

Collaborative Interagency Governance in Securing Election Logistics for the 2024 Election in Jambi City

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Received: November 20, 2025

Revised : April 30, 2026

Accepted: July 14, 2026

Available Online: July 17, 2026

Abstract

The security of election logistics is a crucial prerequisite for maintaining electoral integrity, particularly in simultaneous elections that involve complex distribution, storage, and recapitulation processes. This study analyzes collaborative governance among public agencies in strengthening logistics supply chain security during the 2024 Election in Jambi City. Using a qualitative case study approach, data were collected through semi-structured interviews, document analysis, field observation at the Paal Merah logistics warehouse and recapitulation venues, and online media content analysis. The study applies the Collaborative Governance framework to examine two critical phases: pre-distribution logistics security and post-distribution logistics management. The findings reveal a dual pattern of collaboration. In the pre-distribution phase, collaboration failed at the strategic-preventive level, as reflected in the use of substandard warehouse facilities in Paal Merah, including zinc-based structures, limited access roads, and semi-open storage areas. This weakness resulted from inadequate joint risk assessment and limited strategic asset allocation by the Jambi City Government. Consequently, the police (Polri) and armed forces (TNI) had to deploy disproportionate operational resources to compensate for these infrastructural vulnerabilities. In contrast, post-distribution collaboration was highly effective; security apparatuses successfully secured polling stations and managed prolonged district-level recapitulations—ranging from 10 to 15 days across Alam Barajo, Kota Baru, and Paal Merah—preventing physical escalation despite intense procedural disputes. This study concludes that weak strategic collaboration in logistics planning generates excessive operational burdens during implementation.

Keywords: Collaborative Governance; Election 2024; Logistics Security; Post-Distribution; Pre-Distribution.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33701/jtp.v18i1.5714>

Abstrak

Keamanan logistik pemilu merupakan prasyarat penting bagi terjaganya integritas elektoral, terutama dalam pemilu serentak yang melibatkan proses distribusi, penyimpanan, pemungutan suara, dan rekapitulasi yang kompleks. Studi ini menganalisis tata kelola kolaboratif antar pemangku kepentingan dalam memperkuat keamanan rantai pasok logistik Pemilu 2024 di Kota Jambi. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan studi kasus kualitatif dengan teknik pengumpulan data melalui wawancara semi-terstruktur, studi dokumen, observasi lapangan pada gudang logistik Paal Merah dan lokasi pleno rekapitulasi, serta analisis konten media daring. Kerangka Collaborative Governance digunakan untuk menganalisis dua fase kritis, yaitu fase pra-distribusi logistik dan fase pasca-distribusi logistik. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan adanya pola kolaborasi ganda. Pada fase pra-distribusi, kolaborasi belum berjalan efektif pada tingkat strategis-preventif, sebagaimana terlihat dari penggunaan fasilitas gudang logistik di Paal Merah yang belum memenuhi standar ideal, seperti konstruksi berbahan seng, akses jalan yang terbatas, dan penggunaan ruang semi-terbuka untuk penyimpanan logistik. Kondisi ini menunjukkan lemahnya penilaian risiko bersama dan terbatasnya alokasi aset strategis oleh Pemerintah Kota Jambi. Akibatnya, polisi (Polri) dan angkatan bersenjata (TNI) harus mengerahkan sumber daya operasional yang tidak proporsional untuk mengimbangi kerentanan infrastruktur ini. Sebaliknya, kolaborasi pasca-distribusi sangat efektif; aparat keamanan berhasil mengamankan tempat pemungutan suara dan mengelola rekapitulasi tingkat distrik yang berkepanjangan—berkisar antara 10 hingga 15 hari di Alam Barajo, Kota Baru, dan Paal Merah—mencegah eskalasi fisik meskipun terjadi perselisihan prosedural yang sengit. Studi ini menyimpulkan bahwa lemahnya kolaborasi strategis dalam perencanaan logistik menimbulkan beban kompensasi operasional yang besar pada tahap pelaksanaan. Karena itu, diperlukan pelembagaan mekanisme penilaian risiko bersama serta perluasan cakupan pengawasan pemilu hingga mencakup kelayakan dan keamanan infrastruktur logistik.

Kata kunci: Keamanan Logistik; Pasca-Distribusi; Pemilu 2024; Pra-Distribusi; Tata Kelola Kolaboratif.

