Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan
Volume 13 Issue 2, August 2025, E-ISSN 2477-815X, P-ISSN 2303-3827
Indexing: Scopus, DOAJ, Sinta 1, open access at : https://jurnalius.ac.id/

Unqualified Audit Opinions and Their Role in Promoting
Transparent, Accountable, and Just Governance Reform
Bachrul Amiq1*, Fathul Hamdani2, Wahyu Prawesthi3, Muhammad
Yustino Aribawa4, Ildar Begishev5
Faculty of Law, State University of Surabaya, Indonesia, email: bachrulamiq@unesa.ac.id
2
Faculty of Law, University of Dr. Soetomo Indonesia, email: fhmdnny@gmail.com
3
Faculty of Law, University of Dr. Soetomo, Indonesia, email: wahyu.prawesthi@unitomo.ac.id
4
Faculty of Law, University of Dr. Soetomo, Indonesia, email: yustino@unitomo.ac.id
5
Department of Criminal Law and Procedure, Kazan Innovative University, Russia, email: begi1

shev@mail.ru

Abstract
This study examines the effect of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) audit results with
an unqualified opinion (WTP) on efforts to improve clean governance in Indonesia.
The WTP opinion shows that the financial statements of government entities have been
prepared by applicable accounting standards and regulations. Using a normative legal
research approach, this study examines the relevance of the WTP opinion as the main
indicator of transparency, accountability, and integrity in state financial management.
The results show that the WTP opinion has a positive impact in increasing transparency
and accountability, strengthening supervision and efficiency of financial management,
reducing the potential for corruption, and building public trust in the government. In
addition, the WTP opinion also encourages bureaucratic reform through technology
adoption, strengthening human resources, and more effective budget planning. This
research emphasizes the importance of WTP opinion as a strategic tool in realizing
good and sustainable governance.
Keywords: Accountability; Governance; Just Governance Reform; Transparency; Unqualified
1. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia’s economic crisis has highlighted the deep-rooted impact of poor
governance in both public and private sectors.1 Weak financial management and
ineffective oversight mechanisms have undermined public trust and hindered
institutional credibility. To restore stability and foster sustainable development,
the government has promoted the principles of good governance,2 emphasizing
transparency, accountability, and integrity. Within this context, the unqualified
audit opinion (Wajar Tanpa Pengecualian/WTP) issued by the Audit Board is
often regarded as a crucial benchmark of sound financial governance. This study
positions the WTP not merely as a technical judgment on financial statements,
1
Chairul Rizal, Supiyandi, and Muhammad Amin, “Perancangan Aplikasi Pengelolaan Keuangan
Desa Melalui E-Village Budgeting,” Bulletin of Computer Science Research 3, no. 1 (December 31, 2022): 7–13,
doi:10.47065/bulletincsr.v3i1.181.
2
Fathul Hamdani and Ana Fauzia, “The Authority of the Village Government in the Management of
Village Funds during the Covid-19 Pandemic,” Indonesian Journal of Advocacy and Legal Services 4, no. 1 (April
27, 2022): 195–222, doi:10.15294/ijals.v4i1.53646.
Copyright (c) 2025 by Author(s), This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
License. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.29303/ius.v13i2.1713

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadil an | Vol . 13 | Issue 2 | August 2025 | Page,

458~474

but as an evaluative tool for understanding the broader implementation of governance
reforms in Indonesia.
The transformation of the governmental system through bureaucratic reform has led to
the decentralization of authority to regional governments, including in the management
of public finances. However, despite the structural shift in authority, bureaucratic
politicization continues to prevail within the dynamics of regional autonomy.3 This
issue is further exacerbated by the weak institutional relationship between the regional
executive and legislative bodies, often hindered by the dominance of political interests.4
This reality underscores that structural reforms alone do not automatically ensure the
establishment of clean and accountable governance. Therefore, it is essential to identify
concrete indicators that reflect the quality of governance at the regional level, one of
which is the audit results issued by the Audit Board of Indonesia (Badan Pemeriksa
Keuangan/BPK).
Law Number 22 of 1999 and Law Number 25 of 1999 marked the initial milestones
in the decentralization of government and regional financial management in Indonesia.
These regulations were later revised through Law Number 23 of 2014 and Law Number
1 of 2022, which shifted the accountability of local governments from a vertical model—
towards the central government—to a horizontal one, directly accountable to the public
through the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD). This transition has intensified
the demand for transparency and accountability in regional financial governance. A
central focus of these policy reforms is the necessity of financial reports that are open,
clearly presented, and easily understood by the public. External audits conducted by
the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) play a pivotal role in assessing the integrity and
compliance of local government financial management.
Transparency practices in regional financial management include the public
disclosure of information related to revenues, expenditures, and budget realization.
Such openness functions not only as a mechanism of accountability but also as a form of
social control that strengthens public trust.5 In this regard, the audit opinions issued by
the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), particularly the Unqualified Opinion (Wajar Tanpa
Pengecualian), serve as a key indicator of a public institution’s success in complying
with governmental accounting standards. An Unqualified Opinion reflects the quality
of financial statements that are free from material misstatements and prepared by
applicable accounting principles.6 This study aims to examine how the issuance of an
Unqualified Opinion can be associated with the realization of clean governance at the
regional level.
Referring to the Law Number 15 of 2004 on Audit of State Financial Management
and Responsibility (Law Number 15 of 2004), the opinion given by The Audit Board
is not only in the form of Unqualified Opinion, but there are 3 (three) other types
of opinions given by The Audit Board on the Examination of Government Financial

3
Imam Suryadi and Aminatuzzuhro Aminatuzzuhro, “PENGARUH GOOD GOVERNANCE DAN STANDAR AKUNTANSI PEMERINTAH TERHADAP AKUNTABILITAS KEUANGAN DENGAN KOMITMEN ORGANISASI SEBAGAI PEMODERASI,” INCOME 2, no. 2 (December 31, 2021): 86–98, doi:10.38156/akuntansi.
v2i2.96.
4
Abas, Birokrasi Dan Dinamika Politik Lokal (Yogyakarta: Lontar Mediatama, 2020).
5
Andreas Putranta Sitepu, Transparansi Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah (Pasaman Barat: CV Azka Pustaka,
2022).
6
Rina Widyanti, “Analisis Akuntabilitas Dan Transparansi Pengelolaan Dana Desa Pada Nagari Ulakan
Kecamatan Ulakan Tapakis,” Menara Ilmu: Jurnal Penelitian Dan Kajian Ilmiah 12, no. 11 (October 25, 2018).

