XI JINPING.
AuCHINA DREAMAy.
AND CHINESE MILITARY DIPLOMACY TO ASEAN Lidya Christin Sinaga Center for Political Studies.
Indonesian Institute of Sciences Jl.
Jend.
Gatot Subroto 10.
Jakarta.
Indonesia 12710 bosua@gmail.
Received: 02nd June 2020/ Revised: 08th October 2020/ Accepted: 02nd November 2020 How to Cite: Sinaga.
Xi Jinping.
AuChina DreamAy, and Chinese military diplomacy to ASEAN.
Journal of ASEAN Studies, 8.
, 173-190.
https://doi.
21512/jas.
ABSTRACT
The rise of Xi Jinping has brought together the idea of the AoChina DreamAo as a great revival of China.
Since the dream referred to the nationalism spirit of a Aocentury of humiliation,Ao it has made national security issues as the core of ChinaAos While the national security-related foreign policy has enhanced the military's role in ChinaAos foreign policy-making, it brings consequences for ChinaAos tougher stance in protecting ChinaAos national security.
However.
Xi JinpingAos notion of using military diplomacy has started uneasy relationships between China and some ASEAN countries resulting in Aoongoing negotiation without progressAo for the South China Sea dispute.
The research examines the impacts of the militaryAos growing role in ChinaAos foreign policy under Xi Jinping to its military diplomacy in ASEAN.
The results show that Xi JinpingAos leadership and vision of the China Dream, which uses military diplomacy as a key tool for advancing its whole diplomatic goals, has been seen as a sign of growing assertiveness.
Keywords: Xi Jinping, military, foreign policy-making, national security, military diplomacy.
South China Sea.
ASEAN
INTRODUCTION
AuXiAos foreign policy assertiveness as part of his unique leadership style highlights crucial PLA role.
Ay (Ji, 2014.
The rise of Xi Jinping since 2012 has led to a transformation in ChinaAos domestic and foreign policy.
Some discussions raised that ChinaAos foreign policy under Xi Jinping is more assertive, proactive, and nationalistic than in the previous decades.
Some scholars argue that the change is a departure from previous ChinaAos peaceful rise.
The hallmark of Xi JinpingAos Journal of ASEAN Studies.
Vol.
No.
, pp.
DOI: https://doi.
org/ 10.
21512/jas.
ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic Xi Jinping.
AuChina DreamAy leadership is the China Dream, which has been established since he first reigned.
Xi Jinping refers to the dream as national rejuvenation.
The way China pursues its dream, by implication, changes its diplomatic system.
While the dream is not specific about the militaryAos revival, however, in the following days, the China Dream was first emphasised on the idea of a strong Accordingly.
ChinaAos foreign policy focuses on national security issues, which, in the end, provides a more influential role for the military to be involved in foreign policy-making.
While ChinaAos foreign policy is considered assertive under Xi Jinping, the strategy cannot be separated from XiAos domestic interest and relates closely to the development of ChinaAos military diplomacy, which has grown since the end of the Cold War.
In light of these observations, the research explores the impacts of the militaryAos growing role in ChinaAos foreign policy-making under Xi Jinping to its diplomacy with ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nation.
While this development relates closely to the development of ChinaAos military diplomacy.
ASEAN is crucial to be seen as ChinaAos military diplomacy puts Southeast Asia as its priority in Asia.
Simultaneously, the South China Sea dispute that puts ASEAN and China on the same table is still ongoing and will not end.
light of the observation, the research elaborates on the impacts of Xi JinpingAos vision of the AoStrong Army DreamAo to ASEAN countries with three critical sections.
The essay first sketches out the rise of Xi Jinping and the idea of the Strong Army Dream and how it contributes to the militaryAos role in ChinaAos foreign policy-making.
Second, the research also substantively assesses the militaryAos more active role in ChinaAos foreign policy-making under Xi Jinping.
Lastly, the impacts of the militaryAos growing role to ChinaAos military diplomacy, especially to ASEAN, will be explained further.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Rise of Xi Jinping and the Strong Army Dream Xi Jinping was appointed as ChinaAos Communist Party Secretary-General in the Eighteenth National Congress on November 15, 2012 (AuRemarks on the occasion of meetingAy.
Since the beginning of his administration.
Xi puts a hallmark on his new leadership by revealing the China Dream/Zhongguo Meng.
It includes four essential things, namely Strong China .
conomic, political, diplomatic, scientific, and militar.
Civilised China .
quality and fairness, rich culture, high moral.
Harmonious China .
riendship between social classe.
, and Beautiful China .
ealthy environment and less pollutio.
(Kuhn, 2.
Xi refers to the dream as the nationalism spirit of ChinaAos suffering in the Aocentury of humiliationAo (Miller, 2.
and ChinaAos glory under party rule (AuXi Jinping and the ChineseAy, 2.