INTRODUCTION

General elections are a fundamental instrument of democratic governance because they provide a constitutional mechanism for translating popular sovereignty into legitimate political representation. As one of the world's largest democratic countries, Indonesia faces complex challenges in organizing elections, particularly in ensuring that every electoral stage is planned, coordinated, and implemented effectively (Awaluddin, 2019). The 2024 Simultaneous Election marked an important moment in Indonesian electoral history because it integrated executive and legislative elections within a single electoral

cycle (KPU RI, 2023a). Although this design was intended to strengthen electoral efficiency and political consolidation, it also increased the technical burden of election administration, especially in relation to the procurement, storage, distribution, security, and return of election logistics.

The complexity of securing electoral logistics in the 2024 Election increased significantly due to the larger volume and greater diversity of logistics compared to previous election cycles (Idrus, 2024). The simultaneous administration of five types of elections required the availability of ballot papers, ballot boxes, voting booths, forms, seals, and other polling station equipment in

very large quantities. These materials had to be delivered accurately and on time, while also being protected from damage, loss, manipulation, and unauthorized access. Therefore, election logistics security cannot be understood merely as a technical matter of distribution, but must be positioned as an essential element of electoral integrity, public trust, and the legitimacy of election results.

The integrated implementation of five types of elections President and Vice President, the House of Representatives (DPR RI), the Regional Representative Council (DPD RI), the Provincial Regional House of Representatives (DPRD Provinsi), and the Regency/Municipal Regional House of Representatives (DPRD Kabupaten/Kota) requires a far more massive quantity of ballot papers and polling station (TPS) equipment. This challenge becomes even more complex due to Indonesia's geographical characteristics as an archipelagic country with unevenly distributed infrastructure, resulting in more complicated logistics distribution and security processes that demand intensive inter-agency coordination. Timeliness in delivering logistics, especially to remote areas, becomes a crucial indicator that affects electoral smoothness and the level of voter participation.

The security of election logistics is a vital element in ensuring the integrity and legality of the electoral process (Ramadhan, 2023). Its scope covers the entire logistics cycle, including planning, procurement, warehousing, distribution, polling station use, vote counting, reverse logistics, and recapitulation. Each stage contains different vulnerabilities, ranging from physical damage and loss to manipulation attempts that may disrupt the

democratic process (KPU RI, 2023b). In the pre-distribution phase, risks may arise from inadequate warehouse facilities, weak access control, weather exposure, and limited infrastructure. In the post-distribution phase, risks become more dispersed because logistics are located across polling stations, subdistrict offices, and recapitulation venues. For this reason, logistics security requires serious attention from all relevant stakeholders (Milagsita, 2024). Fundamentally, the technical implementation of elections relies on the respective Regency/Municipal General Elections Commissions (KPU Kabupaten/Kota), particularly the technical aspects of voting, which in this case are carried out by ad hoc bodies ranging from the District Election Committee (PPK) and the Village Election Committee (PPS) to the Polling Station Working Committee (KPPS) at the polling stations (TPS).

Jambi City provides an important case for examining election logistics security because it functions as the administrative, political, and economic center of Jambi Province. As a provincial capital, Jambi City concentrates electoral administration, inter-agency coordination, political competition, and public scrutiny within a relatively compact urban space. Its demographic burden is also significant, with a population of 637,510 people spread across 11 districts (Fadhilurrahman, 2024), while the Jambi City General Elections Commission had to manage logistics for 451,723 voters across 1,903 polling stations (Admin, 2024). These conditions make Jambi City more than a local case; it represents an urban electoral setting where logistics security depends on distance, accessibility, storage feasibility, and inter-agency coordination (Wijaya, 2019).

Inter-agency collaboration is a decisive factor in securing election logistics because no single institution possesses all the authority, resources, and operational capacity required to manage the entire logistics chain. The General Elections Commission is responsible for technical election administration, but its work depends on support from the Election Supervisory Agency for oversight, local government for facilities and regional coordination, and security agencies for physical protection and contingency response (Prima et al., 2025; Yovinus et al., 2024). In this context, collaboration involves more than routine coordination. It requires shared risk identification, joint decision-making, information exchange, resource mobilization, and collective responsibility for preventing logistics-related disruptions. However, such collaboration may be constrained by differences in organizational culture, institutional priorities, and resource capacity (Nurfadilla & Nurdin, 2024).