458 Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan

P-ISSN: 2303-3827, E-ISSN: 2477-815X

Statements, namely Qualified Opinion, Adversed Opinion, dan a statement refusing to
give an opinion (Disclaimer of Opinion).7
The Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) issues four types of audit opinions based on the
examination of financial statements: Unqualified Opinion (Wajar Tanpa Pengecualian),
Qualified Opinion (Wajar Dengan Pengecualian), Adverse Opinion, and Disclaimer of
Opinion. These opinions are determined by the level of compliance with Government
Accounting Standards (SAP) and the integrity of financial statement presentation.
Among them, the Unqualified Opinion is the most desirable for regional governments,
as it signifies professional and transparent financial governance. Conversely, opinions
other than the Unqualified Opinion may indicate weaknesses in financial management
and public accountability.8 This highlights the need for academic inquiry into whether
the attainment of an Unqualified Opinion truly reflects improvements in clean and
accountable governance.
Several previous studies have examined the relationship between BPK audit opinions
and aspects of regional government financial or political performance. However, most
of these studies have focused primarily on technical financial factors, such as budget
absorption, internal audit effectiveness, and follow-up on audit findings. First, Widha
Adinata et al. in Indonesian Treasury Review: Jurnal Perbendaharaan, Keuangan Negara
dan Kebijakan Publik attempted to examine the relationship between audit opinions
and community welfare using an econometric approach; however, the study did not
address institutional or governance-related aspects.9 This indicates that audit-related
research rarely establishes a direct link to good governance, even though one of the
core objectives of bureaucratic reform is to create a clean and accountable government.
The absence of a conceptual framework that connects audit outcomes with governance
principles represents a significant gap in the academic literature. Therefore, this study
proposes a novel approach by employing the Unqualified Opinion (WTP) as a proxy
for assessing the success of good governance implementation at the local level. This
constitutes the main novelty of the present research in comparison to prior studies.
Second, Awaludin Nur Ihfan in Jurnal Bina Mulia Hukum highlighted that the
attainment of an Unqualified Opinion (WTP) from the Audit Board of Indonesia
contributes to strengthening anti-corruption efforts, although its effectiveness still
requires further institutional review.10 Third, Junita Angelina et al. in The Contrarian:
Finance, Accounting, and Business Research examined the influence of audit opinions
on regional performance and corruption levels, yet did not explicitly connect these
findings to the concept of clean governance.11 These studies reinforce the argument that
audit opinions can serve as important indicators, but they have not been systematically
employed in governance measurement frameworks. Therefore, this study aims to
establish an evaluative framework that links financial audit outcomes with clean and
7
Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Republik Indonesia, “Ragam Opini BPK,” Opini BPK, July 13, 2020, https://
www.bpk.go.id/news/ragam-opini-bpk.
8
Chatarina Endang Srimranani, “Peranan Pemerintah Kabupaten Klaten Dalam Melaksanakan Anggaran
Berbasis Kinerja Dalam Mewujudkan Tata Kelola Pemerintahan Yang Baik” (Universitas Atma Jaya Yogyakarta,
2022).
9
Widha Adinata, Teguh Puspandoyo, and Mei Ling, “Pengaruh Opini Audit Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah
Daerah Terhadap Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Di Daerah,” Indonesian Treasury Review: Jurnal Perbendaharaan, Keuangan Negara Dan Kebijakan Publik 8, no. 3 (September 30, 2023): 219–34, doi:10.33105/ITREV.V8I3.566.
10
Awaludin Nur Ihfan, “THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE UNQUALIFIED OPINION BY THE AUDIT BOARD OF INDONESIA AND ANTI CORRUPTION ACT,” Jurnal Bina Mulia Hukum 8, no. 1 (September 30,
2023): 128–43, doi:10.23920/jbmh.v8i1.1239.
11
Junita Angelina, David Paul Elia Saerang, and Jessy D. L. Warongan, “The Influence of Audit Opinion,
Characteristics of Regional Head, and Levels of Corruption on Performance of Local Government in Indonesia,” The
Contrarian : Finance, Accounting, and Business Research 3, no. 2 (July 26, 2024): 96–112, doi:10.58784/cfabr.160.

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan 459

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadil an | Vol . 13 | Issue 2 | August 2025 | Page,

460~474

democratic governance. It seeks to offer both theoretical contributions to the literature
on public sector governance in Indonesia.
Therefore, based on the above background, Indonesia’s experience with governance
crises has shown how weak financial management and oversight mechanisms erode
public trust. In response, reforms were introduced to promote transparency and
accountability through clean governance practices. A key benchmark in this process is
the unqualified audit opinion (Wajar Tanpa Pengecualian/WTP) issued by the Audit
Board of Indonesia (BPK). While WTP reflects compliance with accounting standards,
its broader role in signifying governance reform remains underexplored.
Previous studies often link audit opinions to fiscal performance or budget absorption,
but rarely integrate them with governance outcomes. This study fills that gap by
positioning WTP as a proxy indicator of governance quality. Accordingly, the research
addresses two questions: (1) What is the relationship between unqualified audit
opinions and efforts to achieve clean governance? (2) How do unqualified audit opinions
contribute to promoting transparent, accountable, and just governance reform?
This study employs a normative legal research method, which was operationalized by
conducting in-depth literature-based analysis of legal norms, regulations, and theoretical
frameworks related to the impact of Unqualified Opinions (Wajar Tanpa Pengecualian/
WTP) from the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) on clean state governance. Throughout
the research process, I systematically collected and reviewed legal texts and academic
literature relevant to state financial accountability and public governance. The normative
method enabled me to examine legal obligations and institutional responsibilities as
formulated in various laws and legal doctrines. I did not conduct fieldwork or empirical
interviews, but relied on authoritative legal sources to understand how WTP audit
outcomes are interpreted within the national legal framework. The entire research
process was structured to evaluate not only what the law says, but how it aligns with
real-world governance expectations.
To guide the analysis, two legal approaches were applied: the statutory approach and
the conceptual approach. In applying the statutory approach, I conducted a focused
review of legislative texts such as Law No. 15/2006 on BPK, Law No. 17/2003 on State
Finance, and Law No. 23/2014 on Regional Government, as well as relevant government
regulations and internal audit standards. These sources were selected to map out how audit
responsibilities are defined and to assess the legal authority attached to audit opinions,
particularly WTP. Meanwhile, through the conceptual approach, I integrated scholarly
views and legal doctrines from leading academic sources to interpret the theoretical
foundations of public sector auditing and clean governance. I examined how concepts
such as transparency, accountability, and bureaucratic reform are developed in legal
thought, especially about the meaning and impact of audit outcomes. The combination
of these two approaches allowed for both legal norm analysis and theoretical reflection.
Legal materials in this study consist of both primary and secondary legal materials.
Primary legal materials used include statutory regulations, government audit reports,
and judicial decisions issued by relevant legal institutions, which were accessed through
official legal databases such as peraturan.go.id and the BPK’s audit publication portal. I
paid specific attention to recent BPK reports and legislative amendments that regulate
financial oversight and governance ethics. For secondary legal materials, I reviewed
legal commentaries, doctrinal writings, journal articles, and institutional policy papers.
I focused on recent scholarship that critiques the reliability of WTP audit status in
ensuring good governance, and consulted academic works from experts in administrative
460 Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan

P-ISSN: 2303-3827, E-ISSN: 2477-815X

law, audit law, and governance studies. These sources were essential to enrich the
normative interpretation and validate critical viewpoints in the discussion.
The method of analyzing legal materials applied in this research is qualitative and
interpretative. Legal texts and academic sources were not only read, but also compared,
categorized, and linked to specific governance challenges identified in real audit cases.
I selected and examined several cases where regional governments received WTP
status but were later involved in corruption scandals or administrative failures — for
instance, the cases of Jambi Province and BPK audit findings in DKI Jakarta. These
cases were analyzed to expose the gap between normative audit results and actual
bureaucratic integrity. I also mapped legal inconsistencies or blind spots where WTP
status may be misused for political legitimacy rather than reflecting true accountability.
This interpretive method allowed for a critical evaluation of both the legal text and its
application, forming the basis for the discussion and recommendations in this research.
2. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
2.1 Linkage between Auditor Board’s Unqualified Opinion Results and Attempts to
Improve Clean State Governance

Within the framework of bureaucratic justice, at least three dimensions are relevant.
First, procedural justice: the extent to which decisions are made through clear, consistent,
and non-discriminatory rules. An unqualified opinion requiring adequate internal
controls, orderly documentation, and compliance with standards forces organizations
to tidy up lines of authorization, segregation of duties, and audit trails; this reduces the
space for arbitrary discretion and narrows opportunities for “special treatment” that
violates equality before procedure. Second, distributive justice: the degree to which the
benefits and burdens of policy are allocated proportionally to need and contribution.
Credible financial information (which underpins an unqualified opinion) enables
planners and overseers to evaluate whether spending truly favors vulnerable groups,
lagging regions, or essential services, rather than merely reproducing historically unfair
spending patterns. Third, interactional justice: the way the bureaucracy treats citizens
and businesses in the service process. Discipline in procurement, timely payments,
and documented grievance channels, which typically strengthen as entities pursue
and maintain an unqualified opinion, encourage treatment that is more dignified,
transparent, and predictable for external parties.
The most important convergence between an unqualified opinion and bureaucratic
justice appears in the post-audit phase: follow-up on recommendations must be translated
into process changes that safeguard fairness, not merely close accounting findings. For
example, when an audit uncovers weaknesses in asset management or goods spending,
remediation should go beyond fixing records; it must include service time standards,
explicit prioritization criteria, and queue transparency so that access to services is not
influenced by proximity, political pressure, or lobbying capacity. Likewise, strengthening
controls in procurement must be accompanied by equal access for MSMEs and suppliers
from peripheral areas, with non-discriminatory tender documents and a responsive
challenge mechanism. In other words, the unqualified opinion provides the “reliability
infrastructure” that enforces procedure; the task of governance is to fill it with fair
design, avoiding procedures that appear neutral but produce unequal impacts.
From a policy perspective, the information that yields an unqualified opinion also
opens space for “equity budgeting.” Data on unit costs of services, per-capita spending
Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan 461

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadil an | Vol . 13 | Issue 2 | August 2025 | Page,

462~474

distribution, and measurable output–outcome achievements make it possible to analyze
whether remote areas receive funding proportional to geographic hardship and social
needs, whether health and education programs reach low-income households, and
whether systemic biases leave certain groups behind. An audit opinion on the fairness
of financial statements does not automatically judge the justice of allocations; therefore,
management needs to link audit follow-up action plans to equity indicators, for instance,
reducing inter-regional service coverage gaps, increasing the share of contracts awarded
to small suppliers, or decreasing service complaints from vulnerable groups.
At the organizational level, bureaucratic justice also concerns internal relationships
among leaders, staff, and oversight functions. The pursuit of an unqualified opinion
often drives clearer performance governance (roles, targets, and accountability), which
in turn improves perceptions of fairness among employees: evidence-based performance
appraisals, transparent incentives, and consistent sanctions for violations. This matters
because internal justice correlates with external compliance and integrity; a bureaucracy
that feels fairly treated tends to follow procedures, serve the public respectfully, and be
reluctant to collude in violations. Thus, the unqualified opinion becomes an anchor for
arranging “procedural justice” internally, which radiates outward as fair services.
It remains necessary, however, to guard against “compliance myopia”: an organization
can achieve an unqualified opinion while maintaining substantively unjust policies. Fair
financial statements do not eliminate the possibility of biased allocations, administrative
costs that burden the poor, or service requirements that inadvertently discriminate
against certain groups (for example, documentation obligations that are difficult
for remote communities to meet). For this reason, the linkage design must include
safeguards to ensure accounting compliance does not substitute for justice. Approaches
include applying an equity impact assessment to every procedural change arising from
audit follow-up; integrating justice indicators (equity, accessibility, affordability) into
performance dashboards; and opening service and procurement data in machinereadable formats so that the public can audit them, allowing inequities to be detected
earlier.
A corrective dimension is also part of bureaucratic justice. When an audit uncovers
state losses or services that fail to meet standards, remedial steps should not stop at
administrative sanctions or system fixes; citizens who have been harmed need to
receive proportional redress. Mechanisms such as compensation, service corrections at
no additional cost, or prioritized re-service are concrete examples of corrective justice
that connect audit findings to restoration for affected parties. Without this dimension,
improvements often feel abstract to citizens, so public trust does not recover even when
an unqualified opinion is achieved.
Finally, ethical leadership and public communication determine whether an
unqualified opinion truly advances bureaucratic justice. Leaders must convey that the
opinion is a tool to ensure fair procedures, allocations responsive to needs, and treatment
that respects human dignity, not merely a symbolic accolade. This commitment is reflected
in how performance targets are set (for example, not only “maintaining an unqualified
opinion,” but also “closing 100% of audit recommendations that affect service access”
or “reducing disparities in essential service spending across regions”) and in how the
organization responds to public criticism. By explicitly linking an unqualified opinion
to procedural, distributive, interactional, and corrective justice, this section underscores
that clean governance is incomplete unless it is also just, both in how the bureaucracy
makes decisions, distributes resources, treats people, and restores harm.
462 Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan

P-ISSN: 2303-3827, E-ISSN: 2477-815X

Based on Article 16, paragraph (1) of Law Number 15 of 2004 states that “Laporan
hasil pemeriksaan atas laporan keuangan pemerintah memuat opini (The audit report
on the government’s financial statements contains an opinion)”. The parameters of
reasonableness of information that must be met to support an opinion include, among
others:
1. Conformity with government accounting standards (SAP)
The management of government financial statements requires the Government
Accounting Standards (hereinafter referred to as GASB). SAP applicable in Indonesia
is based on Article 1 Paragraph (3) of Government Regulation Number 71/2010 as
follows: “Government Accounting Standards are accounting principles applied in
preparing and presenting government financial statements. The principles referred
to are accounting basis, historical value, Realization, Substance over form, periodicity,
consistent full disclosure, and fair presentation”.
2. Compliance with laws and regulations
The definition of internal control system according to Article 1 paragraph (1)
of Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 60 of 2008 on
the Government Internal Control System, hereinafter abbreviated as Government
Regulation Number 60/2008, the internal control system is an integral process of
actions and activities carried out continuously by the leadership and all employees
to provide adequate assurance of the achievement of organizational goals through
effective and efficient activities, reliability of financial reporting, safeguarding State
assets and compliance with laws and regulations. The elements of internal control,
according to Article 3, Paragraph 1 of Government Regulation Number 60/2008, are
a. Control Environment
The control environment creates an atmosphere of control in an organization and
affects the organization’s personal awareness of control. The control environment
is the foundation for all internal control components that form discipline and
structure. The control environment is defined as a set of standards, processes, and
structures that provide the basis for implementing internal control throughout the
organization.
b. Risk Assessment
Risk assessment involves a dynamic and interactive process to identify and assess
risks to the achievement of objectives. Risk itself is understood as the likelihood
that an event will occur and affect the achievement of the entity’s objectives, and
the risk to the achievement of all objectives of the entity is considered relative
to the established risk tolerance. Therefore, risk assessment forms the basis for
determining how risks should be managed by the organization.
c. Control Activities
Control activities are actions established through policies and procedures that
help ensure that management’s directives to reduce risks to the achievement of
objectives are carried out. Control activities are performed at all levels of the entity,
at various stages in the business process, and over the technological environment.
Control activities have a wide range of objectives and are applied in a variety of
organizational actions and functions. Control activities include different activities
suchas:authorization,verification,reconciliation,analysis,jobperformance,keeping
company property safe, and separation of functions.
d. Information and Communication

