Ahkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah
https://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/ahkam

Talfīq as A Method for Legal Solutions in Contemporary Islamic
Law
10.15408/ajis.v24i1.33608
Mohd Hafiz Jamaludin*1, Ahmad Hidayat Buang2, and Arip Purkon3
1,2

Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 3Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta
hafiz_usul@um.edu.my*

Abstract
Talfīq, or the combination of various opinions of jurisprudence madhhab, is frequently used to arrive at
solutions in Islamic law. It was used extensively in the tajdīd era, the early 20th century AD, namely
through the Islamic law reforms in family and personal matters in most Muslim countries. The concept
is controversial and not universally accepted by ulama. Most classical ulama opposed it, although most
contemporary ulama believe that talfīq is acceptable as a method for legal solutions. This research
investigated the reasons or factors for this disagreement by analyzing the related views of such ulama.
The qualitative research used a literature review from classical and contemporary books about talfīq.
This research concluded that although the classical ulama appeared to be grounded firmly in their
opposition to the practice of talfīq, subsequent development of Islamic law showed practical
consideration made inroads in accepting talfīq as a method for legal solution. This acceptance is made
by putting conditions and controls on how and when talfīq can be used to solve modern Muslim legal
problems. This modification ensures the traditionalists that the danger of talfīq, as previously envisaged,
would be avoided.
Abstrak
Talfīq atau gabungan berbagai pendapat mazhab fikih merupakan metode yang sering digunakan untuk
mencari solusi dalam hukum Islam. Hal ini digunakan secara luas pada zaman tajdīd, yaitu awal abad
XX Masehi, melalui reformasi hukum Islam dalam masalah hukum privat dan keluarga di sebagian
besar negara Muslim. Konsepnya kontroversial dan tidak disetujui secara universal oleh para sarjana.
Mayoritas ulama Islam klasik telah menentangnya meskipun sebagian besar ulama kontemporer
berpandangan bahwa talfīq dapat diterima sebagai metode penyelesaian hukum. Penelitian ini bertujuan
untuk menyelidiki alasan atau faktor ketidaksepakatan ini dengan melihat sampel dari pandangan
terkait dari para ulama tersebut. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian kualitatif dengan menggunakan
tinjauan pustaka. Data diperoleh dari buku-buku klasik dan kontemporer yang menulis tentang talfīq.
Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa meskipun para ulama klasik pada mulanya tampak berpijak kuat
pada penentangan mereka terhadap praktik talfīq, perkembangan hukum Islam selanjutnya
menunjukkan pertimbangan praktis yang membuat terobosan dalam menerima talfīq sebagai metode
penyelesaian hukum. Penerimaan ini dilakukan dengan meletakkan kondisi dan kontrol tentang
bagaimana dan kapan talfīq dapat digunakan dalam memberikan solusi atas masalah hukum Islam
modern. Modifikasi ini memastikan kaum tradisionalis menghindari bahaya talfīq seperti yang
dibayangkan sebelumnya.
Keywords:
talfīq; uṣūl al-fiqh; source of law; legal; taqlīd
How to Cite:
Jamaludin, M.H., et.al., (2024). Talfīq as A Method for Legal Solutions in Contemporary Islamic Law. AHKAM: Jurnal Ilmu
Syariah, 24(1). https://doi.org//10.15408/ajis.v24i1.33608

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Talfīq as A Method for Legal Solutions

Introduction
After the era of the Prophet (PBUH), legal problems and issues have increased
considerably with the expansion of Muslim territories and conversion to Islam from many races
and religions. One way or another, the laws have evolved and changed accordingly to
accommodate these developments. Primarily, this is done through independent reasoning, or
ijtihād, by qualified ulama, who extrapolated or analogized from the texts of the Quran, hadith,
and decisions or views of the early generations of Islam. The laws are further explained and
elaborated with the emergence of law or jurisprudence madhhab (pattern of thought). By the
second century of Hijrah, this madhhab of law became exclusive to four madhhabs, namely:
Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi īͨ , and Ḥanbalī.
In contrast to the early Islamic legal ulama (fuqahā), they had meticulously explained the
laws and imbued them with the systematic formulation of legal theory or jurisprudence (uṣūl
al-fiqh). These laws are considered the true expression of the sharia (religious law). With the
decline of Muslim intellects at the beginning of the fourth century of Hijrah, the views of the
past masters of these madhhabs of law were declared doctrinaire or dogmatic of which their
followers must abide and follow in fulfilling their religious duties and responsibilities
concerning their everyday life (Mustafa, 1998). This is the beginning of taqlīd or imitation (or
replication) of the views of the past masters. The imposition of taqlīd had also arisen from
many other factors, but the decline in independent reasoning was the most notable.
