https://doi.
org/10.
26593/jihi.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes Giandi Kartasasmita1,2.
Andrea Prisca Kurnadi3 Department of Political Science.
Tunghai University.
Taiwan.
D10530702@thu.
Department of International Relations.
Parahyangan Catholic University.
Indonesia, giandi@unpar.
Department of Political Science.
Tunghai University.
Taiwan.
D10530701@thu.
ABSTRACT
This study explores why the U.
Congress refused to ratify the International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1948 but approved the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994 despite similar circumstances: Democratic presidential leadership.
Democratic majority in Congress and pro-trade party platform.
Using a paired comparative case study and a structured process tracing, this study demonstrates that the interaction between individual ideology and district-level economic exposure better explains cross-party defections and divergent outcomes across the two cases.
Ideological divergence weakened party cohesion in both periods, but constituency economic vulnerabilityAiparticularly in import-sensitive or recession-affected regionsAi was important factor in shaping opposition to trade liberalization.
Keywords: Two Level game.
Trade liberalization Politics.
Congressional Politics.
Trade Institutions.
Ratification.
ABSTRAK
AU Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan mengapa Kongres Amerika Serikat menolak untuk meratifikasi International Trade Organization (ITO) di 1948 dan sebaliknya menyetujui diratifikasinya World Trade Organization (WTO) di tahun 1994, meskipun didalam kedua kasus tersebut memiliki kesamaan situasi.
Presiden dari Partai Demokrat.
Partai Demoktrat menjadi mayoritas di Kongres Amerika Serikat serta arah kebijakan partai Demokrat yang dicantumkan dalam platform partai mendorong liberalisasi perdagangan Dengan menggunakan desain studi dua kasus komparatif dan pendekatan process tracing, penelitian ini memperlihatkan bahwa interaksi antara ideologi personal dan situasi ekonomi pada level distrik lebih dapat menjelaskan pembelotan dan hasil yang berbeda diantara dua kasus tersebut.
Perbedaan ideologi antar anggota dalam satu partai, melemahkan kesatuan partai di kedua waktu, namun kelemahan ekonomi konstituen - terutama di wilayah yang sensitif terhadap impor atau wilayah yang terkena resesi - menjadi faktor penting yang membangun penolakan terhadap liberalisasi perdangangan.
Kata Kunci: Two-Level Game.
Politik Liberalisasi Perdagangan.
Politik Kongres.
Institusi Perdagangan.
Ratifikasi.
Introduction In mature democratic nations such as the United States, political parties articulate their values and ideological commitments annually through party platforms, which serve as guidelines for the political stances of party members.
Consequently, political ideology is expected to play an essential role in the decision-making of members of Congress.
Therefore.
Democratic Party representatives are expected to follow Democratic guidelines or positions, while Republicans are expected to act in accordance with Republican Party values.
Members of Congress are aware of the political benefits that could accrue to them if they vote in line with their party, such as party support for their future Conversely, voting against party preferences carries risks, as the President or Congressional leadership could punish defectors by withholding government funding or blocking future projects from their districts.
At the same time, members of Congress are elected by their constituents and depend on their support for election and reelection.
As representatives, members of Congress must take their 2 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes constituentsAo opinions and the potential impact of legislation on their districts into account when deciding their voting positions.
These dynamics shape the relationship between voting behavior in Congress and voter preferences at home.
Individually and collectively, members of Congress play a crucial role in decision-making.
Congressional decisions to draft, debate, approve, or reject legislation have significant domestic and international consequences for individuals and groups across the country.
Global trade, in particular, affects society at every level: it can benefit local economies but can also be detrimental to them.
it may boost national economic growth but also can contribute to trade imbalances.
and at the global level, trade can be used as a tool of foreign policy to strengthen or weaken relationships between states.
Congressional decision-making is therefore complex.
Members must balance policy control, in which parties seek to secure passage of their preferred agendas, and majority control, in which parties aim to maintain electoral majorities.
Prioritizing policy control may force members to take positions unpopular with their constituents, jeopardizing majority control in future elections.
Conversely, prioritizing constituent interests over party goals may weaken party cohesion and undermine the partyAos ability to pursue a unified partisan legislative agenda.
In making decisions, members of Congress weigh party ideology, personal beliefs, constituent preferences, and pressures from party leaders, the president, fellow party members, interest groups, and donors.
The most reliable way for political scientists to assess the extent to which members favor party ideology, constituent interests, or other influences is through roll-call votes.
By comparing party platforms with roll-call outcomes, it is possible to identify when members adhere to or deviate from their party positions.
This paper examines the domestic aspect of U.
international trade policy, focusing on Congressional responses to the creation of major trade institutions.
While in 1948-1950 Congress declined to ratify the International Trade Organization (ITO).
Congress supported the ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994.
It raises a key question: Why did the U.
Congress respond differently to the ITO .
8Ae.
and WTO .
ratification efforts despite similar institutional and partisan conditions? The paper begins with a brief literature review of Congressional decision-making behavior, followed by a discussion of the research methodology and case selection.
This is followed by a qualitative analysis of the two issues.
The study concludes that Congressional decisions regarding the ratification of trade organizations were shaped less by ideological alignment and more by the economic interests of legislatorsAo constituencies in their electoral districts.
Literature Review There are multiple primary streams of research into congressional decision-making, but scholars are increasingly emphasizing that legislative behavior differs significantly between inward-oriented domestic initiatives and outward-oriented foreign policies.
Domestic measures, such as welfare, taxation, and infrastructure, tend to spark broad distributive politics, consistent party agendas, and geographically diverse political interests.
Outward-oriented policiesAisuch as trade agreements, membership in international organizations, war authorizations, and sanctionsAiexpose legislators to global economic forces, executive diplomacy, localized industrial pressures, and transnational interest groups.
Because decisions regarding the International Trade Organization (ITO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) involve outward-facing economic commitments, situating these cases within this dual framework helps clarify how different theoretical strands apply.
One foundational perspective emphasizes re-election incentives.
David Mayhew emphasizes Congressional voting behavior from a strict reelection perspective.
According to Mayhew.
Congressional parties could assist members in achieving their electoral objectives, but they did not 3 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes pursue policy programs or pressure members to vote with them.
1 While Kingdon agrees with MayhewAos reasoning regarding reelection, he believes that reelection is only one of the multiple goals that Congress members have.
therefore, other goals, such as the desire for increased national influence and implementation of sound public policy, also influence their voting behavior.
2 These dynamics influence both inward and outward policy decisions.
however, outward policy is filtered by district-specific exposure to global markets or involvement in global affairs.
Recent study shows that globalization has increased constituency pressures: exposure to import competition, such as the "China shock," substantially encourages districts and their representatives to protectionism.
3 This finding reinforces earlier evidence, including Ardanaz.
Murillo, and PintoAos argument that members of Congress from import-competing regions oppose trade liberalization regardless of their ideology or educational background.
4 Mansfield and Mutz likewise show that local attachment and sociotropic anxiety influence trade attitudes.
5 Similar constituency logics apply to foreign security policy.
Parallel research outside the trade domain by Kriner and Shen .
also reveal that representatives from districts with high wartime casualty burdens are more likely to oppose foreign deployments, illustrating that constituency effects shape both economic and non-economic foreign policy, though along different demographic and economic dimensions.
A second major tradition is the spatial model of congressional voting.
Spatial voting logic holds that legislators vote for outcomes closest to their policy ideal points.
There are two distinct categories of spatial voting: ideological model and policy dimension theory.
McCormick and Black illustrate the ideological one, on how internalized worldviews shape treaty voting.
while Miller and Stokes demonstrate that legislators categorize proposals along coherent policy dimensions.
Contemporary ideological measures .
DW-NOMINATE and later ideal-point refinement.
show that ideology has become more polarized and increasingly predictive across issue areas.
