Rizka and Handoko

Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business
Vol. 22, No. 2 (May-August 2020): 199-231

The Influence of CEOs’ Hubris on Firms’ Performance in Indonesia: The Moderating Effects of CEOs’ Power and Board Vigilance
a

Noni Ayu Rizkaa, T. Hani Handokoa
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia

Abstract: Studies of CEOs’ hubris have long found that board vigilance is effective in controlling the negative influence of CEOs’ hubris on firms’ performance. Past studies specifically
argued that the CEOs’ non-duality and independent directors’ representations are the determinants of board vigilance. However, these studies have only explored the causal relationship in
the one-tier corporate governance setting. Therefore, this study analyzed the influence of CEOs’
hubris on firms’ performance in Indonesia, by adopting two-tier corporate governance by taking
into account the CEO-board power dynamics. Hierarchical regressions were performed on 99
public listed firms. The results found CEOs’ hubris in Indonesia contributes positively to firms’
performance, while boards with a large number of commissioners are effective in strengthening the positive influence of hubris on firms’ performance. Furthermore, this study hints that
two-tier corporate governance is more efficient in controlling hubris than the one-tier system.
Keywords: CEOs’ hubris, firms’ performance, CEOs’ power, board vigilance, corporate governance.
JEL Classification:G34, M12, M14

*Corresponding author’s e-mail: nonirizka@gmail.com
ISSN: PRINT 1411-1128 | ONLINE 2338-7238
http://journal.ugm.ac.id/gamaijb

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Introduction
Past studies have long found that leaders’ characteristics have influenced their
strategic decision-making, thus leading their
firms to success (Koo and Park, 2018; Wang
et al., 2016). In executing high-risk projects
and investments, a CEO’s confident decision-making is vital (Hiller and Hambrick,
2005; H. Park and Yoo, 2017). CEOs are often influenced by their past successful experiences when making decisions, even if they
did not always yield positive results for their
firms (Claxton et al., 2015). Business research
streams proxy this condition as CEOs’ hubris.
Originating in Greek mythology, hubris is
used to explain executives’ tyrannical behavior (H. Park and Yoo, 2017; Petit and Bollaert, 2012). This term has been used when
explaining failed acquisitions (Roll, 1986),
acquisition premiums (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), failed investments (Malmendier
and Tate, 2005), and fluctuating firm performance (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007).
CEOs’ hubris is characterized by excessive overconfidence that develops from the
media’s praise, successful experiences, and
self-confidence (Asad and Sadler-Smith,
2020; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; H. Park
and Yoo, 2017; Petit and Bollaert, 2012).
CEOs’ hubris significantly affects strategic
decisions, in which CEOs overestimate their
abilities and manipulate the decision-making process (Asad and Sadler-Smith, 2020;
Cormier et al., 2016). A proven and effective
way to mitigate hubris is through board vigilance (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; J. H.
Park et al., 2018). Indicated by the CEOs’
non-duality (J. H. Park et al., 2018), and outside directors’ representations (Hayward and
Hambrick, 1997) board vigilance mitigates
CEOs’ hubris by increasing the monitoring
of the CEOs. Thus, CEOs become more
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careful in deciding which projects or investments to take.
A study by J. H. Park et al., (2018) explored the direct link between hubris and
firm performance in South Korea, and found
that the country-specific context determines
the result of the CEOs’ hubris. CEOs’ hubris
research in Asia has only been conducted in
China (Li and Tang, 2010; Tang et al., 2015;
Zhang et al., 2020) and South Korea (J. H.
Park et al., 2018), which makes it important
to conduct another study in Southeast Asia,
to widen the research stream. Because of this
gap, an extensive study in Indonesia is necessary.
Indonesia adopted the two-tier system
that does not allow CEO-duality to appear
(World Bank, 2014). It is more interesting to
approach board vigilance from the side of
the board of commissioners (BOC). Besides,
the two-tier system mandates a bigger board
with diverse personnel who have different
knowledge and skills (Ali, 2018; Zubeltzu-Jaka et al., 2020) that increases the board’s independence (Tulung and Ramdani, 2018)
and vigilance in monitoring the CEO (J. H.
Park et al., 2018). Therefore, this study aims
to expand the CEOs’ hubris research stream
by conducting research in Indonesia.

Literature Review
CEOs’ Hubris
Originated from ancient Greek, hubris
is defined as exaggerated pride or self-confidence (Petit and Bollaert, 2012). In the
business research stream, this term is used to
explain an executive’s overconfidence in his/
her strategic decision-making process (H.
Park and Yoo, 2017; Powell et al., 2011). The

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initial study conducted by Roll (1986) found
that hubristic executives overestimate the value of the new entity during the acquisition
process and have their focus fully on achieving synergy. These CEOs should have known
that any bid above the market price means
an error in the valuation; thus, the bidding
firms’ shareholders suffer losses (Claxton et
al., 2015; Haynes et al., 2017).
A further study by Hayward and Hambrick (1997) found that shareholders’ losses
following an acquisition were higher when
executive hubris was high, as these CEOs
mistranslated their previous successful organizational experiences into an ability to
manage additional entities. CEOs’ hubris
is the result of three indicators, namely: (1)
firm performance, (2) media praise, and (3)
CEOs’ compensation (Haynes et al., 2017;
Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). Media praise
contributes to hubris by allowing CEOs to
receive external validation of their apparent
capabilities (El-Khatib et al., 2015; Haynes
et al., 2017; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997).
CEOs who have been praised by the media
also receive glorified treatment from their acquaintances (Haynes et al., 2017; H. Park and
Yoo, 2017). The distinctive treatment allows
hubristic CEOs to increase their discretion in
collecting important information (El-Khatib
et al., 2015; Haynes et al., 2017; J. H. Park et
al., 2018).
The definition of hubris often overlaps
with the term high self-esteem (Sadler-Smith
et al., 2017), core-self-evaluation (Hiller and
Hambrick, 2005), and narcissism (Chatterjee
and Hambrick, 2007). High self-esteem is
the belief that an individual can carry out a
task and that they are entitled to gain benefits from other people’s resources, which lack
the specific overconfidence features such as
excessive pride or arrogance (J. H. Park et al.,

2018; Sadler-Smith et al., 2017). Meanwhile,
core-self-evaluation (CSE) specifically states
that the measure of CSE aligns closely with
hubris, but only when the level is high, (i.e
Hyper-CSE) (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005;
Sadler-Smith et al., 2017).
Although narcissistic CEOs were found
to be highly dependent on media and social
praise, it is a personality trait that differs from
the cognitive bias (Asad and Sadler-Smith,
2020; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; H.
Park and Yoo, 2017). Following the behavioral strategy research stream that classified
CEOs’ hubris as a cognitive bias in their strategic decision-making (Powell et al., 2011),
CEOs’ hubris is defined as a cognitive bias
that builds upon internal and external constructs which result in executives incorrectly measuring their capabilities when decision-making (H. Park and Yoo, 2017; J. H.
Park et al., 2018).

CEOs’ Power Strengthening Effect
A CEO’s power specifically refers to an
executive’s ability to exert his/her authority
and thus influence the board of directors
and the whole firm (Asad and Sadler-Smith,
2020; Koo and Park, 2018). CEOs are granted their powers through their position in the
firm and their high level of authority and
ownership (i.e legitimate power), their expertise in management (i.e expert power),
and their reputation in an institutional setting (i.e prestige power) (Asad and SadlerSmith, 2020; Kinicki and Fugate, 2018). As
the firm’s performance is a reflection of its
executives, powerful CEOs accordingly experience more success (Asad and Sadler-Smith,
2020; Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
The managerial expertise of executives
is developed through their time as leaders,
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thus the level of power in a firm is parallel to the length of their managerial tenure
(Haynes et al., 2017; J. H. Park et al., 2018).
A long-tenured CEO has experienced more
success, which is often used to control the
board since the strategic decision-making
process involves CEO-board interaction
(Duru et al., 2016; Koo and Park, 2018). The
successful experiences also contribute to a
strong bond of trust between the CEO and
the board (Koo and Park, 2018; J. H. Park
et al., 2018). Therefore a powerful CEO may
lower the level of the board’s vigilance, which
increases the possibilities of the CEO carrying out wealth-destroying projects or investments (Haynes et al., 2017; H. Park and Yoo,
2017; J. H. Park et al., 2018). In short, the increase in the CEO’s tenure is followed by an
increase in the CEO’s power, which is linked
to hubris and has a negative influence on the
firm’s performance (Haynes et al., 2017; J. H.
Park et al., 2018).
Besides the increasing tenure, it was
found that CEOs’ ownership, in the form of
share ownership, also significantly increased
their executive power over the firm (Deb and
Wiklund, 2017; Haynes et al., 2017). Ownership is a proxy of a CEO’s legitimate power in the firm, which can reduce the level of
vigilance by the board (Deb and Wiklund,
2017; Kinicki and Fugate, 2018; J. H. Park et
al., 2018). A CEO who owns shares may influence both the shareholders and the board
(Deb and Wiklund, 2017; Haynes et al., 2017;
J. H. Park et al., 2018). The CEO who serves
both as the executive and as a shareholder
may deceive the shareholders by acting as
if his/her actions are in the interest of the
shareholders, while actually pursuing no-value investments (Deb and Wiklund, 2017;
Haynes et al., 2017; J. H. Park et al., 2018). In
short, ownership increases a CEO’s opportunities to pursue non-value investments that
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may have a negative influence on the firm’s
performance.
Both tenure and ownership allow a CEO
the power to influence both the board and
the shareholders. Consequently, the combination of legitimate and expert power is most
likely to increase the level of hubris apparent in executives and thereby affect the firm’s
financial performance (Kinicki and Fugate,
2018; J. H. Park et al., 2018). Drawing from
the existing findings, this study developed its
hypotheses based on the argument for tenure
and ownership being the main indicators of
the CEOs’ power, and this strengthens the
negative influence of CEOs’ hubris on firms’
financial performance.