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan 463

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadil an | Vol . 13 | Issue 2 | August 2025 | Page,

464~474

That information is very important for each entity to carry out internal control
responsibilities to support the achievement of its objectives. The information required
by management is relevant and quality information from both internal and external
sources,andinformationusedtosupportthefunctionsofothercomponentsofinternal
control. Information is obtained or generated through a process of communication
between internal and external parties that is carried out continuously, repeatedly,
and shared. Most organizations build an information system to meet the need for
reliable, relevant, and timely information.
e. Monitoring Activities
Evaluation activities with several forms, whether continuous, separate, or a
combination of both, are used to ascertain whether each of the five components
of internal control affects the function of the function within each component, is
present, and functioning. Continuous evaluation is built into business processes
at different levels of the entity to provide timely information. Separate evaluations
are performed periodically, and will vary in scope and frequency depending on
the risk assessment, effectiveness of ongoing evaluations, and other management
considerations
3. Disclosure Financial Report
Hendriksen revealed that there are three general concepts in disclosure, namely:12
a. Adequate disclosure is the disclosure of information by the company to fulfil its
obligation to provide information. The information disclosed is by the minimum
required standards, especially information that, according to the relevant institutions,
must be presented. This type of disclosure is mostly done by companies.
b. Fair disclosure is disclosure made by the company by presenting several information
that the company believes can satisfy potential users of financial statements. The
minimum required information and other additional information are needed to
produce a fair presentation of the Financial Statements.
c. Full disclosure is disclosure that presents all relevant information. The information
disclosed is the minimum required information plus other information disclosed
voluntarily.
SAP is the basis for management that applies the principles of Good Financial
Governance and is the basis for financial management as stipulated in Article 32 of
Law Number 17 of 2003 on State Finance which states that the form and content of
the accountability report for the implementation of the State Budget (APBN) / Local
Budget (APBD) are prepared and presented by government accounting standards. SAP
is prepared by an independent standards committee and stipulated by Government
RegulationafterfirstreceivingconsiderationfromtheAuditorBoard.Itcanbeunderstood
that an Unqualified Opinion means that the financial statements are fairly presented
in all material respects, the financial position, results of operations, and cash flows
of the entity by the principles of SAP as a provision of generally accepted accounting
principles in Indonesia. Thus, the predicate of an unqualified opinion is that it has met
the standards in the principles of good governance, which, among others, are issued
by the auditor under the following conditions:13
12
Eldon S. Hendriksen and Michael F. Van Breda, Accounting Theory, 5th Edititon (Pennsylbania: Richard D.
Irwin Inc, 1992).
13
Brillian Willis, Lanny Kusumawati, and Wafia Silvi Dhesinta Rini, “Keterkaitan Opini Wajar Tanpa
Pengecualian Dari Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Terhadap Prinsip Good Financial Governance,” Al Qodiri : Jurnal
Pendidikan, Sosial Dan Keagamaan 21, no. 2 (July 31, 2023): 389–405, doi:10.53515/QODIRI.2023.21.2.405-421.

464 Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan

P-ISSN: 2303-3827, E-ISSN: 2477-815X

a. All balance sheets, income statements, statements of changes in equity, and cash
flow statements are contained in the financial statements.
b. In the performance of the engagement, all general standards can be met by the
auditor.
c. Sufficient evidence can be gathered by the auditors, and the auditors have performed
the engagement in such a way as to enable them to perform the three standards of
field work.
d. The financial statements are presented by Indonesian accounting principles.
e. There are no circumstances that require the auditor to add explanatory paragraphs
or modify the wording in the audit report.
Several types of financial statements audit can be done by the Auditor Board the
as Article 6 paragraph (3) of Law Number 15/2006 states that “Pemeriksaan BPK
mencakup pemeriksaan keuangan, pemeriksaan kinerja, dan pemeriksaan dengan tujuan
tertentu (BPK’s audit includes financial audit, performance audit, and audit with a
specific purpose).”
a. Financial audit is an examination of the financial statements of the central government
and local government. This financial audit is conducted to provide a statement of
opinion on the level of fairness of the information presented in the government’s
financial statements.
b. Performance audit is an examination of economic and efficiency aspects, as well as
aspects of effectiveness, that are commonly carried out for the benefit of management
by the government’s internal control apparatus.
c. Examination with a specific purpose, namely an examination carried out with a
specific purpose outside the financial examination and performance examination,
for example, an examination of other matters related to finance and investigative
examination.
The unqualified opinion (WTP) issued by the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK)
represents the outcome of a formal audit process focused primarily on assessing the
fairness and conformity of government financial statements with applicable accounting
standards.Atitscore,theissuanceofaWTPopinionisaprofessionaljudgmentconcerning
the accuracy and completeness of financial reporting—not a direct endorsement of
governance quality or institutional integrity. While such opinions are often publicly
interpreted as markers of clean and effective governance, this interpretation can be
misleading when not critically examined in light of broader institutional contexts.
A major concern arises when the WTP opinion is used as a proxy for clean governance
without a parallel assessment of governance practices, ethical compliance, or the effective
use of public funds. In several instances, institutions that received WTP status were
later exposed for corruption or maladministration, revealing a disconnect between audit
outcomes and actual bureaucratic behavior. This misalignment risks eroding public
trust in the audit system and obscuring the deeper structural issues in governance,
such as regulatory loopholes, lack of enforcement, and weak internal controls.
Therefore, efforts to improve clean state governance must move beyond reliance
on audit outputs alone and must instead involve integrated reforms that link audit
mechanisms with accountability systems, public participation, and robust internal
supervision. The unqualified opinion should be seen as a starting point, not an
endpoint, in evaluating institutional performance. Policymakers must ensure that
WTP is complemented with substantive governance indicators—such as transparency

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan 465

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadil an | Vol . 13 | Issue 2 | August 2025 | Page,