Nonetheless, occasionally, ulama emerged with high repute and intellectual qualities, and it
modified or adjusted the laws so that daily business and affairs, social and personal, could run
smoothly and uninterrupted (Krawietz, 2002).
The adjustment was innovative yet accommodative to the madhhab’s theoretical
formulation and contemporary development and demand. This had worked harmoniously for
the pre-modern Muslim society in the past (or known by some writers as classical Islam). The
decline of Muslim political control and the dominance and colonialization of Muslim lands by
Western powers, including the introduction of modernization, had made the traditional
modulation of law no longer viable under the doctrine of taqlīd. Many modern ulama, such as
Muḥammad ‘Abduh and al-Daḥlawī, have been critical of the use of taqlīd, calling for its
replacement with the use of ijtihād (Wan Hassan et al., 2020). Despite this pressure to reform
both the legal theory and law, the idea of taqlīd remained strong among ulama and the Muslim
public. Only this time did it agree that the law should develop and address the needs of
contemporary society. This is simply because new issues had arisen in the law fields,
particularly family relations, financial transactions, and commerce, and most notably in public
law, such as politics, governance, and criminal justice, where no satisfactory answer from the
past madhhabs could be identified. Some solutions to these issues, primarily in the area of
public law and commerce, have been answered through the introduction of Western laws. On
the other hand, Islamic laws still apply to personal laws, and many internal changes have
happened (Kamali, 2007).
Methods used in the previous periods of pre-modern Islam, such as siyāsah, maṣlaḥah,
ḍarūrah, and ḥiyal, were used again actively. Additionally, a so-called ijtihād tanzīlī was and
is still widely used to provide solutions to legal problems, and it is achieved through
comparative analysis of and liberal analogies to the view of the past masters and the traditional
manuals. The term ijtihād tanzīlī (R. Saputra et. al., 2022) must not be confused with suggesting
the abandonment of taqlīd since it was only an attempt to find solutions to the new problems
not explicitly covered and directly by the texts of the Quran and Hadith or discussed in the
manuals of the madhhab or no fatwā was issued by any ulama of the past, using the theoretical
formulation of the established madhhab (Saputra et al., 2022). Thus, instead of following the
past view on the subject, which is not possible because of the non-availability of such an answer
in the first place, a solution should then be sought afresh but using the methods established and
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recognized by the past masters. At the same time, some of the answers can be found outside of
one's legal madhhab. While a follower of a particular madhhab should strictly follow the view
of his madhhab, it is unanimously permissible to cross to another madhhab without any blame
whatsoever (Wan Hassan et al., 2020).
Many of the answers that one madhhab cannot provide are available in another. Since the
doctrine of taqlīd has nothing to say about using the view of another ulama or even madhhab
of law, borrowing the view from another madhhab seemed permissible as it could provide an
answer not found in one's madhhab. This is the beginning of what is to be known as talfīq or
sometime takhayyur. (Rana, 2017)This technique is beneficial to the muftī or lawyer reformer
in the later colonial and post-colonial periods for Muslim countries where modifications to the
classical law could be further made by combining the views of two madhhabs or more. Some
writers describe this technique as cut and paste. Hence, it is likely to raise concerns about the
traditional madhhab since, in some instances, the combination of the views of the madhhab
produced answers or solutions not recognized by the traditional law. Traditional ulama saw
this as a kind of legal funfair and felt the technique if permitted would disrupt the stability and
consistency of the traditional law (al-Safārinī, 1998, al-Shātibī, 1997).
Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, the use of talfīq was recognized by some ulama as
permissible as it would provide the answers or solutions needed without abandoning the
principle of taqlīd. This is indeed an accommodation that would help the ulama particularly
during the early day of Islamic law reform in the late period of the Ottoman Empire and early
independence of Muslim states in the Middle East from the colonial powers to formulate laws
that were suitable to the challenges and dynamics of modern lives. As shown elsewhere, the
modern project of the early Islamic reformers was not entirely successful due to the emergence
of the traditional revivalist ulama madhhab who saw that the reform envisaged by these
reformers was too radical. These reforms were seen as mostly coming from the ruling elite,
largely influenced by western modernization and progress. In contrast to the past, the traditional
ulama began to realize the usefulness of the talfīq and therefore worked to make its application
more acceptable to the traditional law (Abdullah Alwi Hassan, 2007, Mohammad Hashim
Kamali, 2007; Ruzman Md. Noor, 2008). Within this context, this article attempts to analyze
the factors and arguments held by the ulama for and against the acceptance of talfīq in the
modern development of Islamic law. For discussion, the views of some ulama in the 7th to the
13th century Hijri (600H-1299H) or 13th to the 19th century A.D (1203 C.E. to 1882 C.E.). In
the 7th century, Hijri (from 600H to 599H) marked the emergence of discussions on talfīq. On
the other hand, contemporary ulama covered those opinions that prospered in the beginning of
the 14th century Hijri (1300H-1399H) or the late 19th century A.D., including those that subsist
to this day (Bāqir Amīn al-Ward, 1986).
