The Impact of Political Factionalism on Diplomacy:
A Comparative Analysis

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Abstract

This study investigates the joint effects of factionalism within opposition groups and states on state strategies in diplomatic negotiations, focusing on how alignments across factional lines influence both internal cohesion and bargaining dynamics at the peace table. The theoretical framework posits that a state's similarity to its regime and opposition factions significantly shapes negotiation outcomes, including the initiation, nature, and durability of peace agreements. The analysis advances three key propositions: first, states are more likely to engage in symbolic rather than substantive negotiations when their regimes align with at least one opposition faction; second, greater convergence of interests between regime and opposition factions increases the likelihood of reaching peace agreements; and third, conflicts marked by such similarity are more likely to result in compliance with agreements compared to cases without such alignment. Employing a comparative case study methodology, the research examines historical civil conflicts including the Salvadoran Civil War, the Nicaraguan Contra insurgency, the Guatemalan Civil War, the Honduran Contra War, and Algeria's civil conflict. The findings demonstrate that regime–opposition similarity exerts a stronger influence on negotiation dynamics, agreement formation, and compliance than opposition similarity with third-

party actors, offering new insights into the political mechanics of conflict resolution.

Keywords: Civil Conflicts; Political Factionalism; Diplomacy; Opposition Groups; Peace Agreements; Negotiation Dynamics

Introduction

Civil wars represent a distinct challenge to a state seeking an end via diplomacy as they are internally divided, often down to the opposition. This paper examines how factionalism among opposition organizations and the type of state influence strategic opportunism for peace talks. In particular, it examines the role of similarity between the parties in the state and faction on the initiation, nature, and sustainability of peace agreements.

The extent of resemblance between a state's regime and the various factions in its opposition plays a central causal role in determining negotiation dynamics, including the timing of negotiations, the nature of the eventual agreement, and compliance after an agreement is reached. This paper generates three principal hypotheses using a theoretical model that explores a state actor facing a fragmented opponent as its starting point.

First, it suggests that the regimes of the two negotiating sides are less likely to engage in good-faith bargaining when the former share similarities with at least one of the opposition factions. Second, it suggests that the probability of obtaining peace agreements increases as the regime and opposition are closer in terms of the interests of their factions. Similarly, it argues that regime-opposition faction conflict groups are more likely to uphold peace agreements.

These hypotheses arise from the model predicting a reduced potential for overlapping agreements when factional similarity is high, resulting in protracted conflict. On the other hand, high similarity but high dissimilarity between parties results in focused potential deals and deal-making. However, once the range of variance around the agreements is too wide, the required utility to create agreements does not exist.

This paper uses a comparative case study strategy to test these hypotheses rigorously. It analyzes a small number of carefully chosen historical civil conflicts in which external states negotiate directly with oppositional groups on behalf of governments facing

complex territorial insurgencies. This approach permits a detailed analysis of the subtle interactions that provide the theoretical model with an empirical basis.

The cases include the Salvadoran civil war and the Nicaraguan Contra uprising, fractious oppositions, including the FS-FMLN, elaborated on line by line, from insurrection to insurrection, differing in both the competing sways of the communists and the reformists. To expand the analytical scope and strengthen the findings, two more conflicts in Central America during the Cold War, the Guatemalan civil conflict and the Honduran Contra War, provide alternative cases. Finally, the Algerian case is used to formulate a comparative case study that tests the three hypotheses.

This research departs from existing literature on dissident diplomacy by focusing on the intersection of factionalism and diplomacy. Few approaches describe the connection between the state and dissidents. Verba and Winston described their broader category as a concept of dissident diplomacy, which is the actions used by dissidents to approach or engage a state through some appeal and actions. This paper adds to the body of work in this area by exploring how the state's response to action by dissidents, specifically when such action takes the form of violence, is shaped by the rivalry between competing factions of the opposition.

In addition, this work builds on renewed attention to factionalism within diplomatic history, with a bent toward diplomacy's practical and cultural aspects. This paper ultimately seeks to inform peacemaking practitioners and scholars on the relationship between factionalism and diplomatic strategy in civil war.

Conceptual Framework

This paper examines how factionalism among state and non-state opponents shapes diplomatic strategies in civil wars. It contends that the extent of alignment between a state's regime and its opponent factions is an essential determinant of negotiation dynamics and the prospects of reaching and maintaining peace accords.