Since then, the idea of the China Dream has been repeated on several occasions, especially at the closing meeting of the National PeopleAos Congress on March 17, 2013, the inauguration of Xi Jinping as a president (Xinhua, 2.
Xi pledged to achieve the dream by taking the Chinese way: Auspreading the Chinese spirit, which combines the spirit of the nation with patriotism as the core and the spirit of the time with reform and innovation as the coreAy (Yinan, 2.
Xi Jinping confirmed the China Dream idea as both the Aonational revivalAo and Journal of ASEAN Studies ChinaAos world power goal.
However, this idea is not new as a book entitled AuChina Dream:
The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American AgeAy, published in 2010, calling for the awakening of the ChinaAos military spirit (Miller, 2.
Another view suggests that XiAos China Dream was a response to Thomas FriedmanAos column in the Times in 2012 entitled AuChina Needs Its Own DreamAy which expecting Aua new Chinese dream that marries peopleAos expectations of prosperity with a more sustainable ChinaAy (AuXi Jinping and the ChineseAy, 2.
The China Dream has been considered the great revival of China, not only in the domestic sphere but also in its external relations.
As argued by Cameron .
Xi JinpingAos insistence on Aonational revivalAo sends a message that China resumes its place in the world.
Both the Aonational revivalAo and ChinaAos goal to be a world power are related.
As argued by Zicheng.
Levine and Liu .
Authere is a close connection between the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and ChinaAos desire of world power.
If China does not become a world power, the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be incomplete.
Only when it becomes a world power can we say that the total rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been achieved.
Ay Therefore, in the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, in November 2014.
Xi Jinping proposed to advance multilateral diplomacy aiming to reform the international system and global governance and to increase the representation of China and other developing countries (AuThe central conference on workAy, 2.
At this high-level meeting of the China Communist Party (CCP) on foreign relations.
Xi announced a new development in ChinaAos foreign policy.
He officially laid out his new shift in foreign policy, marking a transformation from Deng XiaopingAos dictum of Aokeeping a low profileAo to an Aoactive and creativeAo strategy.
Xi Jinping has put nationalism, patriotism, and pride at the centre of his leadership (Shi and Tweed, 2.
As argued by Huang .
Xi Jinping realised that nationalism is a powerful notion in Chinese society, particularly to secure the support of his nationalist constituency within the military (AuXi Jinping and the ChineseAy, 2.
Military reform had been on the agenda for ChinaAos rejuvenation since the CCP National Congress in 2012.
December 2012, when Xi Jinping inspected naval installations in the Guangzhou Military Region, he stressed a strong military to reach national rejuvenation (Miller, 2.
This emphasis paved the way for the idea of a Strong Army Dream.
Besides, robust compliance with the partyAos orders is also required to be the Aospirit of a strong armyAo (AuXi Jinping and the ChineseAy, 2.
Following this, in June 2013, the army confirmed that Authe China Dream is the Strong Army Dream, the China Dream leads the Strong Army Dream, and the Strong Army Dream supports the China DreamAy (AuXi Jinping Ae China DreamAy, n.
While it remains to be seen, the Strong Army Dream concept promises to be a guiding force in ChinaAos military policy (Miller, 2.
In 2015, for the first time in Chinese history.
China publicly revealed ChinaAos Military Strategy White Paper, a change from ChinaAos National Defence since 1998.
The white paper is essential because it reveals the strategic shift for the PeopleAos Liberation Army (PLA).
First, it outlines a strategy of Aoactive defenceAo and emphasises ChinaAos commitment to Aowinning informationised local warsAo (Kania, 2.
Second, it emphasises the goal of becoming a Xi Jinping.
AuChina DreamAy maritime power and a more significant Chinese naval presence farther from the PeopleAos RepublicAos shores (Gady, 2.
There are four main domains for ChinaAos force development in the new white paper: cyberspace, outer space, nuclear forces, and finally, the oceans (Chang.
Therefore, in December 2015, the PLAAos general command, the PLA Rocket Force, and the PLA Strategic Support Force were officially announced (Liu Hui, 2.
Xi JinpingAos China Dream is not specific about the militaryAos revival.
However, a national rejuvenation to regain the level of Auprosperity and power enjoyed before the period of national humiliationA .
requires effective government, a prosperous economy, a harmonious society, and a strong militaryAy (Miller, 2.
However, in the following days, the China Dream was first emphasised on the idea of a Aostrong military.
Ao Accordingly.
ChinaAos foreign policy gives more focus on national security issues in ChinaAos foreign policy, which in the end, it provides a more influential role for the military to involve in the foreign policymaking.
China established a National Security Commission (NSC), headed by Xi Jinping.
Premier Li Keqiang, and the Chairman of National PeopleAos Congress.
Zhang Dejiang (Zhang.
The new commission seems to solve the problem of fragmentation in ChinaAos foreign policy-making.
Xi tries to make a breakthrough by putting himself at the centre of new leadership and leaving behind the Aocollective leadershipAo style upheld since Deng Xiaoping (AuThe power of XiAy, 2.
