

Democracy, Islam and Party System in Indonesia: Towards a Consensus-Oriented Model?

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Abstract

This paper argues that the impact of “Islam” on the Indonesian political system is worth studying on three different levels: 1. society’s political divisions; 2. the party system 3. parliamentary politics. I contend that there is a specifically Indonesian “consensus-oriented” democracy model involved in the process—which is not, however, without Western predecessors—wherein political Islam and Islamist parties act not as destabilising factors but rather as “Muslim democratic” forces that strengthen democratic consensus in a manner similar to some “Western” Christian democratic parties. This research is based partly on a historical and, implicitly, comparative approach. It builds strongly on the theoretical framework and methodology of Sartori’s classic party system typology, Lijphardt’s “majoritarian” and “consensus-based” democracy model, and the so-called neo-institutionalist debate on the possible advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and presidential governments.

Keywords: *Indonesia, democratisation, party system, political Islam, consensual democracy*

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:

Gerindra – *Gerakan Indonesia Raya* (Great Indonesia Movement Party)
 GOLKAR – *Golongan Karya* (Functional Groups)
 Hanura – *Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat* (People’s Conscience Party)
 Masyumi – *Sujra Muslimin Indonesia* (Indonesian Muslim Liberation Council)
 NasDem – *Partai Nasional Demokrat* (National Democratic Party)
 NU – *Nahdlatul Ulama* (Revival of the Ulema)
 Parmusi – *Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Indonesian Muslim Party)
 PAN – *Partai Amanat Nasional* (National Mandate Party)
 PD – *Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party)
 PDI – *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (Indonesian Democratic Party)
 PDI-P – *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan* (Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle)
 PKB – *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (National Awakening Party)
 PKI – *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Communist Party of Indonesia)
 PKS – *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party)
 PNI – *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Party)
 PPP – *Partai Persatuan dan Pembangunan* (Unity and Progress Party)

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Introduction

When Huntington's clash of civilisations paradigm became one of the most frequently cited topics of international relations literature in the early 1990s, the issue of democracy and its cultural-civilisational embeddedness also became popular topics of research and debate. In Huntington's paradigm, it is assumed that the relationship between Islamic civilisational background and political democracy is problematic, which is likely due to the fact that, for a long time, research into the links between democracy and Islam concentrated on the Middle East. However, this perspective is strongly biased. Undoubtedly, apart from Tunisia and post-Saddam Iraq (with its rather limited sovereignty up to 2011), there are practically no functioning political democracies in the Middle East, the cradle of Islam. This can be explained by the difficulty of adapting the Western nation state model to the Middle East rather than a general incompatibility between "Islam" and democracy.

Today, the demographic—and increasingly economic—hub of the Islamic world has shifted from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. The world's largest Muslim (or Muslim-majority) country today is Indonesia. With a population of 260 million, it is the world's third largest political democracy after India and the United States (Mietzner & Aspinall, 2010, p. 3).

It should be added that, at the time the Suharto regime fell in 1998, the potential for democratisation in Indonesia did not look promising. The regime change process was associated with ethnic and religious clashes. The potential threat of increasingly radical political Islam, as well as the continued political influence of the army and its instigation of ethnic and religious tensions, similarly caused grave concerns. The hard-to-break deadlocks between legislature and the president, as a representative of the executive branch, were encoded in the constitutional system. Establishing a majority government became a major challenge for all presidents, given the weak institutionalisation of political parties, their often-

confusing ideological profiles, and the election system's proportional representation.

However, belying all previous concerns and sceptical expectations, since the fall of Suharto and “regime change” in 1998, Indonesia has seen four parliamentary and three direct presidential elections,² which both international observers and organisers have qualified as free and fair (Ufen, 2018, p.307; Fionna & Tomsa, 2017, p.5). Although some authors remain highly critical of Indonesian democracy, qualifying it as “stagnant” or “low quality” (Mietzner, 2012) or explicitly “oligarchic” (Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Fukuoka, 2013), I would argue that despite all of its weaknesses and dysfunctions the present Indonesian political system meets the minimalist procedural criteria of democracy.³ It is not too much to say that Indonesian democracy has passed the phase of democratic transition, and as such since the mid-2000s (at the very least, since the 2004 elections) the country can be regarded as having a consolidated democracy (Barton, 2010, p.476.).

Main Features of the Research

The present study analyses the interrelations of democracy and Islam in the Indonesian context. More specifically, it argues that the effect of “Islam” on the Indonesian political system is worth studying at three different levels: 1. society's political divisions: the relationship between Islam and the state's secular nature still seems to be the most fundamental political cleavage in Indonesian society; 2. the party system: investigating the position and role of parties

² In Indonesia, the institution of direct presidential election was introduced through constitutional amendments in 2002. As such, the country is fully presidential in its government. The first direct presidential elections were held in 2004, in parallel with parliamentary elections (Ufen, 2018).

³ In the procedural definition of democracy, the criteria of Robert A. Dahl's classic polyarchy model are borne in mind, encompassing free and multi-party elections, institutional division of power, media pluralism, etc. (Dahl, 1971). Following Samuel P. Huntington, it may be added that we speak of successful democratic consolidation when there is a smooth change of power in two consecutive free and multi-party elections. This is what happened after the 2004 elections in Indonesia (Huntington, 1991.).

with political Islamic platforms; 3. parliamentary politics, raising the question of the extent to which secular and Islamic parties are influential actors in the legislative and executive branches.