466~474

in procurement, responsiveness to audit findings, citizen oversight, and measurable
bureaucratic reform outcomes.
In this light, audit institutions themselves have a normative responsibility to
contextualize their findings, issue more nuanced assessments where necessary, and
push for follow-up mechanisms that strengthen governance integrity. Clean governance
requires a holistic approach, wherein audit opinions are embedded within a broader
ecosystem of transparency, accountability, justice, and ethical leadership. Without
such integration, the unqualified opinion risks becoming a symbolic recognition that
may mask persistent governance failures rather than drive systemic improvement.
2.2 The Role of Unqualified Audit Opinions in Promoting Accountable, Transparent, and Just Governance Reform

The role of the unqualified audit opinion (in Indonesia often referred to as WTP—
Wajar Tanpa Pengecualian) can be understood through a bridge between theory
and cross-disciplinary empirical evidence that links information quality, control
architecture, and political–bureaucratic incentives to governance outcomes that are
transparent, accountable, and just. From a principal–agent perspective, an unqualified
opinion reduces agency costs by increasing the credibility of reporting and shrinking
information asymmetries between government (agent) and the public/legislature
(principal), thereby making allocation decisions and oversight more data-driven and
precise, this is the core Jensen & Meckling logic that agency costs fall when monitoring
and reporting mechanisms are trustworthy.14
At the same time, the unqualified opinion functions as a governance quality
signal: consistent with Spence’s signaling theory, a costly, high-quality certification
(a standards-compliant audit culminating in an unqualified opinion) conveys credible
information about the organization’s “type” to the political marketplace and the public,
improving expectations and stakeholder behavior.15 In the realm of managerial behavior,
stewardship theory adds that when organizational aims, public-service values, and
accountability mechanisms are aligned, managers act as stewards pursuing collective
interests; the unqualified opinion then becomes a trust-enhancing coordination device
rather than merely a punitive tool.16 Bovens’s operational definition of accountability, as
a relationship between an actor and a forum that entails the duty to explain, the forum’s
examination and judgment, and potential consequences provides a frame in which
the unqualified opinion chiefly strengthens the “information” phase and triggers the
“discussion” and “consequence” phases in the post-audit cycle (follow-up, sanctions/
rewards, and policy correction).17 To support those phases, contemporary institutional
frameworks, the Institute of Internal Auditors’ Three Lines Model, place independent
internal audit as the “third line” assuring governance and risk management, while
the COSO framework underscores internal control as the foundation for achieving
objectives, mitigating risks, and enabling sound decisions; the unqualified external
opinion is both an output of assurance and feedback that nudges all three lines and the
14
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3, no. 4 (1976): 305–60, https://doi.org/10.1016/0304405X(76)90026-X.
15
Michael Spence, “Job Market Signaling,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, no. 3 (1973): 355–74,
https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010.
16
James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman, and Lex Donaldson, “Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management,” The Academy of Management Review 22, no. 1 (1997): 20–47, https://doi.org/10.2307/259223.
17
Mark Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework,” European Law Journal
13, no. 4 (2007): 447–468, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00378.x.

466 Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan

P-ISSN: 2303-3827, E-ISSN: 2477-815X

control system toward higher maturity.18 The public relevance of an unqualified opinion
is also reinforced by public-sector auditing standards (e.g., ISSAI 100), which stress the
credibility, quality, and professionalism of Supreme Audit Institutions, thereby fostering
process consistency and trust in the opinion’s output.19
At the level of evidence, experimental and quasi-experimental research shows that
audit transparency has tangible consequences: intensifying government audits reduces
“missing expenditures” in village road projects (top-down oversight effects can exceed
those of community participation without formal audit), while publicizing corruption
findings from randomized audit programs reduces incumbents’ reelection prospects,
indicating that when corruption information is exposed through audits, voters
penalize offenders; further results show randomized audits raise the behavioral costs of
corruption and are associated with tighter enforcement. These findings illustrate how
unqualified opinions and the audit ecosystem discipline behavior through reputational
channels, electoral politics, and enforcement.20 Beyond accountability, unqualified
opinions interlock with transparency via open procurement. OECD recommendations
on public procurement, public-investment integrity frameworks, and open contracting
practices (OCDS) advocate end-to-end publication of tender and contract data in open
formats, increasing competition, lowering collusion risk, and strengthening social
auditing; tying post-opinion follow-up to a contract-openness agenda creates a data
value chain from planning through contract management, that is auditable, extending
the impact of the unqualified opinion from accounting into spending integrity.21 The
justice dimension requires that the outcomes of an unqualified opinion be translated
into equity-sensitive budgeting; the spread of gender budgeting across OECD countries
exemplifies instruments that connect performance-financial data with equality impacts
(service access, costs borne by vulnerable groups, cross-regional benefits), ensuring that
audit recommendations do not stop at bookkeeping but guide corrective allocation and
non-discriminatory service design.22
Even so, the literature warns of two conceptual risks when the unqualified opinion
becomes a narrow target. First, Goodhart’s Law: when a metric becomes a target, it
ceases to be a good measure; if “achieving/maintaining an unqualified opinion” is the
sole KPI, “window dressing” may emerge without substantive improvements in service
integrity or equity. The antidote is a package of multi-dimensional indicators (closure
of material recommendations, decline of repeat findings, openness of contract data,
and outcome/justice metrics) and a complementary mix of financial, performance,
and compliance audits.23 Second, institutional theory on “myth and ceremony” and
isomorphism cautions against decoupling, organizations may adopt formal structures to
gain legitimacy while separating them from work practices; to prevent the unqualified
opinion from becoming an administrative ritual, public managers should hard-wire
18
Institute of Internal Auditors, “The IIA’s Three Lines Model: An Update of the Three Lines of Defense”
(Florida, 2024).
19
International Framework for Professional Pronouncements, “ISSAI100: Fundamental Principles of Publicsector Auditing,” 2019, https://www.issai.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ISSAI-100-Fundamental-Principles-of-Public-Sector-Auditing-1.pdf.
20
Benjamin A. Olken, “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” Journal of
Political Economy 115, no. 2 (2007), https://doi.org/10.1086/517935.
21
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Integrity in Public Procurement,” 2020,
https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/integrity-in-public-procurement.html.
22
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Gender Budgeting,” 2022, https://www.oecd.
org/en/topics/sub-issues/gender-budgeting.html.
23
C. A. E. Goodhart, “Problems of Monetary Management: The UK Experience,” in Monetary Theory and
Practice (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984), 91–121, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17295-5_4.