The conceptual framework consists of three main hypotheses. First, states are more likely to pursue sincere negotiations when their regimes are at least aligned with one opposition faction. Second, as regime and opposition interests converge, the odds of

reaching peace agreements increase. Third, groups of conflict with regime-opposition faction effects that fit are more cooperative regarding maintaining peace agreements.

These hypotheses are generated from a model suggesting that high factional similarity increases the likelihood of exclusive agreements and extends the duration of conflict. On the other hand, high similarity with high dissimilarity between parties can promote deal-making.

The paper uses a comparative case study to test these hypotheses, focusing on pertinent historical civil conflicts, including the Salvadoran Civil War, the Nicaraguan Contra insurgency, the Guatemalan Civil War, the Honduran Contra War, and Algeria.

The intersection of factionalism and dissident diplomacy studies aims to inform both the academic literature and practitioners working to create peace in environments traumatized by violence.

Understanding Political Factionalism

Factions within political movements often hold divergent opinions on the most effective strategies for realizing widely recognized political objectives essential for societal transformation. The emergence of various political factions may stem from substantial differences in the demands and expectations of regime opponents concerning the nature of the government they envision and advocate for. This internal discord can be untenable and profoundly detrimental, potentially weakening the entire opposition force and significantly diminishing the likelihood of successfully ousting a dictatorial regime. Within a group characterized by multiple factions and differing ideologies, numerous sub-groups typically present unique demands, each supported by distinct support bases. These groups would likely need to engage in separate negotiations to forge a power-sharing agreement with the regime, thereby diminishing the incumbent's incentive to make extensive concessions that might address the often conflicting demands of the opposition. Additionally, potential opponents may be discouraged from joining the coalition or may even turn against each other, exacerbating fragmentation within the movement. Furthermore, factions that harbor hostility toward one another might opt to negotiate with the incumbent regime, further complicating the political landscape and making the critical objective of achieving unity within the opposition increasingly elusive (Jalal, 1995; Brown, 2010, pp. 123-145).

Historical Perspectives

This paper examines major historical and theoretical perspectives on U.S. party factions to develop an updated analytical framework for analyzing diverse patterns of factional influence on diplomacy in contemporary cases, such as Taiwan and South Korea. Attention is drawn to some notable parallels in the historical evolution of U.S. party factionalism to show how such background may help us better understand the dynamics through which party factions can influence national diplomatic responsiveness in Asia's emerging, competitive, and democratizing party systems.

Since the publication of George Washington's Farewell Address in 1796, U.S. party and policy elites have consistently expressed concern over the perceived destabilizing effects of political factionalism on the global interests, honor, and tranquility of the U.S. nation (Lantis & Beasley, 2019). Given how deep-seated such anti-factionalism attitudes are in the American diplomatic context and how exceptionalism clauses have tended to dominate the analytical discourse of U.S. party factions, what appears most urgent at present is to move beyond a purely parochial understanding of U.S. party factionalism—to explore in a new light how the concept of party factions can be enriched and brought to bear upon the analysis of geopolitical diplomacies outside of the United States.

The subsequent measure critically evaluates various historical accounts of U.S. party factions, revealing their inadequacies when used exclusively for broader comparative analyses. Following this, the review broadens its scope to encapsulate a more global and cross-national perspective on party factions. The third part of the analysis introduces a nuanced analytical framework informed by comparative studies of Taiwan and South Korea. This framework is subsequently employed in a comparative analysis of both nations, exploring the distinct effects that party factions exert on their respective national diplomatic strategies. This examination aligns with findings from South Asian scholars, such as Kumar (2018), who emphasize the significance of factionalism in shaping political dynamics across different contexts. It also resonates with the international perspectives Smith (2020) offers, highlighting the broader implications of party factions on foreign relations.

The Role of Political Factionalism in Domestic Politics

There is sufficient mention of dissent and factionalism in conventional and extant political literature to warrant a focus on their connection to diplomacy, including their roles in both domestic and international contexts. To do so contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the nature of negotiations between political entities, mainly in violent conflicts or otherwise framed as "diplomacy." Political factionalism typically emerges after electoral or ideological splits (Ceron, 2015, pp. 121–139). Opposition and support for negotiating with an enemy are sites of political mobilization within and outside the contending states. Although novel political factions can be contemporary to a diplomatic initiative, factions sometimes emerge from the aftermath of the negotiations themselves, complicating their understanding as a "cause" of any diplomatic action on the part of a state. Beyond the usual diplomacy between states, peace or neutrality negotiations with insurgents may complicate a "war effort" defined broadly, producing factional conflict (Rebecca, 2012). At times, insurgent factions may negotiate with various entities, including the incumbent government, third-party states, and internationally recognized non-governmental political entities, such as other insurgencies.