The research is essentially a qualitative, descriptive case study, though it does not fail to look at history and thus, implicitly, to use a comparative approach. Primarily it builds on the concepts and methodology of political science and transitology, the research into democratic transition processes. In its analysis of the post-Suharto era, it strongly builds on the theoretical framework and methodology of Sartori's classic party system typology⁴ (Sartori, 1976), Lijphardt's "majoritarian" and "consensus-based" democracy model⁵ (Lijphardt, 1984), and on certain findings of the so-called neo-institutionalist debate on the possible advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and presidential governments (Linz, 1990; Horowitz, 1990; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1993).

In the first section, I provide a short summary of the historical and socio-cultural context of Indonesian Islam. In the

⁴ Sartori basically distinguishes between three types of party systems: in the *predominant* party system, aside from a dominant governing party we can find asymmetrically weak and fragmented opposition parties. This may superficially resemble the hegemonic party systems of certain authoritarian dictatorships, but in predominant systems the dominant position of the governing party emerges as a result of free and fair competitive elections and not any administrative restrictions on party competition. In *two-party* systems, the "political arena" is dominated by two equally strong parties which usually form single party governments. Meanwhile, in *multi-party* systems, the party structure is more fragmented, and multi-party based coalition governments are formed. Among multi-party systems, Sartori further distinguishes between "moderate" and "polarised" multi-party systems according to the degree of ideological polarisation (Sartori, 1976).

⁵ Lijphardt, in his ground-breaking theoretical work, elaborated on two ideal types of Western democracies. The "majoritarian" (or Westminster) model, based on the characteristics of the British political system, can be characterised by a relatively homogeneous society (beside social class-based political divisions, there are no ethnic or religion-based cleavages in politics); two-party system; single member constituency-based voting system; parliamentary form of government (with strong parliamentary supremacy and relatively low degree of institutional power sharing); and centralised and unitarian structure of state administration. The other ideal type, a "consensual" or "consensus-oriented" model abstracted from the characteristics of Benelux or Swiss democracies can be described by a more fragmented society, with several parallel political subcultures; multi-party system; proportional, party-list based voting system; and high degree of institutional power sharing, either territorial (federalism) or functional between the legislative and executive branches of power (e.g. presidential form of government). See Lijphardt, 1984.

following sections (2 and 3), I present a chronological overview of the development of Indonesian political subcultures (a.k.a. *aliran*), mass organisations, and the party system during the Sukarno and Suharto presidencies. Finally, I provide a detailed analysis of the post-Suharto era party system based on Lijphardtian and Sartorian theoretical framework before drawing conclusions.

The socio-cultural features of Indonesian Islam and the “pillarised” political subcultures of Indonesian society

The literature on Southeast Asian Islam usually emphasises three decisive features: its peaceful spread, pluralism, and tolerant character (Buehler, 2009).

Due to the fact that Islam spread in Southeast Asia in a peaceful manner as international trade increased, it usually showed great tolerance towards earlier Hindu-Buddhist and animist traditions. On the island of Java, for example, this syncretism was so strong that the faith practised here was Islam on the surface only. Middle Eastern and Indian Muslims—and even its own followers—called it Javanism, suggesting that it was a kind of separate heterodox religious practice. In the courts of the Javanese kings, *sharia* law was applied rather liberally, and people’s everyday lives were guided more by traditional unwritten law, known as *adat* (Hefner, 2000). These heterodox–syncretic currents have been referred to mostly as *abangan* in the cultural-anthropological literature (Geertz, 1976).⁶ Meanwhile, orthodox Muslims have often been called *santri*, derived from the Malay word *pesantren*, meaning a Muslim religious school; the term *santri* originally referred to a student of such a school (Hisyam, 2002).

Islamic values were not only transmitted by merchants, but

⁶ Clifford Geertz in his ground-breaking cultural-anthropological work referred to these heterodox-syncretic currents as “*abangan*”. However, he often confused the term *abangan* with traditionalism and mistakenly identified traditionalist Javanese orthodox Muslims as *abangan* (Geertz, 1976). Actual syncretic *abangan* religious currents have notably lost their significance in present-day Indonesia.

also by itinerant scholars of religious law and pilgrims. Their role in maintaining contact with Indian and Middle Eastern Muslims increased considerably when, from the 16th century onwards, Portuguese and later Dutch colonisers completely disrupted the regional trade networks that had been traditionally operated by Muslims (Meuelman, 2002). From the late 19th century, hajjis returning from their pilgrimage to Mecca gradually became the initiators of a movement that sought to reform Southeast Asian Islam, purifying it from syncretic elements and bringing it closer to a pan-Islamic ideal. Thus emerged a new tendency within the orthodox *santri* community.

These two religious currents have been labelled in many different ways; in Indonesian they are mostly referred to as ‘traditionalist’ and ‘modernist’⁷ (Eliraz, 2004), but these labels—especially the latter—may be misleading. Traditionalists have always emphasised the distinctive and unique features of South East Asian Islam, especially the doctrines of the Shafi’i madhab,⁸ and have been more tolerant of local and tribal traditions. By contrast, modernists have always strived for Southeast Asian Islam to be integrated into the pan-Islamic movement, especially the schools represented by al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu. In this vein, they have usually fought for a stricter, occasionally fundamentalist, interpretation of Islam.

The traditionalist–modernist dichotomy also had its

⁷ Clifford Geertz inaccurately refers to these currents as *abangan* and *santri* (Geertz, 1976). However, as Ufen points out correctly, the conceptual dichotomy of *abangan* vs *santri* simply means a distinction between syncretic-heterodox and orthodox Muslim schools; the traditionalist and modernist cleavage is, in fact, within the *santri* community (Ufen, 2008a). Javanese traditionalists are characteristically followers of *Naskabandi Sufi* mysticism, while modernists reject mysticism and follow puritanical the interpretations and practices of orthodox Islam (Woodward, 2008).