Board Vigilance’s Weakening Effect
Board vigilance’s role in corporate governance refers to the board members’ ability to monitor and disciplin the company’s
top executives (J. H. Park et al., 2018; Sewpersadh, 2019). Previous studies found that
weak board vigilance allowed top executives
to challenge their board’s monitoring abilities
and as a result, a negative outcome from hubris is inevitable (Duru et al., 2016; J. H. Park
et al., 2018). Weak board-vigilance is indicated as a factor in CEO-duality, and the lack of
outside directors’ representations (Hayward
and Hambrick, 1997; J. H. Park et al., 2018).
Following Indonesia’s Constitutional Law No. 40 of 2007, a firm’s corporate
governance must consist of three organs: a
board of directors (BOD), a board of commissioners (BOC), and the shareholders, as
presented in Figure 1. The model depicts the
structure of corporate governance, the flow
of communications, and the responsibilities
each party has. Meanwhile one-tier corporate
governance consists of a board of directors

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Figure 1. Indonesia’s Corporate Governance Structure

who are responsible for monitoring both the
CEO and the strategic decision-making process.
Concerning the board’s vigilance, this
corporate governance model is supposedly effective in repressing the level of hubris
in executives, since it eliminates the CEOs’
duality (Ali, 2018; J. H. Park et al., 2018). A
previous study by J. H. Park et al., (2018)
explored the effectiveness of independent
directors, so, this study followed the same
logic by exploring board vigilance through
the BOC. The independent commissioners’
ratio increases board vigilance by providing
unbiased monitoring of the CEO, since they
do not have any relation to anyone on the
board (J. H. Park et al., 2018; Ramdani and
Witteloostuijn, 2010; Tulung and Ramdani,
2018). Aside from the independent commissioners’ ratio, this study proposed an alternative method for assessing board vigilance,
by considering the size of the board of commissioners. According to studies about board
effectiveness, a bigger board has more prob-

lem-solving capabilities, which are useful for
determining strategic decisions (Ali, 2018;
J. H. Park et al., 2018; Zubeltzu-Jaka et al.,
2020). Drawing from the existed studies, this
study developed hypotheses based on the argument that the independent commissioners’
ratio and board size were the main indicators
of board vigilance that weakened the influence of CEOs’ hubris on firms’ financial performance.

Hypotheses Development
CEOs’ Hubris and Firms’ Performance
There are two different views of CEOs’
hubris: a positive point of view and a negative point of view. The positive view makes
the argument that a dominant and powerful
CEO is predominantly a hero, or a savior,
who is key to the firm’s success (Koo and
Park, 2018; H. Park and Yoo, 2017; Zeitoun
et al., 2019). In contrast, the negative view
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argues that CEOs’ hubris is harmful to the
firms’ performance since hubristic executives
often pursue investments that are in their
own self-interests and which can harm their
firms’ performance (Claxton et al., 2015;
Zhang et al., 2020). The two polarized views
indicate that CEOs’ hubris is a double-ended
sword, with no solid agreement as to whether
it is contributive or detrimental to firm performance.

Therefore, following J. H. Park et al.,
(2018) we seek a neutral way of assessing
hubris through the concept of managerial
entrenchment, with a country-specific context. In a very active capital market, firms are
exposed to enormous takeover pressures, in
which poor-performing firms are often the
victims of hostile acquisitions (J. H. Park et
al., 2018). Thus, to satisfy a CEO’s main objective of keeping his/her position, hubristic
CEOs focus on increasing their firms’ value
and investing in profitable investments, such
as innovations or product development, as
a way to make sure they are not subject to a
takeover (Hirshleifer et al., 2012; J. H. Park et
al., 2018; Sadler-Smith et al., 2017). In short,
in an active capital market, CEOs’ hubris is
beneficial for firms’ performance.
Whereas in a weak capital market that
does not impose any significant takeover
threat, hubristic CEOs pursue their self-interest projects which can be detrimental
to their firms’ performances (Haynes et
al., 2017; J. H. Park et al., 2018). Hubristic CEOs with past successful experiences
falsely believe that they have sufficient capabilities and accurate information to carry
out their self-interest investments (J. H. Park
et al., 2018). In short, under a weak capital
market, CEOs’ hubris is detrimental to firm
performance.
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Following the approaches of the previous studies, Indonesia’s capital market is
considered weak, as indicated by its M&A
activity of only 5.4 percent, which is lower
than the Asia-Pacific average of 10 percent,
and it is much less developed (Bureau Van
Dijk, 2017; Darmadi, 2013; Investment,
2017).
Under low external pressure, hubristic
CEOs in Indonesia will entrench their positions by investing in non-value destroying
projects that negatively influence their firms’
performance. Additionally, Indonesia’s high
power distance and collectivist culture allows CEOs to have more control over decision making, which motivates them to pursue non-value investments that negatively
influence their firms’ performance (Koo and
Park, 2018; Tulung and Ramdani, 2018).
Therefore, this study developed its first hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1 CEOs’ hubris negatively influences firms’ performance in Indonesia.

CEOs’ Tenure
A CEO’s tenure is defined as the length
of time spent by an individual working in the
role of the CEO of a firm (McClelland et al.,
2012). As the tenure increase, the CEO acquires more managerial expertise in aligning
resources and strategy decisions for the firm
(Sewpersadh, 2019; Wang et al., 2016). Managerial expertise is also used in determining
the actions taken by a CEO, thus affecting
the effectiveness of their leadership of the
firm (Carter and Greer, 2013; Sewpersadh,
2019). Referring to the source of hubris as
media praise and awards, a CEO with a long
tenure expectedly has more successful experiences and much media approval, which
increases their level of confidence (Hayward

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and Hambrick, 1997; Haynes et al., 2017).

CEOs’ Ownership

An experienced CEO is more valuable
than a new one as he/she has proven their
expertise, this results in trust from the board
and shareholders (Haynes et al., 2017; Sewpersadh, 2019). Taken together, a long-tenured
CEO who has more successful experiences
will be more powerful than a newly appointed one. Therefore, new CEOs have to make a
greater effort to demonstrate their expertise,
to gain the trust of their boards and avoid
dismissal.

Aside from the power obtained from
the organizational structure, executives gain
power from share ownership. A CEO’s share
ownership in a firm significantly affects the
decision-making process (Deb and Wiklund,
2017; Sewpersadh, 2019). In the two-tier system of corporate governance, where shareholders can appoint every board member,
executives with significant share ownership
have greater control over the shareholders
and the boards (Deb and Wiklund, 2017;
Sewpersadh, 2019; World Bank, 2014). Moreover, by being part of the shareholders, hubristic CEOs are less likely to face dismissal.