8 In economic foreign policy, ideological divides map onto differences between free-market liberalism and protectionist nationalism.
Meanwhile, ideological orientations in non-economic foreign policy take the form of contrasts between internationalism and restraint, multilateralism and unilateralism, or hawkish and dovish worldviews.
Joshua KertzerAos work on resolve, for example, demonstrates that individualsAiand political elitesAiinterpret international commitments through psychological and ideological predispositions rather than purely material calculations.
9 These models underscore that ideology is not merely partisan identity.
it is a stable lens through which outward-oriented policies are The present study draws from this spatial tradition by examining whether ideological ideal points better predict congressional behavior on ITO/WTO than party platforms.
Party-centered explanations further contribute to our understanding of congressional behavior.
RohdeAos Conditional Party Government theory argues that party leaders exert influence when their members share similar preferences, while Cox and McCubbins depict the majority party as a Mayhew.
David R.
Congress: The Electoral Connection.
New Haven.
CT: Yale University Press.
Kingdon.
John W.
Congressmen's Voting Decisions 3rd ed.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Autor.
David.
Dorn.
David.
Hanson.
Gordon and Majlesi.
Kaveh.
AuImporting Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure,Ay American Economic Review 110.
:3139Ae83.
Ardanaz.
Martin.
Murillo.
Victoria, and Pinto.
Pablo M.
AuSensitivity to Issue Framing on Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a Survey Experiment.
Ay International Organization 67.
: 411Ae437.
Mansfield.
Edward D.
, and Mutz.
Diana C.
AuSupport for Free Trade: Self-Interest.
Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety.
Ay International Organization 63.
: 425Ae 457.
Kriner.
Douglas and Shen.
Francis.
The Casualty Gap: The Causes and Consequences of American Wartime Inequalities.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McCormick.
James.
and Black.
Michael.
"Ideology and Senate Voting on the Panama Treaty," Legislative Study Quarterly 8 (Februar.
Miller.
Wakken E.
, and Stokes.
Donald E.
"Constituency influence in Congress.
" American Political Science Review.
Bafumi.
Andrew and Herron.
Michael.
AuLeapfrog Representation and Extremism,Ay American Political Science Review 104.
: 519-542.
Jeffrey B.
Lewis et al.
, 2023.
Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Voting.
https://voteview.
Kertzer.
Joshua.
Resolve in International Politics.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
4 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes Aulegislative cartelAy capable of agenda control.
10 Yet scholars of foreign policy observe that outward-oriented issuesAiespecially trade and warAiregularly produce cross-party coalitions and substantial intraparty dissent.
Hiscox documents persistent ideological heterogeneity within both major parties on trade throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and Drutman argues that American parties until the 1990s functioned more like four ideological blocs than two cohesive units.
11 Research also shows that congressional polarization has reshaped foreign-policy behavior.
BinderAos work on legislative gridlock highlights how partisan conflict constrains CongressAos ability to act collectively even when national interests are at stake.
12 These trends reinforce that outward-oriented policiesAitrade, alliances, war powersAiare no longer insulated from domestic polarization, leading to increased cross-party defection and unstable coalitions.
This pattern appears clearly in both the ITO and WTO episodes: despite formal platform support .
8, 1.
, large numbers of Democrats and Republicans defected from party positions.
Thus, party control helps structure debate but does not determine outcomes in outward-facing policy, particularly those with locally concentrated economic Institutional theories highlight the importance of separation of powers, veto players, and Early work by Lohmann and OAoHalloran shows that divided government enables Congress to reshape international agreements, increasing the risk of ratification failure.
13 Mansfield.
Milner, and Pevehouse further demonstrate that additional veto players slow and complicate trade agreements.
These insights remain influential, but more recent research clarifies how institutional context interacts with contemporary political polarization.
Howell and Pevehouse find that Congress more actively checks presidential war powers under opposition control.
15 In foreign economic policy.
Weingast.
Goldstein, and Bailey argue that the stability of American trade liberalization arises from institutional arrangementsAiespecially the delegation of trade authority to the executiveAithat insulate trade policy from protectionist pressures and create durable, pro-liberalization coalitions.
Their analysis shows that delegation reshapes congressional incentives by reducing the political costs of liberalization and strengthening export-oriented constituencies, making Congress more likely to support multilateral trade commitments when these institutional mechanisms are in place.
16 These studies help explain why institutional environments matter but cannot alone account for divergent outcomes in the ITO and WTO cases: both occurred under Democratic unified government, yet their fates differed sharply, implying that member-level preferences outweighed institutional opportunity.
Interest group and lobbying theories offer an additional layer.
Classic treatments by Olson explain how concentrated industries overcome collective action problems, while Grossman and Helpman formalize how contributions can exchange for policy favors.
17 Mitra identifies limits to such Rohde.
David W.
Parties and Leaders in Postreform House.
Chicago: Chicago University Press: Cox.
Garry and McCubbins.
Matthew.
Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hiscox.
Michael J.
"The Magic Bullet? The RTAA.
Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization".
International Organizations 54.
:669-698.
Drutman.
Lee, 2020.
Breaking the Two-Party Doom-Loop: the case For Multiparty Democracy in America.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Binder.
Sarah A.
Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock.
Washington.
DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Lohmann.
Susanne, and OAoHalloran.
Sharyn.
AuDivided Government and U.
Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence.
Ay International Organization 48.
: 595Ae632.
Mansfield.
Edward D.
Milner.
Helen V.
and Pevehouse.
Jon C.
AuVetoing Co-operation: The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements.
Ay British Journal of Political Science 37.
:403Ae32.
Howell.
William and Pevehouse.
Jon.
While Dangers Gather.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Weingast.
Barry R.
Goldstein.
Judith S.
, and Bailey.
Michael A.
AuThe Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy:
Politics.
Coalitions, and International Trade,Ay World Politics 49: 309-338.
Olson.
Mancur.
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Grossman.
Gene M.
, and Helpman.
Elhanan.
AuElectoral Competition and Interest Politics.
Ay The Review of Economic Studies 63.
:265-286.
5 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes influence when opposing industries counter-lobby, and Bombardini shows that large firms disproportionately drive lobbying coalitions.
18 These findings affirm that interest-group influence is a defining feature of outward-oriented policymaking, though the mechanisms differ between trade and security domains.
The present study incorporates these insights indirectly by examining district-level economic structures that shape the pressure environment surrounding legislators.
Taken together, contemporary scholarship shows that congressional decision-making on outward-facing policyAiboth economic and security-relatedAiis shaped by a complex interaction of ideology, constituency structure, party organization, institutional constraints, and interest-group Yet most existing work focuses either on sector-level tariff votes, preferential trade agreements, or war powers, rather than on the foundational decisions surrounding membership in global economic institutions.
Few studies directly compare congressional reactions to two structurally similar trade organizations across different historical periods.
By examining CongressAos treatment of the ITO and WTO, this study applies modern theories of foreign economic and foreign security behavior to a historical comparison that reveals the enduring importance of ideological worldviews and constituency economic exposure.
Even when party platforms and institutional conditions appear favorable, it is these individual-level forcesAirather than partisan or executive alignmentAithat ultimately explain congressional voting behavior on outward-oriented economic policy.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses This study will focus on Congressional decision-making regarding international trade policies.
In 1949, the Democratic Party Trifecta in the United States failed to secure ratification of the International Trade Organization.
In contrast, in 1994, the same Democratic Trifecta secured ratification of the World Trade Organization in Congress.
The differences between the outcomes generate a research query.
Why did Congress react differently to the ratification of two similar free trade organizations, the ITO in 1948 and the WTO in 1994? This research will examine two competing yet interconnected theories of Congressional voting in order to provide a possible answer to the query.
Congressional voting on trade policy reflects both ideological commitments and district-level economic interests.
These two frameworks generate distinct but complementary expectations about how legislators behave when confronted with multilateral trade institutions.