Previous studies have increasingly emphasized that election logistics should not be treated merely as an administrative back-office function. Recent scholarship positions logistics as a strategic component of electoral integrity because failures in procurement, storage, distribution, and reverse logistics may affect public trust in election results. A systematic review emphasizes that credible elections require an integrated logistics system capable of ensuring the reliability, visibility, and security of sensitive electoral materials (Apiri & Lim, 2025). This argument is supported by empirical findings showing that logistics planning practices significantly influence the performance of electoral systems (Charles et al., 2023). Overall, these studies indicate that logistics security and

visibility must be treated as strategic elements in election administration. Other studies with similar themes also highlight the role of inventory management and warehouse security as key determinants of logistical preparedness ahead of election day. Overall, this shift positions logistics security and visibility as strategic elements that must be prioritized in the design of election administration (Charles et al., 2023).

However, most previous studies still examine election logistics sectorally, focusing on planning, transportation, inventory, warehouse management, institutional evaluation, or technology-based monitoring (Latief, 2022) such studies are important, but they have not sufficiently explained how inter-agency collaboration works in securing election logistics across different phases of the electoral process. In practice, logistics security requires coordinated action among the General Elections Commission, Election Supervisory Agency, local government, Police, and Armed Forces. This gap is important because vulnerabilities in election logistics often emerge not only from technical weaknesses, but also from the failure of institutions to share risks, allocate resources, and make preventive decisions collectively.

This study is important because previous research on the 2024 Election logistics in Jambi City has primarily emphasized technical and managerial aspects of logistics distribution. Earlier findings have identified vulnerable points such as inadequate warehouse facilities and the potential for friction among witnesses during the recapitulation process, but the analysis remains focused on operational evaluation and internal strategic recommendations for the Jambi City General Elections Commission

(Darminto et al., 2025). A significant gap remains in explaining how institutional actors interacted, shared risks, allocated resources, and responded collectively to logistics security problems. Therefore, this article focuses on the collaborative governance dimension involving the Jambi City General Elections Commission, the Election Supervisory Agency, the Jambi City Government, the Police, and the Armed Forces in both the pre-distribution and post-distribution phases.

Based on this background, the research problem in this study focuses on how collaborative governance among public agencies was implemented in securing election logistics during the 2024 Election in Jambi City. This problem is examined through two main questions. First, how did inter-agency collaboration operate in the pre-distribution phase, particularly in the determination and security of logistics warehouse facilities? Second, how did cross-actor collaboration function in the post-distribution phase, particularly in securing polling stations, managing reverse logistics, and mitigating disputes during district-level recapitulation?

Aligned with these research problems, the objectives of this study are: first, to analyze the inter-agency collaboration model in the pre-distribution phase, with emphasis on the establishment and security of election logistics warehousing facilities; and second, to analyze the effectiveness and mechanisms of cross-actor cooperation in the post-distribution phase, which includes TPS security, the management of logistics after voting, and the mitigation of vulnerabilities during the recapitulation process.

To address these focuses, this study employs the Collaborative Governance

framework, an analytical framework used to understand how various actors with differing authorities, resources, and interests can work together in addressing complex public issues. Ansell and Gash (2008) define collaborative governance as an arrangement in which public and non-public actors are directly involved in collective decision-making through formal, deliberative, and consensus-oriented forums. In the context of securing the election logistics chain in Jambi City, this approach is relevant because logistics security cannot be executed by a single institution. The Jambi City General Elections Commission, as the organizing authority, requires support from Election Supervisory Agency for oversight, security assurances from the Armed Forces (TNI) and Police, as well as facility and resource support from the City Government. The complexity of election logistics encompassing procurement, storage, distribution, and layered security makes inter-agency collaboration a prerequisite for maintaining the security and integrity of the process.

The Ansell and Gash (2008) framework emphasizes four key dimensions within collaboration: starting conditions, institutional design, facilitative leadership, and the collaborative process. (Haryono et al., 2024; Hidayat et al., 2024). Initial conditions include the level of trust among institutions, power asymmetry, and the resources possessed by each actor, all of which often determine how quickly collaboration can be established. In the context of the Election in Jambi City, the resource limitations of the The Jambi City General Elections Commission and the high level of security risk serve as key drivers for the necessity of collaboration.