To gain trust from their boards and
shareholders, newly appointed CEOs will be
more likely to try to accomplish higher levels
of strategic actions, which result in significant
changes in their firms, than their longer-tenured counterparts would do (Haynes et al.,
2019; McClelland et al., 2012; Sewpersadh,
2019). However, longer-tenured CEOs are
more skilled in managerial expertise and have
a higher network centrality for obtaining crucial information (El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik, 2015; Haynes et al., 2017). Long-tenured
CEOs, with a high level of trust from their
boards, will negatively affect their firms’ performances since the boards cannot exercise
impartial monitoring (Haynes et al., 2019;
Sewpersadh, 2019). Therefore it can be argued that a long-tenure CEO has more trust
from both the shareholders and the board,
which allows the CEO to pursue value-destroying investments that negatively influence
the firm’s performance. Therefore, this study
developed the second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2a CEOs’ tenure positively
moderates the negative influence of CEOs’
hubris on firms’ performance in Indonesia.
The longer the CEO’s tenure, the stronger
the negative influence of the CEO’s hubris is
on the firm’s performance.

CEOs’ share ownership is ideal for hubris to thrive since a CEO can then influence
both the shareholders and the board (J. H.
Park et al., 2018; Sewpersadh, 2019). These
CEOs can form a strong bond of trust with
their boards and lower the level of their supervision (Haynes et al., 2017; McClelland et
al., 2012). This situation increases the likelihood of CEOs carrying out value-destroying
investments that negatively affect their firms’
performance (Deb and Wiklund, 2017;
Haynes et al., 2017). Therefore, this study
argues that share ownership allows CEOs to
have a strong influence over their boards and
shareholders, which allows them to pursue
value-destroying investments that are harmful to the firms’ performance in Indonesia.
Therefore, this study developed the third hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2b CEOs’ ownership positively moderates the negative influence of the
CEOs’ hubris on firms’ performance in Indonesia. The higher the CEO’s share ownership percentage is in the firm, the stronger is
the negative influence of the CEO’s hubris
on the firm’s performance.
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Independent Commissioners’ Ratio
The initial study by Hayward and Hambrick (1997) found that board independence
significantly affects the vigilance level among
the members. The BOC, which has the responsibility for monitoring the CEO and the
BOD, finds its vigilance increases when there
is an independent commissioner (Otoritas
Jasa Keuangan, 2014; Tulung and Ramdani,
2018; Zubeltzu-Jaka et al., 2020). According
to the Indonesian Financial Services Authority (OJK) Regulation No. 33/POJK.04.2014,
the ratio of independent commissioners in
public firms must be at least 30 percent of
the total membership of the BOC, and they
must be without any affiliations within the
firm (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2014).
In the case of monitoring, independent
commissioners are likely to increase the vigilance of the BOC by being unbiased, since
they are not affiliated with the firm and therefore can do a better job monitoring the CEO
and BOD (Sewpersadh, 2019; Tulung and
Ramdani, 2018). Accordingly, since the BOC
relies heavily on the firm’s financial performance in supervising the BOD, the presence
of outside commissioners subjects the firm
to stricter monitoring and thus effectively
controls any hubris (J. H. Park et al., 2018;
Sewpersadh, 2019; Tulung and Ramdani,
2018). BOC members can exert control by
disapproving the investment proposals that
may seem to add no value to the firm’s performance (J. H. Park et al., 2018; World Bank,
2014).
In addition, the presence of an independent commissioner eliminates the possibility
of “groupthink” in the BOC, hence making
the monitoring more unbiased (Kinicki and
Fugate, 2018; Tulung and Ramdani, 2018;
Zubeltzu-Jaka et al., 2020). Therefore, this
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study argues that the presence of an independent commissioner weakens the negative
influence of the CEO’s hubris on the firm’s
performance in Indonesia by providing impartial monitoring of the CEO and BOD (J.
H. Park et al., 2018; Tulung and Ramdani,
2018). Therefore, this study developed a
fourth hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3a Independent commissioners’
ratio negatively moderates the negative influence of CEOs’ hubris on their firms’ performance in Indonesia. The higher the independent commissioners ratio is on the BOC, the
weaker will be the negative influence of the
CEO’s hubris on the firm’s performance.

Commissioners’ Board Size
A past study discovered board vigilance,
in the form of independent directors’ representatives, controlled the negative effects of
hubris on firms’ performance (J. H. Park et
al., 2018). However, this investigation did not
consider that the number of independent directors’ representatives is determined by the
board’s size (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2014).
The development of a firm is trailed by the
complexity of its functions, which requires a
bigger board comprising of members with
different expertise and skills (Ali, 2018; Sewpersadh, 2019). Bigger boards comprising
of various experts are better at advising the
firm’s management and reducing the CEO’s
power gained through his/her long tenure
(Tulung and Ramdani, 2018; Zubeltzu-Jaka
et al., 2020).
Previous studies found firms with independent boards have positive firm performance and a decreased likelihood of suffering from financial difficulties (Sewpersadh,
2019; Tulung and Ramdani, 2018). Firms
with larger boards and more independent

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directors are better at handling complex data
and have better monitoring of the CEO
and board (Ali, 2018). The problem that
often arises with a CEO’s hubris is that the
CEO often pursues investments for his/her
self-interest, at the shareholders’ expense
(Haynes et al., 2017; J. H. Park et al., 2018).
Since the BOC is more independent, it can

of the CEO’s hubris on the firm’s performance in Indonesia. The bigger the size of
the BOC, the weaker the negative influence
of the CEO’s hubris is on the firm’s performance.
Figure 2 depicts the conceptual model of
this study.

Figure 2. Research Model

exercise rigorous monitoring and easily detect a CEO’s non-value investment initiatives (Duru et al., 2016; Tulung and Ramdani, 2018). In short, a large BOC with wide
ranging knowledge and skills is effective
in monitoring and preventing CEOs from
pursuing investments in their own interests.
In summary, a bigger BOC, whose members have different knowledge and skills, is
effective in monitoring a CEO’s initiatives,
and can weaken the negative influence of
a CEO’s hubris on the firm’s performance.
Therefore, this study developed a fifth hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3b The size of the BOC negatively moderates the negative influence

Methods
Sample and Data Collection
This study observed public firms listed
on the KOMPAS100 February 2017 Index,
which includes the 100 firms with the most
liquid stocks and the largest market capitalization; this covers 70 to 80 percent of the
total market capitalization of the Indonesia
Stock Exchange (PT Bursa Efek Indonesia,
2018). This index was especially chosen to
observe whether the establishment of the
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) imposed a threat to Indonesia’s capital markets
(International Financial Law Review, 2018).
The weak capital markets and the external
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threat are interesting to observe since the influence of the CEOs’ hubris on firms’ performance is highly dependent on the capital
markets’ conditions (J. H. Park et al., 2018).
In collecting the relevant information, this
study relied on secondary data obtained from
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), and
firms’ annual reports, which are available on
the firms’ websites. One firm was eliminated
because of our inability to obtain its annual
report.

Variables and Measures
Dependent Variable
In this study, the dependent variable was
firm performance, measured as the return on
assets (ROA). ROA is an industry-dependent
indicator of how efficient a firm is at managing its assets to generate earnings. Accordingly, a higher ROA means greater assets’ efficiency. The previous study conducted by J.
H. Park et al., (2018) used a two-year adjusted
return on assets (Ad-ROA) by subtracting the
firm’s ROA from the industry median ROA
for each year and then averaging it. However,
due to our inability to obtain the industry median ROA data, this cross-sectional study only
observed each firm’s ROA for the year 2017.
Independent Variable
Following the study by J. H. Park et
al., (2018) on the “unobtrusive” index of
CEOs’ hubris, this study relied on secondary data to avoid bias in the measurement.
The CEOs’ hubris measurement in this study
followed two hubris indicators of Park et
al., (2018), which were awards and overconfidence. The media praise’s measurement was
disregarded due to the inability to obtain an
accurate measurement method.
The awards indicator measured the total

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amount of awards and certifications received
by the CEOs in 2017 (J. H. Park et al., 2018).
The data for awards and certifications were
obtained from the annual reports. The CEOs’
overconfidence indicator was analyzed by using the DICTION application and calculated
following the hubris formula of Armenic et
al., (2010, p. 60):

Hubris = praise + accomplishment + tenacity
Finally, the CEOs’ hubris measure was the
sum of the awards and certifications given
and the result of the DICTION application’s analysis.
Moderating Variables
This study had four moderating variables of CEOs’ tenure, CEOs’ ownership,
independent commissioners’ ratio and commissioners’ board size. CEOs’ tenure was
measured as the number of years each CEO
held the position in the firm (Sewpersadh,
2019). CEOs’ ownership was measured as the
percentage of shares each CEO owned in the
firm (Combs et al., 2007). The independent
commissioners’ ratio was measured as the ratio of independent commissioner members
among all the members of the BOC (J. H.
Park et al., 2018). Commissioners’ board size
was measured as the total number of commissioners on the BOC.
Control Variables
This study used three control variables
namely: firm size, leverage ratio, and CEOs’
succession. Each firm’s size was measured
as the natural log (i.e ln) of the firm’s total assets at the end of the observed fiscal
year. The leverage ratio was measured as the
debt-to-equity ratio of the firm in the observation year. The CEOs’ succession was controlled to avoid bias since a change in CEO

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may have a significant influence on a firm’s
performance (Huson et al., 2004; Sewpersadh, 2019). CEOs’ succession was coded as
1 if the CEO was newly appointed and 0 otherwise.

Analysis

Models 3 and 4 examined the positive moderating effects of CEOs’ tenure and CEOs’
ownership, as formulated in hypotheses 2a
and 2b. Models 5 and 6 examined the negative moderating effects of the independent
commissioners’ ratio and commissioners’
board size, as formulated in hypotheses 3a
and 3b.

This study first measured the independent variable of CEOs’ hubris by adding
up the number of awards and certifications
from the results of the DICTION analysis.
Afterward, hierarchical regression analyses
were performed to test the proposed hypotheses. The first regression analysis consisted
of three regression models (model 1, model
2, model 3). Model 1 was the baseline model
and consisted of the control variables. Model 2 was developed to test Hypothesis 1 in
predicting the negative influence of CEOs’
hubris on firms’ performance in Indonesia.

The validity of the hypotheses testing
results were confirmed by a robustness test,
in which additional regressions were carried
out to find out whether the results changed
under different circumstances, this would
confirm the structural validity of the research
(Lu and White, 2014). First, the 39 samples
that were included in the CEOs’ succession
cases were eliminated. Then, the remaining
60 samples were analyzed using hierarchical
regression analyses. The results from the hypotheses testing and robustness testing were
compared to check whether the new mea-

Figure 3. Data Analysis Flow Diagram

209

Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business - May-August, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2020

surements caused a change in the significance
levels or the direction of the coefficients of
the predictor variables (Lu and White, 2014;
J. H. Park et al., 2018). Multicollinearity was
assessed using the variance inflation factors
(VIFs) score. A VIF value below the threshold of 10 and a tolerance value higher than
0.1 were acceptable (Hair Jr. et al., 2014). Figure 3 illustrates the data analysis process conducted in this study.

model, only consisting of the control variables. Model 2 was developed to test Hypothesis 1 predicting the negative influence
of CEOs’ hubris on firms’ financial performance in Indonesia. Models 3 and 4 examined the moderating role of CEOs’ power
(tenure and ownership) as stated in hypotheses 2a and 2b. Models 5 and 6 examined
the moderating role of the boards’ vigilance
(independent commissioners’ ratio and the
size of the BOC) as stated in hypotheses 3a
and 3b.

Results

Model 2 revealed a positive and significant relationship between CEOs’ hubris and
firms’ performance (β = 0.249; p < 0.05),
which does not support Hypothesis 1. Second, the moderating effect of CEOs’ tenure

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics
and correlations among the variables included in this study. The descriptive statistics
show that the average ROA was 5.7 percent;
the average CEO’s tenure was 6.5 years, and

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Variable
Firm Performance
CEO Hubris
CEO Tenure
CEO Ownership
Independent Commissioner Ratio
Commissioner
Board Size
Firm Size
Leverage Ratio
CEO Succession

Mean SD
1
0.0574 0.094
34.58 24.42 0.254*
6.53 7.91 -0.014
0.0059 0.034 0.096

2

3

-0.056
-0.008

0.203*

4

5

0.41

0.13

0.056

0.200*

-0.169

5.59

1.87

0.038

0.270**

-0.062 -0.169 -0.122

14.57 3.91 -0.171
4.29 19.46 -0.047
0.39 0.49 0.017

6

7

8

0.167

-0.035
-0.126 -0.046 -0.01 -0.016
0.001
-0.097 -0.031 -0.011 -0.127 -0.029
-0.02 -0.509** -0.102 -0.17 -0.058 0.049 0.127

N= 99; *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

the average share ownership a CEO had in a
firm was 0.59 percent. The average ratio of
independent commissioners was 41 percent,
and the average size of the BOC was five persons. The average firm size in this study was
ln 14.57 while the average leverage ratio was
4.29 times, and 39 of the sample’s firms had
new CEOs.

Table 2 provides the results of the hypotheses testing. Model 1 was the baseline
210

in model 3 was not significant, failing to support Hypothesis 2a. The moderating effect
of CEOs’ ownership in model 4 was not
significant, failing to support Hypothesis 2b.
Thus, CEOs’ power does not have any significant moderating effects.
The moderating effect of the independent commissioners’ ratio in model 5 was
not significant, failing to support Hypothesis
3a. Finally, the size of the BOC was found to

Rizka and Handoko
Table 2. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis
Variables
Testing variables
CEO Hubris
CEO Hubris x CEO Tenure
CEO Hubris x CEO Ownership
CEO Hubris X Independent Commissioner Ratio
CEO Hubris X Commissioner Board Size
Control variables
Firm Size
Leverage Ratio
CEO Succession
CEO Tenure
CEO Ownership
Independent Commissioner Ratio
Commissioner Board Size
R2
F

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

0.249**

0.233**
-0.025

0.233**

0.248**

0.273**

-0.052
-0.004
0.191*
-0.174*
-0.056
0.033

-0.166*
-0.056
0.037

-0.166
-0.057
0.031
-0.016

-0.163
-0.053
0.045

-0.165
-0.056
0.039

-0.165
-0.045
0.025

0.114
0.011
0.033
1.078

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05

strengthen the positive influence of CEOs’
hubris on firms’ performance (β = 0.191; p <
0.1). The moderating effects are depicted in
Figure 4 below.

0.095
2.465

0.096
1.62

0.106
1.811

0.095
1.611

-0.048
0.127
2.234

Robustness Test
To ensure the validity of the results, additional regressions were performed to assess

Figure 4. Firm Performance and CEO Hubris Moderated by Commissioner Board Size

211

Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business - May-August, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2020

the robustness of the reported results. Following J. H. Park et al., (2018), the sample was
reduced to the cases where there had been
no change in the CEO’s position. Thirty-nine
firms that had changed CEOs were eliminated, leaving a sample consisting of only
60 firms. The aim was to find whether there
was a change in the results for the main variables and the moderators after eliminating
some of the sample and one control variable
in the regression (Lu and White, 2014). The
results of the additional hierarchical regression analysis revealed that the new measurements did not make a difference to the level
of significance and the coefficient’s direction
for the independent and moderator variables.
In conclusion, the hypotheses’ testing results
were valid.

Discussion
This study aimed to investigate the negative influence of CEOs’ hubris on firms’
performance in Indonesia, and the moderating effect of CEOs’ power indicated by their
tenure and ownership, and board vigilance
indicated by the independent commissioners’ ratio and the size of the BOC. This study
offered two conclusions: (1) CEOs’ hubris
positively influenced firms’ performances in
Indonesia. (2) Board vigilance, in the form of
the size of the BOC, was found to be effective in increasing the positive influence of the
CEOs’ hubris over their firms’ performances.
First, this study found that CEOs’ hubris
had a positive effect on firms’ performance
in Indonesia. Hubris can either be detrimental or productive to a firm’s performance depending on the capital markets’ conditions
(J. H. Park et al., 2018). The positive result is
quite interesting as the previous study by J. H.
Park et al., (2018) found that in a weak capital market hubristic CEOs entrenched their
212

positions by pursuing self-interest projects
that contributed to their firms’ negative performances. However, this argument does not
apply in Indonesia according to the empirical
findings in this study.
This interesting result is caused by the
ASEAN Economic Community that posed
a significant external threat to Indonesian
firms. Faced with the high external pressure
of takeovers, hubristic CEOs in this study
entrenched their positions by increasing their
firms’ value (Hirshleifer et al., 2012; J. H. Park
et al., 2018). In addition, the sample firms’
average length of tenure for their CEOs of
6.5 years indicated that most CEOs in this
study only served for one leadership period
and either quit or were dismissed during their
second. Thus, these CEOs needed to gain the
trust of their boards by making more investments that would enhance their firms’ future
performance (McClelland et al., 2012; J. H.
Park et al., 2018).
Moreover, Indonesian culture emphasizes a high power distance and collectivism within the culture (Koo and Park, 2018; Suhoyo
et al., 2014). Although a CEO has the highest
position in the management team, Indonesia’s
collectivist cultural dimension limits the CEO
from being overconfident, to the extent that
they rarely can claim “I did this,” as is often
exhibited in Western culture (Koo and Park,
2018). Within a culture that focuses on collectivism, a good relationship among each board
member is very important, thus, a CEO must
be accepted by the boards of directors and
commissioners (Koo and Park, 2018; J. H.
Park et al., 2018; Suhoyo et al., 2014). In other
words, a CEO must belong to the firm and be
accepted by the boards; some of the CEOs in
this study might be considered to be “new additions” by the boards and need to prove their
capabilities to be accepted. Hence, CEOs’ hu-