The Ideological Model The ideological model posits that members of Congress possess stable policy preferences and vote according to an internalized set of values and beliefs about the world.
Thus, when a legislatorAos personal ideological position aligns closely with their partyAos platform, they are more likely to support the partyAos preferred policy.
19 Under conditions of ideological convergence, members of a party that endorses free trade .
uch as the Democratic Party in its 1948 platfor.
would be expected to support the establishment of a free trade organization.
Conversely, members of a party that favors tariff protection .
s the Republican Party did in its 1940, 1944, and 1948 platform.
would be expected to oppose such institutions.
Based on this theoretical expectation, the study proposes the following Mitra.
Devashish.
"Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination.
" American Economic Review 89 .
: 1116Ae1134.
Bombardini.
Matilde.
AuFirm Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation.
Ay Journal of International Economics 75.
McCormick and Black.
AuIdeology and Senate Voting on the Panama Treaty.
GonzaAlez.
Passarelli.
, and Puy.
, 2021.
"A theory on party discipline and vote switching by legislators.
" European Journal of Political Economy 66.
6 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes H1.
Members of Congress whose ideological positions align closely with their partyAos platform are more likely to support their partyAos position on the establishment of free trade organizations.
If this hypothesis holds, parties with high internal ideological coherence should exhibit more substantial support for their official Congressional position on the creation of free trade institutions.
On the other hand, when a partyAos members display significant ideological divergence, they are more likely to deviate from the partyAos stated position on the establishment of free trade organizations.
The Constituency Theory The constituency theory posits that members of Congress weigh the expense and benefit of their votes in terms of how legislation will affect their constituents.
International trade policiesAisuch as the establishment of free trade organizationsAihave uneven economic effects across states and districts, producing both beneficiaries and losers of trade liberalization.
20 As a result, constituent perceptions of the risks and opportunities associated with increased liberalism .
uch as the perception that the establishment of free trade organizations reduces state protection and expands trade liberalizatio.
are likely to influence legislatorsAo voting decisions.
As districts differ in their economic structure, they experience trade liberalization in distinct Some districts depend heavily on import-sensitive industries such as textiles, steel, or agriculture, while others benefit from export markets or service-sector growth.
Members of Congress are therefore expected to incorporate the specific economic interests of their districts into their decision-making process.
Based on this theoretical perspective, the study advances the following H2.
Member of Congress representing districts with high import sensitivity or economically vulnerable industries are more likely to oppose the establishment of international free trade organizations, regardless of their partyAos official platforms.
If this hypothesis is correct.
Congressional voting behavior can be explained by examining the economic fundamentals of legislatorsAo districts.
Representatives from districts that benefit from free tradeAisuch as competitive export-oriented or service-based economiesAiwould be more likely to support the establishment of free trade organizations.
In contrast, those representing districts harmed or threatened by trade liberalization would be more likely to oppose the establishment of such To evaluate these two hypotheses, this study compares the written party platforms.
Congressional voting behavior on the two trade organization proposals, and district-level economic Special attention is given to partisan dissenters .
ach partyAos dissenting ballot.
When a party supports free trade organizations as stated in its platform, the analysis focuses on members who defect from this position and examines the economic structure of their districts.
Conversely, if a party supports protectionist positions, the analysis centers on members who break from that stance to vote in favor of liberal trade policies.
Methodology and Limitation of Research This study employs a paired comparative case study, comparing the failed ratification of the International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1949 and the successful ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994.
21 Although the cases occurred 45 years apart, they share striking Kingdon.
John W.
Congressmen's Voting Decisions 3rd ed.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
George.
, and Bennett.
Case studies and theory development in the social sciences.
MIT Press.
7 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes similarities: each involved a Democratic Party president, a Democratic Party Congressional majority in both houses, and a multilateral trade institution aligned with the Democratic PartyAos platform.
This makes the cases well-suited for a most-similar system design (MSSD) that isolates causal factors explaining divergent outcomes.
22 To test the two hypotheses, the study uses a structured, process-tracing approach.
23 The analysis is structured in that both cases are examined using identical theory-driven questions regarding ideology, party cohesion, constituency pressure, and congressional On the other hand, the analysis exclusively incorporates material relevant to the two proposed mechanisms: ideology and constituency interest.
This research has a limitation that should be regarded as a caveat.
This study is experiencing challenges due to data imbalances.
In contrast to the WTO, the ratification process of the ITO did not advance to a voting phase, thus making the roll-call statistics for the 1948 ITO case study inaccessible.
As a result, conducting quantitative evaluations on the two cases presents methodological difficulties.
As a result, the ITO study primarily relies on qualitative historical analysis rather than quantitative Although this research could not statistically establish a causal relationship due to the imbalanced data, it is still plausible to conduct hypothesis testing through the application of process tracing methodology, given the contextual circumstances.
To operationalize ideology, this study employs a variety of indicators.
First.
ADA Congressional Voting Scores .
ange from 0 to .
are utilized to identify individual-level ideological preferences of every Congress member Scores close to 0 indicate a conservative ideology, while scores close to 100 indicate a liberal ideology.
Second, party platform-member alignment is assessed through a qualitative comparison of platform statements and individual Congress membersAo voting behavior.
Constituency economic interests, on the other hand, are measured through industrial mapping in the United States, which identifies districts with economic structures that are either benefited or harmed by free trade policies.
The outcome variableAiwhether legislators favor or oppose the ratification of free trade agreementsAiis determined by recorded roll-call votes in the House and Senate.
Data Sources Data for this study are drawn from multiple credible sources.
Party ideology and platform positions are obtained from the American Presidency Project, which provides complete archival records of Democratic and Republican Party platforms.
Individual-level ideological indicators are taken from Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) Congressional Voting Scores, which offer annual ideological ratings for each member of Congress regardless of party.
The Score measures the liberal quotient (LQ) or ideological leanings of every member of Congress.
Scores close to 0 indicate a conservative ideology, while scores close to 100 indicate a liberal ideology.
Legislative behavior is measured using roll-call voting data from the U.
House of Representatives and Senate, which record membersAo votes on the ratification of the ITO and WTO.
Constituency economic characteristics are derived from U.
industrial and economic mapping, including data from the U.
Census Bureau.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the U.
International Trade Commission (USITC), which identify the distribution of import-sensitive, export-oriented, and trade-affected industries across states and districts.
Together, these sources enable a systematic analysis of ideological alignment, constituency interests, and legislative outcomes across both case studies.
Analytical Strategy Hague.
and Harrop.
Comparative government and politics 6th ed.
England: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bennett.
Andrew and Checkel.
Jeffrey T.
Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool.
Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 8 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes This study analyzes Congressional behavior by tracing how ideology and constituency economic interests shaped decisions in the 1949 ITO and 1994 WTO ratification episodes.
Each case is examined to identify ideological patterns within parties, economic pressures in membersAo districts, and how these factors influenced legislative actions such as delays, defections, or support.
The findings from each case are then compared to determine why similar institutional conditions produced different This comparative logic shows that ideological divergence predicts which members defect from party positions, while constituency interests explain the direction of those defections and the overall legislative outcome.
Through this strategy, the study systematically evaluates both hypotheses and explains why Congress opposed the ITO but supported the WTO.
AU Contextual Explanation of Two Ratification Processes AU The Domestic Failure of ITO Ratification .
In 1930, under Republican President Herbert Hoover and Republican control of both chambers, the United States Congress enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, increasing tariffs by up to 50 percent to protect domestic industries.
The policy triggered retaliatory measures from trading partners, deepened the global economic collapse, and prolonged the Great Depression.
24 When Franklin D.
Roosevelt, a Democratic president, entered office in 1933 with unified Democratic control of Congress, his administration sought to reverse the effects of protectionism.
After considerable debate.
Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (RTAA) of 1934, granting the executive branch authority to negotiate tariff reductions without requiring full congressional approval.
