Nation State: Journal of International Studies, December, 2022
Vol. 5(2), pp. 156 – 177.

E ISSN: 2621-735X
P ISSN: 2620-391X

Article

India’s Relations with Muslim Countries during the
Implementation of CAA/NRC: India-Indonesia and
India-Malaysia Relations
Hadza Min Fadhli Robby
Department of International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta – Indonesia
Corresponding Email: 183230101@uii.ac.id
Submission: 31 August 2022| Accepted: 31 December 2022

Abstract
In 2005, Imtiaz Ahmad wrote an article on the relations between India and the Muslim World.
Ahmad argued that the ties between India and the Muslim World would be determined mainly by
two factors: (1) the diverse and multiple identities of Indian Muslims and (2) the “relative
moderation” driven by the Indian model of secularism. In the wake of the current Indian government
led by the Hindu nationalist BJP, it is essential to review Ahmad’s argument. Although BJP is
known as a party that strives to strengthen the Hindu nationalists’ agenda in Indian polity, it is
vital to note that BJP maintains good relations with most Muslim countries. As BJP furthers its
plan to scrap the special status of Kashmir and amend the Citizenship Act, there are worries that
India’s stature in the Muslim World will worsen. This article would like to investigate whether the
Hindu nationalist outlook in contemporary Indian politics and the standing of the current
government towards Indian Muslims will eventually affect India’s relations with the Muslim World,
especially in the case of India-Indonesia and India-Malaysia Relations.

Keywords: CAA/NRC, India, Nationalism, Muslim World

INTRODUCTION
The influence of nationalism in the global politics has been studied continuously by
scholars. Since the implementation of Westphalian global order, nationalism is still
becoming the zeitgeist of the order. As nationalism provided sense of pride and sovereignty
to the nations, it became clear that each nation was differentiating itself from each other.
That differentiation could be seen in a clearer manner through ‘foreign policy’, or a policy
that distinguished central countries’ political orientations to the other. Nationalism
clearly ‘helped’ countries to delineate which countries could possibly became its allies, or
its enemies. As studied by Woodwell (Woodwell, 2007), rising nationalism had driven
several countries to carefully mitigate foreign influence and to exercise control over some
territories or people which were considered as alien or foreign. While the meaning of
‘foreign’ itself could be contextual from one case to another, the definition of ‘foreign’
depended on how a nation build its conception of ‘nationhood’ and ‘alien people’ as an
opposite of constructed ‘nationhood’. This argument strengthens the notion that foreign
policy and nationalism are actually related to each other.
Many other researches have also suggested that the rise of populist, right-wing, and
authoritarian populism in several countries prompted the aggressive and ultra-nationalist

©Author(s) 2022. This work is licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 International License

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Robby, H.M.F. (2022) “India’s Relations with Muslim Countries during the Implementation of CAA/NRC: India-Indonesia and India-Malaysia
Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

foreign policy. Weiss (2019) has explained the case of China, where the case of ‘rising
nationalism’ in China has resulted in more hawkish attitude in the conduct of Chinese
foreign policy. From several case studies in Armenia, Georgia, and Hungary, Jenne (2021)
also explained that the doctrine of ‘sovereigntism’ promoted by populist parties which are
trying to reclaim the sense of ‘authentic’ state community had clearly affected the foreign
policy orientations in the mentioned countries. In the case of Russia, Laruelle (Laruelle,
2015) elaborated that while Russian foreign policy might not be one that was being driven
by nationalist agenda, Russian foreign policy could be explained by some of its
nationalistic tendencies, which were shown in a post hoc manner after the 2014 Crimean
invasion. This paper would like to dedicate its discussion on the case of India under the
premiership of Narendra Modi. As explained by Wojczewski (2020) & Plagemann and
Destradi (2019), the increasing influence of Hindu nationalism in Indian polity had
changed the landscape of Indian foreign policy.
Several experts have remarked on the Premiership of Narendra Modi as a regime
that has created a pervasive climate of discrimination against the religious minorities of
India, particularly towards Muslim community (Farooqui, 2020; Kim, 2017; Kinnvall,
2019; Wright, 2015). The implementation of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and
the subsequent protests against the enactment of the Act has caused a series of violence
in Delhi in the early months of 2020. The Muslim community was also recently exposed
to the hijab ban for Muslim female students in the state of Karnataka, a condition
currently under the practical ruling of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (BBC, 2022).
These controversial policies have impacted Indian stature in international politics to some
extent. The ever-increasing discrimination against Indian Muslim citizens has caused
critical responses from global communities, predominantly Muslim countries (Iyer, 2019).
Although the responses from Muslim countries were not significantly damaging the
relations between India and the Muslim world, a detailed examination should be done to
investigate whether the BJP-led and Hindutva-inspired Narendra Modi’s premiership has
affected India’s position in the Muslim world.
This paper wishes to re-examine the argument once brought forward by Imtiaz
Ahmad (Ahmad, 2005). Imtiaz Ahmad wrote his article after a brief interregnum of the
premiership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who is also coming from the BJP. The government
of Atal Bihari Vajpayee happened when the world was grappling with the issue of global
terrorism, which actions were being conducted by several groups claiming to represent the
interest of Muslims worldwide. With the ascent of Al-Qaeda and its prevalent threats in
the South Asia subcontinent, India felt it needed to address the probable radicalism
stemming from the Indian Muslim community. In his article, Ahmad argued that while
Muslim communities in the surrounding region are experiencing radicalisation, the
majority of Indian Muslim communities remained immune from any radical tendencies.
Even with the ongoing turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir and the tragic incidents of the
2002 Gujarat riots, which happened between Hindu and Muslim communities, Ahmad
indicated that most Indian Muslims were not taking any extreme actions in response to
the amok conducted by Hindu nationalists. This immunity from radicalism, according to
Ahmad, stemmed from the diverse nature of Indian Muslim society.