⁸ The *Shafi’I* madhab is one of the four main legal schools of Islam, and the dominant school in Southeast Asia. Traditionalists in an Indonesian context can be defined as having a “madhab-centred” interpretation of religion: according to traditionalists, one cannot circumvent the *Shafi’I* intellectual heritage—the so called *kitab kuning* or “yellow books” (referring to the numerous works of medieval scholars and theologians)—in the name of purifying religion.

regional and geographical dimensions. The tribal aristocracies and traditional elites of Java and the rural communities depending on them have sometimes followed syncretistic *abangan* currents, and definitely the traditional school, while modernist-puritanical Islam has primarily gained ground in large cities and in regions wishing to be emancipated from Java's dominance (i.e. Sumatra and Sulawesi, as well as among the Sundanese of West Java). This is part of the reason why, in the modern Indonesian nation state, separatist movements rejecting the dominance of Java (e.g. in Aceh, Sumatra) have frequently appeared in the guise of political Islam (Barton, 2010); this religious factor should be seen together with underlying economic factors (e.g. in case of Aceh, discretion over oil revenues) and/or the desire for greater autonomy.

We can say that these cleavages already existed within the nationalist movement in the colonial period, i.e. in the 1920s and 1930s, and in some sense still divide Indonesian society. While the one emphasised here is the secular–Islamist division, which has always been tangible, the Islamist bloc itself has also been divided between traditionalists and modernists; this, in Ufen's interpretation, as been seen as a reflection of a kind of city–country opposition (Ufen, 2008a, p. 9). As such, four marked political subcultures have crystallised along secular vs religious, traditionalist vs modernist, and rural vs urban cleavages:

1. Behind the secular–nationalist Indonesian National Party (PNI) were mostly the Javanese *abangan* aristocracy, together with middle class colonial officials and religious minorities (Christians and Hindus);
2. The equally nationalistic Javanese-based Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), supported mostly by masses of the urban poor and poor rural peasantry;
3. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the party of traditional rural elites and land-owning peasants;
4. Finally, modernist Muslims, mostly members of the Muhammadiyah movement, which organised itself into a

political party during the Japanese occupation under the name Majelis Sujra Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Liberation Council – henceforth Masyumi). Resembling the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in its ideology and organisational network, this party's basis was mainly the urban middle class and people recruited from outside Java, primarily from Sumatra and Sulawesi (Azra, 2002, p. 33).

Two of these four political subcultures (PNI and PKI) were secular-nationalist, distinguished mainly by social class. The Islamist camp, meanwhile, was divided along the traditionalist–modernist cleavage. Of the four parties, Masyumi was clearly city-based, while NU was undoubtedly of a rural background. PNI and PKI voters, meanwhile, were not polarised along the city–country cleavage (Ufen, 2008a, p. 10). These political subcultures,⁹ which the literature has often called *aliran* (stream) using Geertz' terminology, are conspicuously parallel to the “pillarised society” of colonial Indonesia. They proved to be surprisingly resilient structures, and they continued to define party politics in Indonesia even after the country gained its independence.

Winning independence; the party system; the secular–Islamist confrontation during Sukarno's presidency; and the period of “Guided Democracy”

In the first years of Indonesia's independence, and to some extent even earlier, the main political debates were centred around the character of the State: would it be secular or Islamic? During the Japanese occupation, on 1 March 1945, the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence was organised, with future-president Sukarno presiding. One of its objectives was to formulate the constitution of independent Indonesia. Representatives

⁹ Andreas Ufen, citing Clifford Geertz, writes that the political division of Dutch society was also defined by denominational subcultures: liberal vs secular, fundamentalist vs Protestant/Catholic (Ufen, 2008b).

of Muslim and secular organisations on the committee managed to agree on a number of issues related to the future economic and political setup of the state, but failed to compromise on whether Indonesia should be an Islamic state. Sukarno sought to bridge these groups through his famous five principles, the *Pancasila*, included in the preamble to the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, which became the foundation of the Indonesian state.¹⁰ Muslim organisations considered the first principle, “belief in God” (as formulated by Sukarno) too general and rejected it. They later suggested that it should be rephrased, “Belief in God, with the obligation for the followers of Islam to abide by Sharia law” (Bertrand, 2003). Although eventually the Preparatory Committee included this formulation, commonly known as the “Jakarta Charter”, due to the protests of religious minorities and nationalists it was removed the day before the Proclamation of Independence by Sukarno and future vice-president Mohammad Hatta; their concession to Muslim organisations was found in the final wording of the first principle, “belief in *one* God” (Barton, 2010).

The first big battle between nationalist and Muslim organisations over constitutional principles resulted in a clear victory for secular forces. Following the Dutch withdrawal, in 1950 pro-Sukarno nationalist organisations introduced a new provisional constitution, leaving it for the new Constitutional Assembly—formed after the first free elections—to become the final constitution of independent Indonesia. The first free elections happened in 1955, and Islamic parties had high hopes for them. They assumed that, if they had an absolute majority in the Constitutional Assembly, they would be able to correct Sukarno’s earlier “anti-Islamic” decision.