Furthermore, institutional design requires the presence of work rules, standard operating procedures (SOPs), task distribution, and technical coordination mechanisms among agencies. The collaborative process then materializes through face-to-face dialogue, the development of shared understanding, and open information sharing whether in coordination meetings, distribution simulations, or in determining warehouse security patterns and distribution routes. (Delmana, 2021; Nastiti & Ratri, 2018).

METHODS

This study employed a qualitative case study design to examine the dynamics of inter-agency collaborative governance in securing election logistics for the 2024 Election in Jambi City. The case study approach was selected because the research focuses on a bounded case, namely logistics security management in Jambi City during the 2024 electoral cycle, involving specific actors, locations, and events, as emphasized in context-based qualitative research (Creswell, 2017). Jambi City was chosen because it represents a strategic urban electoral setting in Jambi Province where logistics security problems were visible in two critical phases: the pre-distribution phase at the Paal Merah logistics warehouse and the post-distribution phase during district-level recapitulation plenaries. The unit of analysis in this study consists of the models, processes, and mechanisms of inter-agency collaboration, with a primary focus on the pre-distribution and post-distribution phases of election logistics.

The research was conducted in Jambi City, with field attention directed to several key sites related to election logistics security.

These included the Jambi City General Elections Commission office, the logistics warehouse located in Paal Merah District, selected polling station areas, and district-level recapitulation venues. The research focused on the 2024 Election logistics cycle, covering the pre-distribution phase, voting day, reverse logistics, and the district-level recapitulation process. These sites were selected because they represented the main arenas in which inter-agency collaboration, security coordination, and logistics-related vulnerabilities could be empirically observed.

Informants were selected using purposive sampling based on their direct involvement, institutional authority, and knowledge of election logistics security in Jambi City (Sugiyono, 2019). The informants included leaders and technical staff of the Jambi City General Elections Commission responsible for logistics planning and implementation; officials from the Jambi City Election Supervisory Agency involved in monitoring and handling electoral violations; representatives of the Jambi City Police and the 0415/Jambi Military District Command responsible for security coordination; Jambi City Government officials involved in regional coordination and facility support; and former members of District Election Committees and Village Election Committees who directly observed operational dynamics at the field level. This selection enabled the study to capture both institutional perspectives and operational experiences in the pre-distribution and post-distribution phases.

Data were collected through semi-structured interviews, document studies, field observation, and online media content analysis. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with actors directly involved in logistics planning, warehouse security,

polling station security, reverse logistics, and recapitulation management. Document studies focused on official coordination documents, logistics reports, security directives, meeting records, handover reports, and technical regulations related to election logistics. Field observation was conducted at the Paal Merah logistics warehouse and recapitulation venues to identify physical infrastructure conditions, access routes, storage patterns, and security arrangements. Online media content analysis was used to trace public reports, procedural disputes, security incidents, and institutional responses during the 2024 Election stages in Jambi City.

The Collaborative Governance framework of Ansell and Gash was operationalized into several analytical indicators. The dimension of starting conditions was used to examine institutional resources, authority, trust, and power asymmetry among actors. Institutional design was used to analyze formal rules, coordination forums, standard operating procedures, and role distribution in logistics security. Facilitative leadership was used to assess how leading institutions initiated coordination, framed risks, and mobilized other actors. Meanwhile, the collaborative process was used to examine face-to-face dialogue, shared understanding, information exchange, joint decision-making, and collective responses to risks in both the pre-distribution and post-distribution phases.

Data were analyzed using the interactive model of Miles and Huberman, consisting of data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. Data reduction was conducted by selecting and coding information related to logistics risks, actor roles, coordination mechanisms, institutional

constraints, and security responses. Data display was carried out through thematic matrices, including an actor-role matrix and a risk-analysis matrix for the pre-distribution and post-distribution phases. Conclusion drawing was conducted by comparing patterns across interviews, documents, field observations, and media reports. Data credibility was ensured through source triangulation by comparing information from the General Elections Commission, Election Supervisory Agency, local government, Police, Armed Forces, ad hoc election bodies, official documents, and media reports (Sugiyono, 2019).