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Robby, H.M.F. (2022) “India’s Relations with Muslim Countries during the Implementation of CAA/NRC: India-Indonesia and India-Malaysia
Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

Ahmad also tried to assess the nature of relations between India and the Muslim
World. According to Ahmad, India’s connection with the Muslim world did not necessarily
affect the radicalisation of Muslim communities in India. Instead, the changing
conjuncture of global politics after 9/11 is a definitive event that could transform the entire
framework of Indo-Muslim world relations. Ahmad argued that several factors, such as
the American influence over Indian foreign policymakers, the viewpoints of Indian
security and military establishment on the issue of terrorism and radicalism in the Muslim
world, the background of non-alignment in Indo-Muslim relations, and the efforts to
reorient Indian foreign policy, will be keys to understand the development in the relations
of India and the Muslim World. Although Ahmad had tried to present some general
outlooks on this topic, Ahmad has not explored the detailed picture of the case, particularly
in explaining India’s ‘relative moderation’ and the ‘diverse’ background of Indian Muslims.
Another part of Ahmad’s analysis that needs to be furthered is elaborating on the critical
developments in the relations between India and the Muslim World amidst a new
geopolitical dynamic. Ahmad remarked that the analysis of the relations between India
and the Muslim World should not be limited to the geopolitical realm of the South Asian
subcontinent but also extend beyond the subcontinent.
Thus, this research would like to focus on how India develops its relations with
several Muslim countries, especially in the case studies of India-Indonesian relations and
India-Malaysian relations. The research will commence its analysis with a brief
elaboration of the geopolitical vision of government influenced by Hindutva’s values. This
research will continue to explain the current circumstances of Indian Muslims and how
Indian Muslims should be considered as one of the determinants in analysing India’s
current standing in the Muslim world. After elaborating on the condition of Indian
Muslims and their respective position in Indian foreign policy, this research will also focus
on the CAA’s event as a critical turning point that changes the nature of relations between
India and several Muslim countries, especially in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia.
Some past researches have actually been conducted on the specific matter of IndianIndonesian relations and Indian-Malaysian relations. Singh (2011) has specifically
elaborated the nature of Indian-Malaysian relations from strategic perspective. Singh
considered that the bilateral relations between two countries were missing many
opportunities that are yet to be explored. While this paper has explored many urgent
topics on general development of Indian-Malaysian relations, this paper doesn’t
specifically discuss the factors that contribute to the development of Indian-Malaysian
relations. Another paper written by Chandran (2017) tried to see globalization as
determining factor in the Indian-Malaysian relations. Chandran contributed significantly
in the study of Indian-Malaysian relations by stating that there are three dimensions
which should be seen in order to understand the context of Indian-Malaysian relations in
the era of globalizations: political-strategic, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions.
Singh (J. Singh, 2014) also elaborated some cases of convergence and divergence in India
and Malaysia relations, albeit in general manner. An interesting case study on the
influence of Indian diaspora was also being constructed by Singh (2014) that strongly
argued Indian diaspora as a liability in the Indian-Malaysian relations. Lastly, Chandran

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Robby, H.M.F. (2022) “India’s Relations with Muslim Countries during the Implementation of CAA/NRC: India-Indonesia and India-Malaysia
Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

and Nathan (2015) noted that Indian and Malaysian economic cooperation stimulated
prominently by both governments. Many of these researches are mainly focusing on the
contemporary development in Indian-Malaysian relations from different sectors. Looking
at these researches, Indian-Malaysian relations has been assessed in many sectors. But,
there is a gap that has not been addressed properly in the case of Indian-Malaysian
relations, which is the influence of identity in the bilateral relations.
Indian-Indonesian relations are also important to be discussed in this aspect. Gogoi
and Srinivas (2015) have dedicated their paper to present some main features in IndianIndonesian relations. Gogoi and Srinivas focused their analysis on the recent development
of Indian-Indonesian relations, particularly on the issue of how both countries developed
their relations in new regional and global political contexts. Another research, such as by
Brewster (2011) and Supriyanto (2013), looked on how Indonesia and India could be
reliable strategic and security partner amidst new geopolitical development in AsiaPacific. Supriyanto further argued that India and Indonesia might share new common
visions as both countries are redefining their policy orientations in the regional and global
politics. In his paper, Mishra (2011) has also touched upon a significant factor that could
be main driver in the Indian-Indonesian relations, that is the factor of culture. Manners’
(2014) evaluation on Indian-Indonesian relations is also important to be mentioned here,
since he argued that Indian-Indonesian relations lacked the acceleration it needed in order
to further the bilateral relations. Recent research by Zhang (2021) also emphasized that
the bilateral relations between two countries could be advancing but it will be highly
dependent on the nature of domestic politics in both countries and geopolitical constrains.
This research will fill the gap in terms of addressing the identity factors and domestic
political dynamics which actually could in a way or another affect the nature of IndianIndonesian relations.
GEOPOLITICAL VISION OF HINDUTVA
Before delving further into the discussion on the Indian stature in the Muslim world,
it would be necessary to evaluate the normative framework used by Indian policy maker
during the premiership of Modi and Vajpayee. Many experts have remarked that the
vision of Hindutva has influenced the foreign policymaking process in the premiership of
Narendra Modi. Arndt Michael (2018) noted that there are some expectations from
domestic, regional, and international communities that the Indian government, under the
rule of the BJP, is expected to change its foreign policy orientation. Even though some
figures in BJP are cautious about the possibility of significantly changing the Indian
foreign policy orientation, the premiership of Narendra Modi is steadily incorporating
Hindutva values into the Indian foreign policy conduct. The strong dominance of
Nehruvianist tradition in Indian foreign policy becomes one of the main obstacles for the
Hindutva values to be adopted.
Therefore, as noted by Miller and de Estrada (Miller & Sullivan de Estrada, 2017),
the foreign policy conduct of Narendra Modi’s premiership follows a pragmatic approach
to balance the Nehruvianist and Hindutva values. On the one hand, the government of

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Robby, H.M.F. (2022) “India’s Relations with Muslim Countries during the Implementation of CAA/NRC: India-Indonesia and India-Malaysia
Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