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan 467

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadil an | Vol . 13 | Issue 2 | August 2025 | Page,

468~474

audit recommendations into SOPs, information systems (e-budgeting/e-procurement),
and citizen feedback mechanisms that change behavior and service results.24 Within
the accountability frame, the audit “expectation gap”, the difference between what the
public expects and what auditors reasonably promise, must also be managed through
public communication and a broadened audit spectrum (financial, performance, and
compliance), so the unqualified opinion is not misread as a “fraud-free” guarantee.
Scholars such as Porter have structured this gap into components of reasonableness
of expectations, adequacy of standards, and auditor performance; work since Liggio
underscores the need to educate stakeholders that an unqualified opinion assures fair
presentation, not an absolute certificate of integrity.25
Synthesizing principal–agent theory (reducing information asymmetry), signaling
theory (the unqualified opinion as a credible credential), stewardship (alignment of
values and roles), Bovens’s accountability (information–discussion–consequences), the
Three Lines Model & COSO (control and assurance architecture), alongside institutional
insights and Goodhart’s warning (guardrails against metric ritualism), and linking these
to robust evidence from randomized audits plus open-contracting and gender-budgeting
agendas, this section positions the unqualified opinion as an “actionable leading signal”
for reforms that are transparent, accountable, and just. Practical implementation requires:
(i) integrating audit recommendations into the planning–budgeting–implementation–
reporting cycle, (ii) strengthening independent risk/compliance functions and internal
audit, (iii) expanding openness of spending and contract data for public auditability, (iv)
embedding justice dimensions (access, affordability, equity) in performance indicators,
and (v) clear communication to close the expectation gap. Thus, the unqualified opinion
is not treated as a final medal but as a catalyst for institutional learning that converts
accounting compliance into public value that is measurable and broadly felt. In operational
terms, the opinion’s role as a reform lever must be locked in by guardrails: integrating
recommendations into PPBS with outcome-oriented KPIs; widening measurement from
financial compliance to service performance (service time, output quality, satisfaction/
complaints, and measurable program outcomes); applying equity-impact assessments to
procedural changes; ensuring equal access in procurement (non-discriminatory tender
documents, SME-friendly packaging, responsive challenge mechanisms); protecting
safe, confidential whistleblowing channels; and frank public communication to dampen
over-expectations and educate on the opinion’s meaning. Success also hinges on “tone
at the top” and institutional governance: leaders should tie the target of “maintaining an
unqualified opinion” to meaningful derivative targets, such as closing 100% of material
recommendations that affect service access, eliminating repeat findings within two
budget cycles, narrowing per-capita spending gaps for essential services across regions,
increasing the share of contracts awarded to small/peripheral suppliers, and shortening
resolution times for public complaints.
Technically, an indicator matrix linking transparency–accountability–justice should
be crafted: (i) transparency, open, machine-readable data on budget realization, contracts,
and performance; (ii) accountability, rates of audit follow-up completion, reduction
of repeat findings, and consistency of sanctions/rewards; (iii) justice, need-based
funding equalization, equal access to services and procurement markets, administrative
affordability, and the presence of remedies for harmed citizens. To sustain momentum,
24
John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977): 340–63, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2778293.
25
Brenda Porter, “An Empirical Study of the Audit Expectation-Performance Gap,” Accounting and Business
Research 24, no. 93 (1993): 49–68, https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.1993.9729463.

468 Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan

P-ISSN: 2303-3827, E-ISSN: 2477-815X

an institutional learning loop must be built: unqualified-opinion findings, action plan,
implementation, data-driven evaluation, SOP, and internal-regulation refinement, reaudit that ratchets up standards. With this architecture, the unqualified opinion provides
a reliable infrastructure that makes openness meaningful, enables objective performance
accountability, and shapes fair procedures, provided the signal is translated into
measurable managerial action, guarded by independent institutions, carried by serviceoriented leadership, and supported by open data. In short, the role of the unqualified
opinion in advancing transparent, accountable, and just reform is optimized when it
becomes the lever that integrates compliance, performance, and equity: compliance
supplies the language and foundation; performance ensures resources generate public
value; and justice guarantees that value is shared without bias, realizing governance that
is both clean and fair.26
Regarding creating clean and transparent state governance, one important effort
is through audits by the Audit Board, which provides an Unqualified Opinion. The
Unqualified Opinion indicates that the financial statements of the government agency
or institution have been presented fairly in all material respects by applicable accounting
principles. The effect of this audit result will be:
1. Improving Transparency and Accountability
By obtaining a Unqualified Opinion from The Auditor Board, the government
demonstrates a commitment to transparency. Financial reports that are considered
proper by the Auditor Board provide evidence that the use of the budget has been
carried out properly by accounting standards and applicable laws.
The Unqualified Opinion given by the Auditor Board plays an important role in
strengthening public sector transparency and accountability, which are important
elements of good governance. Based on agency theory, the government, as an agent,
has a moral and professional obligation to provide transparent financial reports to
the public as the principal. The issuance of a Unqualified Opinion by the Auditor
Board shows that an agency’s financial statements have met applicable government
accounting standards, giving confidence to the public that the financial information
is reliable. According to Mardiasmo, this Unqualified Opinion is proof that public
financial management is carried out with the principle of transparency, which in turn
encourages public participation in monitoring and assessing government performance
more critically.27
According to an accountability perspective, Achmad Supriyadi states that the
Unqualified Opinion is not only a recognition of technical compliance, but also a
representation of the government’s responsibility in managing public funds responsibly.
This approach is in line with the theory of public accountability, which emphasizes
that the government must be able to account for its use to the public and demonstrate
a commitment to carrying out good financial management. In addition, according to
Winarno, the Auditor Board’s Unqualified Opinion encourages the improvement of
internal control systems and compliance, thereby creating continuous self-evaluation
for government agencies.28 This is important in supporting effective governance, where

26
Institute of Internal Auditors, “The IIA’s Three Lines Model: An Update of the Three Lines of Defense.”
27
Anggito Abimanyu and Andie Megantara, Era Baru Kebijakan Fiskal: Pemikiran, Konsep, Dan Implementasi
(Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2009).
28
Sri Nurhidayati, “ Pengaruh Desentralisasi Fiskal , Kinerja Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah Daerah Dan Tindak Lanjut Rekomendasi Hasil Pemeriksaan BPK Terhadap Opini Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah Di Indonesia.Nurhidayati, Sri” (Universitas Lampung, 2017).

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan 469

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadil an | Vol . 13 | Issue 2 | August 2025 | Page,