Through this methodological design, the study is able to explain the formation, operation, and limitations of inter-agency collaboration in securing election logistics in Jambi City. The combination of interviews, documents, field observation, and media analysis makes it possible to identify not only formal coordination mechanisms, but also practical vulnerabilities, institutional responses, and the shifting pattern of collaboration between the pre-distribution and post-distribution phases.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

This section presents and discusses the findings by dividing the analysis into two critical phases of election logistics security. The first phase is the pre-distribution phase, which focuses on warehouse determination, logistics storage, and strategic risk assessment. The second phase is the post-distribution phase, which covers polling station security, reverse logistics, and district-level recapitulation. This division is important because the findings show a contrasting pattern: collaboration was weak at the strategic-preventive level in the pre-

distribution phase, but became more effective at the operational-reactive level in the post-distribution phase.

Pre-Distribution Logistics Security: Strategic Failure in Joint Risk Assessment

The pre-distribution phase was a crucial stage because it determined the initial integrity of the election logistics chain of custody. In this phase, the most important issue was not only whether logistics were available, but whether they were stored in facilities that were secure, accessible, and resistant to physical and environmental risks. Field findings at the Paal Merah logistics warehouse show that this phase contained significant vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities were not merely technical problems of warehousing, but reflected weak collaborative governance in identifying, assessing, and collectively responding to logistics security risks.

As the institution responsible for election administration, the Jambi City General Elections Commission had a central role in ensuring the availability of logistics warehouse facilities. However, field findings indicate that the available warehouse option in Paal Merah was not ideal for storing sensitive election materials. The warehouse used zinc-based structures, had limited access roads, and was supported by a semi-open area that was also used for logistics storage. These conditions increased vulnerability to weather disruption, unauthorized access, mobility constraints, and emergency response limitations. Therefore, the warehouse problem should not be interpreted simply as an internal operational limitation of the General Elections Commission, but as a collective

security risk that required broader inter-agency intervention.

Figure 1 illustrates the use of a semi-open space for storing election logistics. This condition indicates that logistics storage was not fully supported by infrastructure capable of protecting sensitive materials from weather risks, unauthorized access, and physical disruption. From the perspective of Collaborative Governance, this finding reflects weaknesses in face-to-face dialogue and shared understanding among key actors. The feasibility of the warehouse was not sufficiently framed as a collective security issue within the coordination forum. As a result, the collaboration process did not produce a strong joint risk assessment, and infrastructure vulnerability was normalized as an operational constraint rather than treated as a strategic threat to logistics integrity.



Figure 1. Semi-open futsal field used as a storage area for ballot boxes.

Source: Personal Documentation

These findings indicate that the Jambi City General Elections Commission had not fully transformed warehouse feasibility into a shared agenda within the collaborative forum. Technical constraints such as narrow access roads, weather-vulnerable zinc structures, and semi-open storage areas should have been framed as collective

security threats to logistics integrity. However, the issue appeared to remain primarily within the operational domain of the election organizer. This limited agenda setting weakened the possibility of joint sourcing, alternative asset allocation, and preventive risk mitigation. In terms of Collaborative Governance, the condition reflects a weak shared understanding among actors regarding the strategic meaning of warehouse infrastructure for election logistics security.

The Jambi City Government had an important role as a provider of regional support, particularly in relation to facilities, assets, and coordination through local government mechanisms. In the context of warehouse determination, the City Government was expected to contribute to identifying alternative public assets that could be used temporarily as election logistics facilities. However, the findings indicate that this role was not sufficiently optimized. The limitation of suitable warehouse facilities was treated largely as a problem of the election organizer, rather than as a shared governance issue requiring strategic asset allocation by the local government.

Ideally, the City Government could have initiated an internal audit of public assets, such as unused government warehouses, large halls, or other facilities that met minimum standards of security, accessibility, and weather protection. The absence of such proactive support indicates a deficit in shared power and joint decision-making. Collaboration in this phase appeared to be limited to information exchange and operational support, rather than preventive problem-solving. This shows that institutional

design was not sufficiently strong to transform warehouse vulnerability into a shared decision-making agenda.

In the pre-distribution phase, the Police and the Armed Forces played a crucial role in providing physical security and territorial stability. Their involvement showed a high level of operational commitment, particularly through static guarding, patrols, access control, and readiness to respond to disturbances around the logistics warehouse. However, their role was more dominant in compensating for existing risks than in preventing those risks at the planning stage. This indicates that security resources were mobilized intensively after infrastructure vulnerabilities had already been accepted.

