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REDUCING THE POLITICIZATION OF RELIGION AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITY GROUPS AHEAD OF THE 2024 POLITICAL YEAR IN INDONESIA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DIGITAL MEDIA

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ABSTRACT

Indonesian people have lived together in a socio-religious context in a peaceful atmosphere, full of tolerance within the framework of diversity, and prioritizing religious values. However, this peace and harmony turned into conflict, hostility, and discrimination, which was triggered by political elites using religion through identity politics and the politicization of religion to gain power in the 2019 legislative and presidential elections, which started with the fire that was ignited in the 2017 DKI Pilkada. This article uses a qualitative type virtual ethnographic method and literature review in obtaining main data derived from the search results, collection, and processing of sixty reputable national and international scientific journals, general and religious-based online news websites, to social media platforms. Digital media has become a battle arena that legitimizes narratives of the politicization of religion and identity politics which ultimately lead to social turmoil with political and religious nuances so that a series of strategies are needed by the government, religious leaders, and a plural society that are concerned about these conditions in moderating the digital world and digitalization-based cross-cultural religious literacy in the form of positive-inclusive content that is massive and has a large flow so that it exalts the political narrative of humanity which becomes the spirit of politics until finally a soothing social and digital media climate is created without any negative tendencies that become seeds of discrimination and conflict when elections come.

Keywords: *Reduction, Politicization of Religion, Minority Discrimination, Politics 2024, Digital*

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia will hold another general election in 2024.¹ The excitement and interest had begun to be felt long before the hot political year came. However, another thing that is considered to need serious attention is the emergence of the discourse on the politicization of religion.² Religion on the other hand has an interesting side when photographed from the perspective of political interests, religion has one trait that is not owned by other entities, namely dogma.³

In addition, religion also has a concept of martyrdom that makes it used as an instrument of political movements in the history of politics in the name of religion to compete for electoral bubbles of power.⁴ Especially in the era of democracy where electoral forces have become the main weapon for the political interests of the elites and their parties. The slogan echoed by political elites affiliated with evil religionists in the form of "dying for religion leads to heaven" has become the mainstream that floods the stage of political speeches and digital media every political year.

Religion can be likened to a kitchen knife that can be used to slice onions or stab people. Religion when it intersects

with practical politics that is full of negative tendencies, in its history has sharpened the sword of hostility, sharpening grudges, and labeling "kafir" to fellow adherents, to the disparity in the management of the bodies of people who died as happened in the era of the DKI Jakarta elections in 2017.⁵ When a political elite has been successfully elected, declaring himself as the representative of religion and the representation of "Godhead", it is as if religion has pushed himself to become the winner of political contestation in the struggle for power.

The facts of the 2014, 2017, and 2019 elections are more than enough to prove that religion has become a political campaign tool in Indonesia, even Brazil and the United States.⁶ In the upcoming 2024 general election, the politicization of religion is indicated to be thickening again, driven by several factors, including the phenomenon of a century anniversary (100 years) of the collapse of the last khilafah in Turkey (1924 AD). Religious narratives and the issue of the revival of the caliphate can certainly be the main themes and references in the political campaign later. Despite the fact that the organization that clearly declares itself as a "khilafah fighter" who wants a state based on the formal laws of Islam was dissolved by the government in 2019, the narrative carried out by its leaders and

¹ SAMOSIR OSBIN, 'Democracy, Political Identity, and the Fate of Minority Politics: Reflections Towards Indonesia's National Concurrent Elections in 2024', *Globus: Social Sciences*, 7.2(36) (2021), 14–22 <<https://doi.org/10.52013/2713-3087-36-2-4>>.

² Mathias Daven, 'POLITIK ATAS NAMA ALLAH', *Jurnal Ledalero*, 18.1 (2019), 22 <<https://doi.org/10.31385/jl.v18i1.162.22-60>>.

³ Imron Mustofa, 'Saeculum-Mundus Politik Indonesia: Satu Kajian Filosofis Dalam Perspektif Nurcholish Madjid', *Hayula: Indonesian Journal of Multidisciplinary Islamic Studies*, 5.2 (2021), 221–42 <<https://doi.org/10.21009/005.02.05>>.

⁴ Agus Machfud Fauzi, Fadilah Salsa Novinayah, and Oktavia Ayu Darmawan, 'Kontroversi Sosial Caleg Perempuan Pks', 03.01 (2019), 40–52.

⁵ Ansar Suherman, Muhammad Rizal Ardiansah Putra, and Mansur, 'Identity Politic Contestation in the Public Sphere: A Steep Road of Democracy in Indonesia', 436 (2020), 227–30 <<https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200529.046>>.

⁶ Budi Irawanto, 'Making It Personal: The Campaign Battle on Social Media in Indonesia's 2019 Presidential Election', *Perspective*, 1.28 (2019), 1–11 <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_28.pdf>.

sympathizers is still visible on the surface.⁷

On the other hand, the era of modernity has changed the socialization model of the world community from conventional to digital.⁸ Social media is the main means used by people to connect with each other in micro and macro scopes. Like the world is held in one hand, people in the digital era can easily communicate with each other, exchange information, and build business relationships. However, with the conveniences offered by the advancement of the internet and social media (digital world), it eventually makes people careless and negligent in the digital world by conducting massive searches and ignoring the dangers that have lurked in the form of hoaxes, fraud, and other negative news or information.⁹ Then, unintentionally or intentionally spreading the negative information to social media and becoming a danger to others and themselves.¹⁰

The role and function of digital media, especially social media, has occupied a dominant position in the lives

of people in the modern-digital era.¹¹ When people in their routine activities when waking up from rest (sleep) have started by opening social media in the form of Twitter, Instagram, Tiktok, online shopping applications repeatedly until they return to their dreams. With digital media, people can easily and quickly obtain various news and information they want, but on the other hand, the tsunami of information has brought a variety of risks and dangers to its accessors, both from individuals and certain groups. The fact that can be used as a lesson is that when the Covid-19 pandemic attacked the world and Indonesia without exception, the digital media universe was filled with information and news whose validity and accuracy could not be accounted for, thus leading to threats to human life.¹²

In addition, Indonesia, which is facing the era of digitalization in all sectors of people's lives, ranging from economy, education, social, politics, to religion, is a challenge and at the same time proves that the government and its people are able to get through this era.¹³ However, the arrival of the digital era faced by the world and Indonesia in particular does not mean without obstacles, this can be proven by the government which is considered not

⁷ Muhammad Misbah and Anisah Setyaningrum, 'Rising Islamic Conservatism in Indonesia Islamic Groups and Identity Politics, by Leonard C. Sebastian, Syafiq Hasyim, Alexander R. Arifianto', *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia*, 178.1 (2022), 136–39 <<https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17801008>>.