The rise of Xi Jinping can be considered as a turning point in ChinaAos national securityrelated foreign policy.
According to Zheng and Liu .
, national security includes national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, peopleAos lives and property, the countryAos political system, economic development, and social stability.
As a result.
Xi JinpingAos administration is being firm on territorial or sovereignty disputes.
As the national securityrelated foreign policy becomes more important, the PLAAos role in ChinaAos foreign policymaking becomes more influential.
The terminology of PLA is unique since it does not necessarily refer to the Chinese army, but the whole armed forces or military.
Initially, the PLA consists of the ground forces, naval forces called PeopleAos Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and air forces called PeopleAos Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
Therefore.
Xi JinpingAos emphasis on the Strong Army Dream refers to the PLA or military.
As Ji .
Authe PLAAos role in ChinaAos foreign policy is integral and deep.
Ay Also.
Ji .
mentions that the PLAAos role in this policy-making is a key in understanding ChinaAos diplomacy.
The next section highlights the militaryAos more active role in ChinaAos foreign policy-making under Xi Jinping.
The Role of Military in ChinaAos Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping China has dual tracks of decision-making system, the party and the state tracks.
The partyAos track is still higher than the stateAos (Jakobson and Manuel, 2.
Accordingly, the party is central to ChinaAos foreign policy-making.
The highest decision-making body, including foreign policy issues, is the Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP (Gore, 2.
As argued by Jakobson and Manuel .
Aualmost all members of the bodies charged with implementing any policies are first and foremost members of the CPC.
Ay The elite group of the CCP only consists of seven members who emanate from the 25-member politburo.
Consequently, the Journal of ASEAN Studies Aoforeign ministryAo of the CCP, the so-called Central International Department (CID), is higher than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gore, 2.
The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in ChinaAos foreign policy-making is not determining, but it shares responsibility with the Central Military Commission/CMC (Ji.
Since the partyAos position is more dominant than the state, the role of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in China is weaker than other countries in the world (Jakobson and Manuel.
The Ministry is responsible for foreign affairs in general and government-togovernment relations.
However, as argued by Gore .
Authe main role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the implementation of policies made elsewhere,Ay not even as a coordination body which is still under the party or the so-called the CCPAos Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Groups.
Therefore.
Gore .
depicted the foreign ministerAos position as Auway down the CCPAos pecking order.
Ay While the civilians are responsible for daily diplomacy, the security or military-related foreign affairs are the military domain (Ji, 2014.
The military has an autonomy that can influence foreign policy.
The autonomy cannot be separated from its historical relationship with the communist party, particularly in the wartime, when the strength of the CCP primarily depended on the military power (Song, 2.
Therefore, as argued by Jakobson and Manuel .
Auparty leadership upholds a decision-making system that keeps the military at armAos length from political decision making.
Ay While the PLA being subordinate to the party, it is ultimately an armed wing of the party, instead of the state, through which the party controls the use of force.
Consequently, the government cannot dictate the military since it has a much higher status than the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Gore, 2.
Unsurprisingly, a foreign policy can be conducted without coordination with the Foreign Affairs Ministry.
There are three channels through which the military plays an integral part of ChinaAos foreign policy-making: the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Politburo, and the Leading Small Groups/LSGs (Grieger, 2.
The CMC is a high-profile body under the party that aims to control the PLA.
The CCP Secretary-General is also the CMC Chairman.
Furthermore, as the CMC Chairman.
Xi Jinping represents the PLA interests and foreign policy views in the Politburo Standing Committee, since there is no military representative in the inner circle of the Politburo (Grieger, 2.
Finally, there are Leading Small Groups (LSG.
in ChinaAos decision-making system that can be channelled as a vehicle for the PLA to feed in the foreign policy process.
However, the LSGs are only advisory in nature, with final decisions in the Politburo Standing Committee.
The existence of the LSGs is distinctive for China.
These small groups cover any issues from the economics, the 2008 Olympic Games, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and foreign The LSGs play essential roles in supporting the policy-making process.
Even it is more important than the ministries (Huang, 2.
However, the LSGs have long played a role in ChinaAos power structure since 1958, comprising the most powerful and influential leaders.
Jinping is one of the leaders that already involved in the LSGs.
In mid-2012, he was a senior leader in the LSGs on maritime security, or the so-called protection of maritime rights (Jakobson and Manuel, 2.
Xi Jinping.
AuChina DreamAy When Xi Jinping was appointed as the CCP Secretary-General in 2012, he introduced the new foreign policy team.
Xi is the first member of the Politburo, along with Premier Li Keqiang.
Zhang Dejiang.
Yu Zhengsheng.
Liu Yunshan.
Wang Qishan, and Zhang Gaoli.
While Li Keqiang was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Seventeenth Party Central Committee, the remaining people were members of the Political Bureau of the Seventeenth Party Central Committee .
November 16, 2.
While the partyAos decision-making system is hierarchical, inevitably.