The Jambi City Police carried out operational security functions through 24-hour warehouse guarding, routine patrols, supervision of entry and exit access, and security clearance during logistics handling activities. These measures were important for reducing risks of theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, and disruption during sorting and preparation. Nevertheless, the need for intensive security deployment also shows that operational security was used to cover vulnerabilities that should have been mitigated earlier through better warehouse selection and joint risk assessment.

In addition to perimeter security, the Police also supported internal warehouse security during sensitive logistics handling activities, including the sorting and folding of ballot papers. Entry and exit supervision was used to reduce risks of manipulation, unauthorized access, and information leakage. This security clearance mechanism was important for maintaining the integrity of logistics handling. However, the need for

strict internal control further confirms that the warehouse environment required intensive operational supervision because its physical and accessibility conditions had not been fully secured at the planning stage.

Supporting security tasks were also carried out to ensure the transition from storage to distribution. These included vehicle inspection, route assessment, vulnerability mapping, and personnel readiness before logistics distribution. Such activities demonstrate that the Police were able to build operational control mechanisms. However, these mechanisms were still reactive because they addressed risks after the warehouse had already been selected, rather than preventing vulnerabilities through earlier collaborative planning.



Figure 2. Limited access road to the logistics warehouse.

Source: Personal Documentation

Figure 2 shows the limited access road to the logistics warehouse. Restricted access may affect mobility, emergency response, loading and unloading activities, and security control. In the context of collaborative governance, this condition should have encouraged joint risk assessment and alternative asset allocation before the warehouse was used. The absence of such preventive action indicates that inter-agency

coordination remained reactive rather than anticipatory.

The Armed Forces, through the 0415/Jambi Military District Command, supported the security of election logistics by maintaining territorial stability and providing contingency support. Their role complemented the Police, especially in anticipating broader disturbances, emergency situations, or potential instability that could affect the election stages. In the pre-distribution phase, the Armed Forces strengthened the security environment around logistics preparation. However, as with the Police, their role was primarily operational and compensatory, rather than strategic in determining whether the selected warehouse met the required level of logistics security.

The operational synergy between the Police and the Armed Forces demonstrates strong resource mobilization at the implementation level. However, this synergy also reveals a paradox. On one hand, security agencies were able to prevent fatal incidents in the warehouse area. On the other hand, their deployment compensated for infrastructure weaknesses that should have been prevented through stronger collaborative planning. This finding confirms that collaboration in the pre-distribution phase was more effective in risk compensation than in risk elimination.

The Jambi City Election Supervisory Agency had a strategic role in ensuring the integrity of election stages, including logistics preparation. However, the findings indicate that its oversight in the pre-distribution phase tended to focus more on procedural compliance, such as the accuracy of logistics quantities, sealing, and documentation. The feasibility and security of warehouse

infrastructure did not appear to receive sufficient supervisory emphasis. In fact, warehouse vulnerability may directly affect logistics integrity because damage, loss, or unauthorized access to election materials can disrupt the credibility of the electoral process.

From the perspective of collaborative governance, this limited oversight reduced the pressure for collective accountability. The Election Supervisory Agency could have played a stronger role by issuing recommendations or formal notes regarding warehouse feasibility and security standards. Such action would have encouraged the General Elections Commission and the City Government to consider corrective measures before sensitive logistics were stored. The absence of strong supervisory intervention contributed to the normalization of warehouse vulnerability within the collaboration process.

Collectively, the pre-distribution phase shows a failure of strategic-preventive collaboration. The General Elections Commission faced limited warehouse options but did not sufficiently frame the issue as a collective security threat. The City Government did not optimally mobilize alternative public assets. The Election Supervisory Agency did not fully expand its oversight to infrastructure feasibility. Meanwhile, security agencies compensated for these weaknesses through operational deployment. This combination produced a collaboration model that was formally present but substantively weak in joint risk assessment.

Although the pre-distribution phase was completed without fatal security incidents, this outcome should not be interpreted as evidence of ideal collaborative governance.

The absence of major incidents was largely supported by intensive operational security measures. Therefore, the success of this phase was compensatory rather than preventive. The collaboration succeeded in controlling risks that had already emerged, but failed to eliminate those risks through early joint planning.