Narendra Modi is pursuing policies of strategic engagement with many countries based
on the Nehruvianist value. Nehruvianist value is based on five principles of peaceful
coexistence, also known as Panchasheel. These five principles, which Jawaharlal Nehru
introduced, consisted of the principles of coexistence, respect for the territorial and
integral sovereignty of others, nonaggression, non-interference with the internal affairs of
others, and recognition of the equality of others (Verma, 1989). While the Panchasheel
principles are based on the non-alignment movement, the Hindutva values are trying to
contextualise the ancient Hindu civilisational glory and to further the Indian leadership
based on the ancient Hindu value of Vashudhaiva Kutumbakam. The usage of
Vashudhaiva Kutumbakam in contemporary times envisions India’s role as one of the
proactive leaders in ensuring peace and stability in modern global politics.
There are differences between implementing Hindutva values during the
premiership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Narendra Modi. Being a leader in the tumultuous
times, Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid careful attention to ensuring India’s security and India’s
territorial integrity against the potential threats coming not only from the surrounding
hostile neighbours but also from the religious and terrorist organisations claiming to
represent the repressed Muslims. Despite coming from the party directly linked to the
Hindu nationalist movement, Vajpayee did not act according to the Hindutva values.
Instead, most experts consider Vajpayee to follow the logical realist framework in
pursuing Indian interests in regional and global politics (Chaulia, 2002; Talukdar, 2018).
The hostile conducts against Pakistan and the Pokhran-II nuclear tests that were
happening during the premiership of Vajpayee were not an indication of Hindutva
influences in Vajpayee’s political behaviour. Instead, what Vajpayee is trying to do is to
re-contextualise Nehruvianism in a new geopolitical environment. Vajpayee once
considered that the traditional Nehruvianism constructed in the heydays of the Cold could
not answer the unprecedented threats (Singh, 2007).
Here, Vajpayee tried to design a new vision of peaceful coexistence that would enable
India to play a more active role in a region. The fast-paced changes in regional and global
politics mean that India has to be responsive in answering new challenges. In many ways,
Vajpayee’s conduct in Indian foreign affairs has been marked by strategic calculations and
careful engagements. The relatively stable relations between India and Pakistan, amid
the heightened tensions after the Pokhran-II test and Kargil War, indicated that
Vajpayee’s considerations were mainly motivated based on material interests. Vajpayee’s
premiership was tested by the unfortunate events of sectarian Hindu-Muslim riots.
Nonetheless, despite several harsh criticisms from Western countries, India under
Vajpayee has tried its best to prove its credential as a secular ‘Hindu’ nation that respects
and upholds the right of its Muslim and other religious minorities in front of the
international community. Vajpayee’s concerns about reforming the Indian economy &
stabilising Indian politics and security have made him realise that promoting the
Hindutva value in Indian foreign policy conducts could bring more harm and
disadvantages. Overall, realism and pragmatism in Vajpayee’s era helped India go
through a challenging era in Indian foreign policy.

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Robby, H.M.F. (2022) “India’s Relations with Muslim Countries during the Implementation of CAA/NRC: India-Indonesia and India-Malaysia
Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

If Vajpayee did not attempt to infuse Hindutva’s values into Indian foreign policy,
how about Narendra Modi? Does he attempt to stay away from involving Hindutva values
in Indian foreign policy? Narendra Modi is often called one of the most successful Hindutva
politicians. Additionally, he is also recognised as a Hva politician who follows the footstep
of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, mainly due to his pragmatism in his effort to catalyse Gujarat’s
economic development. After the sweeping victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the
2014 Indian parliamentary election, Modi had promised to reboot and reorient Indian
foreign policy in order to fulfil the vision of ‘Ek Bharat Shrestha Bharat’ (One India, Great
India), which the path toward the vision will be laid by the motto of Sabka Saath, Sabka
Vikas (Unity and Development for everyone) (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014). As
mentioned earlier in this writing, no one is quite sure about the reboot and reorientation
of Indian foreign policy that Modi will conduct in his first premiership. An expert even
noted that specific complex geopolitical triggers would cause Modi to act impulsively and
unpredictably (Sahoo, 2014). Several experts have shown concern that his legacy in the
2002 Gujarat riot and his repeated remarks on his commitment to reinstate the Indian
civilisational legacy will tarnish Indian credential as a secular and democratic nation, and
this will have severe repercussions on Indian foreign policy (Dalrymple, 2014; HarneitSievers and Bertram, 2014; Mishra, 2014; Prakash, 2014; Shainin, 2014).
What happened in subsequent years after Modi’s election to the position of Indian
Prime Minister has some concerns initially pointed out by experts. Modi intended to revive
the glorious Hindu past seen in Akhand Bharat's vision. This vision had affected how India
would view its non-Hindu citizens, its neighbouring region, and the larger context of global
politics. This intention of Hindutva to revive the glorious Hindu past was unfortunately
marred by the alienisation of minorities and communities outside of the ‘normal’
conception of Hindu citizenship (Anand, 2005). This worsening alienisation was mainly
driven by the ontological insecurity caused by the forceful exposition of secularism towards
the Indian society and the extreme responses from the Hindu nationalists against the
process of political modernisation and secularisation (Kinnvall and Svensson, 2021).
Hindutva is a by-product of this long process which eventually gained necessary
momentum when Narendra Modi’s government created a single, unified identity of Indian
citizens (Prakash, 2020). This notion of creating a single, unified identity of Indian citizens
resulted in clearly defined boundaries between the ‘true’ citizen in the realm of Akhand
Bharat and the non-citizens. They fell outside the ideal portrayal of a ‘true’ Indian citizen
(Wojczewski, 2020).
This tendency to implement boundaries and discriminative policies was deemed by
experts such as Anand (2009) as an effort by the Hindutva political movement to build the
conception of schizophrenic nationalism. The development of Indian nationalism with
these pejorative qualities had marred Indian images and Indian geopolitical standings in
parts of the Muslim world and the global community. While significant incidents between
Hindus and Muslims did not necessarily mark the first premiership of Narendra Modi,
several policies enacted by accomplices of Narendra Modi in the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), such as the politics of cow protection
and the paranoiac responses against so-called ‘love jihad,’ had been noted with criticism

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Robby, H.M.F. (2022) “India’s Relations with Muslim Countries during the Implementation of CAA/NRC: India-Indonesia and India-Malaysia
Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

by human rights organisations and international bodies. The debate surrounding the
system of the National Register of Citizens, which excluded millions of Muslims from being
recognised as full Indian citizens, particularly became the moment that brought India to
a critical conjuncture in its relations with parts of the Muslim world. However, there were
no significant impacts felt by India in this regard. The concerns of discrimination against
Muslims have been noted by several of India’s prominent Muslim allies in the surrounding
regions, such as Malaysia, Iran, and Afghanistan. In the context of the Citizenship
Amendment Act (CAA), many Western countries are concerned about the human rights
violations occurring during the anti-CAA protests.
Regardless of the critical evaluation surrounding the incorporation of Hindutva and
Hindu-centric nationalism in Indian foreign policies, several arguments have shown that
the premiership of Narendra Modi in both the first and second terms was implementing
Hindutva in soft ways. These arguments were constructed because some scholars realised
that Narendra Modi did not make any significant changes or reboot the fundamentals of
Indian foreign policy. Instead, Narendra Modi tried to insert some changes and
adjustments in the conduct of Indian foreign policy. The Indian government under
Narendra Modi was not going to readjust the Indian foreign policy radically. At that time,
the only rational option for Modi and his foreign policy team was to pragmatically assess
the status quo in the Indian foreign policy establishment and arrange priorities that would
align with new plans for Indian foreign policy visions. The Hindutva values were promoted
more softly and applied in a logical framework similar to Vajpayee’s realism alternative
to the Nehruvianist principles (Michael, 2018; Miller and Sullivan de Estrada, 2017).
Narendra Modi’s foreign policy team thus devised a way to pave some ways for
Hindutva to play a positive role in enhancing India’s image in international affairs. In the
examples of International Yoga Day and the promotion of Yoga and Indic culture,
Hindutva had become one of the prime causes that promoted Indian cultural diplomacy
globally (Miller and Sullivan de Estrada, 2017, p. 37). Another aspect that shows the
contribution of Hindutva toward Indian foreign policy is the promotion of BJP-led states’
accomplishments at the global level. This effort was inspired mainly by Narendra Modi’s
tenure as Chief Minister of Gujarat, which is now continued by most BJP-led states, such
as Uttar Pradesh and Bangalore. The re-branding effort for these BJP-led states is one of
the ways to softly promote Hindutva as one of the main positive drivers in the new Indian
foreign policy. The implementation of 5T (Tradition, Talent, Tourism, Trade, and
Technology) in the effort to brand India is seen as a part of integrating the soft version of
Hindutva into the Indian foreign policy (Michael, 2018, p. 70).
Another analysis that needs to be mentioned is that there is no connection between
Hindutva and the conduct of Indian foreign affairs during the premiership of Narendra
Modi. As explained by Krzysztof (2018) in his paper, the inclination of Narendra Modi’s
government to incorporate Hindutva in the aspects of Indian foreign affairs could not be
shown. This inclination is due to the fact that while Narendra Modi is prominently
displaying Hindutva politics in domestic political affairs, the case is not the same in
foreign political affairs. Notwithstanding the fact that the international community is
witnessing the discriminatory policies instigated by organisations affiliated with Hindu
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Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

nationalism, India can still conduct friendly and cordial relations with many Muslim
countries without any significant challenges or hurdles.
Krzysztof noted that there are several reasons behind this condition. Firstly, there
is a clear consensus on the central issues of Indian foreign policy, despite the divergence
of ideologies adopted by Indian political parties. Secondly, BJP, as a national party
pursuing a strategic vision in the global arena, needed to show itself as a flexible political
party. Considering the iron-clad establishment of the non-partisan Indian Ministry of
External Affairs, BJP could not allow the Hindutva establishment represented by RSS to
disrupt the grand design of foreign policymaking still implemented in place. A disruption
would cause a serious mishap to the whole foreign policymaking process. It is also
essential to be noted that the divergence of position in RSS itself on the issue of foreign
policy would be another critical point to disallow RSS’s direct influence on the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs.
In summary, the above explanation is intended to show at least three significant
streams in assessing Hindutva’s influence in the premiership of Narendra Modi. The first
stream argued that Hindutva’s influence on Indian foreign policy has strong tendencies.
This strong tendency of Hindutva brought severe damage that tarnished Indian stature
in global politics. The second stream of thought that Narendra Modi proposed was that
Narendra Modi promoted pragmatism with a soft inclusion of Hindutva in the Indian
foreign policy. The promotion of pragmatism is the only possible and rational choice that
could be taken by the Indian government, considering the complexity of the domestic and
foreign politics of India. The third stream of thought saw that there is no direct correlation
or connection between Hindutva and Indian foreign policy due to the existence of a solid
foreign policymaking establishment in India.
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND THE MUSLIM WORLD
Some issues surround the nature of relations between India and the Muslim World.
First, when considering the nature of relations between India and the Muslim World, it
should be realised that India is one of the countries with the most populous Muslim
communities in the World. Despite becoming one of the largest countries which host
Muslim populations in the World, India was not considered a natural member of the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Besides India’s status as a secular Hindu country,
Pakistan’s continuous attack on India in the case of Kashmir in the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation had disallowed India’s further engagement with the organisation
(Singh, 1994). Initially, during the founding years of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation, India was invited to present its delegation to OIC’s conference, but Pakistan
threatened to boycott the conference (Khan, 2019).
Recently, there have been several attempts from some OIC members to include India
as one of the members of the OIC. Some countries, such as Qatar, support India in its way
for membership in the OIC (Abhyankar, 2018). Bangladesh even argued that there should
be a change in the rulings on membership applications that would eventually allow India
to become a member of OIC (The Times of India, 2018). The disqualification of India just

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Robby, H.M.F. (2022) “India’s Relations with Muslim Countries during the Implementation of CAA/NRC: India-Indonesia and India-Malaysia
Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

because of its status as a secular non-Muslim country contradicts the fact that several
non-Muslim countries, such as Guyana, have been included as permanent member state
of the OIC. In 2006, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia also proposed that India should be one
of the ‘Observer’ states in the organisations (Gulf News, 2006). In year 2019, India was
invited as a guest of honour by OIC and the United Arab Emirates as the conference host
country (Mint, 2019). These recognition of India’s importance in the Muslim world are
notable signs that should not be dismissed.
It is important to note that several Muslim countries could actually think that the
voice of Indian Muslims is underrepresented in the organisation and some channels need
to be opened for these voices to be recognised as well. Pakistani opposition and its
continuing block against Indian membership remain the most critical challenge for India
and Indian Muslims to be accommodated in the OIC. Besides, the debates surrounding
Kashmir’s situation and the reactions also became a significant hurdle for India’s
membership in the OIC. Due to the official ruling in the OIC, an aspirant state could not
be applying to the membership in OIC when the specific aspirant state is having an
ongoing conflict with one of the member countries of OIC (The Times of India, 2022).
Second, the position of Indian Muslim communities as the one of the determinants
as well as crucial broker in the relations between India and the Muslim World should not
be overlooked. Not many researches are dedicated to analyse the influence of Indian
Muslim in the process of Indian foreign policymaking. With the amount of Indian Muslim
totalling to almost quarter billion people and will reach the number of three hundred
million in 2050 (or almost 11% in total), India will be a non-Muslim, secular country which
will host the largest populations of Muslim in the world (Hackway, 2015). However, even
when the population of Indian Muslims had peaked to the number of three hundred
million by that year, there will still be more Hindu citizens living in India than Muslims,
accounting to at least four Hindus in every five Indian citizens. This possible scenario is a
delicate one, noticing that relations between Hindus and Muslims in India are still having
the tense nature. However, this tense relations are balanced with India’s strong credential
as a secular nation in the global politics. India has been relatively successful in building
good and stable relations with many Muslim countries.
As a matter of fact, many of the relations were with Muslim countries were forged
at the zenith of Non-Alignment Movement in 1960s and 1970s. In this period, although
Indian Muslims were not having prominent roles in Indian diplomacy, India had
constructed cordial relations with Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq,
Indonesia, and many other countries within the boundaries of the Muslim World. As
indicated by Theodore P. Wright (1982), Indian Muslims had been able to become a
determining factor in the nature of relations between India and Muslim countries. This is
a particular issue that needs to be considered due to the limited numbers of Indian
Muslims that were being represented in the Indian civil service. Instead of the direct
involvement of Indian Muslim communities in the bureaucracy, Indian Muslims are
primarily involved through mediation and influence exerted by several Muslim
communities.

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Robby, H.M.F. (2022) “India’s Relations with Muslim Countries during the Implementation of CAA/NRC: India-Indonesia and India-Malaysia
Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

Wright argued that the existence of certain Muslim groups in India as middleman
minority have successfully exerted the interest of Indian Muslim towards the Indian
government. One of the groups is the Dawoodi Bohra’s community, who is known for their
political pragmatism and business networks, who was becoming the largest donator for
the Congress in the 1970s. Especially during the leadership of Syedna Mohammed
Burhanuddin, Dawoodi Bohra community have significant roles in strengthening the
relations between India and several Arab countries, such as Egypt and Jordan. On another
side, Wright also noted that the relations between India and Muslim countries were also
being disturbed by events such as the Arab-Israeli War in 1960s and 1970s & the Islamic
Revolution of Iran. Both of these events were giving detrimental effects towards Indian
government and the policies of Indian government towards Indian Muslim.
The Arab-Israeli War in 1973 had resulted significant impact on the economies of
the Gulf countries which resulted in cash donations to various Muslim establishment in
India coming from multi-million petrodollar Muslim countries. These donations were
enabling Muslim educational establishments in India to develop its capacity and also to
turn their Islamic orientation into a more radical and violent one. The inclusion of
Wahhabi-oriented curriculum is radicalising several students and quickly becoming
security concerns for Indian security establishment. The Islamic revolution in Iran has
also fuelled several separatists in Kashmir to openly declaring their support for Pakistani
politics and also to encourage Indian Muslims to become more confrontational towards the
Indian government. At the end of his paper, Wright did argue that the nature of India and
Muslim World relations will still very much be depended on the hostile relations between
India and Pakistan, and less on the relations between India and countries in the Western
Asia.
Compared to today’s geopolitical context faced by the Indian government, some of
his arguments are not holding relevance anymore. Nevertheless, several Muslim
communities are still playing distinctive roles in ensuring the development of relations
between India and the Muslim world. Not only limited to Bohra, specific Muslim
organisations such as Student Islamic Organization of India and also Kerala-based and
Azhar-oriented Markazu Saqafathi Sunniyya are also playing some parts – albeit liminal
– in developing the relations between India and the Muslim world (Visakh, Santosh and
Mohammed Roshan, 2021). The increasing presence of Muslims in Indian foreign service
is also becoming one of the main reasons behind the more robust bonds between India and
Muslim countries. Several of Indian Muslims’ foreign officers, such as Syed Akbaruddin,
Ausaf Sayeed, Salman Haider and Salman Khurshid, have seated in the critical positions
as high-ranking diplomats who have represented Indian represented in the global forum.
The expanding role of Indian diaspora and Indian economic interests in the Gulf,
which is mediated by Indian companies owned by Indian Muslim businessmen, are giving
significant improvements in the correspondence between India and Muslim countries.
Considering these recent developments, it is fair enough to say that Indian Muslims’ role
in crafting new developments and endeavours are gaining more importance than previous
decades. Narendra Modi’s government is well aware of this fact and involving more
Muslim diplomats serving in Indian foreign service to serve in more influential capacity.
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Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

However But, as being noticed by Huju (2022) in her breakthrough work on Indian
diplomats, there are several efforts to ‘saffronise’ or entrench the values of Hindutva to
the Indian diplomatic cadres. Despite of these efforts by the nationalist BJP government,
the inherent ethics and code of conduct which were already applied by Indian diplomat
cannot be easily replaced by Hindutva values and strong nationalist tendencies.
Third, it should also be noted that there are several issues which could significantly
affect India’s stature in the Muslim World. Among the most crucial issues in this aspect,
the case of Islamic radicalism affects India’s position and policies toward Muslim world
and Muslim countries. Central to the concerns of India and the Muslim World is the issue
of Islamic radicalism, especially the activities of movements related to Islamic radicalism
in South Asia and the neighbouring regions. With the rise of Islamic radicalist movements
such as al-Qaeda, ISIS and Jemaah Islamiyah, some Muslim countries are aligning
themselves with the alliance of Global War against Terror. The participation of these
Muslim countries is primarily being driven by American invitation towards these Muslim
countries. Regarding this issue, India is having some significant differences and divergent
point of views with neighbouring Muslim countries regarding the nature of Islamic
radicalism and terrorist movements affiliated with Islam.
The problem that particularly disturbed Indian establishment is the existence of
militia and armed groups affiliated to the radicalist movements within the borders of IndoPakistan and Indo-Bangladesh. Besides the activities of insurgency in Kashmir, India also
blamed Pakistan for not being able to resolve the terrorism and Islamic radicalism in its
own country. The existence of groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Laskhar-e-Taiba
and their series of attacks in India (notably the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, the 2007
Samjhauta Express bombing and the notorious 2008 Mumbai attacks) had been used as a
proof for India to accuse Pakistan and its security establishment to have either direct or
indirect involvement in endangering India’s security and stability (Doval, 2007).
How Indian Muslim establishment reacted to these terrorism-related activities? One
of the largest, earliest, and the most authoritative Muslim bodies in India, Jamiat-eUlama Hind has defended cases of terror-suspects and terror-accused. Jamiat-e-Ulama
Hind has even set up a legal cell in order to work and provide legal services for at least
700 accused in trials related to terrorism cases in India. These accusations were being
legally assisted by Jamiat-e-Ulama Hind due to the number of Indian Muslims that are
allegedly falsely indicated and implicated in cases related to terrorism. Jamiat-e Ulama
Hind defended its action as a part of an effort to defend the minority Muslim community
against the perpetual discrimination (OpIndia, 2021).
On the other side, Indo-Bangladeshi relationships were also marked by the incidents
of terrorism and separatism conducted by several terrorist organisations, such as
Harkatul Jihad al-Islami and Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh. These groups, has been
allegedly funded by Pakistan in order to disrupt and change the secular government to be
an Islamic system (Momen, 2020). Some of the activities conducted by these organisations
are also occurring within the land borders of India and Bangladesh and has increased the
awareness of Indian security establishment over time. Another issues that has that is

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Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

becoming a severe obstacle in Indo-Bangladeshi relations is also the issue of irregular
migration that are happening from Bangladesh to the states of Assam and West Bengal
in India. Some of these migrations were occurring incredibly happening during the years
of Bangladeshi Independence War and the following years due to the continuation of
political and economic instability in Bangladesh (Singh, 2009). This irregular migration
alone has contributed to the number of unrecorded migrants from Bangladesh that will
definitely impacted India’s societal and security stability. This eventually ended in the
enactment of National Registry of Citizen and Citizenship Amendment Act.
CAA/NRC AS A TURNING POINT
The debates surrounding NRC and CAA are not only going on between Indian
Muslims and Hindu communities, but also within the Muslim communities itself. Initially,
the debates are happening between the Muslim communities in Assam, one of the hotspots
of irregular migrations in India. Jamiat Ulama-e Hind branch of Assam has created a new
theory on the existence of irregular migrants from Bangladesh who have resided since the
years of Bangladeshi Independence War. Jamiat Ulama-e Hind branch of Assam
considered that the community were originally Assamese according to historical data
provided by them. Hence, Jamaat Ulama e-Hind Branch of Assam stated that this
community should not be disqualified from their Indian citizenship. A different opinion
was being presented by native Assamese Muslim organisations, such as Ujoni Asom
Muslim Kalyan Parishad. This organisation, together with native Assamese Muslim
organisations, is rejecting the “absurd theory” proposed by Jamiat Ulama e-Hind AssamBranch, saying it as having no clear basis (Acharyya, 2019).
When the NRC system has been established and CAA has been passed into the
legislation by two houses of Indian parliament, the series of persecutions start to be felt
by Indian Muslim. Several debates were notably occurred between Muslim communities
of India, particularly within the Shia community which was known for their strong
support and ties towards the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party. One of the leading Shia
clerics in India, Maulana Kalbe Jawad, said that Shia community in India should be
making a fundamental distinction between the NRC and CAA and not getting involved in
politically-charged issues (ANI, 2020). His statements were then criticised by many
parts of Muslim communities, saying that it does not go in line with Shia Islam’s main
message on injustice. Aside of that, not many Indian Muslim groups are supporting the
NRC/CAA, noticing that this could well be a method indicted by BJP politicians to fuel the
anger of Indian Muslims, which will
consequently make it easy for BJP politicians
and Hindu nationalists to brand Muslim as ‘anti-nationalist’ and to exclude Muslim
entirely from the general public life of Indians.
How this issue then resonates to the global level, especially to the Muslim
communities outside India? Indian neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan and
Bangladesh, are obviously disturbed with the notions that their countries are
discriminating the minority Muslim communities and non-Muslim communities inside of
their respective countries. Afghanistan, once a nation known for its affinity with Indian

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Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

government, also shocked by the decision of India to instate CAA/NRC rulings. Several
Afghanistan citizens even conducted protests against India’s stance against Afghanistan
in the context of CAA/NRC rulings (Tripathi, 2020). The reactions also came from not only
from India’s immediate neighbours but also India’s strategic partners in various parts of
the Muslim worlds, such as Western Asia and Southeast Asia. One of the India’s strategic
partner in the West Asia, Iran is concerned about India’s “discriminatory” policies against
Muslim and lack of actions against extremist Hindus. Despite the ongoing projects in the
Port of Chahbahar, Iranian Supreme Leader and Iranian Foreign Minister constantly
reminded India to restrain the acts of ‘senseless thuggery’ against Indian
Muslim(OutlookIndia, 2020).
Beside Iran, Turkey is also joining in condemning the action of several Indian
citizens towards Muslim as “massacre” (Ensonhaber, 2020). Several parliament members
in Gulf countries, such as Bahrain and Kuwait, were also joining hands in giving
condemnation and showing concerns for the rights of Indian Muslim (National Herald
India, 2020). The notable example of straightforward rejection was also shown by the
Malaysian Prime Minister, which questions the necessity behind the creation of CAA/NRC
rulings. Last but not least, several Indonesian parliamentarians together with Indonesian
Muslim scholar council were closely monitoring the anti-CAA/NRC protests and the
resulting riots. This paper would like to specifically address the India-Indonesian relations
and the Indian-Malaysian relations that were being affected in the course of CAA riots.
Indonesia and Malaysia were being chosen as case studies because these countries were
sharing similar identities as multicultural Muslim nation located in the same region of
Southeast Asia. Nevertheless. But, the responses of Indonesia and Malaysia towards
CAA/NRC policies could be clearly distinguished from each other. The analysis would be
focusing on how both countries are constructing response towards the CAA/NRC
controversies and reasons why both countries could be constructing different views on this
case.
INDONESIAN RESPONSE TO CAA/NRC AND ITS EFFECTS ON INDIANINDONESIAN RELATIONS
Indonesia has always been considered as one of the strategic allies by India. Both
countries has shared a lot of common concerns on many issues, ranging from economic to
strategic issues. Until now, India-Indonesian relations is not encountering serious
troubles and challenges because of this common ground. Kaura (2018) argued that in the
changing dynamics of Indo-Pacific Security, India and Indonesia had chosen to become
close allies to each other because both countries shared security and economic interests in
the region. Supriyanto (2013b) called this reinforced commitment as a journey toward
‘convergent mandala’, which ensured both countries to leave the mutual neglect that had
separated Indonesia and India for so long. Pankaj Jha (2008) also argued that IndonesianIndian bilateral cooperation could be working well in terms of security and maritime
sectors.
Furthermore, what makes the relations between Indonesia and India are thriving
is due to the fact that both countries have sensitivities in ensuring that they are not

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Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

violating each other’s sovereignty by rejecting to comment on internal affairs of each other,
such as in the case of separatism in Kashmir and Papua. This has helped India and
Indonesia to develop a sense of mutual respect and trust throughout the period of different
governments. Currently, both countries are already implementing the Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership as a way to advance the bilateral relations between India and
Indonesia (PTI, 2020).
During the premiership of Narendra Modi, India and Indonesia has reached
substantial progress in its bilateral relations. But at the same time, there are several
challenges that are started to arise during the early years of Narendra Modi’s premiership.
As Narendra Modi begins to strengthen the Hindutva credential in his administration,
several policies has been affected with Hindutva values. CAA/NRC is also becoming one
of the central policies that are significantly influenced by Hindutva. As CAA/NRC
effectively became a law in late 2019, several Indonesian Muslim organisations
intensively followed the development of CAA/NRC and its effects against Indian Muslims.
As the protest and counter-protest of CAA/NRC movement turned violent, Islamic
Defender Front and several representatives of Islamic organisations in Indonesia were
protesting in front of the Embassy of India in Jakarta (DetikNews, 2020). Some Muslim
humanitarian organisations, such as recently-banned ACT Foundation, were also
collecting humanitarian drive for persecuted Indian Muslim (ACT, 2020). Indonesia’s
state-sponsored supreme religious body, the Indonesian Council of Ulama, even sent an
official invitation to Ambassador Pradeep Kumar Rawat to attend a meeting to clarify the
current plight of Indian Muslims. The meeting was planned to be attended by
representatives of Indonesian Muslim organisations. Nevertheless, before this meeting
could happen, Ambassador Rawat skipped the meeting due to his official visit (Detiknews,
2020a). Additionally, it should be noted that Ambassador Rawat had met with
Coordinating Minister for Political, Security and Legal Affairs, Prof Mahfud MD
(Detiknews, 2020b; PKS, 2020). During this meeting, Ambassador Rawat had successfully
confirmed to the Minister that the situation is under the control of Indian
government. The responses were not only given by the civil society organisations, but also
by the parliamentarian members.
Several parliamentary members from 1st Commission of Indonesian House of
Representatives were commenting on the alleged discrimination and violent persecutions
conducted by Hindutva extremists towards Indian Muslims. Sukamta, one of the seniorranking members of the commission who is also member of Islamist Justice and
Prosperous Party, asked the government to strategically react against the discriminative
policies in India (PKS, 2020). Other parliamentary member from Democratic Party, Teuku
Riefky Harsya also resonated similar argument that has been delivered by Sukamta
(Tirto, 2022). A different opinion was presented by TB Hasanuddin, another member of
the commission, which stated that Indonesia believed that this is an internal affairs which
could be managed by the Indian government (Gesuri.id, 2020).
While the members of Indonesian parliament actively reacted to the controversy of
CAA/NRC, Indonesian Foreign Ministry did not provide any specific comment and
response toward the Indian government. Instead, it is the Indonesian Minister of Religious
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Affairs who has voiced his grave concern over the violent that has been happening between
the Hindu and Muslim communities in India (Kemenag, 2020). In this case, it could be
concluded that official stance of Indonesian government did not condemn the Indian
government, as Indonesian government believed that this is a case of domestic nature that
Indian government should be able to solve with its own capability. Thus, CAA/NRC might
have an effect on how Indonesian citizens perceive India, but it is not damaging the whole
nature of Indian-Indonesian relationship. Instead, India continued its strategic
engagement with Indonesian government throughout the critical time.
MALAYSIAN RESPONSE TO CAA/NRC AND ITS EFFECT ON INDIAN-MALAYSIAN
RELATIONS
As one of the countries which hosted significant numbers of Indian diaspora and
Overseas Indian in Southeast Asia, Malaysia is always regarded as one of the critical
partners of India in the region. According to the statistical data from year 2020, Malaysia
currently hosted at least 2.016.000 Malaysian of Indian origin, that is consisted of at least
6.8% of total population of Malaysia(Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2020). This
number signifies the importance of Malaysia in the eyes of India, especially in the era
where Indian government decided to embrace its diaspora whom it called as PIO or
Persons of Indian Origin. The Indian-Malaysian relationship has been established in a
solid foundation due to both countries sharing the similar fate as countries which have
been colonised by the United Kingdom. Many of Malaysian military officers were being
trained at the heart of the British Raj and also obtained education together with fellow
Indian officers. The relations between both countries were very much sustained by the
membership of both India and Malaysia in the Commonwealth organisation. Despite this
close formal affiliations, Singh (Singh, 2014) once argued that Indian-Malaysian relations
was a ‘missed opportunity’.
During the early 2010s, both governments of India and Malaysia successfully agreed
on several ground-breaking agreements that founded new pathways of cooperation
between two countries. Among the agreements that were signed include the Joint
Statement of Enhanced Strategic Partnership between India and Malaysia. Both
countries also established the Joint Commission that would enable both countries to
continue their engagement in a more constructive manner (MEA India, 2013). While this
positive trends continue to happen in the bilateral relations between India and Malaysia,
the return of Mahathir Mohammad to the politics and his subsequent victory slowly
changed the dynamics of bilateral relations between India and Malaysia. Mahathir
Mohammad is a politician who believes in pan-Islamist agenda. During the premiership
of Mahathir, Malaysia was aligning itself with the existing alliance between Turkey and
Pakistan whose trying to tackle the issue of global Islamophobia in many sectors (Anadolu
Ajansı, 2019). Mahathir’s vision in pan-Islamism and Islamophobia influenced his ways
in dealing with India. Many of the problems in the context of Indian-Malaysian relations
were originated from Mahathir’s personal values. One of the earliest turmoil in the context
of Indian-Malaysian relations began when Mahathir Mohammad decided not to extradite
Zakir Naik, who was allegedly accused to incite religious and racial hatred in Malaysia.

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Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

Mahathir Mohammad defended his case by saying that “not many country would receive
Zakir Naik and would ensure his safety” (Malaysiakini, 2019).
Indian-Malaysian bilateral relations was getting worsened once more by Mahathir
Mohammad’s remarks on Kashmir and CAA/NRC controversies. Mahathir Mohammad
commented that he stood by his remarks because he was only following the existing UN
regulation on the Kashmir issue and defended the rights of Kashmiri people based on that
regulation. Since the issue of Kashmir is a matter of national sovereignty for India, one of
the largest trade association in India decided that it will impose an import ban for
Malaysia’s palm oil product. In response to this, Mahathir said that Malaysia will carefully
assess the impact of the import ban and will carefully engage with Indian government .
Not long after the revocation of Article 370 regarding the special status of Jammu and
Kashmir, Mahathir also responded strongly to the CAA/NRC controversy. Mahathir’s
statement clearly disturbed Indian authorities because Mahathir said that he needed to
be frank about the wrong things that are happening in India (Reuters, 2020). His
statement was so speculative that Indian Foreign Ministry felt compelled to call
Malaysian Embassy to clarify Mahathir’s statement and call Mahathir not to comment on
any ‘internal matters’ of India. India even decided to halt import of palm oil and other
commodities from Malaysia as a retaliation to the Mahathir’s derogatory
comments(Reuters, 2019). Responding to this, Mahathir said that Malaysia will not
retaliate against and emphasised that trade should not justify any kind of wrongdoings.
In this context, some Malaysian MPs are also supporting Mahathir’s statements.
Langkawi MP and Lumut MP supported the government’s effort to publicly support the
cause of Indian Muslim, despite the trade ban currently put into place (Dewan Rakyat
Malaysia, 2020) . Besides this, there are no further comments from Malaysia politicians
and civil society organisations that followed Mahathir’s leads.

CONCLUSION
To conclude, it could be said that the government of India under Narendra Modi tried
to balance the national interests of India and its need to accommodate the Hindutva value
in the conduct of Indian foreign policy. While India always wanted its relations with its
strategic partners in region to continue develop in positive manner, India’s strong
inclination to Hindutva had affected certain countries’ stance on India. It could be said
that India’s decision to redefine the concept of Indian citizenship had really prompted
strong responses from many Muslim countries, including Indonesia and Malaysia who are
known as Muslim countries and also strategic partner of India. While both countries has
expressed similar concern over the CAA/NRC controversies, there are differences on how
both countries have reacted to and continue their bilateral engagement after the
controversies.
The case of Indonesia shows that civil society organisations and parliament members
are having essential role in shaping the discourse of the debate surrounding the lack of
inaction and clear policies by Indonesia government on the case of CAA/NRC. This lack of
inaction even drove Indonesian Council of Ulama to invite the Indian Ambassador for a

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Relations”, Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 156 – 177. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.879

meeting. A visible democratisation process in Indonesian foreign policy discourse could
be witnessed this case. But, civil society demands does not really push Indonesian
government to succumb to the demand. Indonesia’s strong ties to India really determine
the Indonesian official response in this case of CAA/NRC. As Indonesia has shown in the
case of Kashmir, Indonesia did not really want to involve in the internal matters of India
and did not want to make its response affecting other strategic sectors of bilateral
cooperation.
The case of Malaysia displays that Malaysia tend to see its credential as a Muslim
nation more important than its status as an Indian strategic partner. This was mainly
seen especially during the reign of Mahathir Mohammad whose tried to attract public
support by publicly supporting many causes in the Muslim world, including the current
plight of Indian Muslims. It could be seen from the Malaysian case that Indian Hindutva
vision in its governance could really affect and disturb the dynamics of bilateral relations
between two countries. The disturbance even brought serious consequences to the trade
activities between two countries. Aside of Mahathir’s personal values and inclinations
towards pan-Islamist agenda, the case of Malaysian identity politics could also be
influential in determining the course of Malaysian policies in the CAA/NRC. It should also
be noted that the lack of civil society response meant that Malaysia has a more centralised
and authority-based decision making process in its foreign policy. Malaysian people have
also entrusted their government to formulate the foreign policy program that would
represent their political and religious interest without necessarily have to demand more
from the Malaysian government.
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