The results of the 1955 elections were a true reflection of the *aliran* subcultures’ ability to affect politics; the party system was structured primarily along secular vs religious and traditionalist

¹⁰ The five principles of Pancasila: 1. Belief in the one and only God, 2. Just and civilised humanity, 3. Nationalism manifested in a unified Indonesia, 4. Democracy, 5. Social justice (Hefner, 2000).

vs modernist cleavages. Of the largest parties, President Sukarno's PNI secured the most votes (22%). Equally surprising was the 16% gained by PKI. The 20% received by the modernist Muslim Masyumi was a disappointment; this was the only party that had included the creation of an Islamic state in its agenda. Meanwhile, the more moderate and traditionalist NU received 18% of votes. Overall, almost as many people voted for Muslim parties as for the nationalist–communist bloc (Hefner, 2000). However, as Mietzner has also noted, the party system remained rather fragmented; although the above-listed political forces received more than 70% of the votes, some 35 parties won seats in the Constitutional Assembly.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that neither the “secular” nor the “Islamist” blocs had the two-thirds majority necessary for constitution making. This created a practically impossible political situation; constitutional debates, which were unsuccessful even after several trials, gradually radicalised the opposing parties. Using Sartori's terminology, following the 1955 elections the Indonesian party system was a typical polarised multi-party system in which—as common in cases of strong fragmentation—centrifugal party competition occurred. This led to extreme radicalisation in party politics, and eventually to the collapse of the democratic political order (Mietzner, 2008).

Even after years of attempts, the Constitutional Assembly was unable to agree upon a draft constitution. With the help of the army, President Sukarno finally dispersed the Constitutional Assembly in July 1959 and introduced the new constitution by presidential decree; more precisely, he declared the return to the 1945 constitution (Barton, 2010), strengthening executive (i.e. presidential) power to the detriment of parliament. As President Sukarno's “Guided Democracy” did not tolerate open political opposition, in 1960 the Masyumi Party was banned, with several of its leaders thrown into prison. At the same time, its youth organisations and provincial militia were allowed to continue.

Sukarno, however, paid a high price for pushing political

Islam into the background: the president who had been balancing between the army and the communists came more and more under the latter's control (Rabasa & Haseman, 2002). As a result of the communists' economic policy, by 1965 the Indonesian economy was close to a total collapse. Meanwhile, due to various natural disasters, millions were starving.

This situation required the army's response. After Indonesia's independence, the army was the number one supporter of the state's secular character and national unity. In this respect, the situation seems to show close parallels with the Turkey of Kemal Atatürk. General Suharto, commander of the army's Strategic Reserve Force, decided to put an end to the rule of Sukarno and the communists. As initially he intended to avoid the impression of an open military coup, he did not directly deploy the army but called on Muslim parties, i.e. the Nahdlatul Ulama and the banned Masyumi militia, to help. In December 1965, at least half a million communist party members and their families fell victim to Muslim militiamen and, in several cases, spontaneous outbreaks of fury. Thus did they practically eliminate one of the oldest communist parties, with the largest memberships, in all of Asia, even though PKI was only banned formally as late as 1967. That same year, the government made President Sukarno resign. Replaced by General Suharto, Sukarno—though never impeached—was kept under house arrest until his death in 1970 (Hefner, 2000).

Wielding power and the party system in the age of Suharto's "New Order"

Islamist parties had high hopes for Suharto's "New Order", but had to be deeply disappointed. Although the "dirty work" was done by the militias of the Muslim parties, the leaders of the army did not intend to open the door wide to Islamist parties in the country's political life. During this period, the Kemalist-type secular modernists—who wanted to curb the power of political Islam as

well as that of the communists—were in majority among generals. Suharto's system was a strictly centralised presidential dictatorship, becoming more personality-centred over time. Regarding the constitutional structure, Suharto made maximum use of and even strengthened the executive's dominance (as guaranteed by the 1945 constitution, and characteristic also of his predecessor's "Guided Democracy"). In practice, the legislature hardly offered a counterweight to the president, although formally the president was appointed for five years by the People's Consultative Assembly (500 MPs and another 500 appointed delegates). These elections were mere formalities, as until Suharto's resignation they had no other candidate (Barton, 2010).

In the Suharto period, political competition was even more restricted than during Sukarno's "Guided Democracy". The 1971 elections, the first since 1955, were hardly "free and fair": authorities allowed only ten parties to run. (Sulistyo, 2002). The clear winner of the 1971 elections was Suharto's newly established Golkar Party, its name coming from the abbreviation of *Golongan Karya*, or "functional groups". As the name suggests, as opposed to old "*aliran*-based" parties, Golkar had no characteristic ideological profile. Strictly speaking, it was not even *one* party, but rather an umbrella organisation of various functional and interest groups that nonetheless still served as the regime's *de facto* state party (Sulistyo, 2002). The choice of the name suggested that the damaging and divisive period of party rivalry had come to an end, and that politics already had on a technocratic-corporative basis. It partly served to give a human face to the regime's pragmatic-technocratic profile, and partly to guarantee the loyalty of the state bureaucracy and the army, thereby guaranteeing the right number of voters in each election. In fact, as a "vote collecting machine" Golkar did not perform poorly: in the six parliamentary elections following those of 1971 (1974, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997), each time the government party received more than 60% of the votes (Sulistyo, 2002).

As far as parliamentary opposition is concerned, their room for manoeuvre continued to narrow. The modernist Muslim Maysumi Party, banned by Sukarno, was not automatically restored. Eventually, in 1968 it was allowed to reorganise under a new name, as the Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, or simply Parmusi), but its leader was appointed by Suharto, ignoring members' preferences. Therefore, it is not surprising that the party secured only 5.4% of votes in the 1971 elections, about a quarter of its share in the 1955 elections. PNI, strongly discredited because of Sukarno himself, also performed poorly, receiving less than 7% of votes. Of the traditional large "subcultural" parties, only NU managed to maintain its support: it again received 18% of votes. Overall, Islamic parties won 27% of the votes, a loss of 10% compared to 1955 (Barton, 2010).

In 1973, the surviving opposition parties were forced to merge into two formations. Following the fall of Sukarno, the considerably weakened PNI was united with the parties of the Catholic and Protestant communities, creating the Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*, PDI), while Muslim parties such as NU and Parmusi were merged in the Unity and Progress Party (Partai Persatuan dan Pembangunan, PPP). The Potemkin opposition, thus, had a "secular" and an "Islamist" wing, although the "Islamic" character of the latter was only acknowledged with a silent public nod of sorts. PPP was not allowed to challenge Pancasila as the exclusive state ideology, and therefore it did not refer in any way to Islam or the party's Islamic character in its programmes, symbols, or even in its name (Bertrand, 2003). Nevertheless, the continuity seems conspicuous if we consider the proportions of the former NU and Parmusi and compare them to PPP's election results: in six consecutive parliamentary elections, it always won 15–25% of the votes, with the best performance in 1977, when PPP secured 29% of votes (Sulistyo, 2002).

In summary, applying Sartori's terminology, the party system in "New Order" Indonesia may be described as typically hegemonic:

it was not a one-party system in form, but the free competition of political parties was institutionally limited, securing the power monopoly of Golkar for nearly three decades, which functioned as a state party. The opposition PDI and PPP were no more than onlookers in this system, as they were unable to affect parliamentary politics or government decision-making. Nevertheless, the constant proportion of votes received by PPP suggests that, on the social and socio-cultural level, traditional and modernist Muslim political subcultures lived on, and there was continued social demand for Islam, despite it being mostly forced underground. In fact, despite—or perhaps because of—the marginalisation of political Islam in the Suharto period, a re-Islamisation process occurred on the social and sociocultural level.

Several political, social, and cultural factors may explain the “modernist Islamic Renewal” process in Indonesia’s culture, way of life, and especially education (Barton, 2010, p. 485). The regime encouraged Muslim thinking in education, partly because it assumed that this might pose a strong counterweight to the spread of radical leftist ideas. Because of these assumptions, Islamic religious classes was made mandatory in state-run primary and secondary schools. The literacy rate increased from 40% to 90% between 1965 and 1990, while the percentage of secondary school graduates went from 4% in 1970 to 30% in 2000. At the same time, religious education was strengthened in higher education as well; state Islamic universities were established, proselytisation (*dakwah*) movements were encouraged on campuses, and female students were allowed to wear the veil again. Headed by the Ministry for Religion, a major mosque construction programme was launched.

As Hefner states in his classic monograph on civil Islam, by the early 1990s a pluralistic and differentiated Muslim “civil sphere” had been created, having its own network, parties, associations, and press (Hefner, 2000). Of its civil organisations, some had a clear political character, while others emphatically stayed away from politics; some declared the importance of liberal and democratic

values, while others rejected them from a fundamentalist platform. We must stress the role of democratic Islamic organisations, primarily the reactivated NU, which broke with the previously “official” Islamic opposition PPP in 1984 (Barton, 2003, p. 486; Ufen 2008b, p. 14). Its president, the highly respected Abdurrahman Wahid, soon turned into a leading figure of the newly forming democratic opposition. As early as the 1994 elections of the PDI chairperson, he called on his followers to support President Sukarno’s daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri¹¹ (Woodward, 2008, p. 50). In the street demonstrations that stemmed from the 1997 financial crisis, a leading role was taken by youth organisations also close to NU and Wahid (Hefner, 2000, p. 207).

In conclusion, the expectation was that, following the regime change, political Islamisation could be accelerated in a democratic Indonesia, or that—similar to the 1950s—the catalysing secular–Islamist confrontation could again become the main cleavage dividing the democratic political community. However, it seems that these expectations and fears have hardly been confirmed by party competition and parliamentary politics since 1998. The next section presents a more detailed investigation and tries to explain this phenomenon

Party competition and political Islam in the “post-Suharto” age

In August 1997, Indonesia was rocked by the most serious financial and later economic crisis of its modern history. Anger over this crisis soon turned into political protests demanding Suharto’s resignation. This quickly eroded the little remaining prestige of the Suharto regime, both inside and outside the country. Eventually, Suharto resigned on 18 May 1998, handing over power to his vice

¹¹ In 1993, President Sukarno’s daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri was elected the president of PDI, which had previously been a political dummy and Potemkin opposition. The regime used every possible tool at its disposal, and later even gangster-like methods, to prevent this from happening, thereby involuntarily transforming Sukarnoputri into a hero of the democratic opposition. Sukarnoputri’s re-election was only prevented through the use of sheer violence (Hefner, 2000, p. 180).

president and selected heir, Yusuf Habibie, an engineer by profession who was perceived as a pragmatic technocrat (Sulistyo, 2002).

Habibie's rather short interim presidency, lasting only a year and a half, is considered the beginning of political reform or "*Reformasi*" and Indonesian regime change (Tanthowi, 2012). Constitutional amendments, adopted mostly between 1998 and 2005, radically transformed the institutional framework of Indonesian politics. In 1999, political parties' activities were liberalised and a new election law was passed (Sulistyo, 2002). As a result, in June 1999 Indonesia held its first truly competitive multi-party elections for the first time since 1955. Taking advantage of the new legal framework, over two hundred new political parties were created, with over forty of them managing to run candidates; eventually, 15 parties won seats in parliament (Ufen, 2008b; Sulistyo, 2002).