470~474

transparency and accountability must be carried out in a unified system to ensure the
prevention of fraud and budget abuse.
Unqualified Opinion is also an important element in reducing the potential for
corruption and fraud in the public sector. In Tjiptohadi S.’s view, the presence of an
audit with a Unqualified Opinion indicates that budget management is carried out with
an accountable process. This opinion implies compliance with financial regulations
and the implementation of good internal controls, which can minimize the space for
fraud. In addition, the Unqualified Opinion is also an indicator of the implementation
of good governance, as explained by Azhar Susanto, where transparency is considered
part of credible and professional management.29 The Unqualified Opinion basically
confirms that the government has demonstrated a commitment to maintaining budget
information disclosure, which increases public and investor confidence in state financial
management. This not only affects the transparency and accountability aspects, but
also contributes to the country’s economic and political stability, both of which support
each other in achieving development sustainability.
2. Promoting Financial Management Oversight and Efficiency
Audits conducted by The Auditor Board not only serve as an assessment but also
as a supervisory tool. Government agencies seek to improve the quality of financial
management so that there are no irregularities, for example, through savings or better
asset management.
The Unqualified Opinion from The Auditor Board has a significant impact in
encouraging supervision and efficiency of financial management in the public sector.
Based on the theory of public accountability, the Unqualified Opinion is an instrument
that strengthens the external and internal control system because it shows that budget
management has met standards and can be accounted for. According to Mardiasmo,
the Unqualified Opinion provides a positive signal to internal supervisory institutions
and the public to be more active in monitoring the use of public funds.30 This positive
effect creates an impetus to maintain the quality of financial management, which then
results in a stronger and more effective oversight mechanism.
In addition, Supriyadi emphasized that the Unqualified Opinion from The Auditor
Board is not just an assessment, but also an implicit recommendation for government
agencies to improve efficiency in every step of financial management.31 Managerial
efficiency theory supports this view, where agencies that obtain an unqualified opinion
tend to be more efficient in resource allocation because they have met compliance
and internal control criteria. Furthermore, according to Winarno, the existence of an
Unqualified Opinion can encourage efforts to improve budget policies by minimizing
waste, optimizing the use of funds, and tightening internal supervision. This is in
line with the value for money principle that is the focus of public sector management,
where every expenditure must provide maximum benefits for the community.
TheUnqualifiedOpinionalsohasadirecteffectonimprovingbudgetdiscipline,which
is an important component of good governance. According to the opinion of Tjiptohadi
S, budget management that receives an unqualified opinion shows a commitment to
transparency and compliance, which will form a more systematic and sustainable
29
Azwar Susanto, Sistem Informasi Akuntansi Struktur Pengendalian Resiko Pengembagan (Bandung: Linggar Jaya, 2013).
30
Abimanyu and Megantara, Era Baru Kebijakan Fiskal: Pemikiran, Konsep, Dan Implementasi.
31
Akhmad Syarifudin, “Pengaruh Kompetensi SDM Dan Peran Audit Intern Terhadap Kualitas Laporan
Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah Dengan Variabel Intervening Sistem Pengendalian Internal Pemerintah (Studi Empiris
Pada Pemkab Kebumen),” Jurnal Fokus Bisnis 14, no. 2 (December 2014).

470 Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan

P-ISSN: 2303-3827, E-ISSN: 2477-815X

supervisory culture.32 Thus, the Unqualified Opinion acts as a control mechanism
that encourages effective supervision and efficient use of public funds, creates higher
accountability, and provides encouragement for the government to prioritize accurate
and efficient financial management.
3. Reducing Corruption and Irregularities
The strict audit process carried out by the Auditor Board is expected to identify
and prevent potential irregularities. Thus, the Unqualified Opinion also plays a role
in minimizing corrupt practices within the government. The Unqualified Opinion
given by the Auditor Board has an important effect in reducing corrupt practices
and irregularities in the public sector. According to financial supervision theory, the
Unqualified Opinion not only assesses the feasibility of financial statements, but also
reflects success in implementing a strong internal control system and compliance with
applicable accounting standards. In Mardiasmo’s view, the Unqualified Opinion creates
a climate of more open and transparent financial management, which encourages actors
in the public sector to be more careful in the use of funds and avoid irregularities.33 This
clarity increases accountability and reduces opportunities for individuals to commit
acts of corruption, as every use of the budget can be audited and closely monitored.
This opinion is reinforced by Supriyadi, who states that the Unqualified Opinion
serves as a deterrent to potential corruption by tightening financial management
procedures.34 The Auditor Board, through a thorough audit process, ensures that entities
receiving an unqualified opinion have fulfilled all obligations related to transparency
and internal control, which makes any potential abuse easier to detect. As such, the
Unqualified Opinion also serves as a risk mitigation tool in public sector financial
management, supporting corruption prevention theories that emphasize the importance
of transparency and effective oversight.
The implementation of good financial management standards, as reflected in the
Unqualified Opinion, indicates the lack of gaps for irregularities. The Unqualified
Opinion shows that the agency has followed the appropriate procedures, which means
that every expenditure can be traced and controlled. This has implications for improving
fiscal discipline and oversight, which creates a cleaner and more accountable work
environment. Within the framework of good governance theory, the Unqualified
Opinion is an indicator of the government’s success in implementing the principles
of transparency and integrity, which ultimately reduces the room for corruption and
irregularities in the management of state finances.
4. Building Public Trust
In the case when the government consistently receives an Unqualified Opinion,
it can increase public confidence in the government’s performance and commitment
to managing the state budget.
5. Encouraging Bureaucratic Reform
Unqualified Opinion is a motivation for various institutions to make improvements
in their bureaucratic systems, such as adopting technology, strengthening competent
human resources, and conducting effective budget planning. Overall, the Unqualified
32
Kemal Hidayah et al., “The Role of Regional Inspectorate of Samarinda City In Maintaining Unqualified
Opinion,” Jurnal Borneo Administrator 15, no. 2 (August 6, 2019): 221–36, doi:10.24258/jba.v15i2.538.
33
Jamaluddin Majid, AKUNTANSI SEKTOR PUBLIK, Cetakan 1 (Sulawesi Selatan: CV Berkah Utami,
2019).
34
Syarifudin, “Pengaruh Kompetensi SDM Dan Peran Audit Intern Terhadap Kualitas Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah Dengan Variabel Intervening Sistem Pengendalian Internal Pemerintah (Studi Empiris Pada Pemkab Kebumen).”

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan 471

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadil an | Vol . 13 | Issue 2 | August 2025 | Page,

472~474

Opinion from The Auditor Board symbolizes the government’s success and real efforts
in creating clean, accountable, and trustworthy state financial governance.
3. CONCLUSION

The issuance of an Unqualified Opinion (Wajar Tanpa Pengecualian/WTP) by the
Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) reflects that the government’s financial statements have
been prepared by Government Accounting Standards (SAP), comply with prevailing
laws and regulations, and are presented fairly and transparently. However, beyond its
technical nature as an assessment of financial reports, the Unqualified Opinion also
carries a strategic dimension in the context of public governance. The correlation
between the WTP and efforts to realize clean governance lies in how the opinion signals
compliance with internal control systems, administrative integrity, and accountability
in public financial management. When a public institution consistently obtains a WTP
opinion, it can indicate the existence of governance practices aligned with the principles
of transparency, efficiency, and protection of public assets. Therefore, the WTP serves as
an initial indicator (proxy indicator) for assessing the extent to which clean governance
principles are being implemented, although it should be complemented by a substantive
evaluation of non-financial aspects such as bureaucratic ethics and the effectiveness of
public services.
The impact of The Auditor Board’s Unqualified Opinion audit results is: First,
increasing transparency and accountability, because the government, as an agent, has a
moral and professional obligation to provide transparent financial reports to the public
as a principal. Second, it encourages supervision and efficiency of financial management,
namely, strengthening the external and internal supervision system, because it shows
that budget management has met standards and can be accounted for. Third, reducing
corruption and irregularities, in this case, the Unqualified Opinion not only assesses
the feasibility of financial statements, but also reflects success in implementing a strong
internal control system and compliance with applicable accounting standards. Fourth, it
builds public trust. Fifth, encouraging bureaucratic reforms, such as adopting technology,
strengthening competent human resources, and conducting effective budget planning.
REFERENCES

