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Indonesia's Multi-alignment Strategy: Explaining OECD Accession and BRICS Membership

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ABSTRACT

This article examines Indonesia's foreign policy under President Prabowo through the lens of neorealism. Amid intensification of geopolitical rivalries among great powers, Indonesia has actively pursued a strategy of multi-alignment. Drawing on neorealist assumptions, Indonesia's foreign policy seeks to maximize national strategic autonomy through diversified bilateral and multilateral partnership. Indonesia demonstrates a pragmatic adaptation to structural constraints in the contemporary multipolar world order characterized by global political uncertainty; numerous middle power countries have started to respond by implementing multi-alignment strategy. Indonesia has taken the same initiatives. Under Prabowo's leadership, Indonesia pursued BRICS membership and continued its OECD accession process as part of its economic and development cooperation initiatives. Notably, these two economic cooperation organizations represent two forces from opposing political blocs. This study emphasis on two significant policy moves in economic and development cooperation: OECD accession and BRICS membership. Drawing on qualitative methods and neorealist frameworks, it investigates how Indonesia aims to enhance its global influence while maintaining its economic interest in the face of rising geopolitical rivalry between rich countries and the Global South. The findings show that Indonesia's multi-alignment strategy is useful enough in securing Indonesia's national interest.

Keyword: Indonesia foreign policy, multi-alignment strategy, BRICS, OECD.

Introduction

Today's global politics is more multipolar than it was in the Cold War. Medium powers exhibit flexible and diverse foreign policy strategies in this context. Multialignment is a strategy where states aim to interact with several global power centres at the same time without identifying themselves as a particular bloc. Indonesia is one of the largest countries in Southeast Asia that gradually adopts this strategy. President Prabowo Subianto has brought Indonesia into a more assertive diplomatic strategy. Indonesia has made substantial progress in its pursuit of membership in the BRICS coalition while simultaneously advancing its entrance to the OECD. Some of the existing studies only read Indonesia's entry into the BRICS and OECD on average using balancing and hedging analysis (Nahak & Kalisang, 2025; Setiawan, 2025). No one has yet read Indonesia's decision as an ambitious and offensive step to achieve Indonesia's goal of becoming a great country. Thus, this research will observe Indonesia's decision to join the BRICS and accession to OECD at once as a dual-track strategy. It underscores Indonesia's dedication to multi-alignment to augment global influence while maintaining strategic autonomy.

BRICS and the OECD are two opposing economic development cooperation blocs, with BRICS formed by southern countries that oppose Western values, while the OECD is a northern bloc that has long dominated the architecture of global development and economic cooperation. In a contemporary international system characterised by the emergence of multiple competing global powers, multialignment has become a strategic response employed by numerous states. Countries are increasingly opting for diversified partnerships across ideological and geopolitical divides instead of aligning with one side in great power rivalries, such as that between the US and China. This is especially observable in the countries of the Global South (Hammouda, 2024). The global south wants to retain strategic independence; at the same time, it wants economic and security collaboration with different blocs. The current global governance dispute has allowed countries to work with both Western-led groups like the OECD and other groups like BRICS (Stuenkel, 2016). Multialignment enables nations to lessen their dependence on a single central authority and optimise their national interests. It is a bastion against global instability, able to survive economic advancements, technical innovations, and a changing global political climate.

India has been a country that is shifting its foreign policy from non-alignment to multi-alignment (Hall, 2019; Mishra, 2023). Since the post-war period, India has been pursuing a multi-pronged approach to maintain political balance (Singh, 2025). India's membership in both the Quad and BRICS; Brazil's interaction with Western and Southern institutions; and Turkey's simultaneous links with NATO and Russia are examples of the growing appeal of pragmatic, non-exclusive foreign policy frameworks (Kutlay & Öniş, 2021). The designation acknowledges a shared commitment to promoting economic engagement and evidence-based policymaking, especially in governance, investment, education, and taxation. India has been actively participating in many international forums, like the G20, BRICS, and Quad, as part of its multi-alignment policy. India wants to maintain a balanced relationship with the US, Russia and China, all of which are often rivals on the world arena, and prefers to work with other countries on specific issues rather than formal alliances.

Brazil fosters South-South cooperation through BRICS and Mercosur and participates in OECD operations. It is not following strict bloc politics but aspires to build "consensual hegemony" throughout Latin America (Burges, 2008). South Africa aims to maintain strong economic ties with the West but also deploy its membership of BRICS to spread its influence among developing economies. These experiences show that multi-alignment is a strategic posture for emerging states to negotiate a multipolar world order, reduce their vulnerabilities, and enhance their bargaining power with international organisations.

Current research on the multi-alignment approach places less emphasis on Indonesia. Although there is an article that discusses Indonesia's multi-alignment strategy, this article focuses on it as a middle-power strategy . This article contributes to the existing literature by studying Indonesia's multi-alignment strategy as an offensive tactic in current world politics. Historically recognised for its non-alignment or non-bloc movement, Indonesia's foreign policy orientation has progressively diminished in significance within the contemporary global landscape. Drawing on a neorealist perspective, this paper seeks to elucidate how Indonesia's discourse is segmented into three sections. The initial portion examines Indonesia's membership in the OECD and BRICS and the significance of both organisations for Indonesia's strategic agenda. This section analyses the viewpoints of Indonesian leaders towards the OECD and BRICS. The second section examines Indonesia's economic objectives and the act by which the multi-alignment strategy aligns with these interests. The last section will conclude the findings of how this multi-alignment strategy creates benefits and risks at once. The findings of the research will contribute to the broad discussion of foreign policy under the Prabowo administration.

Theoretical Framework

Neorealism argues that countries inherently seek to be the dominant power in the international system so that they can be secure. In Mearsheimer's view, the international system is anarchic, meaning that there is no higher authority to regulate the nations. This forces the states to do everything in their power to dominate each other. Mearsheimer contends that states in an anarchic system, motivated by fear of changes in relative strength, are more likely to pursue offensive techniques of control, rather than passively balancing against perceived threats (Mearsheimer, 2001). He argues that in addition to direct threats, the actions of states are also driven by the goal to decrease uncertainty and increase strategic position through growth. The thesis presents a theoretical framework to comprehend the dynamic nature of power in the international system. It reveals that foreign policy is often driven by the quest of power, not only survival.

For this case study, neorealism is more sophisticated for understanding the foreign policy of Indonesia under the leadership of President Prabowo Subianto compared to neorealism. Prabowo's administration has championed a "multi-alignment" policy, in which Indonesia strengthens ties with several of the world's great powers, including the United States and China. Mearsheimer's argument explains Indonesian participation in BRICS and continued accession to the OECD. This strategy is an intentional effort to improve Indonesia's strategic position and influence at the regional and global levels, beyond the conventional balance between two dominant countries. This objective is in line with Indonesia's aspiration to become a major power. From its existing status as a medium power to its recognition as an intermittent major power. According to Rosyidin and Kusumawardhana (2024) an intermittent major power is a state that desires to be significant and also rises in the international political system. This argument aligns with offensive realism thought, which states that nations seek power not only for survival but also to improve their position in the regional and global system (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Method

This research employs a qualitative case study approach. A case study is a method that provides an in-depth analysis of a specific phenomenon, such as an event, an individual, an organisation or a programme. In this study, the case study focuses on a specific event, namely Indonesia's foreign policy measures. Through the case study approach, the researcher is able to explore the phenomenon comprehensively by unravelling its complexities (Creswell, 2014) The type of case study selected is the single-case instrumental study, which aims to examine a case using a specific theory (theoretical testing) (Creswell, 2014). This research uses primary data sourced from official reports of institutions and official documents published by the government and secondary data in the form of previous research and news from trusted media. All the data will be analysed using qualitative methods within the framework of neorealism.

Result and Discussion

OECD and BRICS Reflecting on South and North

The birth of OECD is inseparable from the OEEC, or Organization for European Economic Cooperation. An intergovernmental organisation was founded by European countries in 1948 to manage the economic assistance provided by the United States and Canada under the Marshall Plan for Europe's reconstruction after World War II (Carroll & Kellow, 2021). The OEEC is an important player in overseeing the implementation of the Marshall Plan for European economic recover (Carroll & Kellow, 2011) . The OEEC promotes European economic integration by seeking to reduce regional disparities – such as in underdeveloped Southern European countries – and also supports education as a key driver of economic progress (Ferreira & Mota, 2021). The OEEC significantly impacts the economy and integration of European countries. On the other hand, the condition of the world at that time, faced with the Cold War, raised awareness of the importance of forming a strong economic bloc by adding non-European allies (Woodwarad, 2007). On that basis, the OEEC finally transformed into the OECD, which was marked by the signing of the convention at the Chateau de la Muette in Paris on December 14, 1960, which came into force on September 30, 1961, with 20 member states, including the United States (OECD, n.d.-b). Meanwhile, the OECD currently has 38 member countries, such as Canada, Australia, Chile, South Korea, and Japan, as well as various countries from all parts of the world, including Europe, North America, South America, and the Asia-Pacific. Until now, Indonesia, along with Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru, Romania, and Thailand, has been being prepared as a candidate for accession by the OECD as one of its expansion strategies (OECD, n.d.-d).

As a representative of the Global North, the OECD agrees to commit to individual freedom, the preservation of democratic values, the rule of law, and the advocacy of human rights. The OECD also develops the principles of a free and transparent market economy. In practice, the OECD strives to achieve economic growth and employment but still carries the principle of sustainability. Its joint efforts are to end poverty and address inequality

(OECD, n.d.-a). The OECD seeks to establish and maintain economic liberalisation. Moving away from protectionism, embracing competition, and reforming the labour market and social welfare are initiatives that the OECD is trying to encourage. These efforts are believed to be the right step in the sustainable growth of developed countries (Cammack, 2019). Reporting from the official OECD website, the OECD's current vision is reflected in various values, which include (1) sustainable and inclusive growth; (2) climate resilience and renewable energy; (3) welfare and equality; (4) digital innovation, productivity, and inclusivity; (5) global tax stability; (6) open and transparent trading; (7) a resilient job market and a resilient health system; (8) agricultural and environmental resilience; (9) a multidisciplinary policy framework; and (10) transparency, accountability, and inclusivity (OECD, n.d.-b)

The transformation of the OEEC into the OECD changed and expanded the organisation's focus from solely economic integration to including policy development. The main objective of the OECD is to set international standards and support their implementation (OECD, n.d.-c). The OECD plays an important role as a credible multilateral actor in shaping global governance. Based on its mandate, the OECD strengthens the rules-based international order by developing standards that promote prosperity for all. These standards are, for example, related to taxation, anti-bribery & anti-corruption frameworks, responsible business conduct, corporate governance, development assistance, education, and artificial intelligence (OECD, n.d.-e). The OECD also collaborates closely with the G7 and G20, helping to advance multilateral reforms and solutions to global challenges (OECD, n.d.-c). One of the well-known OECD programmes is the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). PISA measures student ability and shows the OECD's power. PISA is useful in providing an overview of how one country stands against another in the field of education. Thus, it forces countries indirectly to follow the education standards set by the OECD (Niemann et al., 2017). Various countries paid attention to the standards formulated by the OECD, viewing them as prestigious and credible international organisations. This perception is further reinforced by the fact that most of its members are developed countries, so the standards set by the OECD are considered representative of their practices and achievements. The OECD is often defined as a 'rich country club', a 'consultative forum', a 'think tank', and a 'pool of statistical and economic expertise' (Woodwarad, 2007).

Although the OECD has dominated international development cooperation in the field of infrastructure, in recent decades, the dynamics of the global political economy have shifted significantly due to the emergence of new political and economic forces initiated by the alliance of developing countries known as BRICS. BRICS is an acronym for cooperation between countries consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Initially, the alliance was known as BRIC, and South Africa had not yet joined it. At first, BRIC was just an acronym created by an economist named Jim O'Neill in 2001 because, at that time, Brazil's economic strength was experiencing a significant increase (O'Neill, 2001). However, in 2011, South Africa officially joined the BRIC alliance after receiving an invitation from China in 2010, resulting in a change in the alliance's acronym to BRICS, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (Ferragamo, 2025). The presence of BRICS, then, developed into a symbol of the representation of the interests of Southern countries in the international order which has been dominated by the power of the United States and the West. Furthermore, the BRICS alliance revitalises the international political order through its distinctive strategic expansion. Efforts made by BRICS to change the landscape towards the formation of a new vision and mission for international development (Zondi, 2019). The alliance offers developing countries the chance to actively participate in the international political arena. As an alliance consisting of countries with diverse economic, political, and cultural backgrounds, BRICS certainly has a scope of cooperation in it that is more inclusive and balanced in the global world order system (Svetlicinii, 2020).

The values brought by BRICS reflect the alignment of developing countries in the international arena. The presence of BRICS gives rise to the identities of member countries, including the diversity of values, political structures, geographical locations, and development models as well as the existence of a common identity as a developing country. This paragraph implicitly explains that the value brought by the BRICS alliance is to fight for the rights of developing countries to have a place in the policy-making process so as to create equality and justice in the role of each country (Patrick et al., 2025). Through BRICS, the hegemony established in the global order promotes togetherness, equality, and justice, ensuring that no single entity dominates. BRICS is an alliance that poses a threat to Western and US dominance because this dominance has historically denied Southern countries the opportunity to significantly contribute to the international political order. Its member states sought to democratise the post-war liberal world order by increasing their share of votes in the decision-making processes of the Bretton Woods institutions, thereby limiting the dominance of the United States over global economic and financial architecture and ultimately overhauling the U.S.-led liberal world order (Nuruzzaman, 2020). In this way, BRICS can challenge the dominance of the US and the West in the international political order, creating opportunities for Southern countries to make significant contributions. One of these aspects is the BRICS-style economic system, which introduces a fresh perspective to the international political economy.

In the international political economic order, BRICS introduces a fresh perspective by establishing the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) (Mazenda & Ncwadi, 2016). These financial institutions have the potential to be an alternative to financial access to development issues for developing countries (Biziwick et al., 2015; Mangani, 2024). NDB and CRA are different financial systems from Western and US-style financial systems. As the bearer of the development strategy, BRICS, in supporting the development of South-South Cooperation (KSS), sensed solidarity, equality, and inclusivity so as to support their development (Waisbich & Borges, 2020). One of the forms of BRICS support for KSS is to provide opportunities for developing countries through the New Development Bank. The New Development Bank (NDB) is a multilateral institution established by BRICS in 2014 with the aim of mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in developing countries (NDB, 2022). The NDB's funding comes from developing countries that source financial resources through the bank. from developing countries. This means that NDB funding transfers resources from one developing country to another, allowing it to operate within the KSS framework. Additionally, the NDB can significantly increase the amount of financing available to developing countries and reduce the monopoly that developed countries have on the international financial architecture. Thus, the NDB will help build a new mechanism for international development financing so as to create equality and benefits for developing countries.

As an additional step in strengthening the global financial architecture, BRICS also established the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), which serves as a protection mechanism for its member countries in overcoming financial pressures and balance-of-payments crises. The CRA is a financial mechanism established by BRICS member countries (Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa) to provide protection against global liquidity pressures. The CRA is designed to provide liquidity and preventive financial resources so that it can help countries address the challenges associated with short-term balance of payments. The existence of the CRA is a form of dissatisfaction with the financial system of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (Obajinmi & Garba, 2025). In this case, of course, the CRA must have the same methods as the IMF because it has the same function, namely providing financial support to countries experiencing liquidity problems. During the process of getting help from the CRA, the main BRICS countries will use a voting system with equal weight and make decisions by consensus. This implies the vote will decide the path of the decision-making process over the suitability of the country for aid. This ensures openness in the acquisition of aid from the CRA without any intrusion into the internal policies of the beneficiary country. This structure ensures that all BRICS countries have equal influence in strategic decision-making, encouraging a balanced approach in the allocation of funds. Unlike ODA, in the process of getting assistance, there are several conditions in it, including a specification that the recipient country must achieve income in accordance with the criteria of the donor country. This scenario is evident when South Korea's ODA allocations are influenced by the income level of the recipient country and its sectoral needs, although there is a tendency to prioritise countries with stronger commercial relationships (Yoon & Moon, 2022)(Yoon & Moon, 2022). The assistance scheme obtained from ODA is linked to the domestic policy of the recipient country, ensuring that it meets the standards set by the ODA donor country.

Due to historical disparities, the OECD and BRICS approach development cooperation differently. These distinctions are more than just methods; they also reflect the two groups' opposing political identities and visions. The OECD, founded on the US's political triumph following World War II, continues to serve as a tool for Western nations to strengthen their economic and political interests (Ikenberry, 2018, 2019). Meanwhile, BRICS, which developed after former colonies were decolonised, better represents the political ideology of decolonisation and the quest for economic independence in the Global South (Castro, 2024; Hopewell, 2016). As a result, joining one of these camps will have an impact on both a country's economics and politics.

The Multialignment: Indonesia's Strategic Path by Accessing OECD and Joining BRICS

Indonesia has had a close relationship with the OECD, even though Indonesia is not a member. Since 2007, Indonesia has been a major partner of the OECD. The label acknowledges a shared desire to increase economic engagement and evidence-based policymaking, particularly in governance, investment, education, and taxation. Indonesia will also co-chair the ASEAN-OECD regional project from 2024, underlining its increased relevance in Southeast Asia. As a strategic partner, Indonesia enjoys access to the best practices in the world and technical consultations in the creation of public policy. Progress in fiscal policy, labour market reform, and integrity in the public sector has been supported by recommendations from the OECD's economic surveys and committee evaluations of economic policy. The alliance has helped Indonesia set up a government that is more open and friendly to business (Martuti & Andriansyah, 2024).

Indonesia applied to become a full member of the OECD in July 2023. The OECD council formally opened accession negotiations with Indonesia on 20 February 2024, the first Southeast Asian country to do so. Since then, a technical review of the original memorandum of the Indonesian government has been carried out by some 25 policy committees of the OECD (OECD, 2025). The Indonesian government views its membership as a strategic measure to spur changes towards the "Indonesia Emas 2045" plan. 'Full membership of the OECD would have a multiplier impact in terms of expanding investment flows, improving bureaucratic efficiency and improving the credibility of public governance,' said the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs. Furthermore, membership in the OECD provides a strong signal to global markets about the soundness of Indonesia's economy and institutions (Saputra & Adji, 2024; Wihardja & Yusuf, 2024).

Full OECD membership entails voting rights in global policy decisions, full access to technical committees and active participation in the formulation of international standards, none of which are available to a strategic partner. This certification could boost investor confidence as it shows dedication to responsible governance and financial transparency. OECD membership also exerts constructive pressure on Indonesia to complete structural reforms in areas such as anti-corruption, environmental protection, and digital rights (Feingold & Edmond, 2024; Saputra & Adji, 2024; Wicaksono & Bakri, 2024). Thus, becoming a full member of the OECD provides a "stamp of approval" from advanced economies, increasing Indonesia's reputation with global investors and key partners (Connelly, 2014). This allows Indonesia to build structural power through transparent governance and globally recognised policy standards, which are viewed through the prism of offensive realism as strategic assets for increasing influence without military supremacy.

Indonesia will also be co-chairing the ASEAN-OECD regional project from 2024, which highlights its increasing importance in Southeast Asia. From the perspective of offensive realism, this situation means that Indonesia might exploit the OECD platform to project normative influence through changes to its investment rules, anti-corruption laws, and trade policies to become more aligned with its national interests. Indonesia thereby transitions from a subordinate to a more proactive player in the global economic arena. To join the OECD, Indonesia needs to make major changes to its structure, such as signing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and putting in place rules for public transparency to make the state more resistant to outside pressures (Grace Propheta, 2025). Indonesia's full membership of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2023 will also support this initiative (Kemenkeu, 2023). This boosts Indonesia's domestic structure and global credibility, allowing it to better withstand pressure from major powers with increased bargaining power and widening its strategic space in an increasingly competitive geopolitical landscape. Indonesia's decision to join OECD membership demonstrates more than just a desire for global economic integration; it represents a national strategy to improve capabilities and status in an anarchic international order. Under Prabowo's leadership, Indonesia is regaining its sense of identity as a major power, in contrast to Jokowi's leadership, which has placed too much emphasis on domestic interests and affairs without taking into account Indonesia's potential as a major power (Rosyidin, 2017).

In international politics, status plays a crucial role in achieving national interests (Götz et al., 2021). Status in international politics requires symbols in the form of attributes, privileges or practices to form social status to affirm the image of a country (Beaumont & Røren, 2025). In this sense, the OECD is more than just an economic forum; it is an exclusive club of advanced economies that establishes worldwide norms for governance, fiscal transparency, and sustainable development strategies. Indonesia's membership in this organization would give it international credibility as a country with institutions and economic capacity comparable to advanced countries. The move reflects its place as an emerging regional power in Asia-Pacific geopolitical competition, rather than simply seeking technical economic benefits—such as policy assistance or data access—and it asserted its position as an emerging regional power in the Asia Pacific's geopolitical competition. Joining the OECD can be a symbol to interpret Indonesia's institutional capability, governance credibility, and seriousness in aligning with international norms, which ultimately strengthens Indonesia's geopolitical bargaining position. This step also reinforces Indonesia's narrative of being an 'emerging power' rather than a 'major power wannabe'. OECD membership would entail a change from being a developing state to becoming a rule-maker in global governance, especially in economics and development. Indonesia might be more than a norm-taker but rather utilise its membership to shape international laws to its advantage, such as global fiscal justice and energy transitions. Hence, OECD membership is a strategic weapon for Indonesia to raise its international profile and to position itself as a major player in a multipolar world.

In terms of infrastructure development, Indonesia needs to diversify its foreign aid funding. During the new order, Indonesia relied heavily on foreign capital flows from World Bank loans in its development programmes, as well as several other bilateral donors, such as JICA, AusAid, and USAID. Relying on the OECD bloc for infrastructure financing is not enough, especially given the uncertain political dynamics. Therefore, the offer of foreign aid from other sources serves as a safety net for Indonesia's infrastructure projects. To access these funds, Indonesia needs to join the coalition not just through bilateral relations but through multilateralism. BRICS, as a multilateral institution, provides a way for Indonesia to achieve its strategic interests in the form of access to infrastructure financing.

In 2023, Indonesia was offered membership in BRICS. However, President Joko Widodo has chosen to postpone the decision. He added that BRICS membership was not a race and needed to be carefully considered (Rachman, 2023). Hence, the approach to the foreign policy direction of Indonesia is more cautious. Prabowo Subianto, who was elected in October 2024, viewed membership in BRICS as a strategic step to improve Indonesia's global position and increase economic links with developing countries. On January 6, 2025, Brazil, the then-president of BRICS, announced Indonesia's full membership (Antoro, 2025). The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs applauded the decision, adding that membership was a strategic move toward better partnership with developing countries based on equality and mutual respect (Mai, 2025). Indonesia's decision to join BRICS is an ambitious step, not merely a matter of middle-power diplomacy or a strategy to balance power. During the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in July 2025, Prabowo underlined the significance of South-South economic cooperation as well as reforming the multilateral system to make it more equitable and representative (The Jakarta Post, 2025). Indonesia's official membership in the BRICS marks a move in Indonesian foreign policy toward a more multi-alignment approach. The decision to join BRICS was motivated by a number of interrelated economic and strategic considerations that are projected to boost Indonesia's domestic agenda in building infrastructure.

Under Prabowo's administration, Indonesia has carried out big targets, such as a commitment to zero emissions by 2060 (IESR, 2024). Indonesia is a medium-sized country that is now constrained by financial constraints to pay for these large initiatives, so joining BRICS is a strategic step to obtain alternative financial support (Resosudarmo et al., 2023),. One of the main goals of Indonesia's membership in BRICS is to obtain financing for large-scale infrastructure projects through the New Development Bank (NDB), which provides an alternative source of funding to international financial institutions dominated by Western countries. Indonesia will also be co-chairing the ASEAN-OECD regional project from 2024, which highlights its increasing importance in Southeast Asia. For Indonesia, the aim is that BRICS membership will yield concrete long-term economic and geopolitical dividends. In the economic sphere, Indonesia can collaborate with BRICS countries to boost investment and strengthen its domestic sector, notably in renewable energy, infrastructure, and digital technology. Through this relationship, Indonesia has gained greater importance in the development of regional and global economic networks (Aqil, 2023).

On the other hand, Indonesia's membership in BRICS does not only have economic implications, but may also strengthen its diplomatic standing and foreign policy within the framework of global multipolarity (Darwis & Setiawan, 2025). Indonesia's multilateral engagement in the BRICS maintains its strategic autonomy and optimises the benefits of South-South cooperation, such as development financing and technological cooperation, without being overly dependent on one dominant global power bloc. In contrast, accession to the OECD will help balance Indonesia's bilateral engagement with countries in the Global South. It is critical since the much stronger economic positions of some of the BRICS nations may create internal forces that would affect Indonesia's forum agenda, notably on topics of restructuring international financial institutions and more inclusive global economic governance. Therefore, Indonesia will be able to expand its political influence by reforming international institutions and promoting policies that favour developing countries. BRICS plays a significant role in advocating for reforms in global institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, which are often blamed for not successfully representing the interests of poor countries. Indonesia's BRICS membership provides possibilities to better advocate for the country's economic and political interests on a global scale. Strategically, Indonesia's membership in the BRICS boosts its position as a country capable of competing effectively in the global market. Indonesia functions as a link between developed and developing countries, using its BRICS membership to fight for topics that promote sustainable development in these countries, such as climate change.

Conclusion

Indonesia's OECD accession process and BRICS membership provide political and economic benefits at once. Indonesia's accession to the OECD opens up a new platform for greater economic collaboration with industrialised countries that have advanced technologies and stable economies. This membership provides Indonesia with a platform to improve economic governance and public policies in accordance with international norms, thereby increasing Indonesia's global competitiveness. OECD membership also provides access to knowledge and technology that are critical for advancing Indonesia's development in various industries, including renewable energy and the digital industry. Politically, OECD membership will help Indonesia expedite its efforts to become a significant global actor. On the other hand, BRICS, as a group of large emerging countries, provides Indonesia with access to important markets such as China, India, and Russia, which are among the world's largest economies. Indonesia's entry into BRICS is not only about enhancing trade and investment prospects but also about raising the voice of developing countries on global concerns such as climate change, food security and sustainable development. This position can help Indonesia to advance the interests of the Global South and to receive financing and technology transfers needed for local infrastructure development.

Diplomatically, Indonesia's multialignment policy increases its position as a bridge between industrialised and developing countries, increasing its influence in international multilateralism. In this environment, Indonesia not only borders its relationship networks but also takes an active role as a global diplomatic actor. However, this action is not without risk. One of the most significant threats is the tension between the two major power blocs, BRICS and OECD, which have opposing political agendas and objectives. For example, Trump saw Indonesia's membership in BRICS as a move closer to China, resulting in an increase in trade tariffs for Indonesia. When Indonesia's objective conflicts with one of the parties, it may discover itself in a diplomatic bind, making it difficult to maintain beneficial relations with both blocs. Meanwhile, Indonesia's OECD membership will have an impact on its development status, notably in terms of access to international aid. Many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) receive money from OECD member countries via multilateral and bilateral forums, including USAID. Joining the OECD jeopardises this advantage because full membership categorises Indonesia as a developed country. As a result, Indonesia will be compelled to pay membership costs based on its total national revenue. Joining two economic cooperation alliances with different statuses in international politics may benefit Indonesia; however, it is also important to consider the existing risks and prepare to address them.

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Conflict of Interest

Authors have no conflict interest.

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