This finding is important because a collaborative model that relies on intensive security deployment to compensate for weak planning is not sustainable. Election logistics security should be built through early risk identification, feasible infrastructure, clear role distribution, and shared decision-making. The Paal Merah warehouse case therefore becomes a key empirical finding showing that the main weakness of collaboration in Jambi City was not the absence of actors, but the failure to transform infrastructure vulnerability into a shared strategic agenda.

Post-Distribution Logistics Security: Operational Collaboration and Plenary Risk Management

In the post-distribution phase, the dynamics of collaboration shifted from concentrated warehouse security to dispersed operational risk management. Logistics were no longer located in one storage facility, but spread across polling stations, subdistrict offices, and recapitulation venues. This situation required faster coordination, clearer command structures, and more responsive security mechanisms. Unlike the pre-distribution phase, where collaboration failed to prevent infrastructure vulnerability, the post-distribution phase showed stronger operational collaboration in managing risks

that emerged during voting, reverse logistics, and recapitulation.

The complexity of the post-distribution phase increased because logistics security risks became decentralized across polling stations. The Jambi City General Elections Commission relied heavily on ad hoc bodies, including District Election Committees, Village Election Committees, and Polling Station Working Committees, to ensure that voting procedures, logistics handling, and the return of election materials were properly conducted. Field findings indicate that several operational problems emerged, including delays in polling station opening, administrative errors, witness objections, voter-related disputes, and tensions during vote counting. These problems show that post-distribution logistics security was closely connected to procedural order and field-level coordination.

In this phase, the Jambi City Election Supervisory Agency functioned as an important source of field information. Through polling station supervisors and supervisory structures at the subdistrict level, the agency helped detect procedural violations, intimidation, witness objections, and potential disturbances. This role can be understood as a network-sensing function because supervisory information became an early warning mechanism for other actors, especially the General Elections Commission and the Police. The effectiveness of post-distribution collaboration therefore depended heavily on the speed and accuracy of information exchange among institutions.

From the security perspective, the Jambi City Police played the most prominent role in the post-distribution phase. The Police did not only deploy personnel to secure polling stations and recapitulation venues, but also

managed patrol patterns, rapid response teams, and security clusters in vulnerable areas. In practice, the Police functioned as a Network Administrative Organization because they became the central node for coordinating security responses across dispersed locations. This role was crucial for reducing escalation time, maintaining public order, and ensuring that disputes remained within procedural channels.

The Armed Forces supported this security architecture by providing territorial stability and contingency readiness. While the Police handled tactical disturbances and immediate security responses, the Armed Forces strengthened broader stability, especially in anticipating large-scale disturbances, natural disruptions, or communal tensions. This division of roles shows that post-distribution collaboration had clearer operational boundaries than the pre-distribution phase. The Police became the primary operational coordinator, while the Armed Forces acted as a stabilizing and contingency-support institution.

The main security challenge in the post-distribution phase emerged during reverse logistics and district-level recapitulation. At this stage, election materials had to be returned, stored, and recapitulated while technical, procedural, and political risks converged. Witness objections, administrative corrections, and differences in vote-counting interpretations prolonged deliberations in several districts. Thus, logistics security was not limited to guarding ballot boxes, but also involved maintaining procedural order and preventing disputes from escalating into physical conflict.

KECAMATAN	DURASI PLENO
Alam Barajo	15 Days
Kota Baru	13 Days
Paal Merah	13 Days
Pasar Jambi	10 Days
Danau Sipin	10 Days
Telanaipura	10 Days

Table 2. The duration of the District Level Recapitulation Plenary Session in Jambi City exceeded 10 days

Source: KPU Kota Jambi, 2025

The table shows that prolonged recapitulation occurred in six out of eleven districts in Jambi City, indicating that post-distribution logistics security was closely connected to procedural dispute management. Alam Barajo recorded the longest plenary duration, lasting 15 days, due to its large number of polling stations and its position as a single electoral district for the Jambi City DPRD. This condition increased witness scrutiny and intensified objections to vote-counting results. Kota Baru and Paal Merah also recorded 13-day plenaries, reflecting the complexity of administrative verification, witness contestation, and trust-related issues. These findings show that logistics security in the post-distribution phase was not limited to protecting ballot boxes physically, but also involved maintaining procedural order, managing political tension, and ensuring that disputes remained within institutional mechanisms.