25 The RTAA became the cornerstone of U.
trade policy throughout the 1930s and World War II.
As World War II ended, the United States and its allies, especially the United Kingdom, sought to prevent a return to protectionism.
After extensive negotiation, 56 nations signed the Havana Charter in 1948, which created a comprehensive framework for international trade cooperation, including rules against discriminatory practices, provisions for market opening, and the establishment of the International Trade Organization (ITO).
President Harry S.
Truman (Democrati.
strongly supported participation, emphasizing that acceptance of the Charter would foster global economic stability, expand international trade, and promote lasting peace.
His presidential statement on the Signing of the Charter of the International Trade Organization stated the goals of the Charter:26 AuThe Charter for the International Trade Organization is a code of fair dealing in international trade.
Member nations agree to work out mutually beneficial employment policies and ways of promoting economic development.
The Charter provides for limitations upon cartels and defines the proper scope of intergovernmental commodity agreements.
It establishes standards for the conduct of international trade A Acceptance of the Charter, in the spirit in which it has been framed, will stimulate the expansion of international trade upon which world prosperity depends.
By supporting the growth of a prosperous international trade, this code of fair dealing will contribute greatly to our efforts for a just and lasting Ay During the 80th Congress .
, the United States had a divided government, with the Republican Party controlling both chambers and strongly supporting protectionist trade policy.
As a Schatz.
Arthur W.
"The Anglo-American Trade Agreement and Cordell Hulls Search for Peace 1936-1938.
" The Journal of American History 57.
Jungsoo.
Kim.
"Institutional Persistence and Change of the U.
S Trade Policy Regime.
" Journal of International and Area Studies 12.
:17-34.
Truman.
Harry.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States.
9 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes result.
Republicans opposed the ratification effort.
Anticipating Democratic gains in the 1948 elections.
Truman postponed submission of the Charter.
After the Democratic Party successfully won both chambers in 1948.
Truman had confidence in the political landscape, and he then formally submitted the ITO Charter to Congress on April 28, 1949, for formal ratification.
However, the Democrat-led Congress did not progress the idea, despite public presidential backing and endorsement from the 1948 Democratic Party platform, which stated:27 AuWe pledge ourselves to restore the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program formulated in 1934 by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and operated successfully for 14 yearsAiuntil crippled by the Republican 80th Congress.
Further, we strongly endorse our country's adherence to the International Trade Organization.
Ay Hearings were held, but no momentum for a vote emerged.
The bill was blocked in 1949 and early 1950 due to both partiesAo filibustering it.
Truman reaffirmed his commitment in his 1950 State of the Union speech, emphasizing the ITO's role in averting a recurrence of the global trade instability that contributed to the Great Depression.
In his 1950 Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, he stated:28 AuWorld prosperity also requires that we do all we can to expand world trade.
As a major step in this direction, we should promptly join the International Trade Organization.
The purpose of this organization, which the United States has been fore most in creating, is to establish a code of fair practice, and an international authority for adjusting differences in international commercial relations.
It is an effort to prevent the kind of anarchy and irresponsibility in world trade which did so much to bring about the world depression of the 1930Aos.
Ay Nevertheless, congressional hesitation persisted.
Faced with prolonged inaction.
Truman ultimately withdrew the Charter and turned to strengthening the RTAA framework.
This decision allowed the executive to continue shaping trade policy through GATT negotiations without requiring Congressional ratification of a new international institution.
II.
AUThe Establishment of the World Trade Organization Beginning in the 1970s, the United States faced growing trade deficits and intensified competition from Europe and Asia, the rise of Japan, and the Asian Tigers.
Rising concerns over market access, intellectual property protection, and trade imbalances prompted Congress to call for a stronger response.
The Trade Act of 1974 reflected this shift by granting the President Aufast-trackAy authority for trade negotiationsAiallowing Congress only to approve or reject agreements without amendmentAias well as empowering the executive to respond to unfair foreign trade practices using Section 301.
The 1974 Trade Law itself has two significant aspects: first, the shifting perspective of United States political actors on international trade from free trade to fair trade, and second, the self-proclaimed capacity to determine domestic injury and act accordingly.
Table 1.
The United States Trade Balance 1970-2021 Democratic Party.
Democratic Party Platform 1948.
Truman.
Harry.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States.
10 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes Year Balance in Billions of US$ Percentage of GDP Year Balance in Billions of US$ Percentage of GDP $3.
$-96.
$0.
$-101.
$-3.
$-162.
$4.
$-259.
$-0.
$-381.
$15.
$-376.
$-1.
$-439.
$-23.
$-521.
$-25.
$-634.
$-22.
$-739.
$-13.
$-786.
$-12.
$-735.
$-19.
$-740.
$-51.
$-419.
$-102.
$-532.
$-114.
$-579.
$-131.
$-551.
$-144.
$-479.
$-109.
$-510.
$-86.
$-526.
$-77.
$-506.
$-28.
$-536.
$-34.
$-593.
$-65.
$-578.
$-92.
$-627.
$-89.
$-861.
Source: The Bureau of Economic Analysis As a result of expanding congressional pressure to reduce the nationAos trade imbalance.
President Ronald Reagan (Republica.
was compelled to modify his trade policy.
Ambassador William 11 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes Brock, then of the United States Trade Representative, previously stated that the executive trade policy centered on free trade based on mutually accepted trade relations.
White House Chief of Staff Donald T.
Regan revised the White House trade policy, stating that fair trade is a necessary condition for free trade.
Increasing Executive awareness of Aufair tradeAy alters the notion of international trade fairness.
For example, the United States demanded an AoequalAo share of overseas markets for its industries on the basis of reciprocity.
In an AuunfairAy international trade climate, the rising demand for fairness is driven not only by the trade deficit in commodities but also by projected increases and losses in industrial sectorsAo goods and services revenue (Marchetti and Mavroidis, 2.
Graph 1.
United States Goods and Services Trade Balance Source: The Bureau of Economic Analysis Throughout the 1980s.
trade debates increasingly centered on fairness, reciprocity, and the protection of technological and service-sector competitiveness.
domestic industries played significant roles in shaping policy during this period.
The Coalition of Services Industries (CSI) emerged in 1982 to promote service-sector liberalization and influence U.
trade policy.
Its engagement expanded as service exports became central to the U.
economic strategy.
Simultaneously, industries dependent on strong intellectual property protectionAisuch as pharmaceuticals, chemical companies, and technology firmsAibecame increasingly organized.
The Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), led by senior figures from Pfizer.
Edmund T.
Pratt31 and other major firms, played a critical role in shaping U.
negotiating priorities during the Uruguay Round.
Their influence grew through advisory committees such as the Services Policy Advisory Committee (SPAC) and the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations (ACTN).
Concerns about inadequate intellectual property protection abroad further intensified domestic The U.
International Trade Commission estimated that pharmaceutical companies faced hundreds of millions of dollars in losses due to weak international patent enforcement.
These economic concerns pushed the United States to advocate for stronger global intellectual property rules.
The Uruguay Round negotiations culminated in the 1994 Final Act, signed in Marrakesh, which established the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The WTO introduced innovative frameworks Niskanen.
William A.
Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies and the People.
Oxford: Oxford University Press Marchetti.
Juan A.
, and Mavroidis.
Petros C.
AuThe Genesis of the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services.
Ay The European Journal of International Law 22.
Lowenfeld.
Andreas.
International Economic Law 2nd ed.
New York: Oxford University Press.
12 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes governing goods (GATT), services (GATS), intellectual property (TRIPS), dispute settlement mechanisms, trade policy reviews, and plurilateral agreements.
32 Following the conclusion of the negotiations.
Congress approved U.
accession to the WTO on December 1, 1994.
Case Analysis This research analysis begins by testing the first hypothesis, which posits that members whose ideological positions align with their party's platform are more likely to support the partyAos stance on the establishment of free trade organizations.