Method
The research was qualitative and used a literature review. The references used are some
books written by classical ulama about talfīq. The concept of talfīq used as a reference in this
article is al-Ḥilwanī's opinion. Some contemporary books that study talfīq, whether they agree
or reject it, were also used as references in this research.
The Concept of Talfīq
A combination of views from two or more different madhhabs could take many forms,
as will be discussed below. This naturally has led to disagreement among the ulama on its
definition. But this is not unusual in the Islamic legal tradition, especially in uṣūl al-fiqh,
whereby ulama gave more than one definition of talfīq. Nonetheless, the one given by alḤilwanī (d.1944), an ulama from Egypt, appears to describe the meaning of talfīq since it
covers most of the aspects discussed by the ulama and restricts matters that are not that related
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or significant. The definition given by the author is "combining two opinions from two different
madhhabs of jurisprudence that produce a result in a matter of law not recognized by either
madhhabs, or by retaining or using both opinions of the two different madhhabs at the end of
which produces a rule not recognized by either madhhab” (al-Ḥilwanī, 1905).
This definition states that talfīq is a combined opinion between two madhhabs of
jurisprudence. Thus, hypothetically, any combination within the same madhhab of
jurisprudence is not talfīq although it would bring the same result, should these views differ.
The second condition is that the combined opinion deals with the same problem with different
rulings among the madhhabs of law. If it deals with two different problems, it falls under taqlīd
or takhayyur. Nonetheless, this is not strictly the case, as shown below, whereby talfīq could
also include two problems that are closely interconnected. Therefore, as further explained by
al-Ḥilwanī, the precise requirement here is that talfīq only applies when it produces a
combination of laws not recognized by any madhhab of jurisprudence. If the combination of
opinions produces a result that already exists or is known in any madhhab of jurisprudence,
then it does not come under the discussion of talfīq. According to the above definition, the
underlining features that make a particular solution be considered as talfīq is that it produces a
new answer unknown to either madhhab of law and whether such a solution emanates from the
same or two different problems.
Two illustrations are offered in explaining the above definition. The first example is in
the case of the same problem is the ruling of wuḍū’ (ablution) whereby there are more than one
view on how to do certain bodily actions in order to have a valid wuḍū’. Similarly, certain
actions can invalidate the wuḍū’. Talfīq is achieved by combining performing wuḍū’ and
actions that invalidate it according to the most relaxed views, thus producing a new answer or
solution. This kind of talfīq in the case of wuḍū’ is adopted by Malaysian pilgrims while
performing hajj in Mecca by observing rules of making wuḍū’ according to Shāfi‘ī madhhab
but practicing the view from Ḥanafī madhhab in actions that will invalidate the wuḍū’ which
more relaxed than the Shāfi‘ī madhhab. Thus the use of talfīq to the pilgrims in this case of
wuḍū’ is very much needed since it helps to overcome the problem to perform a new wuḍū’
among Malaysian pilgrims during the rituals of ḥajj which can be burdensome to them.
The second example is the combination of opinions on two different problems with a
strong connection between them that allows the issues to be considered as one. The question
here arises on the status of a ṣalāt or prayer of Shāfi’īs adherent following the rule of a wuḍū’
from Ḥanafī madhhab. In a strict observance of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, the ṣalāt is tainted.
Nonetheless, if the result of talfīq in the wuḍū’ is considered good and valid, then the prayer
performed by a Shāfi’īs using such a wuḍū’ should also be the same. It means that the effect of
talfīq in the first problem (wuḍū’) applies similarly to the second problem (ṣalāt) (Razzaq &
Farooq, 2019).
Another example is marriage and divorce, which is effective only when the marriage
contract is legally valid. Thus, in a strict observance of the madhhab, the divorce of a Shāfi’ī’s
spouses has no effect if the marriage is concluded according to Ḥanafī or Mālikī rites which
some of its particulars are different, especially on the requirement of guardian or witness.
Therefore, if talfīq were to be allowed, then a divorce of a Shāfi’ī’s’ spouse whose marriage
was solemnized according to Ḥanafī or Mālikī rites is effective. This is the scenario where a
new solution is created and hence considered as talfīq as according to the definition given by
Ḥilwanī as above (al-Ruwayti’, 2013).