Rizka and Handoko

bris in this study resulted in positive influences on their firms’ performance.
The empirical results in this study
showed that neither CEOs’ tenure nor CEOs’
ownership imposed any statistical significance
when moderating the influence of hubris on
firms’ performance in Indonesia; although it
was argued that the increase in managerial capabilities during the year increased the CEOs’
power in the firms (Kinicki and Fugate, 2018;
Wang et al., 2016). The empirical finding in
this study found that tenure does not increase
the CEOs’ power. The average tenure of Indonesian CEOs in this study was about 6.5
years, whereas the previous study in South
Korea found it to be 3.5 years (J. H. Park et
al., 2018). Despite the higher average length
of tenure and data spread, non-significant results were found in both studies. It is not clear
why tenure is not significant, likewise the previous study by J. H. Park et al., (2018) cannot
explain this finding. Thus, this finding implies
that tenure is not a suitable measurement of
CEOs’ power.
Moreover, the insignificant result for
the variable CEOs’ ownership was due to the
very small share percentage the CEOs owned
in this study. As presented in Table 1, the average percentage of CEOs’ ownership was
0.59 percent, which is very low in comparison to the study by J. H. Park et al., (2018)
which found ownership to be 38.2 percent.
The sample used by J. H. Park et al., (2018)
consisted of blockholder CEOs who owned
more than five percent of the shares and were
members of the founder families (i.e Chaebol),
hence their high share percentage. Therefore, share ownership’s percentage is not an
appropriate measurement of CEOs’ power
for Indonesian firms, since most Indonesian
CEOs only own a very small percentage of
the shares in their firms.

The empirical results in this study
showed that the independent commissioners’ ratio did not significantly moderate the
positive influence of hubris on firms’ performance in Indonesia. The insignificant result
is quite interesting since the sample data’s
mean value of 41.14 percent and a standard
deviation of 13.10 percent were higher than
the previous study (M = 0.318, SD = 0.149)
(J. H. Park et al., 2018). One possible cause
of this insignificance is because an increase
in the size of the BOC is not always followed
by an increase in the number of independent members, to maintain the 30 percent
level as required by the OJK. This argument
is further strengthened by the Pearson correlation’s result between the independent
commissioners’ ratio and the commissioners’
board size (r = -0.122, p > 0.05). Moreover,
the independent commissioners’ data in this
study ranged from 17 percent to 80 percent,
which meant that there were firms which had
less than the required 30 percent of independent commissioners.
This study found board vigilance, in the
form of the size of the BOC, was effective
in increasing the positive influence CEOs’
hubris had on firms’ performance. Initial
studies had only considered board vigilance
in the form of CEO-duality and the independent directors’ representation (J. H. Park et
al., 2018) on the boards, without taking into
account the boards’ sizes. This study proved
that a bigger BOC was effective in preventing
the CEOs from pursuing non-value investments.
A bigger BOC is more independent in
exercising rigorous monitoring and helping
the CEO with the strategic decision-making
process, to make sure that every investment
will yield positive results. Thus, when hubris
contributes to firm performance, a vigilant
213

Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business - May-August, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2020

board significantly increases the positive influence of hubris. In addition, some of the
sample’s CEOs only served for one period,
in which they had to gain their boards’ trust.
These new CEOs, who lacked power, were
under constant pressure to prove their capabilities to their boards and shareholders. This
finding specifically explains that a bigger
board is important for the growth of firms
and for preventing the financial distress that
often comes from a CEO’s hubris.

Conclusion
This study agrees that CEOs’ hubris
research must be approached by taking into
account the country-specific context (J. H.
Park et al., 2018). The establishment of the
AEC was initially thought not to pose any
significant threats to the Indonesian capital
markets, yet it imposed such a threat that
hubristic CEOs secured their positions by
efficiently managing their firms’ ROA as an
anti-takeover strategy. This maneuver produced a positive influence on their firms’
performances and such external threats must
be taken into account when approaching
CEOs’ hubris. The results also indicate that
Indonesian CEOs should be more hubristic,
in other words, these CEOs should be more
confident in their decision-making abilities
when taking on big projects and investments,
since they will contribute to the shareholders’
wealth. In addition, the financial authorities
and the Government of Indonesia (GoI)
should put more effort into making the capital markets more active. This would motivate
the CEOs to manage their firms’ assets and
profits more efficiently, and thus, more people will invest in Indonesian firms.
Second, board vigilance is indeed important in managing CEOs’ hubris. Specifically, this study found a large BOC strength214

ens the positive influence of CEOs’ hubris;
although agency theorists argue that a big
board is inefficient. However, this study
found that a large BOC is effective in managing the positive influence of CEOs’ hubris. A big board with members from various disciplines and with varied knowledge is
effective in preventing CEOs from pursuing
value-destroying investments, and they can
easily monitor and identify the CEOs’ motives. All in all, the results of this study shed
some light on widening the CEOs’ hubris
research stream by providing external validity and a different approach to investigating
CEOs’ hubris in the two-tier corporate governance setting.

Limitation
Although this study explored the influence of CEOs’ hubris on firms’ performance
in Indonesia by considering the moderating
variables of CEOs’ power and board vigilance, this study faced several limitations and
thus suggests some useful recommendations
for future research. First, this study disregarded the CEOs’ media praise in obtaining the
CEOs’ hubris measure, as explained in the
section covering the research method. Based
on the initial study by Hayward and Hambrick (1997), CEOs’ hubris is formerly built
on the three indices: media praise, awards
given, and the CEOs’ self-confidence. Therefore, to obtain an impartial measurement of
CEOs’ hubris, a situational assessment in the
form of the media’s reaction is necessary.
Second, in capturing CEOs’ power, this
study only relied on the previous approach
used in the study by Park et al., (2018). CEOs’
power comes from their position and expertise, therefore the power indicator may be
approached through observable upper echelon characteristics such as age, education,

Rizka and Handoko

and career experiences, to open new research
grounds for the CEOs’ hubris research
stream.

sophisticated manner; therefore, the external
validity of the CEOs’ hubris theory could be
further strengthened.

All in all, future studies should explore
more determinants that can capture hubris,
CEOs’ power, and boards’ vigilance in a more

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Appendix
Diction Result
No.

Unique
Words

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

580
332
431
1,384
254
67
138
1,073
632
134
1,589
219
671
26
1,229
256
178
1,876
147
79
1,400
320
183
369
683
465
377
1,207
197
681
143
636
587
528
171
325

NuAmbivamerical
lence
Terms
0.18
8.97
5.11
8.65
0.73
9.89
1.6
14.1
0.62
10.54
7.09
9.97
0
6.69
1.26
6.16
2.22
4.98
0.48
14.29
1.22
2.28
1.78
16.43
1.41
5.77
0
15.62
5.85
16.93
0.5
9.5
2.55
19.13
7.26
4.2
11.28
17.11
3.6
17.99
0.56
7.48
4.52
12.17
1.43
13.32
1.68
11.45
2.64
7.08
0.75
3.47
0
6.19
0.82
131.63
1.15
21.39
0.85
13.74
2.27
4.48
1.79
8.32
5.69
9.6
0.54
7.98
0
5.95
0.5
4.75

Self-reference

Tenacity

Leveling
Terms

Collectives

Praise

4.06
6
3.96
6.23
14.36
5.75
0
3.88
5.7
10.2
11.68
2
9.05
15.62
5.78
3
2.73
13.59
7.45
10.79
3.8
5.09
2.87
7.61
4.81
3.48
5.23
2.71
3.45
1.99
0
5.87
7.35
9.02
1.49
3.35

1.5
1
5.15
1.69
1.5
0
1.67
2.26
2
0
7.72
4.17
3.75
31.25
3.02
1
2.73
1.53
0
3.6
3.9
9.76
0
8.74
1.25
1.5
0.5
0.59
2.3
1.12
1.84
2.13
2.5
2.25
0
6.2

135.05
110.42
125.9
115.53
138
120.69
132.11
126.13
128.49
128.57
115.55
117.71
134.04
125
144.32
66
139.34
146.72
127.38
133.09
128.15
101.56
118.91
126.98
120.62
150.08
144.49
191.47
140.23
129.06
123.16
129.43
139.32
136.08
156.25
129.11

0.25
0
0.59
0.03
2.5
0
1.67
0.44
0.5
4.08
36.28
1.04
1.56
0
2.81
0
2.73
8
0
0
7.02
0
1.43
0.5
3.94
0.25
0.5
0.81
3.45
0.5
7.35
0.5
1.11
0.25
0
0

11.38
6.15
1.5
5.38
8.18
5.75
3.34
5.51
7.23
12.24
10.99
11.46
6.31
0
4.55
4
8.2
2.89
3.8
7.19
4.47
7.09
11.46
7.24
8.13
3.25
6.59
3.66
9.19
4.5
5.51
6.01
3.11
3.5
7.44
6.7

Satisfaction
4.53
18.44
4.43
11.51
2.5
9.65
14.52
3.39
11.22
6.12
2.51
3.12
3.56
10.62
6.31
44.67
11.86
4.51
3.8
10.79
4.26
9.51
11
5.37
8.33
3.75
10.05
2.63
6.9
3.96
3.68
4.68
1.17
5.93
5.48
4.19

219

Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business - May-August, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2020
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

220

1,318
574
342
1,009
123
495
471
363
1,262
448
501
1,418
692
1,295
704
2,915
129
269
137
213
529
854
1,100
1,374
155
190
485
243
372
238
845
110
582
283
743
796
64
804
1,327
290
677

1.32
11.34
3.33
3.21
5.33
1.76
4.3
3.62
2.34
1.95
0.6
2.6
3.74
4.18
0.9
3.36
2.83
0.35
0
2.02
8.96
1.89
4.11
2.04
1.32
3.1
0.75
1.12
7.14
0
2.41
2.23
12.45
1.5
0.4
2.48
8.53
2
2.12
6.05
2.12

7.45
6.5
13.03
5.49
6.64
7.81
5.81
7.93
6.03
9.98
5.94
6.84
14.49
11.49
4.58
5.09
17.74
5.22
4.55
17.2
3.68
6.24
6.41
4.34
5.22
29.41
4.73
4.53
4.07
9.34
7.05
2.23
11.06
10.45
10.49
8.77
4.27
5.67
10.51
7.18
9.81

8.77
3.44
1.5
6.55
6.64
6.54
6.23
7.93
6.49
5.94
3.48
4.72
7.26
5.33
1.73
3.38
11.47
12.04
4.55
2.15
2.98
3.33
6.72
4.53
6.89
12.38
3.25
3
2
7.69
6.25
2.23
6.27
4
9.8
5.81
0
4.47
5.62
5
5.76

1.25
2.25
2.61
2.94
2.21
4.53
2
0
0.31
3.99
1
0.77
2.53
3.41
1.25
0.26
0
2.5
4.55
0
1.75
1.5
1.12
2.22
1.4
1.55
2.75
2
3.07
2.2
3.12
4.46
8.07
1.5
5.32
0.75
0
4.5
2.85
5.93
0.56

115.26
127.25
143.72
154.42
163.72
122.16
111.01
167.04
126.86
105.49
119.81
147.68
133.66
119.41
136.43
140.3
121.56
160.53
128.79
144.09
137.32
138.03
147.77
126.03
116.25
111.46
109.5
63
113.89
117.58
147.49
133.93
140.68
107.55
138.49
160.91
156.98
151.61
123.29
134.47
136.16

3.01
0.75
5.43
0.94
4.43
0.5
1.76
3.81
10.92
0
1.75
1.88
2.07
2.26
0.88
0.8
0
1.5
0
1.08
0.25
0.12
0.81
3.6
0
3.1
0.5
1.5
0
3.3
0.25
4.46
0.5
2.5
1.97
0.25
0
0
0.69
1.5
1.06

4
3.5
4
7.53
4.43
5.05
7.55
4.25
4.05
8.48
3.25
4.7
10.18
6.98
3.12
5.92
6.88
7
10.61
7.53
6.1
5.29
5.9
3.81
16.81
4.64
4.75
2.5
6.14
6.59
4.86
4.46
6.02
3.5
2.25
5.2
0
5.56
2.85
4.31
6.07

3.31
2.83
2.34
3.73
5.93
9.38
12.93
4.15
2.52
5.32
10.19
4.95
4.04
3.65
9.41
2.96
3.85
6
7.09
10.75
6.6
8.6
3.45
3.72
5.15
5.7
34.98
25
11.43
4.04
4.32
4.46
9.24
12.15
4.35
4.22
0
5.15
8.51
4.62
3.43

Rizka and Handoko
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

146
61
132
664
197
113
273
360
296
136
727
90
360
1,614
296
136
2,800
898
2,111
16,765
75
133

1.89
4.23
4.22
1.73
0.47
1.22
6.88
0.35
0.5
3.89
0.91
4.5
0.35
4.53
0.5
3.89
10.51
3.33
12.29
7.83
5.06
0.47

6.9
6.02
3.12
8.49
2
15.62
2.62
8.57
7.81
4.57
2.79
0
8.57
4.7
7.81
4.57
10.71
13.1
7.03
4.84
3.01
5.45

No.

Inspiration

Blame

Hardship

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

1.43
0.5
2.78
3.04
2.5
5.75
0
1.41
5.15
2.04
10.98
3.12
3.37
0

1.36
3
0
0.36
0
0
0
0
1.83
0
0.57
0
0.65
0

6.72
8.47
3.78
6.49
2.5
0
1.67
3.82
10.72
2.04
3.55
1.04
3.71
0

2.01
6.02
9.35
5.91
2
2.6
7.48
5.79
6.12
13.7
7.45
3.65
5.79
6.36
6.12
13.7
9.76
4.92
9.56
5.16
4.1
1.99

0
0
1.56
2.14
1.5
2.6
2.5
1.37
0.5
2.28
1.25
0
1.37
1.56
0.5
2.28
2.94
1.75
0.94
2.54
0
3.98

128.51
150.6
130.84
149.65
78.5
114.58
123.12
114.59
138.72
130.14
163.33
124.09
114.59
155.38
138.72
130.14
157.81
138.43
110.22
113.97
135.25
157.37

0
0
0
1.75
0.5
0
1
0.5
0.5
0
0.38
0
0.5
3.01
0.5
0
5.48
3.5
14.52
4.33
0
1.99

AcComAggres- comCogni- Pasmunision
plishtion sivity
cation
ment
15.31
3.47
1.43
11.92 23.48
17.77
8.3
0
13.35 33.47
3.91
2.18
0.59
23.46 59.39
9.84
6.25
2.36
20.07 26.37
10.18
1
1.5
49.27 24.75
11.49
5.75
0
0 17.24
13.77
1.67
0
23.41 33.44
5.22
0.69
0.91
16.57 48.92
11.63
7.3
1.58
22.58 19.9
20.41
4.08
2.04
8.16 18.37
3.69
0.91
0.98
14.96 21.36
12.5
3.12
0
17.71 56.25
9.63
2.56
1.31
29.31 23.3
15.62
0
0
31.25 31.25

10.04
6.02
10.9
7.32
2
13.02
4
9.46
6.43
9.13
6.79
0
9.46
4.88
6.43
9.13
2.54
13.35
0.75
2.44
0
5.98

5.38
16.15
3.12
11.03
1.84
14.79
5.25
6.89
3.65
15.98
6.54
10.95
6.89
5.27
3.65
15.98
5.26
0.12
6.24
9.04
2.79
5.34

Spatial
Terms

Familiarity

1.5
1
3.96
1.63
4
11.49
1.67
2.1
2.83
3.37
0.85
0
1.25
0

38.24
31.95
37.05
25.46
47.23
17.24
40.13
39.5
44.57
55.1
26.96
46.88
39.69
31.25

221

Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business - May-August, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2020
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16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

222

7.09
1
4.1
3.87
1.9
0
8.2
1
2.87
2.5
3.94
2
5.46
0.75
1.15
2.12
5.51
0
1.75
4.21
4.46
4.5
2.22
3
4.61
2.02
4.43
6.54
4.03
2.31
5.11
5.49
5.22
5.78
6.66
1.59
2.25
1.31
2.29
10.08
4.55

0
1
0
0.06
0
0
0.59
0
0
0
3.98
0.25
0
0.09
0
0.12
1.84
0.25
0.86
0
0
0
0.31
0.75
0
0
2.21
0
1.5
0
0.5
3.24
0
0.14
0.25
0.44
0.5
2.66
0
0.5
0

5.21
3
10.93
6.51
5.7
3.6
3.83
4
2.87
4.87
2.27
2.75
10.19
4.66
3.45
3.75
5.51
10.76
8.53
13.06
4.46
5.6
5.12
3
2
5.3
2.21
13.09
8.81
3.62
3.09
4.24
4.47
8.13
4.7
7.91
2.62
7.73
9.17
1
4.55

7.89
1.5
8.65
7.86
17.01
25.18
13.87
6.09
8.6
11.38
6.53
6.56
10.82
4.36
10.35
3.4
1.64
6.86
3.14
5.18
19.49
5.07
8.81
5.34
5.22
4.63
4.43
7.26
9.19
8.25
11.05
9.81
11.28
10.79
3.01
17.82
23.38
8.09
20.39
2.17
10.61

2.48
1.5
2.73
0.4
5.7
7.19
0.41
7.17
2.87
2.18
2.69
0.75
1.37
0.88
0
10.63
3.68
2.13
1.61
5.43
2.98
1.85
3.32
11.25
1
1.44
2.21
4.05
5.27
1.81
4.57
3.98
14.39
0.91
2.35
8.95
1.38
5.95
2.29
1
0

0.28
1
0
1.9
0
0
0.2
0.5
0
1.18
0.65
0.5
0
0.91
0
0.12
0
1.63
2.46
1
0
0.5
3.1
1
1.11
0.69
0
1.01
1
1.81
4.14
0
0
0.8
1.82
0.31
0.25
0.57
0
0.5
0

31.35
10
16.39
29.16
30.42
10.79
26.44
20.26
21.49
19.12
16.89
9.7
35.34
13.82
20.69
11.98
39.75
27.16
36.16
21.36
22.32
22.22
12.39
9.45
27.08
17.43
22.12
18.84
15.26
19.62
17.16
15.66
18.89
20.97
36.28
16.44
20.78
22.44
11.47
24.61
10.61

16.84
19.5
5.46
13.29
13.31
57.55
55.32
7
57.31
32.22
21.73
9
25.09
13.39
25.29
13.62
14.71
40.52
29.92
19.42
22.32
35.07
23.16
10.5
51.5
13.49
17.7
15.56
16.03
28.24
21.93
20.97
28.22
18.36
14.45
17.41
17.62
11.69
16.06
46.97
71.21

0.84
0
0
3.39
0
0
1.66
0
5.73
1.68
2.69
0.75
1
1.5
0
1.16
0
3.19
4.34
0.75
1.49
9.41
0.75
0.75
5.82
3.86
2.21
4.03
1
0.81
5.18
0.5
1.91
3.76
5.7
1
1.25
3.72
0
2.5
0

35.88
23.89
59.13
33.89
23.36
39.57
38.01
54.41
38.68
42.22
32.4
22.05
43.06
16.79
44.83
38.71
18.38
29.23
30.77
36.29
39.31
35.35
37.03
25.51
26.56
27.34
19.91
37.1
39.24
29.5
33.36
54.85
35.83
34.89
28.5
35.61
52.75
39.09
50.46
25.16
37.88

Rizka and Handoko
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

5.38
1.75
4.41
4.67
1.56
1.4
1.55
1.75
2
5.14
12.09
2.12
3.35
4.77
2
7.3
4.31
5.81
6.88
1.12
3.31
1
0
0
3.12
2.52
2.5
0
4
1
2
0
3.25
3.65
1
3.3
2
0
3.99
2.12
3.07

0
0
1.83
0.5
0.47
0
0
0.25
0
0.5
0
0.62
2.23
0
0
0.12
0.64
0
0
2.16
0.5
1.56
0
6.02
0
0
0
0
3.48
1
0
0
0.38
0
1
0.78
0
0
0.32
0.38
1.37

5.38
15.55
10.79
6.81
7.02
5.6
3.1
2
3
17.43
3.3
5.37
6.7
5.55
4
4.1
5.12
0
10.44
8.58
3.81
7.39
8.03
0
12.46
4.81
1.5
7.81
10.43
9.82
2
6.85
22.04
7.3
9.82
6.96
2
6.85
8.79
6.87
6.86

6.93
17.12
8.45
6.79
2.22
7
6.19
4.58
30.72
14.19
4.89
8.8
7.69
4.49
8.95
6.43
5.92
11.63
5.32
5.78
7.31
16.41
6.02
6.02
0
10.17
2.5
13.02
10.4
5.8
9.33
12.43
14.24
7.3
5.8
6.15
9.33
12.43
4.84
0.54
1.2

2.15
4.85
5.62
1.25
4.33
0
1.55
2
0.5
7.79
1.1
2.12
4.46
0.5
2.58
0.62
3.08
5.81
4.41
6.17
1
6.08
0
6.02
3.12
2.91
0.5
5.21
10.43
4.32
2.5
2.28
2
10.95
4.32
1.12
2.5
2.28
2.6
0.62
2.48

0
1.5
0
0.12
0.66
0
3.1
0.75
1
0.5
0
0.62
0
1
0
0.25
0.89
0
2.94
1.62
0.5
1.38
0
0
0
0.75
0
0
0.5
2.5
1.5
0
0.75
0
2.5
0.67
1.5
0
8.22
2.12
20.83

37.63
12.83
30.5
28.31
22.11
15.41
13.7
9
11
20.62
23.08
24.69
33.48
19
28.54
31.74
20.97
11.63
27.24
18.47
18.87
27.23
18.07
12.05
20.25
28.34
15.7
20.83
24.85
25.21
16.25
9.13
19.3
32.85
25.21
28.4
16.25
9.13
15.99
21.29
24.55

29.03
22
16.25
9.8
13.92
85.43
18.58
35.17
29
6.5
30.77
31.46
22.32
12.3
70.81
45.67
30.43
17.44
28.66
21.57
48.93
23
30.12
18.07
74.77
15.36
22.5
20.83
17.43
42.92
48.61
36.53
14.5
29.2
42.92
29.87
48.61
36.53
7.01
24.97
1.16

3.92
0.75
3.29
1.31
0.89
4.2
4.64
1.41
2
1.5
1.1
2.62
2.23
0.5
1.5
1.38
2.16
11.63
3.44
1.12
3.31
2.44
2.01
0
1.56
1.5
2
2.6
1
1.37
2
2.28
5.29
0
1.37
3.03
2
2.28
1.32
6.24
3.28

53.76
28.72
41.9
33.97
25.56
39.22
20.12
50.63
42.5
28.88
31.87
39.66
20.09
29.51
27.73
42.24
28.99
17.44
35.11
18.17
29.49
25.04
38.15
36.15
31.15
34.71
21.64
44.27
27.93
22.72
41.74
43.38
57.22
62.04
22.72
26.32
41.74
43.38
7.96
20.79
5.89

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99

No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

224

3.67
0
1.99

17.76
0
1.99

TemPresent
poral
Concern
Terms
10.44
10.49
3.83
17.27
4.28
13.31
7.84
11.27
7.68
33.66
11.49
12.18
5.02
12.33
10.9
6.4
8.97
2.04
14.16
7.29
8.68
0
9.97
4
8.2
16.04
5.7
0
10.06
5.59
2.87
3.18
6
2.5
9.65
3.86
5.75
11.01
7.35
8.66
7.46

22.15
20.41
6.06
12.85
22.1
0
21.01
2.5
23.1
22.27
15.92
17.99
10.43
10.09
7.16
12.25
7.36
20.25
27.58
133.93
19.54
19.7
24.82
17.74
24.45

2.98
4.1
1.99

0.92
4.1
1.99

0.82
4.1
0

3.04
0
0

6.73
16.39
27.89

14.49
81.97
11.95

1.57
0
3.98

6.28
24.59
55.78

Human
Interest

Concreteness

Past Concern

Centrality

Rapport

Cooperation

0.5
2.5
3
0.75
7.18
0
1.67
2.03

10.16
8.15
5.92
7.21
1.5
8.62
11.71
12.21

4.13
3.33
1.59
5.1
7.68
0
1.67
4.49

2.24
5.15
0.5
5.23
2.5
0
1.67
1.86

6.8
7.58
2.23
8.73
18.71
10.14
2.46
5.82

1.43
0.5
0.59
0.81
1.5
0
0
1.38

1
0
2.51
3.12
2.15
15.62
2.49
1.5
4.1
2.67
1.9
0
2.68
3.09
0
2.68
0.25
1
1
1.56
2.3
0.5
0
3.38
4.82

6.74
4.08
9.59
9.38
5.81
0
7.5
50.17
6.83
2.88
3.8
7.19
9.4
12.67
4.3
16.79
8.08
3.75
6.73
3.84
5.75
34.28
28.49
8.07
6.5