Xi has significant influence in the foreign policy process.
Xi then took over by leading the most influential LSGs, such as Taiwan affairs and foreign affairs.
Since Aothe more powerful the head of LSGs, the more powerful the LSGs are seen to be,Ao the involvement of Xi in the foreign affairs LSGs makes LSGsthe most potent LSGs (Jakobson and Manuel, 2.
On the one hand, the establishment of the LSGs is generally accepted as a sign of major political shift.
On the other hand.
Xi JinpingAos decisions to establish and lead two new LSGs (Comprehensive Deepening of Reform and National Security Committe.
seem to confirm his strong determination to ChinaAos foreign and national security policy.
As argued by Huang.
Xi is a very different leader from his predecessor.
Hu Jintao, as AuXiAos style is more like a strongman leaderAy (Huang, 2.
However.
XiAos emphasis on national security affairs cannot be separated from his desire to achieve the China Dream.
For the purpose, he will maintain a decisive role of the PLA since it is an essential pillar of the CCPAos power.
However, as explained before, foreign policy-making in China is shared between the civilians and the military.
In fact, the primacy is still under the civilians (Ji, 2014.
It cannot be separated from the CCPAos indoctrination of Aoabsolute party controlAo and PLA subordination that manage civil-military relations over foreign affairs.
The consensus between the PLA and CCP to prioritise domestic matters and war avoidance has enabled the PLA to deliberately support the civiliansAo foreign policy at the strategic level.
While the civilian-military concern on war avoidance under Xi Jinping remains unchanged, as argued by Ji .
Xi tightens Aoproactive stance but a cautious exercise of hard power.
Ao Consequently.
China seems to move its defence strategy to war preparation.
In April 2016, unsurprisingly.
Xi Jinping entitled himself as a commander in chief of the joint battle command centre and, at the same time, urged to build a military command system that was Aocapable of winning warsAo (Ramzy, 2.
As the military role in ChinaAos national security-related foreign policy is growing, it impacts ChinaAos foreign policy.
First, the PLAAos persuasion and full support for the change have convinced Xi Jinping to conduct a stricter approach to protect ChinaAos national security.
Ji .
argues that the PLA functionally serves as the foundation and the tool of assertive foreign policy, a job assigned by the party.
Since Xi Jinping wants to define his leadership by reasserting and safeguarding maritime territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea and East South China Sea, they come as the core interests of ChinaAos foreign policy.
Consequently.
China had to change its national defensive security strategy from only land defence to land and sea defence (Zheng and Liu, 2.
For a long time.
China projected its defence posture in the terrestrially-based strategy.
According to Ji .
Authe PLAAos continental posture of defensive defence matches the civiliansAo status quo-centred diplomacy Journal of ASEAN Studies with land neighbours.
Ay Previously, parts of the four general departments were responsible for managing the ground forces.
However, now they were integrated into a new PLAAos leading The PLA cut the number of its land-based army to less than 50 per cent of the armed forces, with the previous 18 group armies reorganised into 13 new ones (Liu Hui, 2.
Figure 1.
The New Structure of the PeopleAos Liberation Army Source: https://news.
com/news/2019-12-25/Graphics-Reform-in-China-s-national-defense-and-armedforces-MGRXIeWBZm/index.
Therefore, since Xi Jinping tries to maintain its national security through maritime territorial disputes.
Xi Jinping attempts to increase the NavyAos role.
As evidenced.
Xi Jinping announced the initial idea of a Strong Army Dream in naval installations in the Guangzhou Military Region in 2012.
Consequently, the development has made ChinaAos foreign policy to be firm to safeguard its maritime rights, while at the same time, it has transformed the PLA Navy into a Aoblue water navyAo that is actively involved in ChinaAos active defence strategy (Poulin, 2.
Whether or not the incident can be seen in the context of the PLA NavyAos active defence strategy, it is crucial to consider Chinese naval vessels conducted exercise by crossing IndonesiaAos sea lane of communication without prior notification in May 2016.
The PLA Navy sailed from Hainan Island through the South China Sea, crossed two Indonesian archipelagic sea lanes (Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesi.
, the Karimata Strait, the Sunda, and Lombok Straits, the Makassar Strait, the Pacific Ocean near the eastern part of the Philippines and back to Hainan Island (Pattriardjawane, 2.
The PLA Navy violated the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 in which China is a part of this convention, as already Xi Jinping.
AuChina DreamAy regulated that AuA the requirement of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait to enter, leave or return from a state bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that stateAy .
Second, the PLAAos growing role in national security-related foreign policy-making has made ChinaAos security strategy seem to be merely Aotactical military decisionsAo (Ji, 2014.
explained before, the civilians and military have shared responsibility in foreign policymaking, between public diplomacy and national security-related foreign affairs.
However, as argued by Ji .
, in discussing national security issues.
Authe PLA officers are not less sensible and sensitive towards the crucial questions of war and peace and order of battle.