Bovens, Mark. “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework.”
European Law Journal 13, no. 4 (2007): 447–468. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1468-0386.2007.00378.x.
Davis, James H., F. David Schoorman, and Lex Donaldson. “Toward a Stewardship
Theory of Management.” The Academy of Management Review 22, no. 1 (1997):
20–47. https://doi.org/10.2307/259223.
Goodhart, C. A. E. “Problems of Monetary Management: The UK Experience.” In
Monetary Theory and Practice, 91–121. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17295-5_4.
Institute of Internal Auditors. “The IIA’s Three Lines Model: An Update of the Three
Lines of Defense.” Florida, 2024.
International Framework for Professional Pronouncements. “ISSAI100: Fundamental
Principles of Public Sector Auditing,” 2019. https://www.issai.org/wp-content/
472 Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan

P-ISSN: 2303-3827, E-ISSN: 2477-815X

uploads/2019/08/ISSAI-100-Fundamental-Principles-of-Public-SectorAuditing-1.pdf.
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3, no.
4 (1976): 305–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X.
Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure
as Myth and Ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977): 340–
63. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2778293.
Olken, Benjamin A. “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment
in Indonesia.” Journal of Political Economy 115, no. 2 (2007). https://doi.
org/10.1086/517935.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Gender Budgeting,” 2022.
https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/gender-budgeting.html.
———. “Integrity in Public Procurement,” 2020. https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/subissues/integrity-in-public-procurement.html.
Porter, Brenda. “An Empirical Study of the Audit Expectation-Performance Gap.”
Accounting and Business Research 24, no. 93 (1993): 49–68. https://doi.org/10.1
080/00014788.1993.9729463.
Spence, Michael. “Job Market Signaling.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, no. 3
(1973): 355–74. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010.
Abas. Birokrasi Dan Dinamika Politik Lokal . Yogyakarta: Lontar Mediatama, 2020.
Abimanyu, Anggito, and Andie Megantara. Era Baru Kebijakan Fiskal: Pemikiran,
Konsep, Dan Implementasi. Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2009.
Adinata, Widha, Teguh Puspandoyo, and Mei Ling. “Pengaruh Opini Audit Laporan
Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah Terhadap Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Di Daerah.”
Indonesian Treasury Review: Jurnal Perbendaharaan, Keuangan Negara Dan
Kebijakan Publik 8, no. 3 (September 30, 2023): 219–34. doi:10.33105/ITREV.
V8I3.566.
Angelina, Junita, David Paul, Elia Saerang, and Jessy D. L. Warongan. “The Influence
of Audit Opinion, Characteristics of Regional Head, and Levels of Corruption
on Performance of Local Government in Indonesia.” The Contrarian : Finance,
Accounting, and Business Research 3, no. 2 (July 26, 2024): 96–112. doi:10.58784/
cfabr.160.
Hamdani, Fathul, and Ana Fauzia. “The Authority of the Village Government in the
Management of Village Funds during the Covid-19 Pandemic.” Indonesian
Journal of Advocacy and Legal Services 4, no. 1 (April 27, 2022): 195–222.
doi:10.15294/ijals.v4i1.53646.
Hendriksen, Eldon S., and Michael F. Van Breda. Accounting Theory. 5th Edition.
Pennsylvania: Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1992.
Hidayah, Kemal, Fani Heru Wismono, Mayahayati Kusumaningrum, and Rustan
Amarullah. “The Role of Regional Inspectorate of Samarinda City In Maintaining
Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan 473

Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadil an | Vol . 13 | Issue 2 | August 2025 | Page,

474~474

Unqualified Opinion.” Journal Borneo Administrator 15, no. 2 (August 6, 2019):
221–36. doi:10.24258/jba.v15i2.538.
Ihfan, Awaludin Nur. “THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE UNQUALIFIED
OPINION BY THE AUDIT BOARD OF INDONESIA AND ANTI ANTICORRUPTION ACT.” Jurnal Bina Mulia Hukum 8, no. 1 (September 30, 2023):
128–43. doi:10.23920/jbmh.v8i1.1239.
Indonesia, Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Republik. “Ragam Opini BPK.” Opini BPK, July
13, 2020. https://www.bpk.go.id/news/ragam-opini-bpk.
Majid, Jamaluddin. AKUNTANSI SEKTOR PUBLIK. Cetakan 1. Sulawesi Selatan: CV
Berkah Utami, 2019.
Nurhidayati, Sri. “ Pengaruh Desentralisasi Fiskal , Kinerja Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah
Daerah Dan Tindak Lanjut Rekomendasi Hasil Pemeriksaan BPK Terhadap
Opini Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah Di Indonesia.Nurhidayati, Sri.”
Universitas Lampung, 2017.
Rizal, Chairul, Supiyandi, and Muhammad Amin. “Perancangan Aplikasi Pengelolaan
Keuangan Desa Melalui E-Village Budgeting.” Bulletin of Computer Science
Research 3, no. 1 (December 31, 2022): 7–13. doi:10.47065/bulletincsr.v3i1.181.
Sitepu, Andreas Putranta. Transparansi Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah . Pasaman Barat:
CV Azka Pustaka, 2022.
Srimranani, Chatarina Endang. “Peranan Pemerintah Kabupaten Klaten Dalam
Melaksanakan Anggaran Berbasis Kinerja Dalam Mewujudkan Tata Kelola
Pemerintahan Yang Baik.” Universitas Atma Jaya Yogyakarta, 2022.
Suryadi, Imam, and Aminatuzzuhro Aminatuzzuhro. “PENGARUH GOOD
GOVERNANCE DAN STANDAR AKUNTANSI PEMERINTAH TERHADAP
AKUNTABILITAS KEUANGAN DENGAN KOMITMEN ORGANISASI
SEBAGAI PEMODERASI.” INCOME 2, no. 2 (December 31, 2021): 86–98.
doi:10.38156/akuntansi.v2i2.96.
Susanto, Azwar. Sistem Informasi Akuntansi Struktur Pengendalian Resiko Pengembagan
. Bandung: Linggar Jaya, 2013.
Syarifudin, Akhmad. “Pengaruh Kompetensi SDM Dan Peran Audit Intern Terhadap
Kualitas Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah Dengan Variabel Intervening
Sistem Pengendalian Internal Pemerintah (Studi Empiris Pada Pemkab
Kebumen).” Jurnal Fokus Bisnis 14, no. 2 (December 2014).
Widyanti, Rina. “Analisis Akuntabilitas Dan Transparansi Pengelolaan Dana Desa Pada
Nagari Ulakan Kecamatan Ulakan Tapakis,.” Menara Ilmu: Jurnal Penelitian
Dan Kajian Ilmiah 12, no. 11 (October 25, 2018).
Willis, Brillian, Lanny Kusumawati, and Wafia Silvi Dhesinta Rini. “Keterkaitan
Opini Wajar Tanpa Pengecualian Dari Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Terhadap
Prinsip Good Financial Governance.” Al Qodiri : Jurnal Pendidikan,
Sosial Dan Keagamaan 21, no. 2 (July 31, 2023): 389–405. doi:10.53515/
QODIRI.2023.21.2.405-421.

474 Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan