https://doi.
org/10.
26593/jihi.
Revisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation Rizky Widian1 Ph.
Candidate.
Departement of Political Science.
Tunghai University.
Taiwan Lecturer.
Departement of International Relations.
Parahyangan Catholic University.
Indonesia
ABSTRACT
Southeast Asian countries, situated at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, are increasingly exposed to intensifying great power competition between China and the United States (US).
According to Balance of Threat (BoT) theory, states are more likely to align tightly with a less threatening power in response to rising threats characterized by a rival's aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions.
Based on these indicators.
BoT would predict stronger alignment between Southeast Asian countries and the US to balance against the perceived threat from China.
However, alignment behavior in the region varies, suggesting the need for closer empirical scrutiny.
This study reexamines BoT theory in the Southeast Asian context through a structured comparative empirical analysis of ten countries between 2000 and 2021.
The findings reveal that while BoTAos core prediction holds in some cases, alignment outcomes are mixed.
Thus, the theory receives only partial support in explaining Southeast Asian statesAo responses to ChinaAos rise.
Keywords: Balance of Threat theory.
Southeast Asia, alignment behavior, great power competition.
US-China rivalry.
Indo-Pacific, threat perception, security cooperation, comparative analysis, regional security Introduction The Indo-Pacific has emerged as one of the worldAos most strategically significant regions, largely due to ChinaAos growing power1, assertive territorial claims, and rising tensions with neighboring These developments have fueled concerns about ChinaAos intentions and intensified great power rivalry, particularly with the United States (US).
Washington has officially identified China as a challenge to its global power and interests2, with recent flashpointsAiincluding Nancy PelosiAos visit to Taiwan3 and the downing of a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon4 Aifurther escalating tensions.
The Biden administration has explicitly stated its goal to Auout-competeAy China5, and scholarly attention to this rivalry has grown accordingly.
1 This rise is marked by China's growing aggregate power, reflected in its expanding GDP and military budget, which has translated into advanced offensive capabilities such as fifth-generation fighters, aircraft carriers, integrated combat systems.
For example, see: The Military Balance 2024, vol.
124 (Taylor & Francis, 2.
2 See: A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision.
Department of State .
, 5.
National Security Strategy of The United States of America.
The White House .
, 2 & 25.
3 Vincent Ni, "China halts US cooperation on range of issues after PelosiAos Taiwan visit," The Guardian.
August 6, 2022, https://w.
com/world/2022/aug/05/china-halts-us-cooperation-nancy-pelosi-taiwan.
4 Helene Cooper, "Downing of Chinese Spy Balloon Ends Chapter in a Diplomatic Crisis," The New York Times.
February 4, 2023, https://w.
com/2023/02/04/us/politics/chinese-spy-balloon-shot-down.
5 National Security Strategy of The United States of America.
The White House .
6 See: Nguyen Cong Tung, "Uneasy embrace: VietnamAos responses to the U.
Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy amid U.
Ae China rivalry," The Pacific Review 35, no.
2/09/03 2.
, https://doi.
org/10.
1080/09512748.
Huong Le Thu, "Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific Concepts: From Resistance to Reticence to Reaction," Security Challenges 16, no.
Sung Chul Jung.
Jaehyon Lee, and Ji-Yong Lee, "The Indo-Pacific Strategy and US Alliance Network Expandability:
Asian Middle PowersAo Positions on Sino-US Geostrategic Competition in Indo-Pacific Region," Journal of Contemporary China 30, no.
1/01/02 2.
, https://doi.
org/10.
1080/10670564.
Zack Cooper, "The Future Indo-Pacific Order," Security Challenges 16, no.
, https://w.
org/stable/26924332.
54 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation As the rivalry goes on, the US has sought to involve regional states in its Indo-Pacific initiatives7, most notably through the Quad, which includes Japan.
Australia, and India.
8 Australia and Japan have actively increased their military capabilities in response to ChinaAos growing power 9, while IndiaAidespite being less focused on military expansionAimaintains longstanding border tensions with China in the Himalayas.
10 Unsurprisingly.
China has expressed concern over both the QuadAos development and broader US actions in the region.
11 Although the US has not explicitly framed its efforts as forming a balancing coalitionAipreferring terms like Aubalance of influenceAy12 AyAiits behavior nonetheless reflects an intent to strengthen regional partnerships.
This includes outreach to countries beyond the Quad,13 encouraging closer security ties under the broader narrative that ChinaAos actions are coercive and destabilizing.
14 The US government has emphasized that whether China succeeds in reshaping regional norms depends on the collective response of the US and its partners.
Given the intensifying rivalry, it is understandable that US initiatives in the Indo-Pacific are increasingly seen as pressuring regional states to Autake sides.
Ay16 As great power competition unfolds.
Southeast Asian (SEA) countriesAisituated at the heart of the region and in close proximity to China and key flashpoints like the South China SeaAiare crucial stakeholders.
Not only does the US appear to view them as essential to reshaping ChinaAos strategic environment, but their responses will also significantly shape the regional balance, particularly in the event of direct confrontation between major According to Balance of Threat Theory (BoT)Aione of the leading alliance theories in International RelationsAistates are expected to form alliances to counter perceived threats.
The theory posits that when a state possesses high levels of aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions, nearby states will seek to balance against it.
17 If faced with two 7 Tung, "Uneasy embrace: VietnamAos responses to the U.
Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy amid U.
AeChina rivalry," 6.
8 Although Quad members are reluctant to frame their cooperation as a response to China, many analysts view the initiative as driven by concerns over ChinaAos rising power and assertiveness.
See: Shannon Tiezzi, "ChinaAos Two-Pronged Response to the Quad," The Diplomat.
October 7, 2020, https://thediplomat.
com/2020/10/chinas-two-pronged-response-to-the-quad/.
9 In this light.
Australia is trying to increase its capability by AUKUS cooperation.
See: Ben Westcott, "Analysis: Australia's Decades-Long Balancing Act between the US and China Is Over," CNN.
September 18, 2021, https://edition.
com/2021/09/16/australia/australia-china-us-aukus-submarine-intl-hnk/index.
In this regard.
Japan also prepares more capabilities as mentioned in its recent security documents.
See: National Security Strategy of Japan.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan .
Defense Programs and Budget of Japan.
Japan Ministry of Defense .
National Defense Strategy of Japan.
Japan Ministry of Defense .
10 Vedika Sud, "Indian and Chinese troops clash on disputed border," CNN.
December 13, 2022, https://edition.
com/2022/12/13/asia/india-china-border-dispute-skirmish-tawang-sector-intl-hnk/index.
11 For example, see: C.
Raja Mohan, "Why China Is Paranoid About the Quad," Foreign Policy.
May 17, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2022/05/17/india-china-quad-summit-modi-xi-biden/.
See also the example on how China critique on AUKUS as one of the US and its allyAos regional initiative: "Aukus: China denounces US-UK-Australia pact as irresponsible," BBC.
September 17, 2021, https://w.
com/news/world-58582573.
12 Indo-Pacific Strategy of The United States, 2022, p.
13 For examples, see: Kristien Bergerson.
ChinaAos Efforts to Counter U.
Forward Presence in the Asia Pacific.
-China Economic and Security Review Comission (March 15, 2.
Patrick M.
Cronin, "Deepening the US-Indonesian Strategic Partnership," The Diplomat.
February 17, 2018, https://thediplomat.
com/2018/02/deepening-the-us-indonesian-strategicpartnership/.
Zhan Debin, "South Korea should not blindly follow the US and the West in making its China policy," Global Times.
July 20, 2022, https://w.
cn/page/202207/1270973.
Khang Vu, "ChinaAos Wedge Strategy Towards the US-Vietnam Partnership," The Diplomat.
August 25, 2021, https://thediplomat.
com/2021/08/chinas-wedge-strategytowards-the-u-s-vietnam-partnership/.
Ralph Jennings, "Why the Philippines Picked America Over China," VOA.
August 5, 2021, https://w.
com/a/east-asia-pacific_why-philippines-picked-america-over-china/6209178.
14 This is apparent in the USAo official documents about the Indo-Pacific.
See: National Security Strategy of The United States of America, 2 & 25.
A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision, 5.
Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States.
The White House .
, 5.
15 Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 5.
16 Le Thu, "Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific Concepts: From Resistance to Reticence to Reaction," 55.
17 Stephen M.
Walt.
The Origins of Alliance (Cornell University Press, 1.
, 17-28 & 263-64.
55 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation potential threats.
Stephen M.
Walt, the theoryAos originator, argues that states will align with the power they perceive as less threatening.
18 Walt defines alliance as formal or informal security cooperation, typically signified by defense treaties, military base agreements, or long-term joint training While there is a narrative suggesting that regional countries may perceive either China or the US as a threat20.
Southeast Asian states generally view the US as less threatening.
Despite its global military capabilities, the US is geographically distant from the region and lacks the aggressive posture that characterizes ChinaAos behavior.
In contrast.
China has ongoing security tensions with regional actors including Australia21.
Taiwan22.
Japan23.
India 24, and several Southeast Asian countries over South China Sea25.
Table 1 presents a comparative assessment of threat levels posed by China and the US based on BoT.
As shown, it could be seen that regarding to the theory.
Southeast Asian countries are more likely to align with the US, which posed lesser dangers.
Table 1: Comparison of Threat Levels from China and the US for Southeast Asian Countries.
China Massive Aggregate Power Oo Oo Proximity with Southeast Asians Countries Oo Offensive Capabilities Oo Oo 18 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 264-65.
19 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 12 & 274.
20 Le Thu, "Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific Concepts: From Resistance to Reticence to Reaction," 56.
21 For more information about this, see: "China-Australia tensions explained in 500 words," Aljazeera.
December 1, 2020, https://w.
com/economy/2020/12/1/australia-china-tensions-explained-in-500-words.
Erin Handley, "AustraliaChina relations continued to sour in 2021.
What can we expect in 2022?," Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).
December 29, 2021, https://w.
au/news/2021-12-29/australia-china-relations-in-2022-tensions-trade-rightsolympics/100719632.
Daniel Hurst, "AustraliaAos foreign minister denounces ChinaAos AosecretAo security deal with Solomon Islands," The Guardian.
April 28, 2022, https://w.
com/world/2022/apr/28/australias-foreign-ministerdenounces-chinas-secret-security-deal-with-solomon-islands.