Ay As shown by the case of the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) Act in 2013, which pushed by the PLA to Xi Jinping, the US has perceived it as ChinaAos strategic change.
As a result, the US deepened its involvement in the East South China Sea conflict, and ultimately, it changes the security order in the region.
Several factors are contributing to the mismatch between the PLA and civilians.
First of all, the growing importance of the PLA in Xi JinpingAos administration has made the PLAAos officials do not perceive that informing their civilian counterparts about their foreign policy is such an obligation (Ji, 2014.
As argued by Gore .
Authe military seldom consults diplomats on foreign policy issues, and the latter often hear about the militaryAos action Ay Consequently, both actors cannot avoid themselves from the problem of lack of coordination, which in the end, the PLA took decisions without approval from the civilians.
Furthermore, while the PLA has closer ties with Xi Jinping by the growing importance of national security-related foreign policy, inevitably, the PLA has a larger and more personal influence on Xi Jinping.
Towards this end, there is a possibility that ChinaAos foreign policy is a matter of different interests between domestic actors, instead of ChinaAos vague grand design (Jakobson and Manuel, 2.
While the PLA has a significant role in shaping and implementing ChinaAos foreign policy, the extent to which the idea of the Strong Army Dream impacts ChinaAos military diplomacy to its regional partner is crucial to be seen, especially to ASEAN countries.
As we know.
ChinaAos military diplomacy has put Southeast Asia as its priority in Asia (Allen.
Saunders, and Chen, 2.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The Impacts on ChinaAos Military Diplomacy: ASEAN Countries in the Core At the end of the Cold War.
China has acknowledged military diplomacy as a critical component of its overall foreign relations.
In a broad sense.
China characterised military diplomacy as Auexternal relationships pertaining to military and related affairs between countries and groups of countries, including military personnel exchange, military negotiations, arms control negotiations, military aid, military intelligence cooperation, military technology cooperation, international peacekeeping, military alliance activities, and so on.
Ay (Allen.
Saunders, and Chen, 2.
China conducts its military diplomacy both in a bilateral Journal of ASEAN Studies and multilateral manner.
However, as Allen.
Saunders, and Chen .
argued, most of ChinaAos military diplomacy is bilateral, but the PLA now participates in a range of multilateral meetings, conferences, exercises, and competitions.
As an instrument of foreign policy, military diplomacy is conducted in a top-down manner and shared between the party and While the Central Committee of CCP dictates broad foreign policy goals, the CMC determines specific activities for various PLA parts.
This is related to the fact that ChinaAos military diplomacy is subject to party and national diplomatic strategy and foreign policy (Cai.
According to Cai .
, military diplomacy as an official policy first emerged in the 1998 National Defence White Paper.
In this document, it was stated.
AuChinaAos foreign military contacts are subordinate to and serve the modernization of national defence and the armed China insists on dealing with its foreign military relations independently and engaging in military exchanges and cooperation based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
In its contacts with foreign military circles.
China has always advocated the principles of mutual respect, enhancing understanding, developing friendship, mutual benefit, and ChinaAos armed forces have been active in participating in multilateral military diplomatic activities to bring ChinaAos armed forcesAo positive role into full play in the sphere of international military affairs (National Defence Policy, 1.
Since then, almost every two years.
China regularly publishes its national defence policy.
The exception was in 2012 when China postponed the publication due to internal leadership change.
In 2013, under the new rule of Xi Jinping.
China published its national defence policy with the title AuThe Diversified Employment of ChinaAos Armed Forces.
Ay This was the first time the National Defence Policy presented in specific issues as such.
Then, in 2015.
China published a white paper specifically called ChinaAos Military Strategy.
This is the first white paper systematically expounded on ChinaAos military missions and strategic tasks that have never appeared previously in the National Defence Policy.
The 2015 ChinaAos Military Strategy White Paper stated that:
The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.
It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power (Xinhua, 2.
The latest was in July 2019 when China issued ChinaAos National Defence in the New Era.
As stated, this national defence policy aims to sketch in detail the practice, purposes, and significance of ChinaAos national defence and its efforts to build a strong military (Erickson.
However, the 2019 National Defence Policy has a different emphasis on the nature of defensive national defence policy.
According to Hui .
, it stated that AuChinaAos military role has shifted toward safeguarding ChinaAos overseas interest and international peace.
ChinaAos Xi Jinping.
AuChina DreamAy military modernization is primary to safeguard its territory and sovereignty, dismissing the AoChinaAos threatAo allegation.
The white paper also acknowledged ChinaAos need to protect its investment and citizens overseas in the new eraAy (Erickson, 2.
This focus cannot be separated from Xi JinpingAos priority on securing his ambitious project under Belt and Road Initiative.
Institute for National Strategic Studies in 2017 published a report entitled Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003-2016: Trends and Implications.
By focusing on PLA military diplomacy, this report shows that PLA military diplomacy greatly emphasises on Asia .
per From this percentage.