During the recapitulation process, the Police and Armed Forces functioned as boundary enforcers. They did not intervene in substantive vote-counting debates, which

remained under the authority of the General Elections Commission and the Election Supervisory Agency. Instead, their role was to ensure that procedural disagreements did not turn into physical confrontation. This confirms that post-distribution collaboration was more effective because institutional roles were clearer, command structures were stronger, and the urgency of maintaining order was shared by all actors. In terms of collaborative governance, this phase showed stronger shared understanding and operational commitment, even though it was still reactive in nature.

Overall, the Jambi City case demonstrates a dualism in collaborative governance. In the pre-distribution phase, collaboration was formally present but substantively weak in preventing infrastructure vulnerability. In the post-distribution phase, collaboration became more effective because operational risks were visible, immediate, and required rapid response. This shift shows that collaborative governance in election logistics should not only be measured by the absence of security incidents, but also by the ability of institutions to identify risks early, allocate resources strategically, and prevent vulnerabilities before they become operational burdens.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that collaborative governance in securing election logistics for the 2024 Election in Jambi City produced a dual pattern. In the pre-distribution phase, collaboration failed to operate effectively at the strategic-preventive level, while in the post-distribution phase, collaboration became more effective at the operational-

reactive level. This contrast shows that the effectiveness of election logistics security depends not only on the presence of multiple actors, but also on their ability to identify risks early, share responsibilities, and make preventive decisions collectively.

In the pre-distribution phase, the use of substandard warehouse facilities in Paal Merah reflected weak joint risk assessment, limited shared understanding, and inadequate strategic asset allocation. The warehouse problem was not only an operational limitation of the General Elections Commission, but also a sign that logistics infrastructure had not been fully framed as a shared security risk. This condition required the Police and the Armed Forces to compensate for infrastructure vulnerabilities through intensive operational deployment.

In the post-distribution phase, collaboration was more effective at the operational-reactive level. The Police functioned as a central coordinating actor in managing risks across polling stations and recapitulation venues, while the Armed Forces supported territorial stability and contingency readiness. Although several district-level plenaries lasted more than ten days due to procedural disputes and witness contestation, security coordination successfully prevented physical escalation and maintained the continuity of electoral stages.

The main contribution of this study is to show that weaknesses in strategic logistics planning can generate excessive operational burdens during implementation, while clear command structures and responsive coordination can reduce the risk of conflict escalation in the later stages of the election

process. Thus, collaborative governance in election logistics should not only be evaluated from the absence of major security incidents, but also from the capacity of institutions to prevent vulnerabilities before they become operational risks.

Suggestions

Based on these findings, this study recommends several institutional improvements to strengthen collaborative governance in election logistics security, particularly in the pre-distribution and post-distribution phases.

Improvements for the Pre-Distribution Phase:

First, the Jambi City General Elections Commission, the Jambi City Government, the Election Supervisory Agency, the Police, and the Armed Forces should institutionalize a joint risk assessment mechanism specifically for election logistics security. This mechanism should be conducted before warehouse determination, logistics storage, and distribution planning. Through this mechanism, warehouse infrastructure risks can be framed as a collective security issue rather than merely an operational problem of the election organizer.

Second, the Jambi City Government should develop an inventory of strategic public assets that can be temporarily used as election logistics facilities when existing options are inadequate. This asset inventory should consider minimum standards of accessibility, physical security, weather protection, and emergency response capacity before logistics are stored.

Third, the Election Supervisory Agency should expand its oversight from procedural

compliance to include the feasibility, accessibility, and security of logistics infrastructure. This expanded oversight would allow supervisory recommendations to address not only the quantity, sealing, and documentation of logistics, but also the physical conditions that may affect logistics integrity.

Improvements for the Post-Distribution Phase:

Fourth, in the post-distribution phase, the General Elections Commission and the Election Supervisory Agency should strengthen faster and more transparent dispute-resolution procedures at the district level. At the same time, the Police and Armed Forces should maintain their role in preventing procedural disputes from escalating into physical conflict, while ensuring that security measures do not interfere with substantive electoral deliberation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

We extend our sincere appreciation to the Institute for Research and Community Service (LPPM) of Jambi University for its invaluable support in funding this research. We are also deeply grateful for the technical guidance, academic assistance, and constructive feedback provided throughout the research and writing process. The continuous mentoring and facilitation offered by LPPM have played a significant role in enhancing the quality, depth, and completion of this study. Their commitment to fostering research excellence has greatly contributed to the successful execution of this work.

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