The expectation is that Democratic party members, whose 1948 platform explicitly endorsed the creation of the International Trade Organization, would support the ITO, while Republicans, whose platform leaned strongly toward protectionism, would oppose it.
As shown in Table 2, this expectation aligns with historical evidence.
Although the 1948 Republican Party platform did not explicitly mention the ITO, the Republican-controlled Ways and Means Committee quickly passed a resolution rejecting the CharterAos commitments, stating that the executive's signature on the ITO would not be considered as the United States' commitment to accept any provisions of the International Trade Organization's charter,33 demonstrating clear partisan opposition to the proposal.
However, after President Harry Truman submitted the ITO Charter for Congressional approval and ratification in 1949, neither party pushed the measure forward.
Both Democrats and Republicans prolonged debate, effectively filibustering the bill and allowing it to stall until the end of the first session of the 81st Congress .
October 1.
and throughout the first half of the second session of the 81st Congress.
President Truman, frustrated by resistance within his own party, eventually withdrew the proposal.
He retracted the ratification measure and negotiated with Congress a more flexible Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (RTAA).
34 This sequence of events reveals the mechanism predicted by the ideological model.
Despite unified Democratic control, ideological heterogeneity within the Democratic caucus weakened party cohesion and prevented the party from advancing its own platform commitment.
To assess these further, ideological patterns are examined using ADA voting records.
These scores, presented in Table 3, show substantial ideological variance within both parties in 1949 and In 1949, the Democratic caucus was divided between liberal New Deal members and conservative Southern Democrats, the latter of whom were significantly out of step with the partyAos pro-trade platform.
Scores near the conservative end .
are standard among Democrats, suggesting a lack of ideological coherence.
This divergence provides a clear explanation for why the Democratic majority failed to act: members whose ideological preferences deviated from the partyAos stated support for the ITO refused to advance the Charter.
Thus, the 1949 case demonstrates how ideological fragmentationAiconsistent with H1Aican prevent a party from delivering unified legislative action even when it holds an institutional majority.
Downes.
Gerard.
AuThe Utilisation of Agenda-Setting Power in the Multilateral Trading SystemAos Evolution From AoNegativeAo To AoPositiveAo Integration.
Ay Revista Castellano-Manchega de Ciencias sociales 12:65-80.
Irwin.
Douglas A.
"Clashing over Commerce.
A History of US Trade Policy" Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp.
Lowenfeld.
International Economic Law.
13 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes Table 2.
Party Platforms and Voting on the Establishment of Free Trade Organizations Date International Trade Policy President Senate Composition House Composition Notes and Additional Information ITO signing by the Executive Harry S.
Truman (Democrat Democrat 45.
Republican Democrat 186.
Republican Divided Government, with the Republicans in control of both Chambers of Congress, the Truman administration chose not to submit the charter to Congress until after the 1948 election, which they hoped would return the Democrats to power and significantly improve the chance of getting the ITO approved.
April President Truman submitted ITO for Congress approval Democrat 53.
Republican Democrat 259.
Republican Democratic Party 1948 Platform:
We pledge ourselves to restore the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, formulated in 1934 by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and successfully operated for 14 yearsAiuntil crippled by the Republican 80th Congress.
Further, we strongly endorse our country's adherence to the International Trade Organization .
8 Democrat Party Platfor.
Republican Party Platform 1948:
Within the prudent limits of our own economic welfare, we shall cooperate, on a basis of self-help and mutual aid, to assist other peace-loving nations to restore their financial independence and the human rights and fundamental freedoms for which we fought two wars and upon which dependable peace must build.
We shall insist on businesslike and efficient administration of all foreign aid.
14 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes We shall nourish these Pan-American agreements in the new spirit of co-operation which implements the Monroe Doctrine.
Republican Party Platfor.
Congress Situation:
Unified Democrat Trifecta.
Democratic Party held 55.
2% of Senate voting share and 60.
4% of House of Representatives voting share.
However, the majority power in Congress did not produce Voting or ratification.
President Truman retracted the ratification process and decided not to send the ITO for further congressional Ratification of the WTO Bill Clinton (Democrat Democrat 53.
Republican Democrat 259.
Republican Hearing did not produce voting.
Despite the Unified Democrat Trifecta.
President Truman did not have confidence that Democratic Congressmen would vote for the creation of the International Trade Organization (ITO).
At the same time, he was sure that Republican Congressmen would object because of the then-Republican Party Platform.
Democrat 55.
Republican Democrat 256.
Republican The Democratic Party 1992 Platform:
The United States cannot be strong abroad if it is weak at home.
Restoring America's global economic leadership must become a central element of our national security policies.
The strength of nations, once defined in military terms, is now measured also by the skills of their workers, the imagination of their managers, and the power of their technologies.
Either we develop and pursue a national plan to restore our economy through a partnership of government, labor, and business, or we slip behind the nations competing with us and growing.
At stake are American jobs, our standard of living, and the quality of life for ourselves and our children.
Our government must work to expand trade while insisting that global trade is fair.
15 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes must fight to uphold American interestsAipromoting exports, expanding trade in agricultural and other products, opening markets in major product and service sectors with our principal competitors, and achieving reciprocal access.
Multilateral trade agreements can advance our economic interests by expanding the global economy .
2 Democratic Party Platfor.
The Republican Party 1992 Platform:
We are tough free traders, battling to sweep away barriers to our We are waging the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations to secure worldwide tariff reductions, the elimination of subsidies, and protection of American intellectual property rights.
We are fighting to reduce farm subsidies in the European Community and to break up their government-industry collusion in the production of civil We firmly endorse President Bush's policy of supporting the Republic of China on Taiwan in international trade and in its accession to GATT.
Significant market access gains have been made with Japan, with American manufacturing exports tripling since Throughout the world, we enforced greater compliance with trade rights.
And we are making every effort to bring home a Uruguay Round agreement that is not only good for America, but great for tomorrow's entrepreneurs everywhere.
2 Republican Party Platfor.
Congress Situation:
Unified Democrat Trifecta.
however, the roll call for ratifying the WTO showed that both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party split.
More than 20% Senators from both parties objected the WTO ratification.
While in the House of Representatives, the number 16 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes was higher.
The number of defectors was above 30% for both Republicans and Democrats.
Source: Republican Party Platforms.
Democratic Party Platforms.
Senate, and House of Representatives roll calls.
Compiled by the author.
17 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes Table 3.
American for Democratic Action (ADA) House of Representatives Voting Score for the years 1949 and 1994 Democratic Party Score House Republican Party Senate House Total Number Senate Source: American for Democratic Action Compared with the 1994 WTO ratification, a similar pattern of ideological divergence Table 4 shows that both the Democratic and Republican platforms endorsed the WTO.
Yet, more than 20 percent of Senators and more than 30 percent of House members from each party voted against ratification.
This again reflects the mechanism anticipated by H1: ideological divergence within parties reduces the likelihood that members will follow the party platform.
ADA scores in 1994 confirm this.
Both parties retained substantial ideological diversity, and members in the conservative ideological range were disproportionately represented among defectors.
These patterns align closely with the expectations of the ideological model and reinforce the conclusion that ideological variation within parties is a consistent predictor of defection in both periods.
Table 4.
Congressional Voting on WTO Ratification Numbe r of Seats Nay Percentage of Voting Yay Yay Percentage of Voting Nay Democratic Republican Democratic Republican Senate House of Representatives Source: Senate vote number 329 and House of Representatives roll call 507 on Bill Number H.
18 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes AU In fact, intraparty differences over trade policy have existed since the 19th century, long before the Congress ratified the ITO and the WTO.
According to Michael J.
Hiscox, the growing diversity of each party's primary constituency has always influenced party cohesion.
35 According to Lee Drutman, until political realignment in the 1990s, the American party system at all levels of government was biparty in structure but four-party in practice.