⁸ Bryan S Turner, 'Religious Authority and the New Media', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 24.2 (2007), 117–34 <<https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276407075001>>.

⁹ Siavosh Sahebi and Paul Formosa, 'Social Media and Its Negative Impacts on Autonomy', *Philosophy and Technology*, 35.3 (2022), 1–24 <<https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-022-00567-7>>.

¹⁰ Oksiana Jatiningsih, Windita Mei Bella Averina, and Miftakhul Hidayah, 'Controlling Hoax of Covid-19: Capturing Moral Messages from Social Events', *Proceedings of the Annual Civic Education Conference (ACEC 2021)*, 636.Acec 2021 (2022), 273–77 <<https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.220108.050>>.

¹¹ New Trends and others, 'Digitalization of Education in Modern Scientific Discourse: New Trends and Risks Analysis', *European Journal of Contemporary Education*, 9.2 (2020), 313–36 <<https://doi.org/10.13187/ejced.2020.2.313>>.

¹² Martin Bruder and Laura Kunert, 'The Conspiracy Hoax? Testing Key Hypotheses about the Correlates of Generic Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories during the COVID-19 Pandemic', *International Journal of Psychology*, 57.1 (2022), 43–48 <<https://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12769>>.

¹³ Farid Mutohhari, Herminarto Sofyan, and Muhammad Nurtanto, 'Technological Competencies: A Study on the Acceptance of Digital Technology on Vocational Teachers in Indonesia', 2021 <<https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.6-3-2021.2305971>>.

ready to provide facilities that support the smooth passage of digitalization with the vulnerability of personal data leaks, the spread of hoaxes, intolerance, extremism, and radicalism-terrorism in the digital world.^{14;15} The peak of the creation and dissemination of narratives that lead to the suppression and intimidation of certain religious and minority groups occurs every election month.¹⁶ The actors are represented by party political elites who use religion to gain temporary power at the expense of national unity.

This scientific article will provide a more in-depth review of the indications of the discourse of religious politicization in the face of the 2024 general election and the discourse of intimidation of certain religious groups and minorities carried out by the camps (groups) of election participants in the digital world. In addition, this article also seeks to provide alternative strategic steps that can be applied by the government, religious leaders, and digital plural communities who have concerns about this phenomenon, as well as at the same time maintaining and supervising the course of the upcoming 2024 general elections to run conducively without being accompanied by religious politicization and discrimination against certain minority groups.

RESEARCH METHOD

Researchers in writing this scientific article used a qualitative approach and the methods chosen were netnography and literature review. Netnography is a research method that is becoming familiar to researchers and lecturers in public and private universities in conducting research and writing internet-based publications when the world is experiencing the Covid-19 pandemic, while according to Kozinets netnography is a new qualitative research model and uses a way of working to utilize conventional ethnographic features with the main objective of observing culture and rituals that arise in the process of text-based communication through computer media connected to the internet.¹⁷ Researchers surfed the digital world (internet) to obtain a collection of reputable national and international scientific journals that discuss the theme of politicization of religion and discrimination against minority groups based on the reality of existing cases in Indonesia. In addition, researchers also conducted in-depth observations in the realm of social media in the form of Youtube, Instagram, Twitter, general online news platforms, to religious-based to obtain complex data regarding the themes carried in this study.

The data obtained in this study were then analyzed using the content analysis model, which is a method designed to identify and interpret the meaning in the form of communication derived from a series of data collected by researchers and then produce a description or explanation of the phenomenon of the case being studied.¹⁸

¹⁴ Mutohhari, Sofyan, and Nurtanto.

¹⁵ Rachan Royan, 'The REVITALIZATION OF RELIGIOUS MODERATION TO REALIZE THE CHARACTER OF MUSLIM UMMATAN WASATHAN IN THE ERA OF DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION', *Annual International Conference on Islamic Education for Students*, 1.1 (2022), 138–47 <<https://doi.org/10.18326/aicoies.v1i1.319>>.

¹⁶ Gilang Ramadhan, 'Majority Religious Politics: The Struggle for Religious Rights of Minorities in Sampang, Madura', *Simulacra*, 5.1 (2022), 17–28 <<https://doi.org/10.21107/sml.v5i1.13427>>.

¹⁷ R. V. Kozinets, *Netnography: Doing Ethnographic Research Online* (London, United Kingdom: Sage Publications, 2009).

¹⁸ A J Kleinhessel and others, 'Qualitative Research in Pharmacy Education: Demystifying Content Analysis', *American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education*, 84.1 (2020), 127–37 <<https://doi.org/10.5688/ajpe8417113>>.

Content analysis is particularly useful in a situation where there is a large amount of unanalyzed textual data, such as that which has been collected by digital media researchers as part of research and teaching. Like other research methods, content analysis has three basic principles: objectivity, systematicity, and generalizability.¹⁹ The content analysis method in this context is used to analyze the phenomenon of religious moderation and cross-cultural religious literacy in the digital world with the aim of reducing the discourse of religious politicization and discrimination against religious groups and minorities ahead of the 2024 political year in Indonesia.

DISCOURSE ON RELIGIOUS POLITICIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITY GROUPS

Democracy in Indonesia will again experience political contestation with the upcoming general elections in 2024. The issue and discourse of political parties born from certain religious ideologies to collaborate or coalition again in repeating the elections in 2014 and 2019 has strengthened. Identity politics, which has a bad track record in politics in Indonesia, seems to hope to be repeated by politicians in achieving victory. As a country that upholds democracy, Indonesia provides guarantees and freedom for political parties to have political ideologies. Law No. 2 of 2011 on political parties provides a way for political parties to use certain ideologies and identities as long as the ideologies and identities used do not violate established rules, including in this case

religious ideologies and identities. However, politicians should also be able to put aside their sectoral ego that the interests and unity of the nation are the main thing.