It appears that Ḥilwanī's definition excludes the selection of opinions between madhhabs
of law from different problems or issues known as takhayyur as talfīq. Ḥilwanī seems to
consider this as a part of taqlīd. It is essentially following the ruling of another madhhab of law
in a particular problem while remaining in one’s madhhab law. This ruling is different between
the madhhabs. An example of this is the adaption of the view from Ḥanbalī madhhab on the
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question of presumption of death of a missing person. Through the application of this view, a
Shāfi’ī's wife is able to petition a divorce or the heirs to apply for a death certificate to be used
in estate administration papers within four years of her husband's or their father's disappearance
instead of waiting for a much longer period under Shāfi’ī law. Although it is under taqlīd by
virtue of following the ruling of an established traditional madhhab, some ‘ulamā’s recognize
takhayyur as also a kind of talfīq. This is because although takhayyur has not directly produced
new ruling unknown before, it ultimately has the same effect of talfīq, that is, to find the
solution of a particular problem by combining views from different madhhabs of law or
madhhab or even between ulama. From this angle, the definition of Ḥilwanī can be improved.
As pointed out earlier in the example of wuḍū’, the result of talfīq is producing a more
relaxed or flexible solution to the problem. Because of its flexibility and inclination to have a
more moderate and accommodative solution, some ulama views the real intention of its use
with suspicion. This is particularly true when the technique was later used liberally and
occasionally to achieve suspicious ends that could be considered illegal or impermissible. The
use of talfīq liberally is later known as tattabu‘ al-rukhṣah or following the easiest, which is
prohibited by most of the ulama who view this as a kind of jest to the sharia law (al-Subkī,
2004; al-Zarkashī, 1992). Even a positive and innocent talfīq is not universally accepted by
ulama. The following headings attempt to analyze justifications and reasons for the Islamic
ulama from groups that prohibit talfīq and the others that allow it.
Arguments Against the Implementation of Talfīq
Over time, several justifications have been formulated by ulama who view talfīq with
apprehension. Although the simple reason for its rejection in the legal methodology of the law
was for the liberal use of the views from the madhhab, which could sometimes be arbitrary,
the main argument against talfīq revolves around the question of the possibility of making the
rule of Sharia devoid from its objective or purpose. Social and intellectual environment during
the time of the past ulama also contributed to the rejection of talfīq as a solution tool to legal
problem. Beginning at the 4th Century of Hijrah, under the doctrine of closing the door of
ijtihād, believers are expected to be identified as following one of the four recognized orthodox
madhhabs of law. This is also very true to an ulama and institutions to which the ulama is
attached, like a mosque, courts of law, learning centers, etc., and this observance is systemically
cascaded down to the general public. Consequently, under the rule of taqlīd agreed by most of
the ulama that a Muslim must follow a recognized madhhab in any of the four “orthodox”
madhhabs of law, would become pointless and no longer relevant if talfīq was to be allowed
(al-Qarāfī, 1995, al-Subkī, 2004, Ibn Imām al-Kamīliyyah, 2002).
Another main opposition to the idea of talfīq is that it produces a novel view unknown to
any of the established madhhabs of law, which was unsettling to this group of ulama since, as
they argued, it can become a means to circumvent a ruling based on ijmā‘ (consensus). The
majority of the past ulama were basically alarmed by the fact that talfīq would lead to a
revocation of a law held by ijmā.' This protest also warned that talfīq would pass a law
unrecognized by or not be associated with any madhhab of law. If allowed, the consequence
can be quite devastated to rule of law that had been delicately formulated and reasoned by
ulama based on the sound and established legal methodology. But the strongest dejection was
probably rested on the fact that the application of talfīq could be exercised by a muqallid
(uneducated or uninformed followers). Suppose a muqallid was free to establish a new law by
attempting talfīq. In that case, he has put himself at par with a mujtahid (person capable of
independent reasoning) (al-Ghazali, n.d.). Such a situation is outrageous in the minds of the
past ulama because a muqallid does not meet the conditions already set of the principles of
jurisprudence to offer solutions in legal matter. It is quite hard to appreciate this reason, since

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a muqallid would probably have no idea what are the laws all about even in his own madhhab,
let alone to combine views from other madhhab (al-Subkī, 2004, al-Syawsyawī, 2004).