36 What Drutman meant is that there were Conservative voters in both Republican and Democratic parties, as well as liberal voters in both parties.
Therefore, the regional party strength .
t least until 1.
became less influential in determining congressional voting behavior.
Hiscox and Drutman's arguments align with the Congressional Party cohesiveness score in trade votes depicted in Graph 2.
Graph 2.
Party Cohesiveness Score in Senate and House of Representatives House of RepresentativesAU The Senate AU Source: Michael J Hiscox .
However, the patterns of opposition also reveal precise constituency-driven mechanisms.
Historical scholarship and the economic data strongly indicate that members representing import-sensitive or economically vulnerable districts were much more likely to oppose liberalization, regardless of party platform.
This becomes especially clear in the WTO case, where roll-call votes were recorded.
Examining the representatives who voted AunoAy, as showed in Tables 5 and 6, reveals that opposition clustered in four major economic regions: agricultural states such as Montana.
North Dakota, and Colorado.
Rust Belt industrial states such as Ohio.
Michigan.
Minnesota.
Illinois, and Indiana.
timber, fishing and resource extraction in Alaska.
and the Textile Belt in the western part of United States such as North and South Carolina.
Georgia, and Alabama.
This concentration of opposition shows the mechanism predicted by the constituency model: legislators in regions abundant in import-competing factors .
nskilled labor, natural resources sectors and declining manufacturin.
tend to resist trade agreement that threaten local economy.
Hiscox.
Michael J.
"The Magic Bullet? The RTAA.
Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization".
International Organizations 54.
:669-698.
Drutman.
Lee, 2020.
Breaking the Two-Party Doom-Loop: the case For Multiparty Democracy in America.
New York:
Oxford University Press.
19 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes Table 5.
House of Representatives Objector for the Ratification of the WTO Representative Name State/Party District Browder Alabama (D) Cramer Alabama (D) Hilliard Alabama (D) Condit California (D) Dellums California (D) Edwards (CA) California (D) Birmingham Ae Tuscaloosa area Huntsville industrial West Birmingham urban Central Valley Inner East Bay (Oaklan.
San Jose Ae Silicon Valley Hamburg California (D) North Coast rural district Lantos California (D) Miller (CA) California (D) Stark California (D) San Francisco Peninsula Contra Costa industrial East Bay suburbs (Fremon.
Tucker
California (D) Waxman
California (D) Woolsey
California (D) Hastings (FL) Florida (D) Thurman
Florida (D) Deal
Affected Industries Import
Competition Exposure steel, metal fabrication, auto parts, coal mining HIGH
aerospace, defense manufacturing, electronics HIGH
steel, metal fabrication, auto parts, coal mining HIGH
fruit & vegetable farming, food processing, dairy port services, steel & metal, auto parts, shipping & electronics manufacturing, semiconductors, computer assembly MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
timber, fishing, wine & agriculture port services, high-tech manufacturing, apparel
import/retail HIGH
refineries, steel, shipbuilding HIGH
auto assembly, electronics, machinery apparel & textiles, port-related manufacturing, food
apparel, film-related manufacturing & services, import retail
HIGH
wine, timber, fishing apparel & textiles, tourism-related manufacturing, food imports HIGH
citrus farming, juice processing, food processing MEDIUM
Georgia (D) Marin Ae Sonoma
Fort Lauderdale urban
North Florida / citrus
North Georgia textile textiles, apparel, furniture HIGH
Lewis (GA) Georgia (D) Atlanta urban core
food processing, transport equipment, apparel
HIGH
McKinney
Georgia (D) food processing, transport equipment, apparel
HIGH
Mink
Hawaii (D) East Atlanta suburbs Neighbor Islands / rural
sugar, pineapple, coffee, tourism-related services MEDIUM
Collins (IL) Illinois (D) machinery, steel, food processing, apparel
HIGH
Costello Illinois (D) steel, auto parts, chemicals HIGH Evans Illinois (D) West Chicago inner city Metro East (St.
Louis IL
Quad Cities manufacturing belt
farm machinery, metalworking LOW
Gutierrez
Illinois (D) Chicago West Side
machinery, steel, food processing, apparel
HIGH
Lipinski Illinois (D) Southwest Chicago
machinery, steel, food processing, apparel
HIGH
Rush
Illinois (D) Kansas (D) machinery, steel, food processing, apparel
aircraft manufacturing, agricultural machinery, grain
HIGH
Glickman South Side Chicago Wichita .
South-Central LA
West Los Angeles/ Hollywood
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
20 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO Ratification Processes HIGH Shreveport / oil corridor South Louisiana Portland region aper/textile.
oil & gas, petrochemicals, agriculture MEDIUM
rice, sugar, seafood processing MEDIUM
paper, textiles, timber
HIGH
Baltimore inner city port-related manufacturing, ship repair, steel
HIGH
South Shore suburbs electronics, shipbuilding, textiles HIGH Moakley (MA) Maryland (D) Massachusetts (D) Massachusetts (D) Boston South End printing & publishing, apparel, food processing HIGH Barcia Michigan (D) Saginaw Ae Bay City auto parts, steel, chemicals HIGH Bonior Michigan (D) Macomb County .
auto assembly, auto parts, steel
HIGH
Collins (MI) Michigan (D) Detroit inner city auto assembly, auto parts, steel
HIGH
Conyers Michigan (D) Detroit urban core
auto assembly, auto parts, steel
HIGH
Ford (MI) Michigan (D) Detroit west side
auto assembly, auto parts, steel
HIGH
Kildee Michigan (D) Flint / auto region
auto assembly, auto parts, steel
HIGH
Stupak
Michigan (D) Upper Peninsula
mining, paper & pulp, timber
HIGH
Oberstar Minnesota (D) Iron Range iron ore mining, steel inputs HIGH Peterson (MN) Minnesota (D) Western MN agriculture grain farming, livestock Sabo Minnesota (D) Minneapolis urban food processing, machinery, printing LOW Montgomery Mississippi (D) East MS textile belt textiles, apparel, furniture HIGH Taylor (MS) Mississippi (D) South MS shipbuilding general manufacturing, local services LOW Thompson Mississippi (D) Delta region general manufacturing, local services LOW Clay Missouri (D) St.
Louis urban core general manufacturing, local services LOW Danner Missouri (D) grain farming, meat processing MEDIUM Volkmer Missouri (D) corn & soybean farming, meat processing MEDIUM Williams Montana (D) North Missouri rural Northeast Missouri Statewide Ae ranching/mining cattle ranching, grain farming, mining HIGH Bilbray Las Vegas urban Western NH .
extiles, food & beverage supply, construction materials LOW
Swett
Nevada (D) New Hampshire (D) textiles, paper & pulp
HIGH
Andrews New Jersey (D) chemicals, shipbuilding, food processing HIGH
Pallone New Jersey (D) Camden Ae South Jersey
Jersey Shore
fishing, tourism-related manufacturing LOW
Payne (NJ) New Jersey (D) Newark urban district
port services, chemicals, apparel
HIGH
Engel New York (D) Bronx Ae Westchester apparel, port & warehousing, food processing HIGH Hinchey New York (D) Upstate Hudson Valley light manufacturing, paper, agriculture HIGH Hochbrueckner New York (D) general manufacturing, local services LOW apparel, port & warehousing, food processing HIGH Kentucky (D) Fields (LA) Louisiana (D) Hayes Louisiana (D) Andrews (ME) Maine (D) Mfume Western KY textile & tobacco area textiles, tobacco processing, furniture Barlow Frank (MA) MEDIUM Nadler New York (D) Long Island East End Lower Manhattan / Brooklyn Owens New York (D) Central Brooklyn apparel, port & warehousing, food processing HIGH Rangel New York (D) apparel, port & warehousing, food processing HIGH Towns New York (D) Harlem Brooklyn (East New Yor.
apparel, port & warehousing, food processing HIGH 21 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO
Ratification Processes Lower East Side / Brooklyn
Watt (NC) New York (D) North Carolina
(D)
North Carolina
(D)
North Carolina
(D)
Applegate Ohio (D) Brown (OH) Ohio (D) Industrial SE Ohio
Akron / industrial Kaptur
Ohio (D) Toledo Ae Lake Erie
auto parts, glass, machinery HIGH
Stokes Ohio (D) steel, auto parts, machinery HIGH
Strickland
Ohio (D) Cleveland inner city Eastern OH mining coal mining, steel inputs HIGH
Traficant Ohio (D) steel, metal fabrication HIGH
DeFazio
Oregon (D) timber, wood products, paper
HIGH
Holden
Pennsylvania (D) Youngstown steel valley
Southwest Oregon
Southeast PA
manufacturing belt
machinery, metal fabrication, food processing LOW
Kanjorski Pennsylvania (D) coal-related manufacturing, machinery LOW
Klink
Pennsylvania (D) steel, metal fabrication HIGH
Murphy machinery, metal fabrication, food processing LOW
Spratt
Pennsylvania (D) South Carolina
(D)
Northeast PA (Scranto.