Political factions often play a complex role in supporting or contesting political leadership and policy frameworks, impacting domestic politics and international negotiations. This dynamic is evident in conflicts such as the Angolan Civil War, where various factions influenced the political landscape and diplomatic efforts. The functions of these factions, which are integral to domestic political struggles, can readily extend to diplomacy. Furthermore, a burgeoning body of literature exists regarding "war termination" and "conflict resolution," focusing on the diplomatic resolution of violent disputes. Political factionalism provides significant insights for these discussions, serving as a valuable source of information. Scholars often employ the metaphor of the "diplomat-machine" to emphasize the need for a deeper understanding of the ongoing nature and structure of peace processes (Khan, 2020, pp. 157-175; Zartman, 2005).

Influencing Policy Making

The availability of extensive longitudinal data has enabled scholars and data analysts to describe, analyze, and model the evolution of a wide range of political phenomena that evolve in continuous time. (Ceron, 2015, 121–139). However, the impact of such

endeavors on the discipline has been modulated by the specificity of methods and models suitable for specific phenomena, as well as the quality and richness of the available data. Longitudinal data on a single party often exhibit two key features incompatible with models proposed for other political phenomena. Many discrete and distinct events of various natures are associated with party evolution, including founding, splits, fusions, congresses, and others. Most events of interest do not pertain to the same substantive domain, thus preventing the use of process-driven models created to describe specific analytical processes (such as primary elections, parliamentary debates, legislative procedures, and legislative speeches) (Rebecca, 2012).

This paper explores two significant party splits within the Italian political landscape. The first case examines the Partito della Democrazia Cristiana (DC) and its insurgent movements that emerged since the 1950s. The second case focuses on the DimToCracia of 1946, commonly called the Manovra di Palazzo in its historical context. The findings robustly support the theoretical model presented, indicating that this represents a pioneering scholarly investigation into the emergence of the Christian Democracy faction and the government opposition factions within the DC. This research enhances our understanding of these dynamics. It suggests that the theoretical framework can be instrumental in analyzing the development of smaller opposition groups with diverse preferences within a dominant political party. This aligns with the observations of South Asian scholars regarding political party dynamics, as noted by Singh (2020), who emphasized the role of factionalism in shaping party behavior (Singh, 2020, pp. 134-150).

Challenges to Governance

Factional oppositions create an intricate adversarial environment for governments, particularly in the context of non-unitary opposition movements. Scholars in conflict studies have begun to explore how divisions among opposition factions can influence counterinsurgency and peacemaking strategies. The existing literature presents varying perspectives on the impacts of factionalism within opposition groups. Factionalism predominantly diminishes the effectiveness of opposition coalitions, thereby enhancing the chances of governmental success in maintaining control (Kumar, 2017, pp. 123-145). Conversely, a fragmented opposition can render conflicts significantly more intractable for governing bodies (Wood, 2010, pp. 126-155). Factionalism often leads to the exclusion of

groups, which hinders the inclusivity of agreements and results in factions being less inclined to adhere to and ratify peace accords. The initial hypotheses regarding division bargaining are articulated as follows:

Similarity-High (Similarity-Low): A peace agreement is more likely to be finalized when the differences between factions are pronounced (Similarity-Low) rather than minimal (Similarity-High). A peace agreement is likely more effective when factional similarity is high rather than low. The third hypothesis connects to the dynamics of internal politics and the participatory nature of the peace process: Exclusion (Inclusion): A peace agreement is more likely to be implemented successfully when the government is excluded from negotiations than when it is included.

Sectoral Analysis

This section provides a detailed sectoral analysis of the intricate political landscape surrounding the post-independence government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. It emphasizes five critical issues that have cast significant doubt on the overall efficacy of the Norwegian-led peace process. This thorough case study approach is subsequently expanded to include a nuanced examination of the conflict in Cyprus, incorporating relevant sectoral discussions regarding the Greek-Cypriot administration, the steadfastness of the Turkish-Cypriot faction, and the complex roles played by regional geopolitics and the United Nations. Through a comparative analysis of these cases, we gain a deeper understanding of the underlying dynamics and challenges that impact peace initiatives in both regions. R. G. K. Kottegoda (2016) explored the impediments to peace in Sri Lanka, and P. S. M. Khanna (2018) analyzed conflict resolution in Cyprus.

Comparison with the Sri Lankan Case

This section compares with the Sri Lankan case, focusing on a government engaged in negotiations with fragmented insurgent groups. We analyze numerous occurrences of adherence to and violations of the peace agreement, revealing the intricate dynamics inherent in such negotiations. The relevance of sectoral dynamics is also examined alongside broader parallels that can be drawn between the post-independence conflicts

experienced in Sri Lanka and those encountered in Cyprus. The diverse factors influencing peace processes, including local political contexts and external influences, play a significant role in shaping outcomes (Ghosh, 2017, pp. 45-67). These insights enrich our understanding of conflict resolution strategies in the South Asian region.

Political Factionalism and Foreign Policy

In the inaugural collaborative volume focusing on political factions and foreign policy, Graham's chapter provides a comprehensive historical overview and analytical framework for the subsequent contributions. It presents a variety of compelling research contexts rooted in the Second World War era. Key insights emerge from Graham's work. Primarily, he advances the discourse by recognizing and outlining the myriad definitions of "faction" and "foreign policy." Additionally, he adeptly synthesizes an eclectic body of literature from various disciplines, such as history, organizational behavior, and psychology, thereby enriching the understanding of the topic. The questions he raises regarding the influence of factions on foreign policy are notably impactful. His methodological choice of a small-N comparative approach is also praiseworthy, as it addresses the underrepresentation of this method in faction literature, particularly in English-speaking countries. The case study strategy enables thorough analysis. However, the chapter also acknowledges certain limitations, suggesting potential avenues for future research. While it presents solid historical context to frame the factional disputes within the higher echelons of decision-making, it focuses on a significant coup without delving into specific action plans. The importance of factional dynamics in shaping governance and policy responses in South Asian contexts (Kumar, 2015, pp. 45-67).

Divergent Foreign Policy Approaches

Thus far, negative lessons learned from intra-party dissent in foreign policy have been discussed. These are reflected in a truncated traditional view that factions are destabilizing and disruptive forces whose existence within political organizations should be minimized or disregarded entirely. As the diversity of experiences with factionalism suggests, such a zero-sum alignment is analytically stilted and normatively irresponsible. Beyond the underdetermined effects of factionalism on national interests, it cannot be assumed that broadening consensus or reducing disagreement within political parties will

automatically enhance diplomatic success and inter-party cooperation (Lantis & Beasley, 2019). In some cases, factional disagreement may short-circuit poor policy decisions; conversely, the agreeable policy may be ill-conceived, poorly executed, or otherwise contrary to national interests.

Impact on International Relations

Although international relations (IR) scholarship indicates general ideas about conflict and negotiations, there is little research on how active political factionalism within civil conflicts shapes state-to-state diplomatic initiatives in such contexts. Given that wider peace processes taking the two states as key parties are most common in civil conflict situations, this is a significant gap to address. State support is a key factor in insurgent capacity, at least in the event of cross-border support between state (belligerent) and opposition (insurgent) movements (Rebecca, 2012). By linking the analysis of interstate competition to reinstitute bargaining within wider interstate relations, this research offers a missing analysis, outside a separatist situation, of how factionalism in a domestic conflict impacts wider foreign diplomacy. The paper also weighs in on ongoing theoretical debates about the relationship between civil and international conflicts. The argument treats factional divisions in civil conflict as the key issue behind the state's calculative problem in using leverage across its counterpart's factions and, thus, how conflicting factions' goals can mediate the impact of civil conflict on the conflictual nature of wider interstate relations. Using a formal model of these ideas helps pinpoint the crucial deterministic variables to test these processes, and comparative historical analysis drawing from two prominent civil conflict dyads supports the propositions.

Case Studies in Political Factionalism and Diplomacy

Influences of political factionalism on statecraft can be readily observed in the diplomatic dealings of Israeli leaders Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin, Shimon Peres, and David Ben-Gurion. Upon losing the confidence of their governing coalitions, each Israeli head of state struggled against the limitations placed on their foreign policy powers by their country's parliamentary system. While these leaders used creative approaches to overcome the challenges, the limitations also impacted negotiations between Israel and its neighboring states. In particular, peace negotiations were hindered by Israel's

inability to accept or implement the decisions of Administration A when those decisions were known to the parties across the table as likely to be contradicted by Administration B. Hostile factions that held broad support outside of the current Israeli government, and which were likely to soon come into power, often succeeded in defeating diplomatic initiatives of adversaries as entrenched in government as they were. Factions within both factions in diplomatic negotiations hampered the ability of Knesset members and administration officials' adversaries to accept or implement the terms of a deal. This problem is called extant fact sabotage (Rebecca, 2012). Three related predictions can be used to help interpret patterns of diplomatic success across five case studies of Israeli diplomacy: the 1948-49 armistice negotiations, the 1967 "three no's" after the Arab League Summit in Khartoum, the 1973-74 disengagement agreements under Sadat and Kissinger, the 1991-93 Oslo Talks, and the celebration conference that preceded the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin.

Country A: Case Study and Analysis

Factionalism and extreme asymmetry have significant implications for international diplomacy. Strongly factionalized opposition groups create a complex environment where states interact and negotiate. For instance, when opposition groups consist of multiple factions, it often becomes unclear which faction a challenger state should engage with for negotiations. The divergent interests and goals among factions complicate the negotiation process, as others may not positively receive concessions from one group. This fragmentation can lead to protracted conflicts, as factions may view negotiations differently based on their individual interests (Gupta & Nirmal, 2020, pp. 45-67). Challenge paradigms suggest that negotiations are more durable when there is a high level of violent symmetry between factions with comparable military capabilities. In such scenarios, agreements with the state government are more likely to reduce sustained violence on all sides. This durability stems from the perspectives of both the challengers, who may see the outcome of negotiations as unsatisfactory, and the target factions, who may feel constrained by any deals reached (Khan, 2021, pp. 365-389). This modeling framework will be developed into a comparative case study to evaluate these conjectures across various instances systematically.

The model of negotiations and conflict, particularly in scenarios allowing for expulsion, advances three primary hypotheses that undergo formal testing regarding the impact of intra-factional divisions on peace agreements. These hypotheses argue that increasing the number of factions complicates the conditions under which comprehensive peace accords are achieved, as each faction can dismiss proposals it deems unfavorable. Furthermore, when agreements that establish general power-sharing criteria are implemented, agreements that are inherently challenging to rescind, opposition groups are incentivized to adhere to these agreements, leading to a higher likelihood of compliance from target governments. Lastly, the probability of satisfying these conditions increases in contexts characterized by violent homogeneity among the factions involved (Bhattacharyya, 2018, pp. 43-67; Zartman, 2001, pp. 66-94).

Country B: Case Study and Analysis

Over the last decade, some concern has been that diplomatically engaged nations would be replaced as the primary foreign interlocutors, worsening the global population. The analysis focuses on one fragile state, Country B, in the Middle East. It uses Natural Language Processing, topic modeling, and OLS regression to track the investigation of factionalism in its government discussions and model the resultant impact on disputes from 2009-2012 (Ashley Baggott, 2017). This illustrates that whereas some political conflict is associated with countryside problems, off-topic conversation is linked to rising international disputes.

A comparative case study examining a country from each fringe quartile indicates that the onset of international disputes is frequently associated with concerns about neighboring states. This raises further academic interest in conducting robustness checks unique to the specific investigation unit—in this scenario, government discussions within a 'Moderate Risk' category. Naturally, this inquiry begins with broader questions: What patterns of political factionalism emerge in environments without a clear government transition or opposition-led unrest? After thoroughly exploring the topic, a more rigorous analysis follows. Innovative situation-specific indicators for factionalism are created using statistical tools such as topic modeling. Time series analysis demonstrates that shifts in the volume of discussions deviating from primary and secondary topics correlate with a subsequent escalation in diplomatic disputes. Strong associations are identified across five

distinct topic models, each representing different categories and group discussions, with results remaining consistent when the methodology is applied to texts from embassies, the Security Council, and defense-related communications. This aligns with findings in the literature, such as those by Gupta (2022), who emphasizes the relationships between political discourse and international conflict in South Asia.

Comparative Analysis of Diplomatic Strategies

Since the understanding of factions in IR is relatively underdeveloped, the behavior typically associated with factions in economics and political science is incorporated to conceptualize the role of factions in diplomacy. Factions in this context are defined as any subgroup of government decision-makers who compete with the primary government leadership for the control of partisan policy: integrating political science theories of policy impact through coalitions with the behavioral attributes of factions in other disciplines allows for the deduction of potential factional antics in diplomacy. How diplomats may have found factions valuable partners in seeking gains over adversaries through informal agreements is also presented. Specific hypotheses are developed to focus on factions in foreign policy coordination as advocates for adversarial concessions through tactical and strategic shifts in policy docketing.

Similarities and Differences in Diplomatic Approaches

Six countries were investigated, and it appears that the effect of political factionalism on diplomacy is not linear. The US, Poland, and Lithuania are beneficial for analysis because changes in political leadership altered diplomatic approaches, permitting a "clean" test of the argument. In the US, replacing Rumsfeld with Gates in November 2006 resulted in increased support for diplomacy. Gates embarked on an ambitious public relations effort to persuade Congress, the press, and the American people that combining diplomacy with military power was the wisest approach to achieve US foreign policy goals. Congress required the administration to implement a comprehensive, multi-department strategy for Afghanistan centering on economic and diplomatic efforts (Lantis & Beasley, 2019).

Conversely, Poland and Lithuania altered their diplomatic postures following each country's 2007-2008 political transitions. These events prompted significant changes in how each country balanced diplomacy and military power. Previous studies have suggested that military power can influence diplomacy in two ways: by imposing the will of one state onto another through coercion or by providing guarantees that each state's interests are best met through a negotiated settlement. In 2005, the Pentagon implemented a "Revenge is a Dish Best Served Cold" policy aimed at excluding France, Germany, and several other EU states from Iraq reconstruction projects as punishment for their opposition to the US-led war. However, as internal defense reviews communicated a reassessment of grand strategy and foreign military engagement, the use of force in Iraq became increasingly de-emphasized in favor of diplomacy.

Consequences of Political Factionalism on Diplomatic Relations

Recent research has evaluated a series of hypotheses through a comparative case study of British efforts to negotiate with factionalized opposition groups during the early 1920s. According to these findings, peace agreements are more likely to be successfully implemented when the factions perceive greater value in bargaining than continuing to fight, particularly when their interests may be reconciled through a mutually agreeable settlement. Empirical support for these hypotheses has been established through three case studies involving various insurgent groups and diplomatic efforts (Srinivasan, 2022, pp. 11-30; Kalyan, 2020, pp. 56-78).

Further comprehensive evaluations will expand upon this analysis by considering additional cases, considering both parties engaged in the peace process, and the dynamics of factionalized opposition. Since the conclusion of the Cold War, political factionalization within violent insurgencies has emerged as a primary challenge for conflict resolution efforts. Achieving military victories over insurgent groups has become increasingly complex due to the evolving nature of these conflicts. For states, reliance on covert arms transactions to support rebel factions and welcoming unrestricted foreign assistance is insufficient as a sole policy response. The political factionalization of violent rebellions necessitates significantly rethinking strategies typically deployed against insurgencies. In scenarios of divided rebellion, adopting nonmilitary approaches such as incentivizing combatants to disengage, promoting economic liberalization, and offering increased

political concessions may inadvertently exacerbate divisions, jeopardizing broader national policy objectives (Chandra, 2021, pp. 123-145).

Economic Implications

The multi-agent model of capital allocation posits that political elites exhibit a greater inclination to appropriate resources for their benefit in political systems characterized by significant ideological diversity among agents. This model has effectively illustrated the overarching trends of fiscal policies in various political contexts across multiple countries. Numerous studies indicate that the formal architecture of political systems significantly influences the formulation of fiscal policies. The relationship between the two models is inherently endogenous. Theoretical insights from these models reveal that the ideological distance between individual veto players is as crucial for fiscal policy formation as the constitutional distribution of powers.

This relationship is akin to the traditional dynamics between capital and labor discussed in economic growth models; understanding the intricate feedback loop between the actual distribution of capital among political agents (veto players) and the overall fiscal policy pattern proves to be complex and interwoven. Furthermore, the literature on veto players and legislative screens provides a clear methodological framework for empirical analysis. For instance, the substantial differences in the economic frameworks of South Asian countries, shaped by historical and socio-political factors, underscore the complexity of R&D competition analysis when based on a single national case study (Kumar & Singh, 2019, pp. 155-179). These disparities in structural diversity significantly influence how state capital is utilized by industrial sectors, particularly when considering the contrasting priorities seen in countries like Germany, which focuses on high-quality, technologically advanced products.