In terms of the structure of the party system and the dynamics of party rivalry, at first glance it is already apparent that the system is highly fragmented, which is likely due (at least in part) to the application of a proportional election system. The average number of parties contesting elections between 1999 and 2014 was 14. This is very high, even though it has decreased over time: 21 in 1999, 16 in 2004, 9 in 2009 and 10 in 2014 (Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015). At the same time, the effective number of parties and the effective number of parliamentary parties has actually increased over the past twenty years,¹² from 5.1 and 4.7 (respectively) in 1999 to 8.6 and 7.1 in 2004, 6.1 and 6.2 in 2009, and 8.9 and 8.2 in 2014. These figures actually reflect growing fragmentation (Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015). Accordingly, the average effective value of the party system (including parties outside parliament) is 7.1, while the average effective value of parliamentary parties is 6.55 for the past twenty years (Fionna and Tomsa, 2017). In comparison to systems

¹² According to the formula of Laakso and Taagepera, the effective number of parties in a party system is calculated as follows: 1 divided by the proportion of votes for parties expressed in decimal numbers, squared and values added up. The effective number of parliamentary parties can be calculated similarly, using the mandate proportions of parties entering parliament (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979).

internationally, these numbers are very high.

The data reflect not only a relatively high numbers of parliamentary parties, but also large fluctuations in their share of votes. According to Higashikata and Kawamura, while democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia has generally stable been and consolidated, the Indonesian party system has not (Higashikata & Kawamura, 2017). The percentage of wavering voters (compared to the previous election) was 23% in 2004, 28.7% in 2009, and 26.3% in 2014; this is nearly three times higher than the average for “consolidated” Western European democracies between 1885–1985; however, in comparison with Latin America and Eastern Europe, regions that democratised in the 1990s, this cannot be regarded as outstandingly high (Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015).

Despite the relatively high volatility common in newly democratised countries, there have been some signs of stability and continuity in post-Suharto Indonesia. As Fionna and Tomsa point out, since 1999 six parties have always had a parliamentary presence. Their parliamentary mandates totalled 88% in 1999, 72% in 2004, 52% in 2009, and 63% in 2014 (Fionna & Tomsa, 2017). Close analysis shows that these “core parties” show considerable continuity with the parties of Suharto’s “New Order” period, and even with the subcultures (*aliran*) that defined the pre-Suharto era.

Three of the four political subcultures of the 1950s seem to have survived into the post-Suharto era. The markedly secular-nationalist direction of the PNI was continued by the PDI-P under Megawati Sukarnoputri, which grew from a “salon opposition” into a genuine opposition force by the 1990s and in some sense remained the carrier of Sukarno’s “legacy”. The National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, PKB) associated with Abdurrahman Wahid, showed close personal and ideological parallels with the traditionalist Muslim NU. By comparison, modernist Muslim subculture has definitely been more fragmented on the party level. PPP, which can be regarded as the successor of Masyumi and the official Islamist opposition of the Suharto age, has carried on

(Mas'udi, personal communication, July 26, 2018; Azca, personal communication, July 31, 2018).¹³ Also related to modernist Muslim mass organisations are the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, PAN), affiliated with Muhammadiyah, and the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS), which grew out of campus movements. The radical leftist tradition represented by the communists, however, has had no heirs in the post-Suharto political palette. To many analysts' surprise, Golkar, the technocratic formation of bureaucratic and state functionaries, has managed to remain a major player despite democratic competition (Ufen, 2008b).

Of the six “core parties”, two are clearly secular (PDI and Golkar); the other four are openly or—at least based on their voters' profile—covertly Islamic (moderately or radically) (Alwyni, personal communication, August 4, 2018).¹⁴ However, considering the proportions of votes, the position of Islamic parties is less favourable. In 1999, the four Islamic parties together received 33% of the votes, or roughly as many as Sukarnoputri's PDI alone. Nearly 60% of votes cast in the elections were shared by two secular parties: PDI and Golkar. Higashikata and Kawamura calculate that, since 1999, Islamic parties have constantly received 30–50% of votes (Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015).

The above statement holds true only if the starting premise is accepted, namely that the traditionalist PKB or modernist PAN are indeed “Islamic parties”, even though these political formations have not been in favour of incorporating sharia into the Constitution and still consider Pancasila principles to be decisive (Eliraz, 2004).

¹³ However according to some interviewed experts, it is questionable whether PPP can be considered a “modernist” organisation. As PPP was an artificially amalgamated political formation, since the Suharto era a strong modernist–traditionalist rift has existed within the party. In recent years, the traditionalist wing has gained the upper hand within party leadership (interview with Dr. Wawan Mas'udi at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada and Dr. Muhammad Najib Azca, Center for Security and Peace Studies).

¹⁴ Interview with Farouk Alwyni, the Head of the Diplomatic Bureau of PKS.

Since 1999, even the Islamist rhetoric of PKS has become more moderate, and their programmes have also become somewhat watered down. Many of these decisions may be seen as tactical, but they have certainly given up their demand for an Islamic state (Woodward, 2008, p. 54). Nevertheless, if we still regard these parties as “Islamic” parties in the strictest sense, it seems that the idea of a sharia-based Islamic state has not attracted more than 10% of Indonesian voters at most.

As far as the regional spread of parties’ support bases is concerned, here too patterns of continuity since the 1950s are visible. PDI-P, as well its predecessor PNI, are strong primarily among Javanese *abangan* groups and religious minorities, mainly Christians and Balinese Hindus. PKB, meanwhile, characteristically draws its greatest support from rural Muslim communities in Central and Eastern Java, as with the NU in the “pre-Suharto” period (Ufen, 2008a). Traditionally, parties of the modernist Muslim subculture are strongest in large cities and outside Java. For example, the strongest bastion of the moderately Islamic PPP is Aceh in North Sumatra. Similarly, the originally Muhammadiyah-affiliated PAN is strong in Sumatra, as well as the capital Jakarta and the Javanese district of Yogyakarta (the hometown of party founder Amien Rais, a former leader of Muhammadiyah and professor at Universitas Gadjah Mada); in 2018, however, the gubernatorial election in South Sulawesi was won by a PAN candidate. The modernist PKS, considered more radical than other Muslim parties, is exceptionally strong in Jakarta, where at the peak of its popularity in 2004 and 2009 the party secured more than 20% of votes (Woodward, 2008; Fionna & Tomsa, 2017). In contrast, Golkar has received more support in more peripheral regions, particularly Sumatra, Kalimantan, and the eastern (i.e. east of Bali) “outer” islands such as Sulawesi, Maluku, and Papua (Ufen, 2008a).