Pittsburgh industrial Allegheny County Pee Dee textile region
textiles, apparel, furniture HIGH
Chapman
Texas (D) East Texas rural
HIGH
Gonzalez
Texas (D) San Antonio urban
timber, oil & gas services, chemicals military-related manufacturing, auto parts, food
Hall (TX) Texas (D) Northeast Texas timber, oil & gas services, chemicals HIGH
Payne (VA) Virginia (D) Southeast VA urban
shipbuilding, military contracting, port services HIGH
Sisisky Virginia (D) textiles, apparel, furniture HIGH
Unsoeld
Washington (D) timber, paper, port services HIGH
Mollohan West Virginia (D) Southside VA textile belt
Southwest Washington
timber/ports North WV coal / coal mining, coal-fired power
HIGH
Rahall West Virginia (D) coal mining, coal-fired power
HIGH
Wise
West Virginia (D) coal mining, light manufacturing HIGH
Barca
Wisconsin (D) Southern WV coal
Central WV small
Southeast WI
machinery, auto parts, metal fabrication HIGH
Obey
Wisconsin (D) Northwoods / Wausau
paper & pulp, timber, wood products HIGH
Bachus
Alabama (R) Birmingham suburbs steel and metal fabrication HIGH
Everett
Alabama (R) Wiregrass / Dothan
Young (AK) Alaska (R) Stump
Arizona (R) Statewide at-large Phoenix West Valley / Luke AFB area
general agriculture and food processing commercial fishing and seafood, oil and gas, timber
and wood products aerospace and defense manufacturing, electronics Velazquez
Hefner
Rose
apparel, port & warehousing, food processing HIGH
Piedmont textile region
Coastal NC
agriculture/textiles textiles, apparel, furniture HIGH
textiles, tobacco, furniture HIGH
Charlotte urban
textiles, banking-related services, machinery HIGH
steel, auto parts, rubber
HIGH
rubber & tires, machinery HIGH
HIGH
MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
22 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO
Ratification Processes Dickey
Arkansas (R) Central-southern AR
Hutchinson
Arkansas (R) Doolittle California (R) Northwest Arkansas Sierra foothills / Sacramento suburbs Dornan
California (R) Orange County Gallegly California (R) Ventura County Hunter
California (R) Moorhead
California (R) San Diego Los Angeles / San
Fernando Valley
Pombo
California (R) San Joaquin Valley
Rohrabacher California (R) Royce general agriculture and food processing, light
general agriculture and food processing, light
light manufacturing, timber and wood products aerospace and defense manufacturing, electronics general agriculture and food processing, light
aerospace and defense manufacturing, defense-related industries light manufacturing MEDIUM
MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
MEDIUM
LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
Orange County general agriculture and food processing electronics manufacturing, services .
inance, tourism, governmen.
California (R) Orange County electronics manufacturing, light manufacturing HIGH
Hefley
Colorado (R) Colorado Springs LOW
McInnis
Colorado (R) Western Slope
defense-related industries cattle ranching, natural gas, oil and gas, timber and wood products Schaefer
Colorado (R) Front Range suburbs Bilirakis Florida (R) Diaz-Balart
HIGH
HIGH
LOW
Tampa Bay suburbs light manufacturing, resource extraction light manufacturing, services .
inance, tourism.
Florida (R) Miami Cuban-American services .
inance, tourism, governmen.
LOW
Mica
Florida (R) Central Florida
aerospace and defense manufacturing LOW
Ros-Lehtinen
Florida (R) Miami coastal
LOW
Stearns Florida (R) North-central FL inance, tourism, governmen.
general agriculture and food processing, light
Collins (GA) Georgia (R) North Georgia
furniture manufacturing, light manufacturing, textiles HIGH
Kingston
Georgia (R) Coastal GA
paper and pulp, textiles HIGH
Crapo
Idaho (R) Eastern ID
general agriculture and food processing Burton
Indiana (R) Indianapolis suburbs Myers Indiana (R) Western IN light manufacturing general agriculture and food processing, light
Lewis (KY) Kentucky (R) Central KY
light manufacturing, textiles HIGH
Rogers Kentucky (R) Eastern KY
light manufacturing, timber and wood products HIGH
Livingston
Louisiana (R) New Orleans HIGH
Snowe Maine (R) Central & coastal ME
oil and gas, shipbuilding and repair
commercial fishing and seafood, paper and pulp, shipbuilding and repair
Bentley
Baltimore suburbs light manufacturing LOW
Blute
Maryland (R) Massachusetts (R) Central MA
HIGH
Hancock
Missouri (R) Rural MO light manufacturing, machinery, textiles cattle ranching, general agriculture and food
processing, light manufacturing Smith (NJ) New Jersey (R) Central NJ
chemicals, light manufacturing, pharmaceuticals HIGH
Schiff
New Mexico (R) Central NM
defense-related industries, electronics manufacturing HIGH
LOW
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
MEDIUM
23 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO Ratification Processes Southeast NM North Country / Fort Drum cattle ranching, general agriculture and food processing, oil and gas dairy farming, defense-related industries, paper and Buffalo region Upstate NY (Albany machinery, steel and metal fabrication light manufacturing, services .
inance, tourism.
HIGH
Central NC
apparel, furniture manufacturing, textiles HIGH
Western NC
HIGH
Tulsa region furniture manufacturing, light manufacturing, textiles light manufacturing, oil and gas, services .
inance, tourism, governmen.
aerospace and defense manufacturing, natural gas, oil
and gas
Western OK
cattle ranching, grain farming Upstate SC
apparel, textiles HIGH
Coastal SC
shipbuilding and repair, textiles HIGH
Spence Oklahoma (R) South Carolina
(R)
South Carolina
(R)
South Carolina
(R)
Midlands HIGH Duncan Tennessee (R) Knoxville area defense-related industries, textiles light manufacturing, services .
inance, tourism.
Combest Texas (R) West Texas Johnson.
Sam
Texas (R) Dallas suburbs Wolf
Virginia (R) Gunderson
Skeen
New Mexico (R) McHugh
New York (R) Quinn
New York (R) Solomon
Taylor (NC) New York (R) North Carolina
(R)
North Carolina
(R)
Istook
Oklahoma (R) Oklahoma City suburbs Largent
Oklahoma (R) Lucas Coble Inglis
Ravenel
MEDIUM
HIGH
LOW
LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
LOW
MEDIUM
Northern VA suburbs cattle ranching, cotton farming, grain farming electronics manufacturing, services .
inance, tourism, governmen.
defense-related industries, services .
inance, tourism.