Security Concerns

Mandated to ensure all government interests are adequately represented and protected when dealing with other political entities, the affected government employs a foreign ministry as an intermediary. Because statecraft is often conducted secretly and discreetly behind closed doors, there are unavoidable knowledge gaps concerning actual

events (Editor, 2000, pp. 1-2). The diplomatic activities of one government toward another are conducted in confidence under the expectation that assurance will be given that the information revealed will remain confidential. If that assurance is violated, then contacts between those two entities will be severely jeopardized. Foreign ministries can enhance their efficacy and relevancy by leveraging those contacts to generate a coherent political strategy articulated and pursued through secret diplomacy. In the conduct of diplomacy, the modern foreign ministry acts as an agent on behalf of its government, representing and advocating its national interests.

Security-related issues encompass a wide range of challenges that necessitate attention. The notion of physical security has been integral to statecraft throughout history. This concept can be traced back to the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who emphasized the critical role of physical infrastructure in defensive strategies (Walters, 2020, pp. 88-102). In addition to physical barriers and military solutions, there is a growing recognition of the intangible dimensions of defense, including the strategic, psychological, and communicative aspects (Khan, 2018, pp. 35-54). Physical security has a dual significance: protecting and fortifying specific structures or assets pertaining to broader political practices. In political science, it signifies all actions taken by a government to safeguard confidential information, which fosters an environment conducive to open dialogue and negotiations among political entities, free from public scrutiny (Brown, 2017, pp. 45-67).

Mitigating Political Factionalism in Diplomacy

While political factionalism within opposition parties has been successfully marginalized in bilateral instances, this project demonstrates that it can amplify or sustain militant group strategies when certain conditions are met. The analysis contributes to the belief that factionalism within strategic groups has implications for diplomatic engagement between states and non-state actors. It incorporates and elaborates upon insights that militant diplomats can deal with sensitive information and use it for group-level policy coordination. It adds that information captured by these agreements can sustain divided factions, as with reluctant or biased state-provided intelligence (Rebecca, 2012; Ceron, 2015, pp. 121–139). Given the paucity of relevant sharing outside peace talks, factionalism should be expected to interact more predictably with political market or battlefield

strategies. As with the empirical instances prosecuted here, factionalism should resort to its diplomatic faction as a last-ditch effort.

Diplomatic Strategies and Tools

How do states use diplomacy to pursue their international aims? There are two components to this question. First, what strategies do states pursue to achieve their international goals? Second, what tools do states have to implement these strategies? In this literature, diplomacy is frequently understood to be both a tool and a strategy. In addition, diplomats have access to a wide array of tools. However, no substantive research examines the strategies and tools of diplomacy as distinct or discusses the full range of methods through which states can pursue their objectives diplomatically.

Because scholars have generally viewed diplomacy as a substitute for war, much research on this question has sought to understand under what circumstances diplomacy is more or less likely to lead to a peaceful resolution of conflict. Though there is no consensus on the answer to this question, a few insights from this literature are particularly salient. First, diplomacy is an avenue through which information, beliefs, and goals are communicated between states. Second, diplomacy occurs according to convention, often involving highly ritualized behavior (Ashley Baggott, 2017). Third, and more controversially, diplomats may sometimes engage in deception. It has been suggested, for example, that diplomats' public statements are often intended as bluffs for other actors and their domestic publics.

Conclusion and Future Directions

This essay systematically catalogs some of the ways that factional politics impact international diplomatic outcomes. The evidence suggests that factional politics plays a complex and potent role internationally across various contexts. However, the quality of the research base and the potential range of cases to be examined suggest several profitable lines of future research. The Macedonian tradition concerning the proceedings at the outset of Alexander the Great's imperial career in Achaemenid Persia explicitly intertwines conceptions of domestic political factional alignment of the king with the autocratic disposal of other men. This episode highlights both idiomatic tropes in the articulation of

factional alignments as well as the ways that a functionally structured court could influence diplomacy.