At this point, it is worth noting that, while the spread of the national parties’ voters does reflect a regional pattern of sorts, as in the 1950s regional cleavages have not been decisive, and the country

has not become a field for mobilising ethno-nationalist politics. In addition to showing the relative strength of the Indonesian national consciousness, this also reflects the minimal politicisation of ethnic identities and is partly due to the institutional control of party rivalry. In public administration, the administrative weakening of the provinces in favour of sub-provincial districts, the purely proportional election system, the relatively low 2% parliamentary entry threshold, and the rule that parties wishing to obtain parliamentary seats must run candidates in at least two thirds of Indonesia's provinces (and two thirds of their constituencies)¹⁵ all worked against parties forming at the regional/provincial level and helped ensure the ideological fragmentation of the Indonesian party system (Aspinall, 2011; Ufen, 2008a). This has happened even though many expected the opposite after the fall of the Suharto regime, when numerous separatist and ethnic conflicts flared up.

At this time, the ideological cleavages of the Indonesian party system are still largely defined by the *aliran* subcultures inherited from Indonesia's earliest years as a democracy. As a number of analysts have already shown, relatively large variations have occurred within the votes received between parties within the same subcultural blocs. For example, when Islamist parties such as PPP lost votes, these votes usually went to other Islamist parties (such as PKS) rather than secular parties. As such, there still seems to be little exchange between "Islamist" and "secular" voter blocs (Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015, p. 11; Mietzner, 2008, p. 440). Based on ideological bloc-formation and the fragmented political palette, we could also argue that—in the post-Suharto period, as in the 1950s—a polarised multi-party system of centrifugal dynamics has emerged. Moreover, in political science it is common for the combination of the proportional party list election system (and the ensuing fragmented multi-party system) with the purely presidential

¹⁵ The only exception to this regulation is the Province of Aceh, where—in accordance with the 2005 peace agreement with separatist organisations—regional parties are allowed to function (Ufen, 2008a).

system is unfortunate, as the lack of a supportive majority may lead to conflicts between the legislative and executive branches becoming permanent, thereby destabilising the whole democratic political order (Mainwaring, 1993; Linz, 1990; Mietzner, 2016). However, these expectations are defied by the dynamics of the post-Suharto party system and the relative stability of the government system.

As Mietzner indicates, rather than a centrifugal spiral and a radicalisation of opposing blocs and their parties, in the post-Suharto period a centripetal type of party competition with limited dynamics emerged (Mietzner, 2008). This may be due to several factors. Although at the political subcultures level the secular–Islamist cleavage is still tangible, political parties—unlike in the 1950s—are not grouped into two rigidly opposed blocs. On the one hand, it is highly questionable whether the political parties under the “Islamic bloc” can truly be placed under one big umbrella, as PKB, PPP, and PAN are clearly moderate and have always recognised the Pancasila ideology, while even the more radical, somewhat anti-elite and populist PKS has always kept the rules of parliamentary democracy. The decisive secular forces, i.e. PDP-P and Golkar, have also characteristically followed a pragmatic, centrist political trend. The secular-ideological radicalism represented by the communists in the 1950s is essentially missing from the current political palette. As a result, rather than radicalisation, the centripetal force of the political centre is more marked even in the fragmented multi-party environment (Mietzner, 2008). Generally speaking, the ideological profile of Indonesian parties is more confused than it was in the 1950s; the “core parties” of traditional political subcultures have tended to be dominated by charismatic personalities rather than ideologies (Azca, personal communication, July 31, 2018).¹⁶

Indirectly, certain institutional reforms have also contributed to this centripetal dynamic and to these processes of personal cult creation. The 2004 direct presidential elections, the 2005 direct

¹⁶ In the case of PDI-P, the charismatic personality is Megawati Sukarnoputri; for the

gubernatorial elections, and the 2009 introduction of the open-list system in parliamentary elections all weakened the role of political parties and contributed to increased personality-centrism (Fionna & Tomsa, 2017). As a result, since 2004—in addition to the traditional *aliran* “core parties”—a completely new type, namely “one-person” political movements have emerged. One of them is the Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrat*, PD) of retired general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. After losing the elections to Sukarnoputri, he launched his own movement, which came practically out of the blue and broke into the political mainstream in 2004, finishing third party in the elections. Similarly, the Great Indonesia Movement Party (*Gerakan Indonesia Raya*, Gerindra) was established by Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s former son-in-law and a former general, after losing the fight for leadership of the Golkar Party to Aburizal Bakrie in 2004. The same can be said of General Wiranto’s People’s Conscience Party (*Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat*, Hanura), founded in 2006, and media baron Surya Paloh’s National Democratic Party (*Partai Nasional Demokrat*, NasDem) (Ufen, 2018).