Religious (Islamic) parties during the reformation period did have a glorious record with the leadership of a leader and at the same time Kyai (cleric), KH. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) through Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB).²⁰ Meanwhile, the leaders of Islamic political parties want the next election to repeat the history of reform, but they seem to have forgotten that the situation, conditions, and times are different. This political discourse is considered to jeopardize the integration and solidarity of the nation, which is recovering from the terrible historical accident of the past. This is because history has proven that the use of religious symbols is a major factor in causing political turbulence.

During the dictatorial era of President Soeharto in power after he left and entered the Kaaba (carrying out the 5th pillar of Islam, namely Hajj) and built mosques in various regions, people at that time said that Soeharto had planned to divide Muslims and was a representation of the ad-Dhirar Mosque at the time of the Prophet Muhammad SAW which was destroyed because it became a symbol for hypocrites and dissidents at that time, but finally the accusation turned out to be reversed. Soeharto was called al-Hajj Muhammad Soeharto in a mosque called the al-Azhar Grand Mosque and was also the location of tabligh akabr in giving praise and flattery to Soeharto by his loyal supporters. However, later the mosque

¹⁹ Vanessa Woodward Griffin and O. Hayden Griffin, 'Content Analysis', *The Encyclopedia of Research Methods in Criminology and Criminal Justice: Volume II: Parts 5-8*, 2008, 2021, 375–80
<<https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119111931.ch75>>

²⁰ Vishnu Juwono, 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Retrogression of Governance Reform and Anti-Corruption Measure in Indonesia 1999–2001', *Jurnal Politik*, 6.1 (2020), 121
<<https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v6i1.307>>.

was turned into a tabligh akbar by the same group to blaspheme Soeharto.^{21;22} This phenomenon is an irony experienced by Muslims from time to time.

The use of religious jargon and narratives as a logo for selling is also considered to play a role in the dwarfing of democracy. A healthy democracy can be obtained when it is carried out with a rational political flow by gradually excluding the protrusion of certain identities to the public.²³ On the contrary, democracy in Indonesia will be limited to procedural and tiresome routines when it is enlivened with irrational narratives, including in terms of politicizing religion and certain minority groups. As a generation of people who want a quality and healthy democracy, it is only natural to reject the axis of political parties that use identity politics jargon.

The 2017 DKI Jakarta elections are among the clear examples of religion and minorities being used as instruments to defeat winning revalidity and lead to a rift in the social cohesion order.²⁴ In addition, the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections also saw religion and minority groups being used to attack each other in the contestation for the election of the country's leaders. The wound obtained by the Indonesian nation is still gaping wide

and shows no sign of being fully healed. The barriers and walls as a result of the use of religion and minority groups in the political agenda are still very thick, high, and strong in providing distance and separating fellow children of the nation, which is difficult to recover. The use of identity politics by politicians and their coalition is an old agenda and contradicts eastern politics that prioritizes nobility and courtesy, not focusing on narrating religious sentiments that imprison and kill common sense. The discourse on the use of identity politics will only make this nation repeat a dark history that is counterproductive in welcoming the brilliance of the future. As a discourse that will still be carried out, it is already negative, especially if it is actually realized.

Then, political elites should have a firm stance not to use political speeches that lead to identity politics, the use of religious figures for provocative religious lectures at pulpits and places of worship, the use of campaign posters and billboards that contain SARA, to the spread of hate speech through anonymous accounts and political buzzers on social (digital) media.^{25;26} When these things cannot be avoided by political elites and their followers, it is difficult to avoid public uproar in the implementation of elections. Another pattern of religious politicization can be seen when there is a struggle for the authenticity of religious practices that come from the same religion, for example Islam. Legitimacy is obtained from the

²¹ Masykur Hakim, 'Soeharto and the Politicization of Indonesian Islam (1968-1998)', *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 10.2 (2016), 159–80 <<https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2016.10.2.159-180>>.

²² Sugit Sanjaya Arjon, 'Religious Sentiments In Local Politics', *Jurnal Politik*, 3.2 (2018), 171 <<https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v3i2.123>>.

²³ Kikue Hamayotsu, 'Beyond Faith and Identity: Mobilizing Islamic Youth in a Democratic Indonesia', *The Pacific Review*, 24.2 (2011), 225–47 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.560960>>.

²⁴ Jonathan Chen, 'Representing Chinese Indonesians: Pribumi Discourse and Regional Elections in Post-Reform Indonesia', *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 41.1 (2022), 59–87 <<https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034211036716>>.

²⁵ Iswandi Syahputra, 'SEARCH Journal of Media and Communication Research Expressions of Hatred and the Formation of Spiral of Anxiety on Social Media in Indonesia * Iswandi Syahputra', 11.1 (2019), 95–112 <<http://search.taylors.edu.my>>.

²⁶ Masduki, 'Cyber-Troops, Digital Attacks, and Media Freedom in Indonesia', *Asian Journal of Communication*, 32.3 (2022), 218–33 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2022.2062609>>.

number of scholars (religious experts) who provide support to one particular candidate to win the election to the labeling of liberal, secular, radical, moderate, to the lineage (pedigree) of the kyai or ordinary people.

Another model of indications of religious politicization can be seen when candidates competing in elections are of the opposite sex, namely men and women. The narrative that is built will lead to a genre bias that women are the mum of men and men as imams (leaders). So, if drawn to the red thread of religion, women are forbidden to become leaders as religious fatwas that emerged during the 2004 presidential election political battle involving SBY and Megawati.²⁷ In addition, the politicization of religion can also be noted from the support obtained by candidates who come from certain religious (Islamic) organizations in Indonesia, for example Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which have been major political vehicles used by politicians in their history.^{28,29}

People who were initially optimistic about the disappearance of sect politics or the politicization of religion are again pessimistic. This is because the state provides support for the revival of religion normatively, for example the role

of the ministry of religion which appears to be dominant in the wheels of government, religious fatwa institutions that receive large amounts of funding from the government, to religion-based regional regulations that remain in effect and are strictly maintained.³⁰ Thus, religiosity is no longer the identity of religion, but also becomes one with the identity of the state.³¹ At its peak, the role of religion became dominant in the lives of Indonesians as an identity.

The number of religious mass organizations in Indonesia is also considered to be a factor in the politicization of religion.³² Religious organizations are varied with all their roles and become pillars of Indonesianness and democracy. The religious organizations that the author refers to are not only those that have an Islamic religious background, but also those that represent the six recognized religions in Indonesia. Then, it is still added by organizations with nationalist, regional, and tribal directions that are evenly distributed in almost all major cities in Indonesia.

INFORMATION FRAMING BY DIGITAL MEDIA

Mass and digital media essentially have inherent characteristics including publicity, universality, periodicity,

²⁷ Noory Okthariza, 'Between the Internal Struggle and Electoral Rules Effect: The Challenges of Political Islam in a Democratic Indonesia BT - Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia', ed. by Brendan Howe (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022), pp. 39–59 <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4_3>.

²⁸ Muhammad Turhan Yani and others, 'Advancing the Discourse of Muslim Politics in Indonesia: A Study on Political Orientation of Kiai as Religious Elites in Nahdlatul Ulama', *Heliyon*, 8.12 (2022) <<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2022.e12218>>.

²⁹ Haedar Nashir and others, 'Muhammadiyah's Moderation Stance in the 2019 General Election', *Al-Jami'ah*, 57.1 (2019), 1–24 <<https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2019.57.1-24>>.

³⁰ Negara Hukum, Pada Era, and Otonomi Daerah, 'Peraturan Daerah Berbasis Syari' Ah Dalam Perspektif Negara Hukum Pada Era Otonomi Daerah', 2020.

³¹ SUNNY TANUWIDJAJA, 'Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing the Evidence of Islam's Political Decline', *Pacific Affairs*, 32.4 (2010), 29–49 <<https://doi.org/10.1355/cs32-1b>>.

³² Ahmad Najib Burhani, 'Fundamentalism and Religious Dissent: The LPP's Mission to Eradicate the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia', *Indonesia and the Malay World*, 44.129 (2016), 145–64 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/13639811.2015.1135610>>.

continuity, and actuality.³³ Publicity can be summarized as the media's agenda in creating and disseminating information to the public through a variety of content it creates and its reach is so wide (universality), the information conveyed always follows a certain period of time (periodicity) which is different, information that is continuously updated every few moments (continuity), and presents diverse and renewable information topics according to issues that are currently being discussed by the digital community (actuality). In its history, the reform era media has gained freedom that seems to have gone out of line from the ethics of reporting regulated by the national press council in order to create healthy and accountable news making and presentation. Digital media has become a tool for political and religious propaganda by putting aside the values of truth through the framing process.^{34;35}

Media framing in the communication science literature can be described as a form of selection and highlighting that the media does in relation to certain aspects of reality³⁶. For example, the

reality taken is the life of a minority of a particular religious group, but in the creation and distribution of information and news to the public only takes on certain aspects of the overall reality of the religious group. Meanwhile, framing analysis is an effort made by connoisseurs of information and news in dissecting and looking more deeply at how the media works to present a reality that has been constructed in such a way, even on facts that become the media's main concentration in reporting. So, framing can be concluded as a method that the media does in packaging or framing a case, event, incident, and reality to be presented to the public.

The issue of minority groups experiencing discrimination framed in different ways by different media can produce different interpretations and conclusions in the public. Thus, framing is closely related to the slanting of public opinion, the breakdown of perceptions and interpretations, and the psychological part of the audience desired by the maker of information and news. With the prominent construction of one or two realities in the news carried out by the media against certain religious minority groups, eventually there is a blurring of the dominance of other realities. For example, in a series of shooting cases in the United States that occurred in public spaces and educational institutions, media framing took the role of creating a blurring of the dominant reality, until finally the shooting cases in the United States repeated themselves every time without any concrete efforts to solve them.^{37;38}

³³ Christopher Andreas and others, 'Analisis Hubungan Media Sosial Dan Media Massa Dalam Penyebaran Berita Hoaks Berdasarkan Structural Equation Modeling-Partial Least Square', *MUST: Journal of Mathematics Education, Science and Technology*, 6.1 (2021), 81 <<https://doi.org/10.30651/must.v6i1.8816>>.

³⁴ Megan Boler and Elizabeth Davis, 'The Affective Politics of the "Post-Truth" Era: Feeling Rules and Networked Subjects', *Emotion, Space and Society*, 27.December 2017 (2018), 75–85 <<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2018.03.002>>.

³⁵ Natalia Tsvetkova, 'Russian Digital Diplomacy: A Rising Cyber Soft Power? BT - Russia's Public Diplomacy: Evolution and Practice', ed. by Anna A Velikaya and Greg Simons (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), pp. 103–17 <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12874-6_6>.

³⁶ Yasmin Jamali, Ghazala Shoukat, and Rameez Ali Mahesar, 'Comparative Study of Democratic Performance of News Media in

Pakistan: Analysis of Framing Theory', *Ilkogretim Online*, 20.5 (2021), 6897–6906 <<https://doi.org/10.17051/ilkonline.2021.05.778>>.

³⁷ Emma E. McGinty and others, 'News Media Framing of Serious Mental Illness and Gun Violence in the United States, 1997-2012', *American Journal of Public Health*, 104.3 (2014), 406–

In addition, among the popular functions of media framing is the steering of public opinion. The public obtains information and news about certain cases from mainstream and digital media, so that the interpretation of an event carried out by the public is not based on knowledge and information that has been known and trusted, but the flow of information from digital media that has been read and examined also takes a large portion of the role. Framing becomes a tool in socio-political movements that is used by elites and organizations to gain the same perception as the public through issue creation.³⁹ For example, by creating a common 'enemy' with the public and the public can ultimately be mobilized to support the viewpoints held by these elites and socio-political organizations.

In the observations that researchers have made in the past few years, discrimination against religious-based minority groups in the realm of digital media has turned into an area of public discussion and debate. Discussions and debates carried out by taking the theme and title of certain religious minorities do not always run in a friendly and sweet climate, but tend to be tangential debates and high emotions. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the attention of society as a whole is more focused on what is happening in the digital world and ignores the portrait that takes place in the real world order. In fact, certain political

elites utilize lower-middle class civil society to circulate and reproduce offline narratives (reality), but the distribution of content and narratives that lead to discrimination of minority groups still uses certain digital media platforms. Uniquely, the planting and planting of negative discourse to each individual and group is carried out offline with the initiation of religious actors and certain figures who have a large base of followers (loyalists).

For example, public and private schools (public and private) that force their non-Muslim students to wear the headscarf do not show a big wave on the surface because it is not done in the realm of digital media, unlike when the case occurs in the online world, of course it will spark a climax and massive discussion and debate between the two big political poles in Indonesia. Negative and political narratives in the digital media universe can converge in the real world, which seems difficult to mitigate and reduce from the public due to the strong and large amount of information provided. Coupled with Indonesia's public literacy level, which is considered still ranked "medium" in the world in the process of obtaining information and processing it into knowledge that can be accounted for.

Then, there are still a collection of accounts on social media from Instagram to Twitter that create and spread narratives with the theme of religious politicization and discrimination against certain minority groups on a massive scale. In the author's observations, these social media accounts were deliberately created and funded by political actors who have great influence in the political scene in Indonesia, including the owners of capital and entrepreneurs who take part in it. Another irony is the discovery of a group of political buzzers that are indicated to be affiliated with the government and trigger a process of

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<<https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301557>>.

³⁸ Thomas A Birkland and Regina G Lawrence, 'Media Framing and Policy Change After Columbine', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 52.10 (2009), 1405–25
<<https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764209332555>>.

³⁹ Bruno Araújo and Hélder Prior, 'Framing Political Populism: The Role of Media in Framing the Election of Jair Bolsonaro', *Journalism Practice*, 15.2 (2021), 226–42
<<https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2019.1709881>>.

religious to political polarization in the digital media universe involving two opposing political poles.⁴⁰ Thus, society in general becomes directly or indirectly involved due to social media users in Indonesia, which will reach 191 million in 2022 and an increase of 12.35% compared to the previous year, which was 170 million in 2021.^{41;42}

This is exacerbated by articles published by mass and digital media that have received political orders from politicians and capital owners. In fact, the mass and digital media seem to have acted like public relations (PR) for politicians to the public in smoothing political agendas. The owners of digital media and television companies are declared not to be independent, including in terms of the proportion of news and information conveyed tending to party owners who are also owners of mass and digital media companies, such as Hary Tanoesoedibjo who founded MNC TV and is Chairman of Perindo, Abu Rizal Bakrie who owns TV One-ANTV and is also the board of trustees of the Golkar party, and Surya Paloh who founded Metro TV and is Chairman of the Nasdem Party. So that in the end, the news and information produced and published are more negative nuances aimed at certain political opponents who are framed in such a way and become

public consumption almost every day not only when the general election is approaching, but also in certain periods and times according to the owner's orders.

MODERATE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES SPEAK UP

In the history of the development of religious understanding in Indonesia, there are at least 5 (five) major currents of religious models including liberal, moderate, conservative, Islamist, and radical or extremist.⁴³ The liberal group is a religious model that actively voices thoughts in the form of dissatisfaction with reason, tradition, norms that are considered too given restrictions by Muslim groups who are the majority (Ahlussunnah wal jamaah), then a moderate religious model is a religious life that synergizes between reason and revelation, respect for good traditions and culture of society, and tolerance between community groups with the main goal of obtaining common benefits and avoiding mafsadah (bad effects).^{44;45} Furthermore, there are conservative and Islamist religious groups, namely religious groups that make the traditions and culture of the Arab nation (Middle East)

⁴⁰ Norvin Dwiya, 'The Role of Buzzer Groups in Policies for Handling the Covid-19 Pandemic on Social Media', *International Journal of Social Science and Human Research*, 05.06 (2022), 2008–11 <<https://doi.org/10.47191/ijsshr/v5-i6-03>>.

⁴¹ Wonhyuk Cho and Winda Dwi Melisa, 'Citizen Coproduction and Social Media Communication: Delivering a Municipal Government's Urban Services through Digital Participation', *Administrative Sciences*, 11.2 (2021) <<https://doi.org/10.3390/ADMSCI11020059>>.

⁴² Bayu Kharisma, 'Surfing Alone? The Internet and Social Capital: Evidence from Indonesia', *Journal of Economic Structures*, 11.1 (2022) <<https://doi.org/10.1186/s40008-022-00267-7>>.

⁴³ Muhammad Parhan, Ristris Hari Nugraha, and Mohammad Rindu Fajar Islamy, 'Model of Religious Moderation in Universities: Alternative Solution to Liberal, Literal and Radical Islam', *EDUKASIA ISLAMIKA Model of Religious Moderation in Universities : Alternative*, 7.1 (2022).

⁴⁴ Agus Ahmad Safei, 'Promoting Moderate Islam in a Global Community through the "English for Ulama" Programme', *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies*, 77.4 (2021), 1–8 <<https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v77i4.6878>>.

⁴⁵ Ahmad Syukran Baharuddin and others, 'MODERATE ISLAM AS A SOLUTION TO PLURALISM IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD: THE EXPERIENCE OF INDONESIA', *AL-SHAJARAH: JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND CIVILIZATION (ISTAC)*, 2019 <<https://journals.iium.edu.my/shajarah/index.php/shaj/article/view/929>>.

at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the generations of companions as a duplication that must be used formally and campaign actively to the public about the obligation of Islam to be used as a political system in order to realize a literal Islamic state.^{46;47} Radical and extremist groups become the last religious model that carries out propaganda and violence in the name of certain religions to realize religious visions and missions according to the version they have.⁴⁸

The religious model above was born not only as a representation of one particular religion (Islam), but other major and recognized religions in the world have also been proven to be liberal to extremist. Jews who justify the colonization, attack, and murder of Palestinian citizens, Hindus in India who build power through political governance, discrimination, and islamophobic narratives that last hundreds of years as an inherited myth of past history, and other major religions.⁴⁹ Then, there are various characteristics that can be observed from the religious model that has led to conservative, Islamist, and radical-extremist, namely being apathetic to the development of the modern world

and rejecting the development of religious interpretation in adjusting in the face of changing times, making al-hadith which is the second source after the Qur'an as a literal reference without being followed by an explanation from the experts (Ulama), to make a strong refutation of all forms of traditional wisdom that grows at the grassroots of the community order which is claimed to have never been found in the era of the Prophet Muhammad SAW and the generations after him.⁵⁰

The digital universe is a representation of the world today. When every human being has used technology and communication tools in the form of smartphones that have been connected to the internet network and digitalization with the number of users of more than 196.7 million in Indonesia.⁵¹ Moderate intellectuals have been found busy making and writing works derived from their ideas and ideas in opposing narratives and propaganda that lead to discrimination against certain religious minority groups through websites that can be accessed easily and cheaply by the public. However, on the side of the lay public, it seems that they have already used Youtube media as the mainstream as a source of religious information, where it can be known together that the

⁴⁶ Syafiq Hasyim, 'State and Religion: Considering Indonesian Islam as Model of Democratisation for the Muslim World', *Colloquium on Models of Secularism*, 2013, 1–32 <http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2015/5692/pdf/State_and_Religion.PDF>.

⁴⁷ Harleen K Gambhir, 'Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State', *Background*, 2014, 1–12 <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Dabiq_Background_Harleen_Final.pdf>.

⁴⁸ Perdana Putra Pangestu, 'INDONESIAN MUSLIM IDENTITY CONSTELLATION IN THE DIGITAL MEDIA: Labeling Arrogant Islam by Permadi Arya on Social Media', *Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam*, 21.1 (2021), 55–71 <<https://doi.org/10.21154/altahrir.v21i1.2658>>.

⁴⁹ Thameem Ushama, 'Islamophobia in India during the Covid-19 Crisis: A Surge of Stigmatization, Vilification and Murder', *Al-Shajarah*, 26.1 (2021), 71–98.

⁵⁰ Sunarwoto, 'Online Salafi Rivalries in Indonesia: Between Sectarianism and "Good" Citizenship', *Religion, State and Society*, 49.2 (2021), 157–73 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1924014>>.

⁵¹ N I Purnayasa, 'Analisis Tingkat Cyberbullying Di Indonesia Menggunakan Teknologi Big Data', *Researchgate.Net*, April, 2021 <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ngurah-Indra-Purnayasa/publication/351141847_ANALISIS_TINGKAT_CYBERBULLYING_DI_INDONESIA_MENGGUNAKAN_TEKNOLOGI_BIG_DATA/links/608a60b092851c490fa3d11f/ANALISIS-TINGKAT-CYBERBULLYING-DI-INDONESIA-MENGGUNAKAN-TEKNOLOGI-B>.

authenticity of the sources referred to cannot be accounted for. In addition, ordinary people in Indonesia are also more massive to surf through social media Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, and so on, where through these media channels, ultra-conservative religious groups are found to show their activities quite massively.

The religious content followed by the cyberspace community is generally incomplete, even though it is serialized, because the content is similar to political demagoguery that attacks the opponent, does not invite reflection, but is a reaction. Content that is able to go viral and get the main attention of the public is a religious lecture in the form of a slant towards religious polarization, and all aim to go viral due to the characteristics of digital media called the principle of digital darwinism (the survival of the most viral). Thus, religious lectures end up being controversial, sensational, polemical and extreme in order to get attention.

The religious content obtained is not actually religious, but political. Although the content refers to the books of the heavenly religions, it has been produced based on the triumphalistic spirit and flavored with the political dichotomy of friends and foes. This is attractive and exciting for the audience, as it is similar to football and boxing matches in that it is easy to catch and has a clear picture of the enemy (opponent). Thus, the virality of such polarizing lectures is a result programmed by social media algorithms that ultimately brings profit to media companies, as the more controversial the content, the more profitable it is.

Then, the themes carried are generally about religious knowledge regarding bid'ah in the worship rituals of the majority Muslims, polygamy, sharia trading, and politicization of religion⁵².

⁵² M. Khusna Amal, 'Anti-Shia Mass Mobilization in Indonesia's Democracy: Godly

Thus, the digital world in the industrial era 5.0 has occupied a crucial, far-reaching role, and turned into a battleground between religious, social, and political ideas. In the end, it becomes quite a challenge in exercising control and spreading influence, despite the fact that individuals and groups who have concerns about religious minority groups have been busy speaking out, in contrast to the previous few years, which was known as the silent majority, namely transnational groups and conservative religious sellers with light mouths and actions to commit infidelity, liberal labeling, misdirection, and even attacks.^{53,54} In these conditions and situations, the majority group seems to have been victimized by their silence, growing fear, and inability to fight back as a consequence of being persecuted and bullied.

However, after the HTI and FPI groups were successfully suppressed and disbanded by the government after a long process, considering the voices of people who were tired and jaded by the behavior of their leaders and followers. The dissolution has led to a downward trend in social media aspirations (weakening) by these groups, as evidenced by the disappearance of social media accounts that originally voiced and narrated hostility in the name of religion loudly have turned anonymous. On the contrary, a new model of labeling by

Alliance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Exclusion', *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, 10.1 (2020), 25–48 <<https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v10i1.25-48>>.

⁵³ Muhammad Zainal Abidin and Yulia Hafizah, 'Conflict and Integration in The Salafi-Wahabi Purification Movement in South Kalimantan', *Wawasan: Jurnal Ilmiah Agama Dan Sosial Budaya*, 4.2 (2019), 191–201 <<https://doi.org/10.15575/jw.v4i2.6194>>.

⁵⁴ Noorhaidi Hasan, 'The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 27 (2007), 83–94.

government political buzzers who easily accuse other individuals and groups of being radicals and terrorists without in-depth study (*tabayun*) has emerged.⁵⁵

DIGITAL LITERACY BASED ON CROSS-CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS

When people in the digital era have drunk information that comes from a large river in the form of the internet, it raises new problems, namely the internet that has been distorted, filled with waste and pollution, therefore a response is needed in reducing the pollution of information waste. When individuals and groups whose ideas are oriented towards violent campaigns in the form of divisions and bloodletting, which when realized in the form of actions can endanger the lives and bodies of others, blocking action must be taken. In addition, it is necessary to create positive and healthy content with a large flow that can eventually unravel the pollution of information waste on the internet in the form of negative content, with the hope that it can finally be eliminated. Furthermore, firmness in law enforcement is needed, the resistance of fellow narratives, content development is not sufficient if it is not balanced with the boldness of legal entrapment for the perpetrators, the law is not in the sense of proving the ITE Law which is still getting a hot debate to be applied, but rather a punishment that is social in nature and enlightenment not to repeat in the same case (stop).

Then, continuous digital literacy education to the community regarding the use of the internet as a safe and friendly digital media platform for social

and religious life.⁵⁶ So far, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Ministry of Communication and Information have collaborated in intensifying digital literacy to the public, especially among Nahdliyyin who are the majority in Indonesia. This is because there are still people who have a high intellectual level who still disseminate information and news in the social media universe without verification and in-depth analysis, even the information and news disseminated do not have clear authors, sources, and contents. This is motivated by the anatomy of information that has a tendency to support its political position. A person will use any means to obtain validation or support for political positions, even sourcing from fake online portals.

In addition, cross-cultural religious literacy based on digitalization is considered necessary to be emphasized as a model of approach in thinking deeply, behaving, and acting with the aim that people are able to carry out cooperation despite different religions and beliefs while still based on the principles of independent thinking, spirituality, and their respective beliefs.⁵⁷ Cross-cultural religious literacy does not mean placing uniformity on religions and beliefs that already exist in the community order, but rather the diversity that is owned is able to be managed properly by different adherents through the stages of evaluation, interaction, communication,

⁵⁵ Ade Kurniawan Siregar and Eka Fitri Qurniawati, 'Analisis Framing Pemberitaan Buzzer Di Tempo.Co', *Journal of New Media and Communication*, 1.1 (2022), 1–15 <<https://doi.org/10.55985/jnmc.v1i1.1>>.

⁵⁶ Najla Amaly and Armiah Armiah, 'Peran Kompetensi Literasi Digital Terhadap Konten Hoaks Dalam Media Sosial', *Alhadharah: Jurnal Ilmu Dakwah*, 20.2 (2021), 43 <<https://doi.org/10.18592/alhadharah.v20i2.6019>>.

⁵⁷ Sumarto Sumarto and Emmi Kholilah Harahap, 'Moderasi Beragama Ummat Hindu Di Kampung Bali Kecamatan Nibung Kabupaten Muratara Sumatera Selatan', *Jurnal Literasiologi*, 8.1 (2022), 155–65 <<https://doi.org/10.47783/literasiologi.v8i1.355>>.

joint initiation to obtain positive opportunities in resistance and preparedness to face challenges that are national and international in nature. Thus, cross-cultural religious literacy in digital space is considered to be a form of approach model that is required (good) in affirming and reconstructing the potential and ability of religious communities not only with each other but also involving other interfaith communities actively and massively. The cross-cultural religious literacy referred to by the author is not a form of eloquence or incomprehension, but instead puts humans in a position that has the spaciousness of heart and mind to be willing to listen, observe, examine the gifts of differences that have circulated in the context of social interaction of religious communities.

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which has become the glue of the Indonesian nation, has succeeded in arousing the awareness of the Indonesian people at large to work together to build a common life that understands each other, respects each other, and can accept all forms of differences that already exist in order to create an atmosphere of peaceful and peaceful community life.⁵⁸ However, the changing times have brought a strong influence on the rotation of patterns of thinking and behavior of the community, the atmosphere of community life that is photographed in everyday life is found to have shifted in the realm of unhealthy competition, the emergence of tribal and regional, ethnic and religious sentiments, and communities or groups in all aspects that emerge over the interests of the nation and state. In addition, the pattern of community life that began to individualize with selfishness and groups also appeared prominent rather than building harmony, helping each other,

respecting each other, and strengthening each other. Today's digital era has encountered dense tangents that, if not managed appropriately, can lead to social friction and conflict that can lead to the degradation of human dignity and destabilize the nation as a whole. In its history, Indonesia has recorded various socio-political problems involving certain groups, indicating that there are still many obstacles in building harmonious life in plural societies within the framework of maintaining human dignity in the life of the Indonesian state.

Religion can be a glue and unifier, but not a unifier. The concept of unification is not gradual uniformity, instead it will become a new root of religious conflict. Unification can be interpreted as an attitude of tolerance towards religious teachings, so that religious people must be able to prioritize an initiative attitude towards diversity which is the priority of the nation's agenda. Indeed, religion does not teach coercion and violence, but religion encourages its adherents to be able to think clearly and honestly, avoid violence and injustice, and manipulation.⁵⁹

Digital-based cross-cultural religious literacy does not aim to merge religions, nor is it a new manifestation of secularism. With digital-based cross-cultural religious literacy, it is hoped that the strengthening of tolerance will build cooperation between religious leaders, religious believers, and adherents of different beliefs to be able to understand differences between people. However, the differences that already exist can be used as capital to build the country, society, and of course the relationship

⁵⁸ dkk. Isra Widya Ningsih, M A Lubis, and S Biru, 'Indonesiaku Bhinneka Tunggal Ika', 24.1 (2022), 143–65
<<https://doi.org/10.7454/global.v24i1.699>>.

⁵⁹ I Komang Widyana, I Made Darsana, and I Gede Arya Juni Arta, 'Religious Moderation in the Framework of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in Indonesia', *Proceedings of the Annual Civic Education Conference (ACEC 2021)*, 636.Acec 2021 (2022), 166–69
<<https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.220108.029>>.

with God Almighty. With a high sense of appreciation for the diversity reflected in *Bhinneka Tungga Ika*, a sense of civilized humanity will be realized as the second principle, treating humans fairly as the fifth principle, and realizing unity as the third principle of Pancasila.⁶⁰ Therefore, religious pluralism requires religious people to be able to mix and discuss with other religious communities.⁶¹

It becomes a humane wound when there is violence or crime aimed at imposing religion on others, because religion is a belief that each individual has. Awareness and belief that the common good for mankind will be achieved not when the diversity of religions and beliefs is rejected through the attitude of truth claim, defensive-apologetic, superiority or crushed into uniformity which is interpreted by assimilative. The three models of approach above, if applied in a structural way and on a massive scale, Indonesia can be ensured with high optimism that it can become a common home by giving each other the highest respect, even for religious minority groups.

ADOPTING THE POLITICS OF HUMANITY OF KH. ABDURRAHMAN WAHID (GUS DUR)

The political climate in Indonesia in recent decades has been filled with mutual hatred and discrediting between one political group and another. Then, it creates a large spectrum in the aspects of religion, ethnicity, race, to certain margi-

nalized groups and minorities. Meanwhile, the struggles and problems in the rising political temperature occur in a large ecosystem, namely the digital media scene. Digital media has taken a significant role in the efforts of political elites and their supporters to gain victory by using it as a means of self-proclaiming and campaigning to build self-image to the public to be willing to be part of and support the political elite.

The essential value of politics is the humanity that can be maintained closely without any attempt to discredit one another.⁶² Do not repeat the tragedy of division against the culture of people who have different political principles in future elections. As a result of the tension that occurs between political elites, it results in the abrasion of disputes among the middle and lower classes, especially in the realm of digital media. Narratives and behaviors that are hostile to each other have become a common sight as a result of the political power struggle that takes place every five years.

Departing from this phenomenon, it is appropriate for the community and the elite to reflect and carefully absorb the principles of democracy, politics, and humanity of KH. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) during his time as a leader and cleric (Kyai) in this country. Gus Dur is a fundamental figure of the nation and state who has an attitude of not taking political positions excessively and desperately, and Gus Dur is a religious politician who is able to get along and build good relations with his political opponents who have succeeded in building a structured and systematic evil conspiracy in bringing Gus Dur down from the seat of the legitimate President

⁶⁰ Rizal Al Hamid, 'Reinterpretation Of Understanding Pancasila And The Value Of Diversity In Post-Reform Era', *Empirisma: Jurnal Pemikiran Dan Kebudayaan Islam*, 31.1 (2022), 16–29 <<https://ojs.iainkediri.ac.id/index.php/empirisma/article/view/3629>>.

⁶¹ Demeiati Nur Kusumaningrum and Tri Sulistyarningsih, 'The Internalization of Nationalism and Pancasila for Teenager as the Value to Living in the Era of Digital Transformation', *Journal of Community Service and Empowerment*, 3.2 (2022), 1–10.

⁶² Imam Ghozali, 'The Criticism of the Political Model of Humanity's Twitter NU Garis Lucu Against Intolerant Groups and Government', 8.1 (2022), 1–11 <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.30983/islam_realitas.v8i1.5250>.

of the Republic of Indonesia at that time.⁶³ In fact, Gus Dur in an interview conducted by a journalist on private television media, Metro TV and TV One, once mentioned that he had banned his loyalists (loyal supporters) who wanted to defend and protect Gus Dur from East Java as many as hundreds of thousands of people. The goal that Gus Dur wants is to avoid bloodshed and loss of life as fellow children of the nation just to maintain temporary power.

The values that Gus Dur has left behind in the face of a political scene that is always full of hot and passionate tension are considered so relevant to be adopted by political elites and Indonesian society. Manners and courtesy in politics must be able to be at the forefront as a cultural characteristic of the Indonesian nation. Humanity does not need to be sacrificed to gain political benefits as the end result of differences in identity, differences in views, and political choices. Various deceptions, hoax news attacks that flood digital media timelines, divisive narratives and so on must be able to mitigate their existence properly. In the midst of a hot and tense political temperature with the emergence of mutual reporting and mobilizing the law, to the sale of hatred and hostility, the humanitarian political model is considered to occupy a strategic role.

CONCLUSION

Moderation in the digital world is considered to be an alternative solution that can be done to answer the problems faced by religious communities and the Indonesian nation in facing the coming political year 2024. Moderation in the

digital realm is absolutely necessary in order to create and maintain the stability of the temperature of religious and political contestation, which often uses God's religion as a campaign tool to gain public votes to discriminate against certain minority groups. In addition, Indonesian people who are enjoying the glittering era of media digitalization are considered to be a formidable challenge in the creation of inclusive religious moderation when they often have difficulty in selecting and sorting out information or news that floods from all directions. A large flow of positive and moderate information is needed to keep people in a safe position in surfing digital media.

On the other hand, the legal approach taken by election organizers in collaboration with law enforcers related to the politicization of religion and discrimination against minority groups has not shown optimal results, so that other anticipatory steps are needed in the form of educational and pedagogical aspects to the community and make the community have a unified view that the politicization of religion and discrimination against minority groups can endanger the pace of democracy and finally the community has a kind of anticipatory step (social filter) that is useful for fortifying itself against the discourse of the re-presence of religious politicization and discrimination against certain minority groups. In addition, a new approach movement is needed, namely cross-cultural religious literacy based on digitalization in the context of society being able to create deep patterns of thinking, behaving, acting in harmony in a pluralistic society order of culture and spirituality without eliminating independence. Collaboration and integration of all elements of the nation starting from the government, religious leaders, moderate religious communities who see politics based on the lens of

⁶³ Ratnadiyah Anisa Putri and I Putu Anom, 'Open Access Motivation of Visitors to the Tomb Area of K . H . Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) in Cukir Village , Diwek District , Jombang Regency', 1, 2022, 291-97 <<https://www.ajhssr.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ZC22601291297.pdf>> .

sacred and universal religious values, strengthen a sense of justice, provide respect, and put basic human fundamental rights in place or what is known as the meaning of humanitarian politics which was proclaimed by KH. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) as the 4th president of the Republic of Indonesia at that time and is still so relevant to be duplicated today.[]

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