  |
| 3  | Batang          | 58   | 5,4  |
| 4  | Blora           | 15   | 1,4  |
| 5  | Boyolali        | 22   | 2,0  |
| 6  | Brebes          | 40   | 3,7  |
| 7  | Cilacap         | 43   | 4,0  |
| 8  | Demak           | 111  | 10,3 |
| 9  | Grobogan        | 19   | 1,8  |
| 10 | Jepara          | 71   | 6,6  |
| 11 | Karanganyar     | 7    | 0,7  |
| 12 | Kebumen         | 42   | 3,9  |
| 13 | Kendal          | 72   | 6,7  |
| 14 | Klaten          | 20   | 1,9  |
| 15 | Magelang City   | 1    | 0,1  |
| 16 | Pekalongan City | 17   | 1,6  |
| 17 | Salatiga        | 5    | 0,5  |
| 18 | Semarang City   | 21   | 2,0  |
| 19 | Surakarta       | 5    | 0,5  |
| 20 | Tegal City      | 3    | 0,3  |
| 21 | Kudus           | 49   | 4,6  |
| 22 | Magelang        | 31   | 2,9  |
| 23 | Pati            | 34   | 3,2  |
| 24 | Pekalongan      | 21   | 2,0  |
| 25 | Pemalang        | 40   | 3,7  |
| 26 | Purbalingga     | 8    | 0,7  |
| 27 | Purworejo       | 14   | 1,3  |
| 28 | Rembang         | 42   | 3,9  |
| 29 | Semarang        | 26   | 2,4  |

|    |                          |       |      |
|----|--------------------------|-------|------|
| 30 | Sragen                   | 64    | 5,9  |
| 31 | Sukoharjo                | 6     | 0,6  |
| 32 | Tegal                    | 36    | 3,3  |
| 33 | Temanggung               | 19    | 1,8  |
| 34 | Wonogiri                 | 30    | 2,8  |
| 35 | Wonosobo                 | 40    | 3,7  |
|    | <b>Total respondents</b> | 1.076 | 100% |

The results above show that the majority of santri in Central Java live in Demak (10.3%), Kendal (6.7%), and Jepara (6.6%). Meanwhile, the cities/regencies with the fewest students are Magelang (0.1%), Salatiga (0.5%), and Sukoharjo (0.6%).

### Socio Economic Background

Referring to previous research on santri networks (Abdulrahman, 2025), Islamic boarding school networks also play a significant role in the general elections in Central Java, helping to secure the victory of certain candidates.

Social and economic conditions influence political participation. Several scholars have described socioeconomic factors influencing political participation, such as age, education, occupation, and income. There is a tendency for high political participation among productive-age groups. In unconventional political participation, participation rates among productive-age groups tend to increase, peaking in middle age and then declining with age (Roth and Wilson, 1980; Roskin et al., 1991; Dahl, 1991; Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Verba & Nie, 1972; Lipset, 1981). The majority (58.1 percent) of Islamic boarding school students are of productive age, between 17 and 40 years old. Only a small number (3.5 percent) are elderly, as shown in Table 2. This condition allows for a

high level of political participation among Islamic boarding school students, at least until the next election.

Tabel 2. Respondents Age Distribution

| Ages  | Freq | %    |
|-------|------|------|
| 17-22 | 131  | 12,2 |
| 23-30 | 254  | 23,6 |
| 31-40 | 240  | 22,3 |
| 41-50 | 244  | 22,7 |
| 50-60 | 169  | 15,7 |
| >60   | 38   | 3,5  |

From the outset, this research limited respondents to those who were eligible to vote in general elections in Indonesia. In Indonesia, voting rights are granted to citizens aged 17 or married. The data also shows that santri (Islamic students), unlike the term "students" for school children, do not feel they have ceased to be santri even though they are no longer studying at Islamic boarding schools. Age also no longer defines whether someone is a santri or not. Referring to the association of santri as devout Muslims (Anwar, 1995: 128-133), this becomes relevant because age is no longer a barrier to one's devotion as a Muslim.

The next factor is education. There is a tendency for people with higher education to participate at a higher level than those with lower educational backgrounds (Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Almond and Verba, 1963; Verba and Nie, 1972; Roth and Wilson, 1980; Roskin et al., 1991; Dahl, 1991; Lipset, 1981).

Looking at the situation of santri, only a small portion (12.9 percent) of them have completed higher education. The majority of students have secondary education, with 22.6 percent receiving only elementary school education, as shown in Table 3. This situation

has the potential to impact the quality of students' political participation. During election campaigns, students overwhelmingly attend open rallies. As Mayer (2011) noted, there is a positive and substantive effect on political participation among those who pursue higher education.

Referring to Mayer's research and examining the distribution of educational levels among student respondents, there appears to be a potential for less substantive and positive political participation. However, further research is needed to examine the type and quality of political participation among students.

### Education Background

The research results related to the respondents' educational level show that the majority of respondents' highest education attained was high school/equivalent (40.7%) and junior high school/equivalent (23.8%). The number of respondents who pursued higher education was 12.9%, indicating a low number of Islamic boarding school respondents pursuing higher education.

Table 3. Education Background

| Latest Education        | Freq | %    |
|-------------------------|------|------|
| Elementary non-graduate | 31   | 2,9  |
| Elementary School       | 212  | 19,7 |
| Junior High School      | 256  | 23,8 |
| Senior High School      | 438  | 40,7 |
| Diploma                 | 23   | 2,1  |
| Bachelor                | 113  | 10,5 |
| Postgraduate            | 3    | 0,3  |

Various studies have shown that occupation can contribute to a person's level of political participation (Roth and Wilson, 1980; Roskin et al., 1991; Dahl, 1991; Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Lipset, 1981). People with higher occupational status tend to be more likely to participate politically. This is based on the assumption that people with higher education have a higher awareness of the importance of citizen involvement in politics to create a better and quality community life.

Businessmen, white-collar employees, government employees, commercial-crop farmers, and miners tend to participate more strongly than unskilled workers, servants, service workers, peasants, and subsistence farmers (Lipset, 1981).

The research results show that the majority of respondents were housewives (18%) and self-employed (22.5%). Self-employment in Indonesia refers more to workers in the small business sector and tends to be short-term, lack job security, and present economic vulnerability (Choirotunnisa, 2023).

Therefore, the santri in this study demonstrates economic vulnerability because the majority work in the self-employed sector. Similarly, housewives also constitute a significant portion of the findings in this study. Housewives are economically vulnerable because they do not earn a living. Therefore, it is relevant that the majority of respondents referred to the head of the household as a political reference in determining their choice in general elections. Although other studies have shown the independence of housewives in determining political choices in general elections (Gama & Widarwati, 2008; Kushadajani, et.al, 2023), this study provides a

different perspective on how the political choices of housewives and heads of households become a primary reference in decision-making.

Table 4. Job Background

|    | Job            | F    | %    |
|----|----------------|------|------|
| 1  | Factory labor  | 49   | 4,6  |
| 2  | Teacher        | 41   | 3,8  |
| 3  | Housewife      | 194  | 18   |
| 4  | Self-employed  | 164  | 15,2 |
| 5  | Student        | 75   | 7    |
| 6  | Pensions       | 6    | 0,6  |
| 7  | Private sector | 242  | 22,5 |
| 8  | Village admin  | 11   | 1    |
| 9  | Farmer         | 153  | 14,2 |
| 10 | State employee | 12   | 1,1  |
| 11 | Part-timer     | 83   | 7,7  |
| 12 | driver         | 8    | 0,7  |
| 13 | unemployed     | 38   | 3,5  |
|    | total          | 1076 | 100% |

The table below shows that the majority of santri respondents earn less than 1 million rupiah per month (37.6%), while another large group of respondents earn 1-2 million rupiah per month (31.2%) and 2-3 million rupiah per month (20.9%). These results indicate that the majority of santri (at least 37.6%) are definitely classified as poor by the World Bank.

Table 5. Monthly income (in Rupiah)

| Monthly income | Freq | %    |
|----------------|------|------|
| < 1 mil        | 405  | 37,6 |
| 1mil - 2 mil   | 336  | 31,2 |
| 2 mil- 3 mil   | 225  | 20,9 |
| 3 mil - 5 mil  | 90   | 8,4  |
| 5 mil - 10 mil | 14   | 1,3  |
| > 10 mil       | 6    | 0,6  |

These results are relevant to previous research on income and political participation (Verba and

Nie, 1972; Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Lipset, 1981). People with high incomes or who are more prosperous are more likely to participate than those with low incomes or who are less prosperous. People with low incomes tend to focus more on meeting basic needs and lack the energy and time to consider other matters such as politics.

## Engagement with the Organizations

### Islamic Organizations

The research results showed that 776 students (72.1 percent) felt they were part of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). 58 (5.4 percent) held NU member cards, and 37 (3.4 percent) were NU officials.


106 students (9.9 percent) felt they were part of Muhammadiyah. 10 (0.9 percent) had Muhammadiyah member cards, and 7 (0.7 percent) were Muhammadiyah officials.

These results are not surprising, as in Indonesia, santri culture is more closely associated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) culture than Muhammadiyah culture. However, the finding that Muhammadiyah was part of the 9.9% of respondents who felt they were santri also aligns with research findings that Muhammadiyah Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in Indonesia are not new. However, one of the differences between Muhammadiyah and NU Islamic boarding schools is that Muhammadiyah is institutionally owned and managed by Muhammadiyah (Alam, Jamil & Adnan, 2022).

### Engagement with the political parties

Party or candidate preference (Milbrath & Goel, 1982; Nie, Verba & Kim, 1974). A person's sense of closeness to a particular political party

or candidate will influence their political participation. People with strong party identification or feelings of closeness to a particular candidate are more likely to actively participate in the political process.



963 students (89.5 percent) were unaffiliated with any political party, and 113 students (10.5 percent) were members or administrators of political parties. These responses demonstrate the fluidity of santri's political party preferences, although in Indonesia, parties like the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the United Development Party (PPP) often identify themselves as close to santri. PKB and PPP also frequently demonstrate closeness to religious leaders (kyai) in the hope of gaining more votes among students (Sucipto, 2006). However, in Central Java, santri feel less affiliated with any political party.

### Political Participation (Sources of Political Information, Role of Figures)

Meanwhile, Huntington and Nelson describe participation as independent activities or personal awareness, which is referred to as autonomous participation. On the other hand, mobilized participation is participation that is mobilized, people are encouraged to behave without personal interest, they act on

instructions, motivated by loyalty, affection, respect, fear of the leader, or by the desire for benefits that they believe the leaders can provide (Huntington & Nelson, 1976: 125-126).

### Traditional Ties


This is a form of mobilized participation based on traditional ties between followers and leaders. These ties are defined and legitimized by long-standing cultural, social, or religious traditions.

Santri and various parties who serve as references for determining political choices also exhibit a variety of traditional ties. Specifically, the relationship between santri and kiai (Islamic scholars), categorized as religious figures in this study, cannot be equated with a patron-client relationship or patronage (Abdulrahman, 2025). This is because there is no economic reciprocity in this relationship. Meanwhile, the relationship between patron and client requires economic exchange (Wilson, 1961).

Traditional ties more accurately describe the relationship between santri and religious figures because religious, cultural, and social traditions contribute to the relatively strong relationship between santri and kiai (17%).

Although the diagram below shows that the most important people referred to in discussing political choices in regional head, presidential, or political party elections are the head of the family (37.4%) and family members (19.4%). In this research, the head of the family can be either the father or the mother. However, in Indonesian and Central Javanese traditions, the role of head of the family is always held by the father unless the father died. Then, the mother replaces the father's role as head of the family. Meanwhile, the Kiai (religious leader) ranks

third as the party most frequently referred to regarding political choices. The bond between students and Kiai, from a traditional perspective, arises from the culture within Islamic boarding schools and Islamic religious communities in Indonesia, which places the Kiai (religious leader) as a reference in daily life, including politics. This relationship is not considered transactional because it lacks economic interests, as occurs in patron relationships. In patron relationships, there are economic benefits for one or both parties.




### Media and Communication Habit

Access to political information (Roth and Wilson, 1980; Lipset, 1981). People with extensive access to political information tend to be more likely to participate in politics than those with limited access. Access to political information comes from many sources. Political information from religious leaders can motivate and increase the political participation of their followers (McClendon and Riedl 2015).



Developments in media technology. The development of the internet has been able to boost levels of political participation, at least in unconventional forms. People who actively use internet information media are more likely to obtain political information and are more likely to participate actively (Lee, 2018).

Survey results indicate that the internet is the primary means of obtaining information, including from platforms like WhatsApp, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and online media. The Q4 diagram shows that WhatsApp is the platform most frequently accessed by the majority of students. 35.5% of students reported using WhatsApp very often, and 37.3% stated they frequently use it. One interesting finding from the Q4 diagram is the continued high number of TV viewers. 24.4% reported watching TV very often, and 34% reported frequently. This data illustrates students' general sources of information, not specifically political information.




During election periods, the presence of the internet as an information source also indicates that santri have direct access to information.

Mediatization theory demonstrates how the interrelationships between society, media, and culture can change due to the presence of media. In a political context, media, especially social media, bring politics to the fingertips of voters. Political information reaches voters directly and massively, unfiltered by media institutions. Mediatization in politics demonstrates how social change occurs more rapidly due to the presence of media. The advent of the internet has encouraged all political elements, including actors, institutions, and political parties, to adapt to become more responsive or less reactive in responding to evolving political dynamics in society (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014).

In the context of mediatization and politics, Strömbäck explains how interpersonal communication initially served as the most important source of information, then shifted to media as the primary source, media then became more independent from political institutions, and how political actors then attempted to follow the logic of media to adapt and remain relevant in society (Stromback, 2008).


In the context of santri, politics, and media, and in relation to sources of political information and the role of those around the students as respondents in this study, family is the primary source. This is relevant because WhatsApp is the platform most frequently used as a source of information. Through WhatsApp, students connect with their families.




However, when respondents were asked about sources of information related to candidates and political parties, the majority of them answered billboards and banners (37%). The second highest position was from TV advertisements (16%). The fact that many students still obtain information about candidates and political parties from TV advertisements is also relevant to the findings in the Q4 diagram which shows that TV is still one of the most frequently and frequently accessed media by students in Central Java. If accumulated sources of information about candidates and political parties originating from the internet as much as 24.2% which includes social media (13.5%), online news (8%), WhatsApp groups (2.7%). This finding shows the continued importance of campaign promotions using banners, billboards and TV advertisements to increase the popularity of candidates and political parties among students in Central Java amidst the massive digital campaign.

The involvement of santri respondents in events organized by political parties or candidates remains relatively low. Similarly, their experience of receiving assistance from political parties and candidates remains low. Only 16.4% of santri reported receiving assistance or

participating in activities organized by politicians or political parties. The remainder (83.6%) reported never having participated in or received assistance.




An interesting finding emerged from another question, which revealed inconsistencies in the santri's responses. 38.2% of santri admitted to having received goods and/or money from political candidates. 61.8% stated they had not. This finding suggests that the definition of assistance in Q6 differs among students. Assistance can include assistance with permits, administrative matters, and so on. Meanwhile, the money and goods received by respondents were not considered assistance.



Pragmatism was evident among the santri respondents in this study. Only 24.9% of respondents felt that giving goods and money from political candidates to voters to encourage them to vote for them in political elections was inappropriate and would be rejected. The rest

gave different answers. 4.7% stated they would accept gifts and vote for the candidate who gave the most money and goods. 16.5% of respondents stated they would accept and vote for that candidate. Meanwhile, the majority of respondents answered that it was normal for political candidates to give money and goods to voters, but they would vote based on their own preferences. These answers also indicate that gifts from political candidates do not guarantee election, but at the same time, giving nothing to voters would be considered inappropriate by 75.1% of santri in Central Java.



With an educational background where the majority did not pursue higher education (87.1%) and a monthly income of under 2 million rupiah (68.8%), a pragmatic attitude towards giving money and goods in political elections makes sense.

## Conclusion and Recommendation

Research shows that santri's political preferences are not entirely independent, as they still consider their families and heads of households the primary political references in determining their decisions about which candidate and political party to vote for in an election. The presence of religious figures among the top three primary sources of

reference for their voting decisions also demonstrates the strong traditional ties among Islamic boarding school students to religious figures. In Islamic boarding school culture, religious figures, viewed as kiai (Islamic teachers), serve not only as references for Islamic education but also for political reference. Furthermore, placing the head of the household as the primary reference can reinforce the already strong position of religious figures as political references.

If the head of the household then also relies on the guidance of religious figures to inform political decisions for themselves and their families, further research would be interesting if it could delve deeper into the dynamics of santri's political choices and the interrelationships between the head of the household, the family, and religious figures, using both quantitative and qualitative approaches.

Another interesting aspect is the pragmatism of santri voters regarding the giving of goods and money to vote for political candidates in elections. While this study attempts to capture the santri's close relationship with the process of seeking religious knowledge at Islamic boarding schools, pragmatism also becomes evident when examining their educational background and monthly income more closely.

It would be interesting if further research could contrast santri's religious views with the justification for giving money and goods by politicians in elections.

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