Through course of time a more lenient practice of talfīq known as tattabu’ al-rukhṣah
(choosing a legal solution with inclination to the most expedience) was introduced and this
caused a further reason for the ulama in this group to reject talfīq. Needless to say, because the
technique is considered too relaxed and complaisant, it was rejected by majority of ulama
including the contemporary ulama who had supported talfīq. Some ulama even went so far as
to describe the practitioners of tattabu’ al-rukhṣah as being misled or deviated (al-Maradawī,
2000; Ibn al-Najjār, 1993). What that is important to note here taking from this point was that
the permissibility of talfīq albeit conforming to its rigorous conditions, would still provide a
possibility to the practise of tattabu’ al-rukhṣah or even probability of promoting it in the
future. Because of this apprehension, talfīq must not be allowed to avoid the danger of tattabu’
al-rukhṣah from occurring under the sadd al-dharā‘i principle (blocking the evil means).
Based on the above arguments, the traditional ulama believed that talfīq should not be
allowed to avoid danger and violation of religious rules. It was shown that talfīq had been used
to attain ulterior motives prohibited by the religious law, such as fornication and consumption
of alcohol. Through mixing various views of the ulama in the conditions of valid marriage, in
particular requirements of the guardian and witness in the marriage, a marriage can be
consummated without the fear of committing a sexual violation of zinā (fornication or
adultery). Similarly, violation of consumption of alcoholic drinks can be avoided by mixing
the views of the Ḥanafīs and the Shāfi’ī’s. However, to many ulama, this view is total contempt
and frivolous to religious law and cannot be considered talfīq. Lastly, the logical consequence
of mixing different views of the ulama is the materialization of two or more opposing views.
Although difference of views and rulings in matters of law is not a flaw in Islamic law, the
creation of views originating from talfīq is viewed differently as it is a combination of views
based on different legal methods or arguments (al-Bannānī, n.d., al-Safārinī, 1998).
Reasoning from the theological perspective was also offered to augment their argument
against talfīq further. Under the title of truth or ḥaqq, the question was asked whether there is
one truth or multiple truths in the law of God or sharia.? If we were to accept multiple truths,
it would mean a prohibition or obligation has little consequence or effect on a believer. Another
argument availed by the opposition is the claim that legalizing talfīq will lead to the
permissibility of prohibitions such as adultery, alcoholic consumption, etc. The argument finds
its basis in the principles of the jurisprudence of blocking or preventing means that could lead
to something unlawful or sadd al-dharā’i‘. Both of these arguments have been easily dismissed
since talfīq is a matter of ijtihād whereby multiple views are allowed as a sign mercy from God,
and it has been held unanimously that talfīq must not be used to allow something that is
prohibited either by texts or consensus. Both of the arguments against talfīq, as presented
above, is considered as outside the scope of discussion or khārij ‘an maḥal al-nizā’ and it is
therefore, should be dismissed (al- Safārinī, 1998).
Arguments for the Implementation of Talfīq
As in any other new or innovative initiatives, proponents of talfīq based their arguments
by referring to the texts of the Quran (al-Baqarah: 185, al-Nisā’: 28, al-Hajj: 78) and Hadith
(al-Haitāmī, 1994) on the general principles of the law that observance of particulars of the law
must not inflict difficulties or harshness on the believers (‘adam al-ḥaraj or mashaqqah) and
that the sharia law has always promoted the idea of easiness (yusr). Similarly, the general
principle of the law is that obligation and prohibition in the law must be based from a clear
textual provision to the effect. There is none in the text that prohibits the practice of talfīq. In
fact, the view of a jurist is not binding to any Muslim and a believer can either choose to accept
it or otherwise (al-’Anzī, 1999, al-Bānī, 1997, al-Mayman, 2008; al-Zuhaylī, 1986). The
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proponents also substantiate their support by stating that talfīq is the result of taqlīd (Abdul
Rahman Haji Abdullah, 1998). Furthermore, the idea of taqlīd to a mdhhab has somehow been
modified to the notion that the public has no madhhab in the sense that they only follow the
madhhab of a Muftī who then will decide which views of the ulama that they should follow in
answering their problems. Therefore, if a muftī should decide to practice talfīq then it is the
duty of the public to follow his fatwā which is based on talfīq. In addition to this di, sallowing
talfīq would make many of the rituals and rites practiced by the public become bad and
therefore deny the principle of easiness as promoted by the sharia. The example of Malaysia’s
pilgrims during ḥajj as shown above is a good show case whereby strict observance to the
Shāfi‘īs madhhab would indeed ruin their rituals because the impracticality of full observance
of such view of the madhhab to which they adhered (al-’Ātibī, 2009; Maszlee Malik, 2005).