Over the past two decades, the drivers of party politics and parliamentary politics in post-Suharto Indonesia have tended to be personal patronage and clientelism rather than ideological confrontation (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016). Gaining a share of government patronage positions has proven to be the decisive motivation for Islamist parties as well, which seek to participate in governance rather than withdraw into opposition (Mietzner, 2008; Ufen, 2018). Meanwhile, in the context of the fragmented multi-party Indonesian parliamentary palette, presidents have been able to successfully exercise their executive power only by building the broadest “rainbow coalitions” possible. President Joko Widodo, for example, has consciously utilised parliamentary parties’ internal

traditionalist PKB in the *Reformasi* period, it was Abdurrahman Wahid, who died in 2009; PAN was organised around Amien Rais, the leader of Muhammadiyah (Ufen, 2008b). Rais had an intellectual/academic background similar to Wahid. He was a professor of political science at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, which explains his party’s particular popularity in Yogyakarta (interview with Dr. Muhammad Najib Azca).

power struggles, repeatedly empowering the factions that support his government (Ufen, 2018). As a result, although Widodo was elected as a PDI-P candidate in the 2014 elections (when the party received 19% of all votes), today he heads a coalition of six parties: PDI-P, Golkar, Hanura, NasDem, PKB, and PPP. PAN's position seems to be a bit ambiguous (Mas'udi, personal communication, July 26, 2018); although the party was also part of Widodo's coalition, in the upcoming 2019 presidential elections it seems to have sided with the incumbent's main challenger, Prabowo Subianto ("Prabowo Subianto to Run for 2019", 2018).

Of the four parliamentary Islamist parties, three were—and two still are—on the side of the current president. The actual political opposition in the upcoming elections is constituted of Prabowo's Gerindra as well as PKS, whose political identity is built on Islamism and an uncompromising stand against elitism and corruption. In exchange for Islamist parties' support, the government has sometimes embraced their political agendas; this is what happened in 2006 when they voted for a law against pornography, which had originally been urged by PAN (Ufen, 2018).

In the upcoming 2019 presidential elections, we are witnessing two camps emerging: current president Joko Widodo enjoys support from a PDI-P, Golkar, Hanura, NasDem, PKB, and PPP coalition, while his main rival Prabowo seems to be supported by a Gerindra, PD, PKS, and PAN alliance. If we consider PPP a traditionalist Muslim party, the make-up of Jokowi's coalition reminds us of the 1950's Nasakom government (with one significant difference: the communists are not involved). Similarly, the current political opposition consists of both secular parties and the modernist Muslim PAN and PKS. As such, unlike in the first years of Indonesian democracy, we cannot speak of a clear secular-Islamist rift. This is especially clear given that Jokowi has chosen 75-year-old Islamic cleric Ma'ruf Amin as his running mate in the 2019 presidential

election.¹⁷

Frequently in parliamentary politics, decisions on laws are made as a result of compromises negotiated in the background, outside of the public eye; parliamentary parties make these final decisions consensually and without voting (Ufen, 2008b). For this reason, parliamentary legislative procedures may seem obscure and corrupt. Nonetheless, the functioning of the Indonesian model may be seen from a positive angle, as a multi-party consensus-oriented democracy similar to the former colonial Netherlands, where political decision-making is not unilaterally held by political forces with a majority mandate, but rather involves as many political subcultures as possible.

Conclusion

The present study has examined the possibilities of political democracy in Southeast Asian Islam. In the history of Indonesian democracy, secular and Islamic political subcultures have always been present, at times mutually opposed and at other times mutually supportive. The latter subculture has been further divided along traditionalist–modernist lines. The party system reflects these cleavages. In the first years of Indonesian democracy, in the 1950s, the confrontation of secular and Islamic “blocs” led to dramatic consequences: the radicalisation of party politics and eventually the collapse of the democratic political order. In the post-Suharto age, however, the government–opposition dichotomy in parliamentary politics has not followed these cleavages. In the present ruling coalition, for example, both traditional and modernist Muslim parties are—or were—present, and the ideological profile of the political opposition is similarly mixed.

According to analysis of Indonesia’s four Islamic parties,

¹⁷ Amin is the influential head of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), who issued a statement condemning Basuki Tjahaja Purnama—a Christian of Chinese heritage who had served as the governor of Jakarta—as a blasphemer during the heated Jakarta gubernatorial campaign of 2017 (Dewi, 2018).

the traditionalist PKB and modernist PKS have a strong chance of keeping their mandates or even gaining more seats in the 2019 parliamentary elections. However there are serious doubts that PPP—weakened by internal party struggles—, and PAN—the popularity of which has constantly dwindled since Amien Rais’s resignation as party leader—can pass the elevated 4% parliamentary threshold (Mas’udi, personal communication, July 26, 2018). Nonetheless, at least one traditionalist and one modernist Islamic party will most likely remain present in the Indonesian legislature.

Although analysis of Indonesia’s constitutional framework is not the focus of this study, we would like to call to attention that the constitutional features of the Indonesian political system (presidentialism, high degree of power sharing between the executive and legislative branches, decentralised state administration, proportional voting system, etc.) also fit the “consensual” ideal type, as do the highly fragmented Indonesian party system and the parallel political subcultures of Indonesian society.

I would argue that there is a specifically Indonesian “consensus-oriented” democracy model in the making, one which is not without certain Western predecessors. In it, political Islam and Islamist parties are not active as destabilising factors, but rather—as with a number of “Western” Christian democratic parties¹⁸—act as a “religious democratic” force that reinforces the democratic consensus.

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¹⁸ According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the secular–religious division remains present in most Western party systems. However, since the Second World War, Christian democratic parties have played a key role in consolidating German and Italian democracies; they remain important actors in German, Austrian, Benelux, etc. party systems. Similar examples can also be found in the Middle-East (e.g. moderate Islamic parties seem to have played a democratic-consensus strengthening role in Tunisia since the so-called “Arab spring”). However, secular–Islamist confrontations and the radicalisation of Islamic movements has led to disastrous consequences in many countries (Algeria, Egypt, Syria, etc.).

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