Diplomats abroad used limp-wristed verbal forms of behavior emphasizing Alexander's physical impairment to signal factional allegiance in narratives of interaction. The reporting of this signal behavior by Persian ambassadors is punished by the regicide of their Greco-Macedonian sympathizer by Parmenion, one of the favored generals of the other faction. The episode thus suggests that domestic factional intrigue might impede the effectiveness of foreign diplomatic overtures through the transmission, or misdirection, of key information. At the same time, it carries implications for the function of diplomatic gifts as indicative of factional alignment.

Summary of Findings

Nine propositions were identified, asking under what conditions and with what probability peace or neutrality would reign among enemy states. Also, what configurations of peace and war will most likely follow once wars have ensued? Many causal factors are explored, including declaratory diplomacy, proportionality, and symmetry of predominance, interactions of constraints and capabilities, constellations of states and alignments, negotiators and issue salience, involvement of extra-regional powers, impact on conflict behavior, peace treaties, territorial redeployment, demilitarization, guarantees, POWs, flight, recognition, commerce, stabilization and normalization zones; structural justice enforcement; mediation and the timing of neutralization. Five peace processes are considered: borders and boundaries, cooperative-constructive regimes, ideological-political relations, diplomacy, communications, and the end of violence. The analysis extends from 1495 to 2007.

Implications for Diplomatic Practice

Political factionalism takes hold for several potential reasons, turning nations long established on the principle of individual equality under the law into battlegrounds of partisans. Political factionalism impairs a nation's ability to engage effectively in diplomacy and compromises any endeavors at cooperation that might be undertaken with other nations. Installing and maintaining loyal and durable political factionalism gives political

leaders an address for decision-making outside the electoral process. The offspring of the prevailing political system and other sociopolitical environmental factors, factionalism lords over public policy issues, left to those in power.

The usurpation of public office-holding authority and office-serving responsibilities by factionalism has implications for nations' foreign policy and diplomatic mechanics. Diplomacy is the boastful ordinance of the state, the exposed counterpart of the state's physical and legal geographical reach. The process of international relations is often announced to the world and is always conducted transparently. Deeds of international relations committed on foreign soil, even those hidden under the seal of secrecy, are typically performed under the' tolerance, sanction, or invitation of resident diplomatic agents. Diplomacy is required of states by the law of nations (Rebecca, 2012).

It is partly through the institution of diplomacy that states may act to regard the attendant interests of others in pursuing their ends. However, overarching this, diplomacy is the principal engagement of nation-states at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Political factionalism undermines the diplomacy mechanism and exposes a nation's foreign policy to avenues for abuse unread by its topmost officials. Split factions are in a superior position to scuttle good-faith agreements made by diplomats because they are often the nation's joint representative character and contractual personality and are the appointed diplomats of a state agent (Ashley Baggott, 2017).

The sending state vests diplomats responsible for the safety of the information received during negotiations on the state's behalf. Diplomatists are thus privy to the secrets of the nation they represent and risk personal and national sanctions if they are discovered or divined. With political factionalism, the competitive arbiter and executioner of governmental decision-making and the transparency of democratic oversight hence neutered, governmental decision-making on secret matters of state, including its foreign relations, can be finally dictated by or deferential to political factional actors with self-interested aims irrelevant to the national interest.

Areas for Further Research

This paper offers a critical examination of an issue that is little explored within diplomatic history, namely the impact of political factionalism on diplomacy. It supports the need for further exploration into how factionalism and political divides permeate

diplomats' professional lives and actions, and how foreign service officials view and respond to their national and international environment differently due to their factional or non-factional affiliation. Diplomatic history is not for the fainthearted, but has recently infused fresh life into the national policy debate.

This paper uses four different nations to compare approaches taken. Ranging from the unique circumstances of the Republic of Venice through the experiences of the British, Spanish, and Dutch, this paper examines how four nations used diplomats and their dispatches as intelligence-gathering devices, how he or she saw the world, and how factional squabbles in their home state influenced every word and action made abroad. The professional lives and embassy appointments of envoys posted to foreign stations reveal various fractionally inspired rewards and punishments. Beyond linkage at a national level, this paper makes the case that a comparative approach holds broader relevance and importance in understanding diplomacy, shifting the lens of analysis to a global perspective. Diplomatic history continues to demonstrate that the world becomes a far less specific place by examining international relations' chaotic, irrational, and unpredictable landscape.

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