Contemporary ulama regarded arguments for rejecting talfīq as one-sided by just
analyzing the negative aspects of talfīq without considering many of its benefits. This style of
argument is not tenable and fair. Although there are indeed some concerns about the use of
talfīq, one cannot deny the positive aspects of talfīq. Facing with current needs and demands
for legal solution according to Islamic sharia in modern times, contemporary ulama argued that
talfīq could provide a method by which problems can be answered expeditiously without
resorting to free reasoning or ijtihād which was and is still apprehensible to many, traditional
Islamic ulama of modern era. In fact, talfīq perpetuates the practice of taqlīd to one of the four
recognized madhhab albeit in a different and cosmetic or lip service fashion. Moreover, the
subject matters which come under talfīq are issues concerning to ijtihād and ikhtilāf, which are
subject to changes and revisions based on the needs and demands of the people, society, place
and time.
The most significant example brought forth by contemporary ulama to prove the
applicability of talfīq is the process of codifying laws that had lately taken place in most Muslim
countries. The laws of a particular country were practically based on the foundation of the
majority adherence of a particular madhhab (madhhabs of jurisprudence). However, certain
instances proved that the codified laws were the result of not only one, but combined opinions
taken from multiple madhhabs, as a response to meet the rising needs and issues. Examples are
codification of laws on waṣiyyah wājibah (obligatory bequest) and waqf. Currently, the
waṣiyyah wājibah has been adopted in family law in several countries, namely Egypt, Syria,
Tunisia, Morocco, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Pakistan and Indonesia. In the former, opinion from
the Ẓāhirī madhhab was adopted to create a will through the provision of the law made by a
grandfather to his grandchild of whom his or her father predeceased the grandfather. On the
latter, the opinion of the Ḥanafī madhhab was taken to provide for the substitution of waqf
property or for the provision of waqf other that landed property. However, most of this
adaptation is not talfīq in its technical sense that they are not combinations of different views
creating a new view unknown or unrecognized to the madhhabs of law. However, rather than
the implementation of a view of a different madhhab to the populace of another madhhab,
which is aptly known as the selection of opinions from madhhab or takhayyur, as shown above,
Nonetheless, it can still be classified as talfīq looking at the general perspective of choosing
views from different madhhab to find a solution to a legal problem. Takhayyur is part of the
freedom the ulama allows believers to choose any of the four madhhabs of law. Despite the
insistence on observance of a madhhab, the ‘ulamā’s were also careful not to encourage
fanaticism by allowing the choice of switching to another madhhab. Permission to choose
madhhab is allowed on the understanding that rulings and laws under each madhhab are based
on the acceptable established legal methodologies (al-Muhayrī, 1997, Hallaq, 2004).

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The Use of Sharia
The principle of sadd dharī‘ah by the past ulama in prohibiting talfīq is the clear instance
of looking talfīq at its negative aspect. In contrast to this approach the contemporary ulama
seek to support the use of talfīq to positive aspect of Sharī’ah though the well-known principle
of leniency and facility or yusr. This is the main principle of Sharī’ah which has been used by
the early legal reformers of Islamic law to introduce codifications of Islamic law in Muslim
countries, particularly in the middle east. References were sought according to the number of
verses in the Quran and Hadith that advocated leniency and facility, partly to remove the plights
and harms that may befall the believers. This is in addition to the peril and vulnerability of
using or following to a single madhhab or view which can result in rigidity and impracticality
of religious teaching and eventually would bring distress and hardship to Muslims both
individually and socially. It also conflicted with the principle that any difference of opinions
among the ulama was a mercy or blessing to the society. Through these differences, Muslims
can choose to pick any of these opinions that are suitable and appropriate to their place and
time (Ahmad Hidayat Buang & M. Cholis Nafis, 2012, al-Zuhaylī, 1986).
An example of the current talfīq is the payment of zakāt fiṭrah in Indonesia. The majority
of Indonesian people adhere to the Shāfi’ī’ Madhhab. In the Shāfi’ī’ Madhhab, zakāt al-fiṭr
must be paid with 2.5 kg of food, paid no later than before the ‘Id al-Fitr prayer. Meanwhile,
in the Ḥanafī Madhhab, zakāt al-fiṭr may be paid as much as 3.8 kg of food or its equivalent
(money). The time for paying zakāt al-fiṭr can be any time. The Religion Ministry of Indonesia
Republic stipulated that the zakāt al-fiṭr is 2.5 kg, can be paid with food or money, and is paid
no later than the Eid al-Fitr prayer. This means that talfīq has been carried out between the
Shāfi’ī’ madhhab and the Ḥanafī madhhab. This talfīq based on the principle of leniency and
facility or yusr, because paying with money is more practical and recipients of zakāt al-fiṭr
(mustaḥiq) do not necessarily need rice or food.