Southeast Asia has the highest priority .
per cen.
, followed by South Asia .
per cen.
Northeast Asia .
8 per cen.
, and Central Asia .
per cen.
The indicative is the PLAAos strong emphasis on senior-level contact with Europe and countries in Asia, especially in the subregions of Southeast and South Asia.
Accordingly, this report also explained that PLAAos increasing interactions with Asia cannot be separated from the 2011 US rebalance strategy to Asia and the rise of Xi Jinping to power in 2012.
This statement is related to the 2015 ChinaAos Military Strategy: AuAs the world economic and strategic centre of gravity is shifting ever more rapidly to the Asia-Pacific region, the US carries on its AorebalancingAo strategy and enhances its military presence and its military alliances in this region.
Ay However, the more significant portion of ChinaAos military diplomacy to Southeast Asia and South Asia is not new.
According to Sachar .
, a large number of military equipment of Pakistan.
Bangladesh.
Sri Lanka, and Myanmar from China indicate the military diplomacy being pursued by China for balancing India.
This was ChinaAos attempts in the regional context to minimise IndiaAos influence by arming its neighbours and establishing strong military ties with them.
As a result, there are strong military relationships and growing dependence of these countries on China.
Thailand and Myanmar are two ASEAN countries that have a long story of military diplomacy with China, especially in terms of arms transfer in the mid-1980s (Sachar, 2.
At that time.
China was the only source of arms for some states that faced USsponsored sanctions, like Myanmar.
Up to now.
Thailand still maintains China as its essential source of arms (Storey, 2.
In 2019.
Thailand signed a contract with China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) to build the amphibious vessel for the Royal Thai Navy (AuChina to build landingAy, 2.
Undoubtedly.
ChinaAos military diplomacy grows with the development of ChinaAos foreign policy.
Heydarian .
figured out three crucial phases of ChinaAos foreign policy.
The first phase was during the era of Mao Zedong, where China was involved in a protracted ideological war in the Aosurrounding environmentAo, especially in Southeast Asia.
Local communist movements relied on BeijingAos material and political support during the Cold WarAos early phases.
China under Mao rejected the international order as an illegal construction of Western capitalists while openly supporting the revolutionary movement in the AoThird WorldAo.
After the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s.
China launched a global struggle against the West (Americ.
and the East (Soviet Unio.
This era made China face major powers and their regional allies, including Japan and Western-oriented regimes in the Third World.
Cai .
asserted that China had exercised military exchanges with foreign defence forces in this early period of a new state.
Journal of ASEAN Studies The second phase was after Mao ZedongAos death in 1976 and he was replaced by Deng Xiaoping.
Deng made high-level diplomatic visits to key countries in Southeast Asia, such as Singapore.
Malaysia.
Thailand, and the United States.
China then normalises relations with western countries and neighbouring countries, such as Japan and ASEAN member states.
Like Mao.
Deng still saw ChinaAos active participation in global organizations led by the West as a distraction or trap.
In other words.
Deng only wanted to be involved with the outside world as long as it helped strengthen the countryAos economic development.
Therefore, according to Yasuhiro .
China at that time showed a negative response to security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries: AuChina with its Aohorizontal linkAo tradition prefers bilateral diplomacy with small countries.
Ay China just began targeting ASEAN as a whole for dialogue around 1992 to 1993.
Yasuhiro .
Aohorizontal linkAo tradition dated back to the warring states period of the Chinese dynasty.
As described by the Han-era historian Sima Qian, there was a Aovertical link-horizontal linkAo description.
While the former described a policy taken by small countries to ally to oppose the great power, the latter destroyed the Aovertical linkAo by seeking treaties of alliance one after one.
The Aohorizontal linkAo won the war by using divide-and-conquer methods.
The third phase was started by Jiang Zemin, who continued Deng XiaopingAos In the early 1990s, there was a gradual change as a new form of the authoritarian regime in Beijing, called a Aoparty-stateAo collective leadership.
This happened after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, which shook the foundation of the communist regime.
ChinaAos political system dramatically became plural, with the business class gradually entering the higher levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
In this phase, domestic industrialization triggers China to try building relations with other countries, especially for the source of raw materials, both to Africa and Latin America.
Besides, this period was also marked by the migration of millions of Chinese citizens.
As a consequence.
China began to praise itself as a potential development model for the post-colonial world.
China began to see itself as an emerging economic power with global Joshua Ramo .
gave the name AoBeijing ConsensusAo as opposed to the World Bank and the IMF, which are part of the Washington Consensus.
The Beijing Consensus is characterised by a non-ideological, selfless, pragmatic approach to global trade and investment.
From Jiang Zemin to his successor Hu Jintao.
China introduced the third phase of ChinaAos foreign policy called the Aocharm offensiveAo.
In this period.
China was no longer passive and gradually playing a leading role in regional mechanisms (Yasuhiro, 2.
China used the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) platform to host several regional meetings.
Since 2001, the frequency of defence ministersAo attendance increased, including the ChinaAeASEAN Defence MinistersAo Meeting (ADMM) and ADMMAePlus (Allen.
Saunders, and Chen, 2.
While ADMM is the highest defence consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN.
ADMMPlus is a platform for ASEAN and its eight Dialogue Partners, namely Australia.
China.
India.
Japan.
New Zealand.
Republic of Korea.
Russian Federation, and the United States, to strengthen security and defence cooperation for peace, stability, and development in the region .
org, n.
Xi Jinping.
AuChina DreamAy However.
Cai .
underlined that defence diplomacy developed by ADMM-Plus has a conceptual conflict with ChinaAos military diplomacy.
Although ChinaAos military diplomacy is still evolving.
ChinaAos military diplomacy can be defined as Authe pursuit of foreign policy objectives under the guidance of ChinaAos national grand strategy through the peaceful employment of military resources and capabilities to maintain national interests .
oth domestically and oversea.
, security, and development,Ay meanwhile, defence diplomacy is Aua traditional security concept used for the realpolitik purposes of strengthening Western allies against common enemiesAy (Cai, 2.
The divergence of both concepts lies on, for ChinaAos point of view represented by Chinese diplomat Qian Qichen, that Auin regard to foreign relations, any armed force to coordinate diplomatic actions cannot be called military diplomacyAy (Cai.
Under Xi Jinping.
ChinaAos scepticism goes hand in hand with some changes in ChinaAos foreign policy.
As stated before.
China has a greater determination to protect its core interests (Cameron, 2.
The ChinaAos core national interests have driven the ChinaAos foreign policy, with domestic political stability related to foreign policy.
These core national interests include sovereignty, territorial integrity, and sustainable socio-economic development.
The report of the 18th CCP Congress of 2012, a guide for the next five years, emphasised the importance of protecting these interests and sovereign rights of China and of not surrendering to outside Furthermore.
China applies a more proactive and coordinated approach in foreign policy-making (Zhang, 2.
There are two elements of this approach.
First.
China applies the Aotop-level designAo in foreign policy-making that has enabled a more centralised foreign policy process and a more efficient foreign policy implementation.
For the first time since 1949.
China held a Working Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013.
The conference involved the seven members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, provincial leaders, leading officials from various central government departments, military, foreign affairs, state security, financial institutions, and key state-owned enterprises.
In this conference.
Xi urged all elements to take a more proactive approach in strengthening the relations with ChinaAos neighbours.
This working conference was held after Xi Jinping announced his vision on Maritime Silk Road (MSR).
The revival of MSR is the grand vision of ChinaAos foreign policy with its peripheral Eurasian neighbours (Heydarian, 2.
According to Heydarian .
, while the best way to understand Xi JinpingAos BRI visionAos strategic logic is to see the geography of Chinese power, its peripheral Eurasian neighbours are the primary key of the overall strategy.
Apart from this.
China applies the Aobottom-line thinkingAo, which sets the Aored lineAo for tolerated actions by other countries (Zhang, 2.
Consequently.
China takes a tougher stance in its territorial disputes, especially in the South China Sea and the East China Sea disputes.
For Chinese scholars.
ChinaAos more assertive approach is, in part, the result of BeijingAos previously more moderate position.
As Heydarian .
argued, in the context of the Aocharm offensiveAo, we can understand why China signed the Declaration of Code of Conduct (DoC) in The signing of the DoC during Hu JintaoAos time was none other than being influenced by the Chinese leadership at that time with the Aocharm offensiveAo policy.
Hu Jintao tried to Journal of ASEAN Studies establish good relations with countries in the region and has a new security approach.
Aopeaceful developmentAo.
Not only was the signing of the DoC, but Beijing also made maritime delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin .
with Vietnam, and in 2005 with the Philippines and Vietnam.
Therefore, enhancing the role of the PLA under Xi Jinping, as explained above, undoubtedly gives impacts to ASEAN as the South China Sea dispute is still unresolved.
The 18th CCP Congress has reclassified the South China Sea as a national core interest.
Simultaneously, there are several indications of ChinaAos growing assertiveness in the South China Sea under Xi Jinping.
First.
China actively conducts military exercises in the South China Sea to strengthen its claims.
China regularly sends patrol boats to the area and has even built military posts and airstrips on some islands.
These moves heightened regional tensions, especially following ChinaAos unilateral declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.
This action raised some worries that China would make a similar declaration regarding the South China Sea (Panda, 2.
Second.
China has carried out extensive land reclamation projects in the South China Sea.
However, article 121 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) declares that any party cannot claim submerged features .
uch as shoal.
and that Aurocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelfAy (United Nations, n.
China is now building new islands on five different reefs and is creating conditions to sustain human habitation to bolster its claims (Tiezzi, 2.
In January 2014, massive land reclamation was done at Johnson South Reef (Wingfield-Hayes, 2.
Additional land reclamation is also being done on Woody Island.
Duncan Island, and Drummon Island, accompanied by infrastructure (Lee, 2.
According to Tiezzi .
Johnson South Reef will be the home to a new South China Sea airbase.
Third.
Chinese vesselsAo massive presence in MalaysiaAos.
VietnamAos, and IndonesiaAos Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Since 2014.
China showed its intention to place the Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig at a location within VietnamAos EEZ.
While this triggered massive antiChinese protests in Hanoi, after nearly two months, on July 16, 2014, the China National Petroleum Corp finally shut down the rig and moved it closer to Hainan Island in southern China.
ChinaAos presence in IndonesiaAos EEZ is showed by repeated encroachment to the waters of the Natuna Islands that has been continually resurfaced since 2009.
Chinese presence in the Natuna Sea has been continued until December 2019, when Chinese fishing vessels and coast guard ships entered the northern waters of the Natuna Sea.
The Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Retno L.
Marsudi, on January 3, 2020, issued four points of Indonesia's attitude regarding China's claims in the Natuna Sea, followed by the Indonesian PresidentAos Joko Widodo visit to the Natuna Sea.
This presence even carried out during the Coronavirus Disease-19 (COVID-.
global pandemic.
In April 2020, a Chinese government survey vessel, the Haiyang Dizhi 8, accompanied by a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, entered MalaysiaAos EEZ and operated close to a drillship under contract to Malaysian state oil company Petronas (Latiff and Ananthalakshmi, 2.
Xi Jinping.
AuChina DreamAy Fourth.
China shows aggressive actions against other claimantsAo fishing vessels.
March 2014.
China blocked two civilian ships chartered by the Philippines navy to send logistics to the Philippines Marine Unit stationed on Second Thomas Shoal.
This disputed shoal in the Spratly Islands is located 200 km from Kalayaan Islands-Western Philippines and has been claimed as part of the PhilippinesAo continental shelf.
In 2016, there are three incidents in March.
May, and June between Indonesian patrol vessels and Chinese fishermen vessels fishing in IndonesiaAos EEZ in the Natuna Islands.
Overall.
Xi JinpingAos leadership and vision of the China Dream focus on military diplomacy as a key tool for advancing its diplomatic goals.
Thus, we can argue that it has created at least two major impacts on ASEAN.
First, this development has led to a growing sense of assertiveness, especially in the South China Sea, which is regarded as a national core While growing assertiveness has caused uneasy relationships between China and some ASEAN countries.
ChinaAos military diplomacy, which has a different approach with ASEAN, has resulted in Aoongoing negotiation without progressAo for South China Sea dispute.
Second, although China continues to enhance its military diplomacy with neighbouring countries.
Xi Jinping remains essentially unchanged from the Aohorizontal linkAo tradition.
ChinaAos preference for bilateral diplomacy can be seen as an indicator of a Aogreat power mentalityAo that opposes allying since it is regarded as a policy taken by a small country.
Meanwhile.
Aohorizontal linkAo tradition prefers seeking treaties of alliance one by one with its opponent parties by using divide-and-conquer methods.
Therefore, up to now.
China deliberately maintains various degrees of bilateral military diplomacy with several ASEAN member states.
CONCLUSIONS
The growing role of the military in ChinaAos foreign policy has been enabled since Xi Jinping made a strategic shift by emphasizing national security-related foreign affairs.
The emphasis on national security cannot be separated from his administrationAos hallmark: the AoChina DreamAo, which emanates from the nationalism spirit of national rejuvenation.
It is a tool for achieving the dream instead of reviving a strong army.
However, the interests of Xi Jinping and the military intertwined with each other.
Jinping needs support for his leadership legitimacy from the military as the central pillar of the CCPAos power.
Conversely, the military, especially those who were unhappy with their perceived weakness of civiliansAo foreign policy, seeks to play a more influential role in ChinaAos foreign policy-making.
While the growing role of military under Xi Jinping is more in domestic interests of both actors, it impacts the whole ChinaAos foreign policy.
First, the military persuasion and full support for the change have ensured Xi Jinping to conduct a stricter approach to protect ChinaAos national security.
Second, the growing role of the military in national security-related foreign policy-making has made this policy seem to be merely tactical military decisions.
While the assertiveness has become Xi JinpingAos foreign policy identification, he should carefully calculate this growing tendency unless it will only put China in a gravely negative geopolitical situation (Ji, 2014.
Journal of ASEAN Studies Overall.
Xi JinpingAos leadership and vision of the China Dream, which uses military diplomacy as a key tool for advancing its whole diplomatic goals, has been seen as a sign of growing assertiveness.
In this regard, the South China Sea dispute is regarded as a national core interest.
While growing assertiveness has caused uneasy relationships between China and some ASEAN countries.
ChinaAos military diplomacy, which has a different approach with ASEAN, has resulted in Aoongoing negotiation without progressAo for South China Sea dispute.
REFERENCES