"Aukus: China denounces US-UK-Australia pact as 22 The problem between China and Taiwan is quite complicated where the US recognize the One China Policy but still continuing a Aurobust unofficialAy relationship with Taiwan that includes trade and arms sales.
See: "What is the 'One China' policy?," BBC.
October 6, 2021, https://w.
com/news/world-asia-china-38285354.
In response.
China criticized the relationship between the US and Taiwan by stating that improper handling of this issue could possibly harm US-China relations.
See: "Xi tells US to handle Taiwan AoproperlyAo to avoid damaging ties," Aljazeera.
March 19, 2022, https://w.
com/news/2022/3/19/xi-warns-us-over-taiwan-impact-on-relations.
"Xi says improper handling of Taiwan issues will hit China-U.
ties," Reuters.
March 19, 2022, https://w.
com/world/china/xi-says-improperhandling-taiwan-issues-will-hit-china-us-ties-2022-03-18/.
23 China and Japan are having issues over territorial boundaries in several location such as in the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Island dispute.
See: Hui-Yi Katherine Tseng, "ChinaAos Territorial Disputes with Japan: The Case of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands," The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies 1, no.
24 See: Aditya Sharma, "What is next in the China-India border conflict?," DW.
January 28, 2022, https://w.
com/en/what-is-next-in-the-china-india-border-conflict/a-60586745.
25 Located at the centre of the Indo-Pacific, the South China Sea has been disputed persistently by the claimant states such as China.
Vietnam.
Malaysia.
Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines.
While Indonesia has not declared itself as a claimant.
Indonesia still having serious concern about what happened in the South China Sea, especially in regards of ChinaAos assertiveness in its claim.
For more information about Indonesia position, see: Lisa Yosephine, "Minister echoes IndonesiaAos stance on the South China Sea," The Jakarta Post.
June 21, 2016, https://w.
com/news/2016/06/21/ministerechoes-indonesias-stance-on-south-china-sea.
Tom Allard, "Asserting sovereignty.
Indonesia renames part of South China Sea," Reuters.
July 14, 2017, https://w.
com/article/us-indonesia-politics-map/asserting-sovereigntyindonesiarenames-part-of-south-china-sea-idUSKBN19Z0YQ.
The issues over the South China Sea have contributed to the regional security dilemma, especially due to concern about ChinaAo intention in these waters.
For more information, see: Rizky Widian and Arimadona, "Cooperation & Security Dilemma In The South China Sea," Global Strategis 12, no.
: 98-99.
56 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation Aggressive Intentions .
uch as Claiming Territor.
Oo (Especially in the South China Se.
Source: Illustrated by the Author.
Contrary to BoT, some Southeast Asian countries have been hesitant to join US efforts to counter China.
26 Many view the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) framework as pressuring them to choose sides.
27 Despite this, the US has continued to engage the regionAiseeking to strengthen alliances with Thailand and the Philippines, while deepening ties with key partners such as Indonesia.
Malaysia.
Singapore, and Vietnam.
28 The engagement to the Southeast Asian countries captured by the public on several occasions.
29 However, not all targeted states demonstrate the level of commitment associated with tight alignment.
30 While the US has expanded its military presence in countries like Singapore and the Philippines, it is worth noting that the Philippines has been a treaty ally since long before China emerged as a major rival.
Hence, while BoT remains a useful framework to understand alignment behavior, the variation in Southeast Asian countries in alignment to the US amidst threat from China cast doubt to the theoryAos main argument.
Indeed, several literatures have noted the limitations of the theory.
For instance, the theory seems to focuses narrowly on security-related variablesAipower aggregate, proximity, offensive capability, and aggressive intentionsAiwhile overlooking the role of other factors such as domestic politics, economic relations, or historical enmity, which may moderate or even constrain alignment 31 Further, as Cooreman .
shows in the case of Vietnam, states may behave differently based on how they value disputed territoriesAisuggesting that perception of threat is not only material but also shaped by issue prioritization.
32 This underscores the theoryAos limitation in capturing responses to threats that go beyond structural power and perceived aggressive intentions.
More.
WaltAos original definition of alignment seems to lacks the granularity to capture nuanced behaviors like limited alignment or hedging, which are prevalent in SEA.
26 Jung.
Lee, and Lee, "The Indo-Pacific Strategy and US Alliance Network Expandability: Asian Middle PowersAo Positions on Sino-US Geostrategic Competition in Indo-Pacific Region.
27 Le Thu, "Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific Concepts: From Resistance to Reticence to Reaction," 55.
28 National Security Strategy of The United States of America, 46.
A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision.
Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 9.
29 For examples, see: Cronin, "Deepening the US-Indonesian Strategic Partnership.
Vu, "ChinaAos Wedge Strategy Towards the US-Vietnam Partnership.
Jennings, "Why the Philippines Picked America Over China.
Brad Lendon, "US gains military access to Philippine bases close to Taiwan and South China Sea " CNN.
April 4, 2023, https://edition.
com/2023/04/04/asia/us-philippines-military-base-access-intl-hnk-ml/index.
30 Stephen Walt gives an important insight about this.
In his book, he identified alliance network by members of the by the existence of formal security treaty or significant level of security cooperation between countries and the great power.
In this case, it could be reflected by something like permanent training.
See: Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 274.
Further, since significant level of military cooperation is an important thing for the conception of alliance in the theory, agreement of military bases also appears to be an important element to identify alliance network.
31 For example, see: Hunter S Marston, "Navigating great power competition: a neoclassical realist view of hedging," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 24, no.
, https://doi.
org/10.
1093/irap/lcad001.
Mingjiang Li, "The PeopleAos Liberation Army and ChinaAos Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia," Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no.
5/04/16
, https://doi.
org/10.
1080/01402390.
"Implications of the Recent Philippines-China Naval Stand-Off," Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, updated May 7, 2020, accessed April 6, 2025, https://amti.
org/implications-of-therecent-philippines-china-naval-stand-off/.
Tomotaka Shoji, "VietnamAos Security Cooperation with the United States: Historical Background.
Present and Future Outlook," NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, no.
32 Dominik H.
Cooreman, "Balance of Threat in the South China Sea: Vietnam's Multi-Faceted Approach to Maximizing its South China Sea Interests in the Face of Dominant Chinese Power as a Case Study in Great Power-Middle Power Dispute Dynamics" (Master of Arts New York University, 2.
57 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation A substantial body of literature highlights how Southeast Asian countries adopt strategic hedging in response to intensifying great power rivalry.
33 Strategic hedging here refers to efforts to maintain good relation with the great powers to achieve more benefits from them.
34 Scholars also note that the Southeast Asian countries aim to AuenmeshAy the great powers within ASEAN-led frameworks, allowing them to benefit from US security presence while continuing to draw economic gains from China.
The enmeshment strategy is reflected in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which presents the region not as a zero-sum arena of rivalry but as one that emphasizes cooperation and ASEAN centrality.
36 Southeast Asian countries have expressed concerns that the US-led Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) framework pressures them to choose sides.
37 While the US has acknowledged ASEAN centrality and sought to align FOIP with AOIP38.
Southeast Asian perceptions of regional dynamics often diverge from WashingtonAos view.
39 Literature on strategic hedging and enmeshment provides valuable insight into how Southeast Asian states navigate great power competition, but it has yet to fully examine the variation in responsesAian angle that could help evaluate the applicability of BoT.
Looking further, there are also some literatures that specifically discuss on the balancing topic in the Southeast Asia.
One analyzes how Thailand and the Philippines, as US treaty allies, resist ChinaAos assertiveness while supporting US regional leadership.
40 Another argues that no Southeast Asian country is actively balancing against China41, while others suggest that indirect or internal balancing strategies are at play.
42 These works offer valuable insights into regional balancing dynamics and highlight the complexity that BoT may overlook.
However, they do not directly test BoTAos core claims, leaving the question of alliance formation underexplored.
33 Some examples of literatures on strategic hedging in the Southeast Asia could be seen from: Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," International Security 32, no.
Jung.
Lee, and Lee, "The Indo-Pacific Strategy and US Alliance Network Expandability: Asian Middle PowersAo Positions on SinoUS Geostrategic Competition in Indo-Pacific Region.
Iis Gindarsah, "Strategic hedging in IndonesiaAos defense diplomacy," Defense & Security Analysis 32, no.
6/10/01 2.
, https://doi.
org/10.
1080/14751798.
https://doi.
org/10.
1080/14751798.
Wen Zha, "Southeast Asia amid Sino-US Competition: Power Shift and Regional Order Transition," The Chinese Journal of International Politics 16, no.
https://doi.
org/10.
1093/cjip/poad006.
David Martin Jones and Nicole Jenne, "Hedging and grand strategy in Southeast Asian foreign policy," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 22, no.
, https://doi.
org/10.
1093/irap/lcab003.
34 Jung.
Lee, and Lee, "The Indo-Pacific Strategy and US Alliance Network Expandability: Asian Middle PowersAo Positions on Sino-US Geostrategic Competition in Indo-Pacific Region.
35 Evelyn Goh, "Southeast Asian perspectives on the China challenge," Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no.
4-5 .
7/08/01
, https://doi.
org/10.
1080/01402390701431915.
36 ASEAN Outlook on The Indo-Pacific.
ASEAN .
, https://asean.
org/speechandstatement/asean-outlook-on-the-indopacific/.
Le Thu, "Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific Concepts: From Resistance to Reticence to Reaction.
National Security Strategy of The United States of America.
A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision.
Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States.
National Security Strategy of The United States of America.
39 ASEAN create its own vision about the Indo-Pacific called ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP).
In contrast with the Indo-Pacific envisioned by the US where it explains the existence of a revisionist actor with dangerous behavior, the AOIP tend to see the Indo-Pacific in more win-win than zero-sum game where the region is seen as a closely interconnected region of dialogue rather than rivalry, with ASEAN having a central and strategic role in it.
For more information, see: ASEAN Outlook on The Indo-Pacific.
Tam-Sang Huynh, "Bolstering middle power standing: South Korea's response to U.
Indo-Pacific Trump
Biden," The Pacific Review
3/01/02
https://doi.
org/10.
1080/09512748.
40 Linda Quayle, "Southeast Asian perspectives on regional alliance dynamics: the Philippines and Thailand," International Politics 57, no.
0/04/01 2.
, https://doi.
org/10.
1057/s41311-019-00193-9, https://doi.
org/10.
1057/s41311-019-001939.
41 Ann Marie Murphy, "Great Power Rivalries.
Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages," Asian Security 13, no.
7/09/02 2.
, https://doi.
org/10.
1080/14799855.
42 Moch Faisal Karim and Tangguh Chairil, "Waiting for Hard Balancing? Explaining Southeast Asia's Balancing Behaviour towards China," European Journal of East Asian Studies 15, no.
, http://w.
org/stable/44162371.
58 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation One of the few works that directly addresses external balancing and alliance behavior in Southeast Asia is CiorciariAos study, which argues that regional states engage primarily in limited, rather than tight, balancing with the US against China.
43 Although his work does not directly critique BoT, it offers valuable insight by introducing a typology of alignmentAitight, limited, and nonalignmentAi based on the depth of security cooperation.
Tight alliances, in his view, are grounded in formal treaties and institutionalized defense ties, closely reflecting WaltAos definition.
This study adopts CiorciariAos typology but modifies it by treating the existence of a formal alliance agreement as sufficient to indicate a tight alliance, given the high level of commitment such agreements imply.
Unlike CiorciariAos broader framework, however, this study focuses specifically on testing BoT and extends the analysis beyond his original scope.
The literature reviewed above suggests that BoTAos predictions warrant further testing, as Southeast Asian alignment behavior often diverges from what the theory anticipates.
While many studies highlight the influence of factors beyond WaltAos original threat variablesAisuch as economic dependence, domestic politics, and hedgingAithey rarely engage directly with BoTAos core proposition:
that alignment is driven by perceived threat, based on aggregate power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions.
This article focuses specifically on testing those original variables to evaluate whether they still explain alignment behavior in the Indo-Pacific from 2000 to 2021.
While the findings may inform future research on how other factors shape alignment, this study centers on the fundamental question: Does perceived threat alone drive alignment? The answer contributes to ongoing debates about the foundations of alliance formation.
Methodology This study employs a structured comparative empirical analysis to examine Southeast Asian alignment behavior in response to Chinese threats from 2000 to 2021.
Relying primarily on empirical data from datasets and reports, with some supplementary information from media sources, the analysis remains qualitative in nature.
It applies the same four BoT variablesAiaggregate power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentionsAiacross all Southeast Asian states.
Rather than using process tracing or statistical modeling, the study adopts a cross-case comparative approach with a longitudinal dimension, tracking alignment patterns over time.
Alignment is categorized as tight, limited, or non-aligned, based on formal defense agreements, joint exercises, arms transfers, and basing access, ensuring consistency across cases .
ee Table .
Table 2: Degree of Alignment.
Genuine non-alignment a a Allow exchanges and share of No great powers access to defense facilities, including on a commercial basis Tight Alignment44 Limited/ Partial Alignment a a a Preferential arms transfer and Cooperation on joint training or assistance but does not entail support in a crisis or engage in joint combat operations Does a a a a a Formal treaties or informal Institutionalized arrangements .
NATO/
SEATO).
High .
Basing privileges.
Joint military operations.
43 J.
Ciorciari.
The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975 (Georgetown University Press, 44 This classification by Ciorciari seems to be matched with the criteria of alliance by Walt.
See: Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 59 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation Source: Ciorciari .
This study defines alignment strictly in security terms, using a structured classification system to track trends over time and ensure cross-case consistency.
While Ciorciari requires at least two indicators for tight alignment46, this study adopts a slightly different approach: the presence of a formal defense treaty alone is considered sufficient to indicate tight alignment.
Such treaties reflect a high level of commitment and can serve as a foundation for deeper security cooperation, including joint combat Hence, tight alignment reflects what Walt defines as an alliance, making the concept of tight alignment in this study largely equivalent to his definition.
47 Security agreements are classified as limited alignment if they lack the defining features of tight alignment.
Agreements that allow for joint exercises or broader defense cooperation are coded as limited alignment from the year they are signed, unless later revoked, expired, or replaced.
Even unimplemented agreementsAisuch as joint statements or MoUsAi are included, as they reflect intent to engage in security cooperation.
Excluding them would risk underestimating Southeast Asian states' alignment tendencies.
In this study, non-alignment includes instances where cooperation is mentioned broadly but lacks a clear focus on defense or security.
For example, joint statements that exclude security-related content are classified as non-alignment.
A country may be economically close to a great power without aligning in the security domain, which is the key focus of this research.
Additionally, visits or exchanges between defense officials that do not result in formal or informal agreements are also considered nonalignment, as they do not necessarily indicate meaningful engagement.
This framework is used to assess Southeast Asian countriesAo alignment with competing great powers.
This study proposes that if BoTAos predictions hold.
Southeast Asian countriesAior at least the majorityAishould exhibit tight alignment with the US in response to rising regional threats.
To evaluate this, the study examines four independent variables drawn from BoT: aggregate power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions.
These are assessed against the dependent variableAi Southeast Asian alignment levels.
The analysis is structured into four subsections, each addressing one of the variables.
Aggregate power is measured using ChinaAos Global Power Index (GPI) to explore whether changes in ChinaAos global power share correlate with alignment behavior.
The proximity section examines how geographic closeness and factors such as buffer zones influence alignment.
Offensive capabilities are assessed by tracking ChinaAos mobile weapons strength across air, land, and sea domains.
Aggressive intentions are proxied through an analysis of territorial disputes and are further reinforced with perception-based data on regional trust in China.
The final section summarizes findings across the four variables, discusses research limitations, and outlines directions for future study.
Southeast Asia and the Balance of Threat As noted earlier, this section is divided into four parts, each analyzing one of the factors that, according to BoT, influence alliance formation.
The analysis begins with ChinaAos aggregate power, followed by geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions.
ChinaAos Aggregate Power and Alignment Behavior in Southeast Asia While BoT argues that states balance against threats, it places particular emphasis on aggregate material power as a key indicator of threat perception.
The underlying assumption is that greater material power enhances a state's capacity to impose threats on others.
48 Unsurprisingly.
Southeast Asian Ciorciari.
The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975.
46 Ciorciari.
The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975, 9.
47 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 274.
48 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 22.
60 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation countries have expressed concern over ChinaAos growing powerAifor instance.
Indonesia has questioned ChinaAos regional intentions.
49 In this context, it becomes important to assess whether the rise of ChinaAos aggregate power has shaped the alignment dynamics of Southeast Asian countries toward the US.
In BoT, aggregate power is typically measured through indicators such as military capabilities, population, and economic development.
50 To assess this variable in relation to Southeast Asian alignment, this study uses ChinaAos Global Power Index (GPI), developed by the Frederick S.
Pardee Center for International Futures.
The GPI reflects ChinaAos annual share of global power based on a composite of economic, demographic, technological, diplomatic, and military indicators, drawing from sources like the World Bank and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
The GPI builds on indices like the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) by incorporating additional elements such as technological advancement, nuclear capabilities, and international engagement.
As such, it offers a more comprehensive measure of aggregate power and aligns well with BoTAos conceptualizationAicapturing both its core components and broader dimensions.
ChinaAos aggregate power, as reflected in the GPI, is visualized in Graph 1 below.
The GPI builds on indices like the CINC by incorporating additional elements such as technological advancement, nuclear capabilities, and international engagement.
51 As such, it offers a more comprehensive measure of aggregate power and aligns well with BoTAos conceptualizationAicapturing both its core components and broader dimensions.
ChinaAos aggregate power, as reflected in the GPI, is visualized in Graph 1 below.
Graph 1: China's Aggregate Power .
0Ae2.
Source: Visualized by the Author from GPI dataset by Frederick S.
Pardee Center for International Futures.
Higher GPI values indicate a greater share of global power held by China.
As could be seen in the graph.
ChinaAos share of global power has continued to rise over time.
This index is then compared with Southeast Asian countriesAo alignment levels to assess whether growing Chinese power corresponds 49 Rizal Sukma, "IndonesiaAos Response to the Rise of China: Growing Comfort amid Uncertainties," in The Rise of China:
Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan, ed.
Jun Tsunekawa .
-2-1 Nakameguro.
Meguro-ku.
Tokyo 153-8648.
Japan: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2.
50 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 274.
For more detail information, see: "National Power," Frederick S.
Pardee Center for International Futures, accessed April 21, 2024, https://korbel.
edu/pardee/content/national-power.
52 "National Power.
61 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation with closer alignment to the US as a less threatening alternative.
These comparisons are presented in Table 3 below.
Table 3: ChinaAos Power Aggregate and Southeast Asian Countries Degree of Alignment with the US .
ChinaAos GPI Degree of Alignment Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam ChinaAos GPI Degree of Alignment Brunei Cambodia = Non-Alignment Indonesia Lao PDR = Limited Alignment Malaysia Myanmar = Tight Alignment Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Source: Illustrated by the Author.
In Table 3, the degree of alignment is represented by cell colors, with tight alignment shown in As previously noted, tight alignment refers to cases where a country has formal treaties or informal arrangements involving binding obligations, institutionalized security ties .
NATO), access to basing facilities, or substantial joint military operations.
From WaltAos perspective, this level of security 62 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation cooperation reflects what he defines as an allianceAimaking tight alignment, as used in this study, largely equivalent to WaltAos definition.
53 Such alignment remains relatively rare among Southeast Asian As shown in Table 3, only two Southeast Asian countriesAiThailand and the PhilippinesAimeet the criteria for tight alignment.
Both maintain longstanding security relationships with the US based on formal defense treaties that include collective defense commitments, implying mutual obligations in response to shared threats.
54 The Philippines signed its Mutual Defense Treaty with the US in 1951, while ThailandAos alliance originates from the 1954 Manila Pact, later reinforced by the Thanat-Rusk communiquy .
, the 2020 Joint Vision Statement, and the 2022 US-Thailand Communiquy on Strategic Alliance and Partnership.
55 Given that these alliances predate ChinaAos rise, their tight alignment is unlikely to be a direct response to ChinaAos growing power.
However.
ChinaAos increasing strength, as shown in Graph 1 and Table 2, may reinforce the rationale for maintaining these alliances.
Limited alignmentAirepresented by light blue cells in Table 3Airefers to security relationships involving preferential arms sales, joint training exercises, or other forms of cooperation that exclude binding defense obligations or basing privileges.
This category is the most common among Southeast Asian countries, accounting for over half of the total data points .
While some states were non-aligned with the US in the early 2000s, limited alignment became more prevalent as ChinaAos global power increased.
This shift is reflected in the growing number of joint exercises, including Garuda Shield .
ow Super Garuda Shiel.
with Indonesia56.
Keris Strike with Malaysia57.
Valiant Mark with Singapore 58, and Angkor Sentinel with Cambodia.
59 VietnamAos case is more gradual.
Early ties with the US were constrained by post-war issues such as POWs and normalization.
However, since 2010, the relationship has steadily advanced through MoUs, joint statements, and arms transfers.
The prevalence of limited alignment in Southeast Asia suggests that many countries seek military cooperation with the US in response to ChinaAos rising aggregate power, as shown in Table 3.
The US itself views exercises like Garuda Shield61 with Indonesia and Tiger Balm62 with Singapore as key to deterring aggression and promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific.
These activities serve both as deterrence and preparation for potential threats linked to ChinaAos growing capabilities.
However, the dominance of limited alignmentAirather than tight alignmentAiindicates that while Southeast Asian 53 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 274.
"U.
Collective Defense Arrangements," U.
Department of State, accessed February 4, 2025, https://20092017.
gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/.
55 "U.
Relations With Thailand," U.
Department of State, 2024, accessed February 4, 2025, https://w.
gov/u-srelations-with-thailand/?utm.
56 "Super Garuda Shield: U.
Partners Train in Indo-Pacific ".
Departement of Defense, updated September 12, 2023, accessed February 5, 2025, https://w.
gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3523152/super-garuda-shield-uspartners-train-in-indo-pacific/.
57 "U.
and Malaysia Enhance Military Cooperation through Exercise Keris Strike 2021," U.
Indo-Pacific Command, updated November 2, 2021, accessed February 5, 2025, https://w.
mil/Media/News/News-ArticleView/Article/2830728/us-and-malaysia-enhance-military-cooperation-through-exercise-keris-strike-2021/.
"U.
Security Cooperation With Singapore ".
Departement of State, updated January 20, 2025, accessed February 5, 2025, https://w.
gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-singapore/.
59 "U.
Cambodian Forces Partner for Angkor Sentinel 2016 ".
Embassy in Cambodia, updated March 14, 2016, accessed February 5, 2025, https://kh.
gov/u-s-cambodian-forces-partner-for-angkor-sentinel-2016/.
60 See: Ciorciari.
The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975.
Lewis M.
Stern, "U.
-Vietnam Defense Relations: Deepening Ties.
Adding Relevance," Strategic Forum no.
No.
61 "Indo-Pacific Exercise Offers Effective Deterrence ".
Department of Defense, updated October 11, 2022, accessed February 5, 2025, https://w.
gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3184720/indo-pacific-exercise-offerseffective-deterrence/.
62 "US and Singapore Armies Conduct 40th Annual Tiger Balm Exercise," U.
Indo-Pacific Command, updated May 14, 2021, accessed February 6, 2025, https://w.
mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2618514/us-andsingapore-armies-conduct-40th-annual-tiger-balm-exercise/.
63 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation countries value US engagement, they stop short of fully aligning as Thailand and the Philippines have.
This suggests that BoTAos expectation that states will rally around the less threatening power is only partially supported.
Notably, this does not mean that all other Southeast Asian states consistently exhibit limited alignment with the US.
Table 3 also highlights instances of non-alignment, shown in grey.
This category reflects the absence of substantial military cooperation, though it may still include defense delegations and information sharingAiwithout granting great powers access to defense facilities, even commercially.
Indonesia, for example, was under a US arms embargo in the late 1990s due to its militaryAos role in postcrisis unrest.
Although relations were later repaired, the country initially exhibited non-alignment before shifting to limited alignment.
Laos followed a similar trajectory, marked by early US disengagement and historical distrust, before gradually moving toward limited alignment.
63 Myanmar, by contrast, remains largely non-aligned with the US, primarily due to sanctions tied to its internal political 64 Cambodia presents a more dynamic case: it moved from non-alignment to limited alignment between 2004 and 2017, then reverted to non-alignment in 2018 following the suspension of US military assistance amid democratic backsliding and deepening ties with China.
65 A brief military education agreement66 in 2019Ae2020 no indication that this agreement was renewed.
In 2021.
Cambodia lost eligibility67 for the US military academy program, reinforcing its return to a non-aligned position.
Although non-alignment with the US is not widespread in Southeast Asia, it raises the question of whether these states align with China instead.
Further data suggests that alignment patterns in the region are more complex than US-focused analysis alone reveals.
Despite facing varying degrees of threat from ChinaAos growing power, many Southeast Asian countries also engage in military cooperation with Beijing.
Table 4 presents the degree of alignment between Southeast Asian states and China.
Table 4: ChinaAos Power Aggregate and Southeast Asian Countries Degree of Alignment with the China .
ChinaAos GPI Degree of Alignment Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar Joshua Kurlantzick, "Troubling legacy of a forgotten war haunts Laos," Nikkei Asia.
Febryary 10, 2017, https://asia.
com/Politics/Troubling-legacy-of-a-forgotten-war-haunts-Laos.
64 For examples, see: U.
Sanctions on Burma.
Congressional Research Service (October 19, 2.
Restrictions on Relations with Burma.
Congressional Research Service (March 18, 2.
"Imposing Sanctions on BurmaAos Military Regime Three Years After the Military Coup," U.
Embassy in Burma, accessed February 4, 2025, https://mm.
gov/imposing-sanctions-on-burmas-military-regime-three-years-after-the-military-coup/.
65 Cambodia, (Congressional Research Service.
July 27, 2.
Ry Sochan, "Cambodia strengthens military ties with the US," The Phnom Penh Post.
March 21, 2019, https://w.
com/national/cambodia-strengthens-military-ties-us?utm_source=chatgpt.
67 Kimseng Men, "Cambodian Cadets at American Military Academies Lose US Funding," Voice of America.
July 06, 2021, https://w.
com/a/student-union_cambodian-cadets-american-military-academies-lose-us-funding/6207892.
64 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam ChinaAos GPI Degree of Alignment Brunei Cambodia = Non-Alignment Indonesia Lao PDR = Limited Alignment Malaysia Myanmar = Tight Alignment Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Source: Illustrated by the Author.
Table 4 applies the same alignment categories to evaluate Southeast Asian countriesAo security relations with China and reveals that all maintain limited alignment.
This suggests a regional openness to military cooperation with China, despite its rising power.
However, this does not indicate bandwagoning, as none of the countries exhibit tight alignment with Beijing.
Rather, the findings reinforce that BoTAos predictionAithat states will align with the less threatening powerAiis only partially Most Southeast Asian states neither engage in tight alignment with the US nor avoid engaging China militarily.
Notably, even the Philippines and ThailandAiWashingtonAos two treaty allies in the regionAifall into the limited alignment category, highlighting the regionAos complex, non-zero-sum approach to great power competition.
Southeast AsiaAos limited alignment with China is based not only on MoUs and joint statements, but also on joint military exercises and arms transfers.
While many Southeast Asian countries have long participated in annual exercises with the USAisome dating back before 2000, like Tiger Balm with Singapore68, they have also welcomed China in similar activities, such as Falcon Strike with Thailand and Aman-Youyi with Malaysia.
69 China has increasingly filled strategic gaps left by the US, particularly in countries like Cambodia, where US military assistance was suspended in 2018.
In 2020, 68 "U.
Security Cooperation With Singapore ".
69 For more information on China participating in Falcon Strike exercise, see: "China.
Thailand host joint air force exercise "Falcon Strike 2018"," China Military, updated September 7, 2018, accessed February 4, 2025, http://eng.
cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/9275202.
For more information on China participating in Aman-Youyi exercise, see: "Malaysia-China Defence Relations: Disruptions Amid Political Changes and Geopolitical Tensions," ISEAS, updated 2021, accessed February 4, 2025, https://w.
sg/articles-commentaries/iseasperspective/2021-57-malaysia-china-defence-relations-disruptions-amid-political-changes-and-geopolitical-tensions-byngeow-chow-bing/.
65 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation ChinaAos ambassador to Cambodia described the bilateral relationship as one of Auironclad brothers,Ay coinciding with the expansion of CambodiaAos Ream Naval Base.
Although reports of exclusive Chinese basing rightsAian indicator of tight alignmentAihave been denied, the relationship remains within the bounds of limited alignment.
70 Still, this case illustrates how China is expanding its security footprint in the region, particularly where US engagement has declined.
China has filled the gap not only in Cambodia but also in Myanmar, which lacks access to US military equipment.
Between 2000 and 2021, approximately 43% of MyanmarAos arms imports came from China, highlighting its dependence on Chinese weaponry.
Similar patterns are observed in Cambodia and Laos, as shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Comparison of Total Volume of Arms Exports from China and the US to Southeast Asia Brunei Total Exports to Southeast Asian Countries USAos Exports to Southeast Asian Countries .
ChinaAos Exports to Southeast Asian Countries .
%) Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar .
Philippines .
%) Singapore .
%) Thailand Vietnam Source: Adapted by the author from SIPRI dataset on arms transfer.
70 For more information about Ream Naval base issue, see: Jonathan Head, "Does China now have a permanent military base in Cambodia?," BBC.
October 8, 2024, https://w.
com/news/articles/cx2k42n54kvo.
Sakshi Tiwari, "Ream Naval Base Not For China.
US Warships Welcome At CambodiaAos Beijing Aided Port Ae Deputy PM," The EurAsian Times.
October 3, 2024, https://w.
com/ream-naval-base-creates-tensions-between/.
71 See: "Arms transfers database," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), accessed February 4, 2025, https://armstransfers.
org/ArmsTransfer/ImportExport.
Notes: .
This table reflect the total volume of transfers of arms from both China and the US from 2000-2021.
The symbol Au-Au indicates no identified deliveries of arms from either China or the US to the respective recipients.
The numbers are in millions.
However, it does not represent monetary values.
Instead, it reflects scores from SIPRI trend-indicator values (TIV.
In this writing this data provides insights into the military 66 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation Table 5 shows that around 50% of CambodiaAos and 37% of LaosAos arms imports came from China.
Along with Myanmar, these cases reflect a pattern in which China fills the arms transfer gap in non-major Southeast Asian countriesAithose less prioritized by the US in its Indo-Pacific strategy.
contrast, major72 regional players explicitly targeted by US engagement73AiIndonesia.
Malaysia, the Philippines.
Singapore.
Thailand, and VietnamAireceive more arms from the US than from China.
Even Brunei, though not a key US partner, receives substantial US arms transfers while having none from China.
This suggests that seven out of ten Southeast Asian countries enjoy greater access to US arms, indicating a degree of alignment, albeit mostly limited in nature.
In short, while most Southeast Asian states align with the US in the face of ChinaAos growing power, their alignment tends to be limited rather than the tight alignment BoT would predict.
Notably.
ThailandAidespite its status as a US major nonNATO allyAireceives similar volumes of arms from both China and the US, further illustrating the regionAos openness to engagement with both powers.
In sum, the comparison between empirical data and the alignment behavior of Southeast Asian countries amid ChinaAos rising aggregate power reveals three key points.
First, most Southeast Asian countries alignAialbeit limitedlyAiwith the US, engaging not only in MoUs and joint statements but also in regular military exercises and arms transfers.
Second, these countries also pursue limited military cooperation with China, not just economic engagement, adding nuance to existing literature that emphasizes hedging strategies.
Third.
China has filled security cooperation gaps in countries where US engagement is absent, such as Cambodia and Myanmar.
These findings suggest that BoTAos predictionAi that Southeast Asian states would side with the US to counterbalance ChinaAiis only partially supported.
While alignment with the US exists, it is predominantly limited in nature, and most states also maintain limited ties with China.
Given the lack of widespread tight alignments.
BoTAos expectations are not fully However, the consistent pattern of limited alignment with the US does indicate that perceived threat still plays a role, supporting BoTAos core logic to a degree.
Southeast AsiaAos Proximity to China and Alignment Behavior The next BoT variable influencing alignment behavior is geographical proximity74, based on the idea that nearby threats are more dangerous due to their ease of projecting power.
75 Thus, observation to test whether closer proximity is somehow related to alignment behavior should include assessment about how close China is with the Southeast Asian countries.
To assess whether proximity to China correlates with Southeast Asian alignment behavior, this study compares the distances between each countryAos capital and Beijing.
However, recognizing the limits of objective distance alone, the analysis significance of arms deals in which the bigger the number and percentage of the TIVs the more significant the arms transfer from either China or the US to the recipient countries.
For more details on how the formulas for TIV works, please refer to:
"Sources and methods," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), accessed February 4, 2025, https://w.
org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods.
Major Southeast Asian countries refer to those that possessed more edge on economic and military capability compared to the other Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia.
Philippines.
Malaysia.
Singapore.
Thailand, and Vietnam.
The mentioned countries are also the ones that refers as AuEmerging AsiaAy by the IMF.
See: Regional Economic Outlook for Asia and Pacific: Sailing into Headwinds.
International Monetary Fund (October, 2.
73 For more information on how the US regard them as strategic, see: National Security Strategy of The United States of America, 46.
A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision, 6.
Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 9.
74 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 276.
In this regard.
WaltAos observation on the Middle-East implies that countries are more sensitive to threats that are close so they care more about regional dynamics rather than global power balance between See: Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 269-70.
75 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 23.
In this regard.
Walt also borrows the explanations from other literatures such as: Harvey Starr and Benjamin A.
Most, "The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research," International Studies Quarterly 20, no.
, https://doi.
org/10.
2307/2600341, http://w.
org/stable/2600341.
Boulding.
Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (Valmy Publishing, 2.
67 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation also considers geographic factors such as natural barriers and buffer zones.
76 A country may be geographically close to China but protected by features that reduce vulnerability.
If BoT holds, states closer to China should align more closely with the US, which is geographically distant and thus perceived as less threatening.
Before proceeding with the analysis, a clarification is needed.
In SEA, proximity and aggressive intention are often intertwinedAifor instance, a country may be geographically distant from Beijing but close to disputed areas in the South China Sea.
While proximity to ChinaAos territorial claims is relevant, this study excludes such factors from the proximity analysis to avoid overlap with the aggressive intention variable, which is addressed later.
Instead, this section focuses solely on whether geographic closeness to ChinaAimeasured by capital-to-capital distance and geographic featuresAirelates to alignment behavior.
Table 6 outlines the proximity and geographic characteristics of each Southeast Asian country in relation to China.
Table 6: Distances from Southeast Asian Capitals to Beijing and Geographical Barriers Distance to Beijing .
n K.
Barriers Myanmar Lao PDR Vietnam Cambodia Oo Philippines Oo Thailand Oo Brunei Oo Malaysia Oo Singapore Oo Indonesia Oo Source: Illustrated by the Author.
Table 6 compares the proximity of Southeast Asian countries to ChinaAos capital and identifies whether geographic barriers or buffer zones exist along their borders.
Most Southeast Asian countries are separated from China by either natural barriers or intermediary states.
Maritime Southeast Asian countriesAiIndonesia.
Malaysia.
Singapore.
Brunei, and the PhilippinesAiare distanced from China by the South China Sea and are geographically farther from Beijing.
On the mainland.
Cambodia and Thailand are buffered by Laos.
Myanmar, and Vietnam.
These barriers may limit ChinaAos ability to project power directly and, from a realist perspective, reduce the urgency to balance.
77 According to BoT, states closer to a threatening power and lacking natural defenses should be more inclined to align with a less threatening alternativeAinamely, the US.
If BoT holds, countries like Myanmar.
Laos, and 76 For instance.
Mearsheimer .
explain that geographical barriers like huge body of water inhibit power-projection For more detail information, see: J.
Mearsheimer.
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Norton, 2.
, 114-28.
77 Mearsheimer argue that geographical barriers and buffer zone could inhibit balancing behavior and inducing buck-passing strategy instead.
Buck-passing strategy here refers to behavior when a country passing its responsibility to balance against threatening power to other states that might be located closer to the threat.
For more detail explanation about this point, see:
Mearsheimer.
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 329-33.
68 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation VietnamAithose with direct borders and minimal geographic protectionAishould exhibit stronger alignment with the US.
Table 7 evaluates this proposition by presenting their respective alignment levels.
Table 7: Degree of Alignment (Shorted by Geographical Proximity with Chin.
Degree of Alignment Myanmar Lao PDR Vietnam Cambodia Philippines Thailand Brunei Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Degree of Alignment Myanmar Lao PDR Vietnam Cambodia = Non-Alignment Philippines Thailand = Limited Alignment Brunei Malaysia = Tight Alignment Singapore Indonesia Source: Illustrated by the Author Table 7 shows the degree of alignment between Southeast Asian countries and the US using the same criteria as Tables 3 and 4.
Among Myanmar.
Laos, and VietnamAicountries closest to China and lacking significant geographic barriersAilimited alignment with the US accounts for 26 out of 66 data points .
0Ae2.
, or roughly 39%.
The remaining majority reflects non-alignment, with Myanmar contributing most to that category.
Laos, which shifted to limited alignment after 2006, holds 15 of 22 data points .
%) in that category.
Vietnam began limited alignment in 2011, making up 11 of 22 data points .
%).
These figures suggest that even the Southeast Asian countries geographically closest to China do not exhibit strong alignment with the US.
While limited alignment is presentAiespecially in Laos and VietnamAiit falls short of supporting BoTAos prediction that proximity to a threat increases 69 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation alignment with a less threatening power.
In fact, taking together, these three countries show more instances of non-alignment compared to others in the region.
Non-alignment is also evident in CambodiaAia country relatively close to China but separated by buffer zones.
Ranked fourth closest to China among Southeast Asian countries.
Cambodia was nonaligned in the early 2000s and again in 2018 and 2021.
When combined with Myanmar.
Laos, and Vietnam, these four countries show 46 out of 88 data points .
2%) as non-aligned and 42 .
7%) as limited alignment.
With non-alignment slightly outweighing limited alignment, the data offers little support for BoTAos prediction that proximity to a threat leads to alignment with an alternative power.
Additionally, these countriesAiexcept VietnamAilean toward China in military cooperation.
As shown in Table 5, arms transfers to Myanmar.
Laos, and Cambodia are dominated by China.
This is further supported by developments such as China's influence in Cambodia, which led to the suspension of US military assistance, and LaosAos military cooperation with China on the Ream Naval Base.
A different pattern emerges among Southeast Asian countries located farther from China and protected by geographic barriers.
These states mostly fall under limited alignment, except for the Philippines and Thailand, which maintain tight alignment with the US.
Notably, both rank mid-range in proximity to China.
If BoTAos proximity-based logic held fully, these two would exhibit limited alignment, while more distant countries like Malaysia.
Singapore, and Indonesia would remain nonaligned.
However, the opposite is observed.
As shown in Table 5, countries such as the Philippines.
Thailand.
Brunei.
Malaysia.
Singapore, and Indonesia receive more US arms transfers and maintain long-standing annual military exercises with the US, including Garuda Shield.
Keris Strike, and Tiger Balm.
These patterns suggest that proximity alone does not determine alignment behavior.
The findings in this section suggest that BoTAos prediction regarding geographical proximity is not well supported.
The countries closest to ChinaAiMyanmar.
Laos, and CambodiaAido not exhibit tight alignment with the US and are largely characterized by non-alignment or limited alignment.
Meanwhile, mid-range countries like the Philippines and Thailand maintain tight alignment with the US, and more distant countriesAiMalaysia.
Singapore.
Indonesia, and BruneiAiconsistently show limited alignment with a slight tilt toward the US, particularly in military cooperation.
While BoT acknowledges that proximity can lead to either balancing or bandwagoning78, it emphasizes a stronger tendency to balance against nearby threats.
79 Yet, with the exception of Vietnam, the closest states appear to lean toward China rather than balancing it.
Their limited engagement with the US and growing military cooperation with ChinaAidespite the absence of tight alignmentAiundermine BoTAos argument that geographical proximity to a threat drives alignment with a less threatening power.
ChinaAos Offensive Capabilities and Southeast AsiaAos Alignment Behavior Offensive capability is another key factor in BoT, as it enables a state to threaten others.
80 The theory suggests that large, mobile military forces signal strong offensive potential.
81 In this study, mobile weapon systemsAithose capable of crossing borders and projecting forceAiare used as proxies for offensive capabilities and are compared against the alignment behavior of Southeast Asian countries.
this case, aerial and maritime weaponryAisuch as combat-capable aircraft, ships, submarines, and aircraft carriersAiare used as proxies for offensive capability.
These platforms are especially relevant in 78 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 24-24 & 153.
79 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 158-65 & 78-80.
80 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 24.
Similar perspective seems to be shared by others like Jervis .
See also: Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no.
: 200-05, https://doi.
org/10.
2307/2009958,
http://w.
org/stable/2009958.
81 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 24.
Charles L.
Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can Measure it?," International Security .
, https://doi.
org/10.
2307/2539240,
http://w.
org/stable/2539240.
70 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation SEA, where most countries are connected to China by sea.
While air and naval assets can serve both defensive and offensive purposes82, their presence often generates perceived threats, particularly in contested areas like the South China Sea.
For example.
China may view these weapons as essential for defending territorial claims, while other claimant states see them as offensive provocations.
Given their mobility and strategic utility, these weapon systems are appropriate indicators for assessing ChinaAos offensive capacity in relation to Southeast Asian countries' alignment behavior.
While land-based weapons like armored vehicles are generally less relevant for maritime conflicts, they can still reflect offensive capability in specific contexts.
As three Southeast Asian countries share direct land borders with China, this study includes main battle tanks (MBT.
as an additional proxy for ChinaAos offensive strength in those cases.
These dataAicovering air, naval, and landbased systemsAiare compared with Southeast Asian countries' alignment behavior to assess whether ChinaAos offensive capabilities influence their inclination toward the US.
83 The analysis begins with Graph 2, which compares aerial weaponry between China and Southeast Asian countries.
Graph 2: Comparison of Combat-Capable Aircraft Between China and Ten Southeast Asian Countries .
China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Cambodia Laos Myanmar Brunei Source: Adapted by the Author from IISS Military Balance Reports.
As shown in Graph 2.
China possesses an overwhelming number of combat-capable aircraft compared to the ten Southeast Asian countries.
Beyond sheer quantity.
China has also advanced significantly in aerial technology.
In 2017, it introduced the Chengdu J-20, a fifth-generation stealth fighter now deployed across all major regions of the country.
85 This was followed by the J-35A, a medium-sized stealth fighter designed for mass production and lower cost, while maintaining high 82 See: Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," 204.
See also: Jack S.
Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," International Studies Quarterly 28, no.
: 225-26,
https://doi.
org/10.
2307/2600696, http://w.
org/stable/2600696.
83 The data on weaponries in this writing are adapted from IISS Military Balance reports from the year 2000-2022.
See: "The Military Balance," (IISS Website, 2001-2.
https://w.
com/loi/tmib20.
84 Notes: .
The design of the of the Graph is adjusted in a way that reveal the gap between compared countries.
This writing found that other design reveal less of the Southeast Asian countries dynamics since the gap in the data with China is too big.
The IISS Military Balance reports shows no record of Brunei having combat capable aircrafts from the year 2000-2021.
85 See: Franz-Stefan Gady, "ChinaAos First Fifth-Generation Fighter Jet Enters Service With the PLAAF," The Diplomat.
March 14, 2017, https://thediplomat.
com/2017/03/chinas-first-fifth-generation-fighter-jet-enters-service-with-the-plaaf/.
Liu Xuanzun, "J-20 fighter jet active in all five PLA theater commands: delegate," Global Times.
October 20, 2022, https://w.
cn/page/202210/1277527.
71 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation combat capability.
China is also reportedly developing a sixth-generation fighter.
86 In contrast.
Southeast Asian countriesAiexcept Singapore, which has acquired fifth-generation aircraft from the US87Aioperate or plan to acquire fourth or 4.
5-generation jets.
ChinaAos numerical and technological edge in air power clearly gives it an offensive advantage over the region.
The next section turns to naval capabilities, shown in Graph 3.
Graph 3: Comparison of Combat-Capable Ships Between China and Ten Southeast Asian Countries .
China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Cambodia Laos Myanmar Brunei Source: Adapted by the Author from IISS Military Balance Reports.
Graph 3 shows that China has a significantly larger number of combat-capable ships than the ten Southeast Asian countries.
Although Vietnam briefly surpassed China in 2007.
IISS Military Balance reports .
ee Graph 2, note .
did not include ChinaAos paramilitary vessels from 2000Ae2009, meaning China's actual numbers may have been higher.
This numerical advantage underscores ChinaAos ability to assert maritime claimsAiparticularly in the South China SeaAirelative to its Southeast Asian 86 See: Liu Xuanzun and Yang Sheng, "Three types of stealth fighter jets star Airshow China opening," Global Times.
November 12, 2024, https://w.
cn/page/202411/1322920.
Liu Xuanzun and Guo Yuandan, "PLA Air Force to debut J-35A stealth fighter jet at Airshow China," Global Times.
November 5, 2024, https://w.
cn/page/202411/1322452.
87 For more information, see: Brad Lendon, "The message to China behind SingaporeAos US F-35 jet plan " CNN.
March 11, 2019, https://edition.
com/2019/03/06/asia/singapore-f-35-fighters-analysis-intl/index.
88 Notes: .
Since there are some indications that some Southeast Asian countries as well as China using paramilitary forces and since some of these forces possess combat capable ships, the units shown in the graph also include combat capable ships belong not only to the respective navies but to their paramilitary as well.
From the year of 2000-2009 the IISS datasets do not record ChinaAos paramilitary ships, indicating that the number of combat capable ships of China might be higher than the record shows.
Regarding the naval weaponries data of Singapore, the IISS reports did not record SingaporeAos paramilitary ships for the year of 2004 as well as 2020 and 2021 which implies that in these years, the Singapore might possess more combat capable ships than the record reflected.
Similarly, data on IndonesiaAos paramilitary ships from 2018 onwards seems to be partially unrecorded, indicating Indonesia might have more paramilitary ships than expected.
While Laos is a landlock country, the reports that Laos possessed some combat capable ships under the armies.
The IISS Military Balance reports implies no paramilitary ships owned by Cambodia and Laos.
72 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation While Graph 3 captures overall naval strength.
Graphs 4 and 5 further highlight ChinaAos dominance in key categories, including main surface combatants and submarines Graph 4 & 5: Comparison of Principal Surface Combatants and Submarines Between China and Ten Southeast Asian Countries .
Graph 4: Principal Surface Combatant China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Cambodia Laos Myanmar Brunei Graph 5: Submarines China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Cambodia Laos Myanmar Brunei Source: Adapted by the Author from IISS Military Balance Reports.
Graphs 4 and 5 show that China holds a clear advantage over the ten Southeast Asian countries in both principal surface combatants and submarines.
Principal surface combatantsAisuch as aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and frigatesAitypically have a full-load displacement above 2,200 tonnes and are equipped for high-seas combat.
90 Dominance in this category reflects ChinaAos significant power projection and offensive maritime capabilities.
Additionally, as shown in Graph 6.
China also maintains superiority in combat-capable paramilitary vessels.
89 Notes: .
The data on principal surface combatant include aircraft carriers.
The IISS Military Balance reports indicated no existence of principal surface combatants for Brunei.
Cambodia, and Laos.
The IISS Military Balance reports indicated no existence of submarines for Brunei.
Cambodia.
Philippines.
Thailand, and Laos.
90 The Military Balance 2024, vol.
124, 538.
73 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation Graph 6: Comparison of Paramilitary Ships Between China and Ten Southeast Asian Countries China Singapore Laos Indonesia Thailand Myanmar Malaysia Vietnam Brunei Philippines Cambodia Source: Adapted by the Author from IISS Military balance Reports.
As shown in Graph 6.
China has more combat-capable paramilitary vessels than the ten Southeast Asian countries.
Notably.
IISS Military Balance reports did not fully account for China's paramilitary fleet before 2009, suggesting its actual size may be significantly larger.
The 2022 IISS report identifies the China Coast Guard (CCG) as the worldAos largest92, strengthened further by the 2021 CCG Law, which expanded its role in law enforcement and maritime power projection.
93 China has repeatedly used the CCG to assert claims in the South China Sea, including incidents in VietnamAos exclusive economic zone (EEZ)94.
Scarborough Shoal95, and the Natuna area96.
Alongside the PLA Navy and maritime militia, the CCG plays a central role in ChinaAos maritime strategy.
97 Its fleet includes Zhaotou-class cuttersAiparamilitary ships with a displacement of about 12,000 tonnes, even larger than many principal naval combatants like destroyers and frigates.
98 The size and presence of these vessels 91 Notes: .
From the year of 2000-2009 the IISS datasets do not record ChinaAos paramilitary ships, indicating that the number of combat capable ships of China might be higher than the record shows.
Regarding the naval weaponries data of Singapore, the IISS reports did not record SingaporeAos paramilitary ships for the year of 2004 as well as 2020 and 2021 which implies that in these years, the Singapore might possess more combat capable ships than the record reflected.
Similarly, data on IndonesiaAos paramilitary ships from 2018 onwards seems to be partially unrecorded, indicating Indonesia might have more paramilitary ships than expected.
While Laos is a landlock country, the reports that Laos possessed some combat capable ships under the armies.
The IISS Military Balance reports implies no paramilitary ships owned by Cambodia and Laos.
"Chapter Six:
Asia," The Military Balance .
2/12/31 https://doi.
org/10.
1080/04597222.
93 "Chapter Six: Asia," 234 & 38.
94 For incident near the oil block, see: James Pearson and Khanh Vu, "Vietnam.
China embroiled in South China Sea standoff," Reuters.
July 17, 2019, https://w.
com/article/world/vietnam-china-embroiled-in-south-china-sea-standoffidUSKCN1UC0M4/.
95 For incident in Scarborough Shoal, see: "South China Sea: Philippine coastguard accuses Chinese vessels of Aodangerous, blocking manoeuvresAo," South China Morning Post.
February 11, 2024, https://w.
com/news/asia/southeastasia/article/3251664/south-china-sea-philippine-coastguard-accuses-chinese-vessels-dangerous-blocking-manoeuvres.
96 For incident in Natuna, see: Haeril Halim.
Anggi M.
Lubis, and Stefani Ribka, "RI confronts China on fishing," The Jakarta Post.
March 21, 2016, https://w.
com/news/2016/03/21/ri-confronts-china-fishing.
97 "Chapter Six: Asia," 238.
Some reports that it is the largest ships for paramilitary purposes.
See: "Chapter Six: Asia," 238.
"A new law would unshackle ChinaAos coastguard, far from its coast," The Economist.
December 3, 2020, https://w.
com/china/2020/12/03/anew-law-would-unshackle-chinas-coastguard-far-from-its-coast.
For comparison.
Destroyers is usually have FLD around 4,500 Ae 9,749 tonnes while Frigates class FLD are about 2,200 Ae 9,000 tonnes.
For these ships classification, refer to: "Chapter Six: Asia," 516.
74 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation raise serious concerns among other claimants, particularly the Philippines.
99 In sum.
ChinaAos naval superiorityAiespecially in paramilitary capacityAiis evident when compared to the Southeast Asian In addition to naval capabilities, this study also examines land-based power relevant to Southeast Asian countries sharing a direct border with China.
To assess ChinaAos advantage in this area, main battle tanks (MBT.
are used as a proxy.
The comparison is presented in Graph 7 below.
Graph 7: Comparison of Main Battle Tank (MBT) Between China and Ten Southeast Asian Countries China Singapore Laos Indonesia Thailand Myanmar Malaysia Vietnam Brunei Philippines Cambodia Source: Adapted by the Author from IISS Military balance Reports.
Graph 7 shows that China holds a significant numerical advantage in main battle tanks (MBT.
compared to the ten Southeast Asian countries.
This superiority is further reinforced by ChinaAos continued development of advanced MBTs, including the mass-produced Type-96 and the more sophisticated Type-99 series.
101 The Type-99A, equipped with features like laser-guided missile jammers and digital maintenance systems, is considered one of the most capable preAefourth generation MBTs.
102 China is also reportedly developing a next-generation MBT103, further widening its advantage in land power.
The assessment of ChinaAos offensive capabilities highlights its clear advantage over the ten Southeast Asian countries.
If BoTAos prediction holdsAithat greater offensive capability induces tighter alignmentAione would expect stronger alignment with the US.
However, interpreting this relationship For more information on Philippines concern about the large CCG Ship, see: Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, "Philippines Challenge AoMonsterAo China Coast Guard Cutter.
Carrier Vinson Drills with Philippine Forces in South China Sea," USNI News.
January 20, 2025, https://news.
org/2025/01/20/philippines-challenges-monster-china-coast-guard-cutter-u-s-carriervinson-drills-with-philippine-forces-in-south-china-sea.
100 Notes: The IISS Military Balance reports indicated no existence of submarines for Brunei & Philippines.
101 See: Amber Wang, "ChinaAos latest main battle tank could soon be ready for service, analyst says," South China Morning Post.
October 11, 2022, https://w.
com/news/china/military/article/3195585/chinas-latest-main-battle-tank-couldsoon-be-ready-service.
Franz-Stefan Gady, "China Reveals New Main Battle Tank," The Diplomat.
July 14, 2016, https://thediplomat.
com/2016/07/china-reveals-new-main-battle-tank/.
102 "Chinese Tanks: Roles and Capabilities of All Five Models in Production Today," Military Watch.
June 28, 2021, https://militarywatchmagazine.
com/article/chinese-tanks-how-capable-are-they.
See: "ChinaAos Semi-Autonomous Next Gen.
Tank Needs Just Half the Crew of its Western Rivals - Unveiling Imminent ".
Military Watch.
October 11, 2022, https://militarywatchmagazine.
com/article/china-s-semi-autonomous-next-gen-tank-needsjust-half-the-crew-of-its-western-rivals-unveiling-imminent.
Zhang Tong, "ChinaAos futuristic smart tank can turn drones against drones, leaked images suggest," May 28, 2024, https://w.
com/news/china/science/article/3264397/chinasfuturistic-smart-tank-can-turn-drones-against-drones-leaked-images-suggest.
75 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation also requires consideration of geographic factors discussed earlier.
Since offensive weapons are designed for mobility and territorial penetration, their perceived threat varies by domain.
China's air power, for example, can project force across the entire region, especially against nearby statesAi suggesting closer countries should show greater alignment with the US.
104 Naval weapons pose a more direct threat to countries with overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea, so those exposed should be more inclined to align.
In the case of land power, represented here by MBTs, the threat is most relevant to countries sharing a direct land border with China.
To evaluate these expectations, this study refers again to Table 6, which reflects alignment behavior within its geographic context and serves as a useful basis for comparison in this section.
In the context of ChinaAos superior air power.
Table 6 shows that the countries closest to China do not exhibit tight alignment with the US.
Among the five nearest Southeast Asian countries, only the PhilippinesAiranked fifthAimaintains such an alliance.
Thailand, ranked sixth in proximity and buffered by geographic barriers, is the only other country with tight US alignment.
While ChinaAos air power, including aircraft carriers, could threaten the Philippines across maritime distance105, the same applies to other sea-separated countries like Brunei.
Indonesia.
Malaysia, and SingaporeAinone of which show tight alignment.
This suggests that ChinaAos aerial superiority alone does not explain the PhilippinesAo or ThailandAos alignment with the US, as neither proximity nor distance consistently correlate with tighter alignment across the region.
Regarding ChinaAos overwhelming naval advantage.
Table 7 shows that among the Southeast Asian countries connected to China by sea and concerned with ChinaAos maritime claimsAisuch as Brunei.
Malaysia.
Vietnam.
Indonesia, and SingaporeAionly the Philippines maintains tight alignment with the US.
While this may appear to challenge BoTAos prediction, a broader comparison reveals that maritime Southeast Asian countries are generally more inclined to align with the USAialbeit mostly in limited formsAithan their mainland counterparts.
Countries like Myanmar.
Laos.
Vietnam, and Cambodia tend to remain non-aligned or lean toward China.
As shown in Table 5, maritime states also receive more US arms transfers, whereas mainland states rely more on Chinese weaponry.
This pattern suggests that ChinaAos superior naval capabilities may influence Southeast Asian alignment behavior, but not strongly enough to drive tight alignmentAiexcept in the case of the Philippines.
When it comes to ChinaAos advantage in land power.
Table 7 shows that the countries closest to ChinaAisuch as Myanmar.
Laos, and VietnamAitend to exhibit non-alignment rather than aligning with the US.
As seen in Table 5.
Myanmar and Laos .
nd Cambodia, which is geographically close to Chin.
receive most of their arms transfers from China, with Vietnam being the exception.
This pattern weakens the BoT argument that superior offensive capabilitiesAiproxied here by ChinaAos large number of MBTsAiwould push nearby countries to align with the US.
In fact, proximity to ChinaAos land power appears to correlate more with non-alignment or closer defense ties with China.
Notably.
Thailand, despite being a US treaty ally, is also a buyer of Chinese MBTs106, further suggesting that Chinese land power has limited influence in driving Southeast Asian countries toward alignment with the US.
In sum, the analysis of ChinaAos offensive capabilities across air, land, and sea suggests that BoTAos predictionAithat such capabilities drive alignmentAiis only partially supported.
Despite ChinaAos clear advantages, there is little evidence of tight alignment with the US, even when accounting for factors like shared borders, power projection, and proximity.
However, in the case of limited alignment, some 104 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 23.
105 China possesses three aircraft carriers including the two operational: the Liaoning & Shandong, and one unit in development, the Fujian.
See: The Military Balance 2024, vol.
124, 235.
106 For more information, see: Prashanth Parameswaran, "Thailand to Buy Battle Tanks from China " The Diplomat.
May 18, 2016, https://thediplomat.
com/2016/05/thailand-to-buy-battle-tanks-from-china/.
Wassana Nanuam, "Army to buy 14 more Chinese B2.
Bangkok Post.
Janruary https://w.
com/thailand/general/1615074/army-to-buy-14-more-chinese-tanks-at-cost-of-b2-3bn.
76 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation patterns emerge.
Maritime Southeast Asian countriesAiBrunei.
Indonesia.
Malaysia, and SingaporeAi show an early and consistent inclination toward limited alignment, likely influenced by ChinaAos naval As reflected in Table 5, these countries also receive greater access to US arms.
Including the Philippines, which maintains tight alignment, five countries collectively show a tendency to align with the USAifour limited, one tightAidespite ChinaAos growing military power.
ChinaAos Aggressive Intentions and Southeast Asian Alignment Patterns The final key variable that distinguishes BoT from balance of power theory is aggressive BoT argues that the more aggressive or expansionist a state appears, the more likely others are to align against it.
107 However, assessing aggressive intention is inherently difficult.
In the anarchic international system, intentions are uncertain108AitodayAos friendly posture may turn hostile tomorrow.
While difficult, aggressive intention can still be inferred from state behavior.
Actions such as territorial claimsAiespecially when asserted forcefullyAican signal expansionist intent.
In this context.
ChinaAos claims in the South China Sea are widely perceived as aggressive, particularly by other claimants and nearby states.
Repeated intrusions into EEZs that China considers its own have heightened regional 109 Although China frames its actions as defensiveAiviewing the South China Sea as part of its core interestsAimany Southeast Asian countries see them as offensive or even expansionist.
110 Regional leaders often perceive China as a revisionist power.
111 Therefore, this study uses territorial claims and assertiveness in defending those claims as practical indicators of aggressive intention.
Thus, this study intends to examines all known territorial disputes between China and the ten Southeast Asian countries as a basis for assessing perceived aggressive intention.
Countries with active disputes are considered exposed to a high level of aggressive intent, as they risk losing territory they claim as their own.
112 Those without direct disputes but experiencing Chinese intrusionsAisuch as into their EEZsAiare categorized as facing moderate aggressive intent, given the potential loss of economic Finally, countries with neither disputes nor reported intrusions are classified as experiencing lower levels of aggressive intent, though they may still feel threatened by ChinaAos broader power Table 8 presents this classification, ranking countries from closest to furthest from Chinese Table 8: Southeast Asian CountriesAo Exposure to Aggressive Intentions Countries Exposure Level Geographical Border Myanmar Less Direct Lao PDR Less Direct Vietnam High Direct Cambodia Less Undirect: Buffer Zones Philippines High Undirect: Sea 107 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 25.
108 Mearsheimer.
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 3.
109 For examples, see: Sylvia Yazid and Rizky Widian.
Diluting Rivalries between Great Powers.
Friedrich Naumann Foundation For Freedom .
110 Ann Marie Murphy, "ChinaAos Grand Strategy toward Southeast Asia: Assessing the Response and Efficacy," ed.
David B.
Denoon.
ChinaAos Grand Strategy : A Roadmap to Global Power? (New York: New York University Press, 2.
Murphy, "ChinaAos Grand Strategy toward Southeast Asia: Assessing the Response and Efficacy," 140-41.
112 Realist like Mearsheimer even argue that territorial integrity is strongly related to a stateAos sense of survival and will try to maintained it.
See: Mearsheimer.
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 31.
77 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation Thailand Less Undirect: Buffer Zones Brunei High Undirect: Sea Malaysia High Undirect: Sea Singapore Less Undirect: Sea Indonesia Moderate Undirect: Sea Source: Illustrated by the Author.
Table 8 reveals several key observations.
First, among the countries closest to China, only Vietnam appears to face a high level of aggressive intention, as Myanmar and Laos have no territorial disputes with China from 2000Ae2021.
Second.
VietnamAiwith both a direct land border and overlapping maritime claimsAilikely experiences the highest level of aggressive intent.
Third, countries separated from China by sea are more likely to face aggressive behavior, as many have active maritime disputes.
These findings provide a useful foundation for analyzing the aggressive intention variable.
The discussion now returns to Table 6 for comparison with alignment behavior.
As shown in Table 7, countries exposed to moderate or high aggressive intentionAisuch as Brunei, the Philippines.
Malaysia, and IndonesiaAitend to exhibit stronger alignment with the US.
contrast, countries facing lower levels of aggressive intent, particularly those closest to China .
xcept Vietna.
, show patterns of non-alignment.
Myanmar.
Laos, and Cambodia also lean toward China in terms of military cooperation, as reflected in arms transfer data, which may further explain their limited or non-alignment with the US.
Although China does not directly threaten these states through territorial disputes, they may still perceive risks due to ChinaAos aggregate power and offensive capabilities.
similar rationale may apply to Indonesia, which, despite only moderate113 exposure to aggressive intent, maintains limited alignment with the US due to its relative distance from China.
While BoTAos prediction holds for some cases, the overall picture is more complex.
Among South China Sea claimants, only the Philippines maintains tight alignment with the US.
Other Southeast Asian countries with territorial disputesAidespite facing high levels of aggressive intentionAiremain in limited alignment, making it difficult to fully support the theoryAos claim that higher threat levels lead to tight allignment.
Taken together with the earlier analysis on proximity, it appears that Cambodia and Thailand are in the "safest" positions, lacking both territorial disputes and shared borders with China.
According to BoT, they should show low alignment with the USAian expectation reflected in CambodiaAos stance but contradicted by ThailandAos tight alignment.
If the theory held fully.
Thailand would likely to align limitedly to the US.
The case of Vietnam also challenges BoTAos predictions.
Despite facing the highest threat levelAidue to ChinaAos superior power, shared land border, and ongoing territorial disputesAi Vietnam remains only in limited alignment with the US.
As Table 4 shows.
Vietnam receives minimal arms transfers from the US, far less than most other Southeast Asian countries with similar access.
To deepen the analysis, this study draws on perception data from the ISEAS Ae Yusof Ishak Institute State of Southeast Asia surveys .
9Ae2.
, which assess how Southeast Asian countries view 113 Although Indonesia is not a claimant state in the South China Sea, it put concerns in the disputes.
See: Widian and Arimadona, "Cooperation & Security Dilemma In The South China Sea.
Allard, "Asserting sovereignty.
Indonesia renames part of South China Sea.
" Indonesia also experienced intrusion by Chinese ships.
For examples, see: "Indonesia seizes Chinese fishing boat and crew in escalating Natuna Islands row," ABC News.
May 31, 2016, https://w.
au/news/2016-0531/indonesia-seizes-chinese-fishing-boat-and-crew/7461334.
"Cina protes penembakan kapal nelayan.
TNI AL: "Kami tidak brutal"," BBC.
June https://w.
com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/06/160620_indonesia_tnial_bantah_kapalcina.
Fadli and Dian Septiari, "Indonesia eyes response to Chinese activity in Natunas," The Jakarta Post.
December 30, 2019, https://w.
com/news/2019/12/30/indonesia-eyes-response-chinese-activity-natunas.
78 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation ChinaAos strategic intent.
A recurring question asks whether respondents trust China to Audo the right thingAy for peace and stability .
ee Table .
Table 9: Southeast Asian CountriesAo Trust That China Will Contribute to Peace and Stability .
9Ae2.
Confidence Comments Confidence Confidence Comments Confidence Confidence Comments Confidence Myanmar Laos Vietnam Cambodia Philippines Thailand Brunei Darussalam Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Source: Adapted by the Author from ISEAS Ae Yusof Ishak Institute Reports.
The ISEAS survey data on trust in China reinforces the threat perception patterns discussed From 2019Ae2021.
Southeast Asian countries consistently showed low confidence in ChinaAos role in promoting regional peace.
Among those closest to China.
Myanmar.
Laos, and Vietnam reported rising distrustAiVietnamAos Auno confidenceAy responses remained above 73%, reaching 75.
4% in 2021.
This aligns with its high threat exposure, despite maintaining only limited alignment with the US.
Laos, while geographically close, showed higher trust levels, though declining over timeAireflecting fewer aggressive encounters and a more nuanced perception.
Cambodia and ThailandAiconsidered structurally "safer" due to geographic buffersAistill exhibit significant distrust toward China, with ThailandAos Auno confidenceAy reaching over 65% by 2021.
Despite its relatively low threat exposure.
Thailand maintains its alliance with the US, contradicting BoTAos expectations.
The Philippines, a direct maritime rival of China, shows the highest distrust levelsAi exceeding 80%Aialigning with its tight US alignment and high perceived threat.
Even countries farther from China, like Malaysia.
Singapore, and Indonesia, display majority distrust .
bove 50%), though with less intensity.
Overall, the ISEAS survey supports this studyAos classification of aggressive intention:
countries facing higher threat exposure tend to exhibit stronger distrust, reinforcing the relevance of perceived intent in alignment behavior.
In sum, the findings suggest that Southeast Asian countries exposed to higher levels of aggressive intentionAimeasured through territorial disputes, intrusions, and proximityAitend to align more closely with the US.
This is most clearly seen in the Philippines, which faces ongoing maritime tensions with China, exhibits high levels of distrust (ISEAS dat.
, and maintains its tight alignment with the US.
However, key deviations challenge BoTAos predictions.
Vietnam, despite facing the most severe threatsAiincluding land borders, territorial disputes, and high distrustAionly maintains limited alignment "State of Southeast Asia Survey," (ISEAS, 2019-2.
https://w.
sg/category/centres/asean-studiescentre/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/.
79 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation with the US.
Thailand, by contrast, faces minimal threat but remains a US treaty ally.
The ISEAS survey adds a useful perceptual layer: distrust in China correlates with structural exposure but does not always lead to higher alignment.
These mixed outcomes indicate that while aggressive intention remains a relevant variable, it does not fully explain alignment patterns in SEA.
BoTAos prediction on this factor is therefore only partially supported.
Conclusion Stephen Walt argues that no single source of threat can be deemed most important in advanceAi all four factors likely contribute to alignment behavior.
115 The analysis in this study shows that, aside from geographical proximity, the other three threat variables generally reflect alignment behavior.
However.
BoTAos predictions are only partially supported.
At the aggregate level, most Southeast Asian countries exhibit limited alignment with the US, rather than the tight alignment the theory suggests.
Only Thailand and the Philippines meet the criteria for tight alignment, marked by formal treaties or deep security cooperation.
A closer look at each variable reveals mixed support for BoT.
On aggregate power, most Southeast Asian countries pursued limited alignment with the US despite China's rising influence.
Proximity showed little correlation, as countries closest to China did not exhibit stronger alignment.
However.
China's naval superiority appears to influence alignment behavior, with most potentially affected countries engaging in limited alignmentAiexcept for the Philippines.
In terms of aggressive intention, countries with territorial disputes, especially in the South China Sea, tend to align with the US, though mostly on a limited basis.
Vietnam, despite high threat exposure, remains only a limited partner, while Thailand, which faces minimal direct threat, maintains a tight alignmentAiboth complicating BoTAos predictions.
In sum, despite these inconsistencies, this study does not reject BoT Most Southeast Asian countries, though aligning only in limited ways and not exclusively with the US, still lean toward Washington amid ChinaAos growing power and perceived threats.
These findings raise further questions for future research.
While Southeast Asian countries appear to perceive China as a threatAievident in their tendency to align, albeit limitedly, with the USAithe puzzle is why they stop short of tight alignment.
This points to the influence of additional factors.
Although China is seen as a threat.
Southeast Asian countries may view it as too economically or strategically significant to jeopardize their ties.
Another key implication of this study concerns the tight alignment of the Philippines and Thailand with the US.
Although both alliances were established before 2000, it is difficult to argue that ChinaAos growing power and assertiveness play no role in sustaining them.
Still, the early origins of these alliances suggest that China is not the sole driverAiespecially when contrasted with the limited alignment of other Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia.
Malaysia.
Singapore, and Vietnam, despite also being targeted for US engagement.
This raises an important question: What sets Thailand and the Philippines apart? Could it be historical ties, ideological alignment, or other factors? While BoT still offers some explanatory power, these findings highlight its limits.
Future research is needed to further test and refine the theory to better capture the complexity of alignment behavior in international politics.
Lastly, this study acknowledges its limitations, particularly the lack of quantified uncertainty in its findings.
Future research could address this by applying statistical models with refined measurements to better capture key variablesAisuch as combining geographical proximity and barriers, or measuring aggressive intention more precisely.
Such efforts would deepen our understanding of alignment Nonetheless, the findings presented here offer a valuable starting point for more robust future 115 Walt.
The Origins of Alliance, 26.
80 Rizky WidianiCRevisiting Balance of Threat Theory: The Case of Contemporary Southeast Asia in the Context of Great Power Contestation References