Wisconsin (R) Western WI
dairy farming, light manufacturing, paper and pulp
HIGH
Klug
Wisconsin (R) Green Bay
machinery, paper and pulp
HIGH
Roth
Wisconsin (R) Northeast WI
machinery, paper and pulp
HIGH
Sensenbrenner Wisconsin (R) Milwaukee suburbs HIGH
HIGH
LOW
Source: House of Representation roll call 507 on Bill Number H.
Affected Industry data is derived from U.
Census Bureau County Business Patterns.
BEA Regional Economic Accounts, and industry concentration documented in Hiscox .
, and Destler .
Exposure categories are based on standard import-penetration measures using USITC DataWeb.
NBER Feenstra trade data, and the methodological framework of Autor.
Dorn & Hanson .
3, 2.
and Hiscox .
Table 6.
Senate Objector for the Ratification of the WTO Senator State/Party Area Affected Industries Import Competition Exposure Heflin Alabama (D) State steel, manufacturing, agriculture HIGH Shelby Alabama (D) State steel, automotive suppliers, agriculture HIGH 24 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO
Ratification Processes Campbell Colorado (D) State
light manufacturing, agriculture, mining MEDIUM
Wellstone Minnesota (D) State
steel, iron ore, machinery, agriculture HIGH
Baucus
Montana (D) State
agriculture, mining, timber
MEDIUM
Exon
Nebraska (D) State
corn, beef, grains, food processing MEDIUM
Bryan
Nevada (D) State
tourism, small manufacturing LOW
Reid
Nevada (D) State
tourism, small manufacturing LOW
Dorgan
North Dakota (D) State
wheat, cattle, agriculture Metzenbaum
State
steel, autos, machinery, rubber
Hollings Ohio (D) South Carolina
(D)
State
textiles, apparel, manufacturing Leahy Vermont (D) State
dairy, electronics, machine tools MEDIUM
Byrd
West Virginia (D) State
coal, steel, heavy manufacturing HIGH
Feingold
Wisconsin (D) State
machinery, paper, dairy HIGH
Stevens Alaska (R) State
fishing, oil, timber
HIGH
Brown
Colorado (R) State
light manufacturing, agriculture MEDIUM
Craig
Idaho (R) State
agriculture, timber
MEDIUM
Kempthorne Idaho (R) State
agriculture, timber
MEDIUM
Burns Montana (R) New Hampshire (R) North Carolina
(R)
State
cattle, wheat, timber, mining MEDIUM
State
machinery, electronics, textiles State
textiles, apparel, agriculture State
cattle, wheat, oil & gas
Thurmond
Oklahoma (R) South Carolina
(R)
State textiles, apparel, manufacturing Jeffords Vermont (R) State dairy, electronics, machine tools Smith Helms Nickles Source: Senate vote number 329 on Bill Number H.
Affected Industry data is derived from Census Bureau County Business Patterns.
BEA Regional Economic Accounts, and industry concentration documented in Hiscox .
, and Destler .
Exposure categories are based on standard import-penetration measures using USITC DataWeb.
NBER Feenstra trade data, and the methodological framework of Autor.
Dorn & Hanson .
3, 2.
and Hiscox .
Statements by members reinforce this interpretation.
For example.
Ohio Democrat Marcy Kaptur and Illinois Democrat William Lipinski both grounded their opposition not in ideology but in defense of local workers, framing free trade as a threat to jobs and community welfare.
William Lipinski, for instance, stated:37 AuThey think we are protectionists, as if it were some kind of dirty word.
Well, if trying to protect American jobs, the American standard of living, and American working families makes me a protectionist, then I will gladly wear that label.
Ay Another example was New York.
Although New York is commonly associated with finance and trade openness, many of its districts' primary economy were in manufacturing such as textile, apparel, light manufacturing, metal goods and printing that faced pressure from foreign import Irwin.
Clashing over Commerce.
A History of US Trade Policy.
MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
MEDIUM
HIGH
MEDIUM
25 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes Other area of New York, such as Brooklyn .
epresented by Representative Owen, and Town.
Harlem (Representative Range.
Hudson Valley (Representative Hinche.
and Lower East Side and Queens (Representative Velazque.
had large concentration of low-skill, labor intensive industries that are sensitive to trade liberalization.
These positions demonstrate that constituency economic conditions were a primary factor shaping congressional behavior.
Meanwhile, members from economically competitive or export-oriented districtsAiparticularly those in technology and aerospace sectors on the West CoastAiremained firmly supportive of WTO ratification, even when their ideological scores diverged from their partyAos dominant position.
These patterns illustrate how constituency pressures, as predicted by H2, structured the coalition for and against WTO approval.
In the earlier ITO case, a similar but more uniform constituency logic operated.
Many districts in 1949 still had economically fragile manufacturing bases or agricultural sectors recovering from wartime transitions.
These vulnerabilities made representatives cautious about entering a new binding trade agreement.
Although no roll-call vote was taken, the reluctance of Democratic Party members to push the Charter forward suggests that exposure to the constituency contributed significantly to their Taken together, the evidence indicates that ideological divergence explains why many members deviated from party platforms in both 1949 and 1994, but constituency interests explain the direction and distribution of those deviations.
Members who represented economically vulnerable districts tended to oppose free trade organizations, while those representing globally competitive industries tended to support themAiregardless of ideology.
Therefore, while H1 accounts for the pattern of intraparty defections.
H2 provides the stronger explanation for why the ITO failed while the WTO succeeded.
In 1949, constituency vulnerability was widespread, and ideological cohesion was low, making ratification unlikely.
In 1994, economic conditions were more diverse, producing a substantial bloc of representatives whose districts benefited from liberalization, thus enabling WTO ratification despite continued ideological fragmentation.
Conclusion This study set out to explain why Congress reacted differently to two comparable free trade organizationsAithe ITO in 1948 and the WTO in 1994Aidespite similar institutional settings and party The research objective was to determine whether the difference in outcomes can be attributed to party ideology, constituency interests, or a combination of both.
The analysis demonstrates that party platforms alone do not determine Congressional behavior on trade institution ratification.
Instead.
Congressional decisions are primarily shaped by legislatorsAo ideological positions and their constituenciesAo economic interests.
Ideological divergence within both parties weakened party cohesion, making it unlikely that members would follow platform commitments when their ideological preferences differed.
However, it was constituency economic interestsAiparticularly exposure to import competition or vulnerability during economic downturnsAithat provided the most consistent and powerful explanation for voting behavior.
Members representing import-sensitive or recession-stricken districts were significantly more likely to oppose free trade institutions, regardless of party.
The contrasting outcomes of the ITO and WTO ratifications, therefore, reflect the interaction between individual ideology and district-level economic incentives, rather than changes in party doctrine or presidential leadership.
In 1949, constituency vulnerability was widespread, and ideological cohesion was low, making support for the ITO politically risky.
By 1994, the U.
economy had diversified, producing a larger coalition of export-oriented districts whose representatives found the WTO advantageous despite continued ideological variation.
The research 26 Giandi Kartasasmita.
Andrea Prisca Kurnad.
Explaining U.
Congressional Voting Variations in the ITO .
and WTO .
Ratification Processes thus concludes that Congressional behavior on trade institutions is best understood through the combined influence of ideological alignment and constituency economic structure.
This conclusion fulfills the studyAos objective by identifying the key domestic factors that shape Congressional responses to international trade agreements.
It highlights that the tension between national economic objectives and local economic realities fundamentally conditions congressional decision-making.
Further, this study demonstrates that congressional trade politics is driven by an interaction effect rather than a single-factor explanation.
In Economic realm, this enduring dynamic of ideological variance and constituency-driven mechanisms continues to influence U.
trade politics Notable example was the U.
AeChina Relations Act of 2000 (China PNTR), 73 out of 211 Democratic Representatives and 57 out of 221 Republican Representatives objected the ratification of the treaty.
It is safe to say that constituency pressures related to the exposure to import competition, substantially encourages districts and their representatives to protectionism.
References