The effect of the above principle is evident when it comes to general Muslim public in
the sense that they can practice taqlīd as required but with choices or benefits of the view of
different madhhab. For the contemporary ulama, both the concept of talfīq and taqlīd are
intertwined, with the former being also a part of the latter. More importantly, there is no direct
evidence from the primary sources of the sharia that directly or clearly prohibit talfīq (Ghazala
Ghalib Khan, 2013:141–66, Abdul Razzaq, 2019).
Analysis of the Opposing Views
Despite the disagreements on accepting talfīq as a method for solving the legal problems,
both sides agree that talfīq must not contradict the clear rules of the sharia law. As shown
above, the opponents viewed the use of talfīq and its flexibility can be abused for intention
undesirous to the sharia law. This is especially so when its flexibility is left to the public to
choose, which may lead to frivolousness in observing the law. The ulama believed it was
natural that the public and the political authority would opt for an easier and more lenient
opinion of the law. This contradicts the rule that choosing a view in the sharia law must always
be based on the most correct decision based on the clear proof of the texts and reasoning.
Attention must always be given to the majority opinion or jumhūr when choosing the view
since it is accepted that the majority's view carries more weight than the view of the minority
and even less an isolated view of a jurist.
This concern for such a misadventure is on the justification that behind of all seemingly
strict and harsh laws, there are wisdoms and goodness for the benefit and interest of a Muslim
be it individually or communally both in this world and the hereafter. In other words, the law
sometimes needs to be strict and harsh, in order to protect its higher objectives and the interest
of the many. Despite this, it is agreeable to all that flexibility is always one of the important
traits in Islamic law. If talfīq was accepted as part of this principle of legal flexibility, it needs
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some sort of conditions or controls to avoid being misused or abused. These controls are to
safeguard from the habit of excessive promotions of leniency in selecting the view of the
madhhab which would undermine the wisdom behind purposes of the laws (maqāṣid alsharī’ah) and the intended obligations (taklīf) required by the law.
It is accepted that talfīq operates under the doctrine of taqlīd. Whilst the idea of taqlīd
suggests rigidity, talfīq offers flexibility to choose within this rigidity. Hence, the underlying
question is whether all believers are qualified to choose whichever view of a ulama or madhhab
of laws suit their needs? With all the technicalities and sophistication of the advanced science
of law and its methodology in the sharia, it would require a talent and mastery of such
knowledge to seek answer by themselves. The shorter route for a layman is to be an informed
muqallid; a follower with some appreciation of the law without having trouble studying and
analyze the law's proofs to arrive at an answer. As such, a muqallid with no or limited training
in the science of the law may not be able to practice talfīq because they might violate some
provisions of the sharia. A mujtahid or a ulama, on the other hand, with knowledge and skills
in the particularization of the laws, is allowed to practice talfīq since they are able to provide
proof and evidence on the selection of the views and thus avoid using talfīq arbitrarily.
As a general rule under the doctrine of taqlīd, a believer must adhere to a particular
madhhab or madhhab from any of the four recognized madhhabs. Only in case of difficulties
or distress then a person is allowed to seek reference to other madhhabs for solution. But then
that person must abide by all the conditions and terms of that madhhab. This rule is nothing
new as changing or switching of madhhab is allowed by all ulama, including that of the
opponents of talfīq. Again, if the answer from other madhhabs of law is still unable to provide
a satisfactory solution where the answer from the madhhab resulted in extraordinary rigidness
or an occurrence of emergency to the general public that requires an urgent solution, only then
it is allowed to practice talfīq within the permitted limitations. This is to suggest that talfīq is
allowed only as a last resort and to be exercised only by a person competent in the sharia.
Permission to practice talfīq in this situation is to avoid unnecessary burdens to Muslims in
observing the laws sanctioned in the sharia. Therefore, it is common to find that talfīq in
modern times is frequently employed by experts in the sharia in drafting laws relating to family
relations, economic and political issues, as well as other novel issues from any fields of law
that demand critical attention.
The opponents and proponents of talfīq have their merits and justifications in supporting
their views. Specifically, the above discussion identifies at least three reasons for rejecting the
practice of talfīq in the legal methodology of Islamic law namely; (1) the revocation of the rule
based on consensus, (2) the frequent use of tatabbu’ al-rukhṣah and (3) inconsistencies in the
sharia rules based on the established legal methodologies. The application of talfīq is indeed
highly necessary when the ulama have no choice, but to adopt it as a technique or method of
legal solution, the negative aspects of talfīq deliberated by past ulama must be taken care for
prior to its use to the general public. It is therefore important to address the danger or risk that
talfīq will pose to the general fabric of Islamic law vis-a-vis its benefits or advantages by putting
certain safeguards or limitations on its use.
To counteract the first negative aspect of talfīq that will result in the abandonment of
rules based on consensus, talfīq is used as a last resort in the process of finding solutions. Talfīq
is only permitted when solutions cannot be found or there are impediments in using the
madhhab's views for acute hardship or ḍarūrah. Careful consideration and specific parameters
need to be identified to establish events that come under the definition of ḍarūrah. In this
respect, events that affect the society's basic needs or endanger the life and security or property
of the states and public can be considered ḍarūrah. Of course, there is some degree of
subjectivity on these matters among ulama, but the help or assistance of scientists and experts
in the various field can be sought to determine the graveness of the events. By doing this, the
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concern that talfīq will erode the established view of law based on consensus can be avoided,
making talfīq far from falling victim to satisfying an individual's whims and selfish desires.
The use of tatabbu’ al-rukhṣah appears to discard the established view in the madhhab,
but its application is supported by sharia principle of easiness or yusr. The supporters of
tatabbu’ al-rukhṣah view this support as better than and more reliable than the one that was
argued for by the traditional ulama. Although established and the majority rules as embodied
in the view of the madhhab take precedent to the weak or rejected, the flexibility of the sharia
always exist in allowing the use of isolated or weak views of the madhhab if there is a need or
necessities for adopting such a view. Needless to say tatabbu’ al-rukhṣah is applied cautiously
and for a limited scope of application or specific group of people (al-’Ātibī, 2009, al-Maradawī,
2000).
Lastly, in order to avoid the law being inconsistent, the resultant of the law using talfīq
most part of it is consiered as exception to the rule and to be used as a last resort. Conditions
that talfīq is to be used in this fashion would be expected to reduce the resistance against using
talfīq in legal solution. Further condition attached is the exercise of talfīq should be limited to
qualified individuals. This is to avoid the use of talfīq for personal interest and desire. It also
ensures talfīq is exercised for a valid reason using a correct methodology. This is similar to
conditions of a mujtahid for all the intents and purposes. For further protection and to guarantee
a proper and accurate usage of talfīq, it is suggested rulings based on talfīq can only be issued
by a Mufti or persons or committee appointed by the authority to deal with issuing fatwa to the
public (Jamaludin, 2016).
Conclusion
The emergence of madhhab in the tradition of Islamic law with the requirements of taqlid
in the later period provides an opportunity to ulama to formulate talfīq as a technique for legal
solution. In terms of chronological order, talfīq comes later than taqlīd as al-qawā‘id alfiqhiyyah comes later than uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh. Indeed, al-qawā‘id al-fiqhiyyah used the
wealth of uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh in formulating the maxims of the law to apply to the detailed
problems of the law. Interestingly, the exercise or effort to devise al-qawā‘id al-fiqhiyyah was
usually cross madhhab as in uṣūl al-fiqh. Similarly, albeit controversially, talfīq has used the
wealth of the fiqh cross madhhab by mixing and combining all the views. The protest of talfīq
was simply because it has no stable or accepted legal methodologies as it was in al-qawā‘id alfiqhiyyah.
Ulama realized this predicament, and from time to time, conditions or controls have
been imposed to ensure that talfīq is used in its proper purpose and context. Because of this,
the concerns about the past of ulama, as elaborated above, have been largely dealt with by later
jurists. It is safe to say that ulama have generally accepted the practice of talfīq except perhaps
the extreme version of talfīq as shown above in the case of revocation of consensus and
tatabbu’ al-rukhṣah. To reduce resistance and scepticism, use of talfīq can only be made in the
events of high emergencies and necessities exercised by qualified individuals. But this must be
used always as a last resort and as an exception to the general rule. Lastly, in final analysis of
the discussion is that talfīq is perhaps the precursor to ijtihād, which was banned by the doctrine
of taqlīd in traditional law. This is because in one way or another, the result of talfīq produces
a new view unknown to madhhab either in contrast to ijmā‘ or employing isolated views
rejected by madhhab. Unfortunately, the use of ijtihād is still elusive today, although the call
for it was made a century ago by modern reformers such as Abduh, Iqbal, Muhammad Asad
and others. Many reasons have been attributed to this impasse, but this is not within the scope
of this article to analyze. Instead of ijtihād, the current ulama of Islamic law seem to prefer and
actively propagate the idea of maqāṣid al-sharī’ah and maṣlaḥah. These two sources or
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Talfīq as A Method for Legal Solutions

approaches, including talfīq, are actively used in the modern application of Islamic law,
particularly in fatwā and legislation.
Acknowledgment
Acknowledgement to MOHE-UM-INCEIF Islamic Finance Research Program, Grant No.
MO007-2017 for providing research funds to complete this paper.
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