10.59
8.16
2.92
6.25
2.15
0
6.79
3.74
4.1
5.95
3.8
0
1.94
6.76
3.58
4.7
11.03
2.41
8.6
4.03
3.45
2.99
8.27
2.42
4.9

3.69
2.04
0.45
1.04
0.38
0
0.31
2
0
0.3
4.75
7.19
2.92
1.25
1.43
1.6
2.45
0.82
1.82
0.77
0
1.12
1.84
2.82
3.21

6.68
9.72
3.86
10.92
3.93
0
4.89
3.8
10.07
2.09
1.9
0
7.19
19.61
9.69
5.18
9.33
2.44
3.13
2.86
8.93
13.46
14.1
5.76
2.86

0.66
0
0.05
2.08
2.56
15.62
0.78
0
0
0.74
0
0
0.06
0.5
1.43
0.5
2.83
0.25
1
0.75
0
0.62
0
0.75
2.5

Rizka and Handoko
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

4.96
2.98
9.56
5.1
5.25
6.53
7.77
2.21
4.03
6.53
5.78
9.68
7.98
14.67
7.12
3.37
7.36
3.88
10.47
2.29
3
1.51
2.15
3
5.79
14.01
5.44
3.5
6.19
3
7.5
9.79
6.59
4.73
8.93
16.11
4.08
3.12
3.29
0
6.06

15.46
24.36
16.76
12.24
10.52
16.24
19.4
24.65
14.69
7.49
20.24
15.83
14.2
20.68
20.53
16.36
7.44
19.23
17.25
18.35
13.77
19.7
26.56
15.28
24.56
20.25
11.78
14.01
5.42
4.72
12.36
18.53
13.19
19.63
30.12
18.68
6.5
27.75
16.92
34.88
21.49

0
1.49
6.7
1.28
1.5
1.5
2.2
0
5.04
2.5
2
0.94
4.49
1
1.27
4.73
0.31
1.38
3.09
4.59
1
4.55
2.15
2.25
2.58
0.38
4.74
1.4
0
0.25
0.5
1.57
1.1
2.74
0
1.5
0.5
2.22
1.39
0
2.75

3.62
11.9
21.61
14.68
7.25
12.07
13.13
12.17
7.55
7.79
7.25
6.85
13.22
16.94
4.97
21.31
15.05
3.81
4.45
3.44
4
24.24
15.05
6.47
10.08
12.49
19.6
22.41
20.12
4.38
6
11.15
13.19
11.23
6.7
9.8
12.65
6.14
12.69
20.35
8.63

4.28
2.98
6.7
14.99
3.39
2.83
4.3
11.06
7.79
5.11
10.18
5.87
2.97
1.64
9.29
4.28
6.35
3.01
6.59
0
2.45
1.51
2.21
11.57
7.54
7.8
7.82
0
3.1
1.74
4.25
10.13
9.89
7.03
4.46
5.64
3.5
9.25
5.77
0
8.03

2.46
1.49
1
3.44
1
1.33
3.02
1.44
1.83
1.26
1.81
4.57
1.25
7.86
0.7
5.5
5.44
1.04
6.56
0
4
0
2.15
7.4
2.21
0.49
4.41
0
0
0.75
1.5
4.11
0
1.12
2.23
3.27
0.5
0.42
3.13
0
1.6

7.53
5.7
5.23
10.8
4.4
2
7.26
4.43
7.59
8.22
2.8
3.54
11.17
9.86
5.36
6.83
7.83
2.8
3.99
4.05
7.41
11.51
7.53
5.77
7
7.7
9.57
3.96
4.64
21.7
3.34
8.52
7.69
4.24
2.23
4.3
4.63
2.91
3.62
0
7.69

0.75
0
4.7
6.83
1
3
1
0
2.51
2.26
0.5
0.94
0.75
1.75
0.44
2.57
0.47
0.38
0.17
0
1.5
3.03
0
1.5
0.88
2.01
1.53
2.8
10.84
0.75
1
0.5
4.4
2.25
0
1.25
6.58
2.6
0.88
5.81
3.94

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79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

7.27
10.06
7.39
8.03
0
1.56
8.54
5
10.42
3.98
10.56
10.25
6.85
10.83
7.3
10.56
9.87
10.25
6.85
2.18
5.87
2.76
0.59
0
3.98

10.25
17.37
16.5
18.16
20.32
17.13
23.45
12.19
17.44
22.31
13.54
18.24
24.53
18.56
36.5
13.54
24.69
18.24
24.53
8.77
3.99
0.77
3.57
12.3
25.9

1.36
2.81
0.81
4.02
0
1.56
0.25
1
0
0.5
0.87
4.62
4.57
1.38
3.65
0.87
0.93
4.62
4.57
1.22
6.86
2.09
0.63
0
0

No.

Diversity

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

0
3.65
1
0.12
0.5
0
1.67
0.65
0
0
0
0

Exclusion
13.76
7.79
15.14
17.73
4.5
11.49
10.03
16.24
14.71
14.29
10.04
8.65

Libera- Denition
al
0.25
1.68
0
2.33
1.18
1
0.03
2.54
0
1
0
5.75
0
0
1.16
0.38
0.25
0.5
0
0
0.02
0.98
1.04
1.04

226

13.52
18.56
12.52
20.08
12.05
15.58
7.55
8.5
3.91
16.45
13.32
18.81
18.26
15.33
29.2
13.32
5.17
18.81
18.26
17.35
13.72
8.31
10.52
24.59
15.94

Motion
15.17
22.25
2.09
43.38
11.86
11.49
6.69
1.81
22.66
4.08
0.8
11.46

6.07
4.99
8.96
0
6.02
3.12
4.32
1
0
5.95
7.01
1.5
6.85
2.54
7.3
7.01
7.38
1.5
6.85
11.31
11.23
13.83
5.9
4.1
3.98

6.34
1
3.79
0
6.02
0
3.66
0
0
8.94
2.73
0
0
0.62
0
2.73
1.05
0
0
9.11
15.43
24.94
11.8
4.1
0

8.18
2.84
3.76
9.03
6.02
3.12
4.5
2
4.76
2.5
6.76
6.96
9.13
15.55
3.65
6.76
2.64
6.96
9.13
7.54
8.04
5.25
8.49
4.1
3.98

1.06
1
1.06
2.01
0
0
0.64
1.5
2.6
0
1.73
1
0
0.12
0
1.73
0.11
1
0
1.18
2
0.91
1.39
0
5.98

Insistence
63.16
55.58
47.94
58.88
34.71
5.75
159.2
106.97
65.68
145.71
214.28
59.58

EmbelVariety
lishment
0.94
0.43
3.97
0.58
1.15
0.46
1.8
0.51
0.27
0.6
0.85
0.77
3.57
0.46
0.72
0.48
0.85
0.48
0.57
0.55
0.85
0.51
0.71
0.46

Complexity
5.34
5.24
5.2
5.07
5.13
5.6
5.1
5.05
5.35
5.7
5.61
5.1

Rizka and Handoko
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14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

0.5
15.62
0.28
0.5
0
0
0
0
1.21
7.67
0
0
1.15
0.5
0
0
0
0
0
0.94
0
0
0
0
0
0.25
0
0
0
0.51
1.51
0
1.42
2.24
10.92
0.3
1.6
4.93
0
0.51
0

12.71
0
12.6
6.8
20.49
16.99
10.27
26.62
14.56
10.76
17.19
10.16
15.79
10.1
13.86
8.76
14.37
8.94
8.27
16.13
10.25
5.3
17.86
17.11
14.73
9.05
11.32
20.05
12.84
19.38
14.93
17.82
17.36
11.83
9.19
19.7
20.92
7.35
8.75
16.53
14.68

0
0
0.16
0
1.37
1.43
1.9
0
0.47
0
1.43
0.5
0.25
0.25
0
0
0
0.38
0
0.5
0.5
4.43
0
0
0
0.75
1
0.06
0
0
0
0.5
0.06
0.5
1.5
2.78
1.32
0.09
1
1.75
0

1.15
0
1.43
1
2.73
0.61
0
0
0.25
0.5
1.43
0
4.38
1.25
1.37
0.06
1.15
10.51
5.51
1.88
0.5
2.46
0
1
1.16
1
1.61
1.89
0
1.53
1.26
0.81
3.14
0.5
0.5
0.41
0.5
1.12
1
0.18
0

5.18
31.25
5.64
0.5
12.3
1.74
13.31
7.19
0.75
26.93
21.49
12.92
21.25
8.5
3.6
5.72
5.75
40.66
16.54
7.07
2.25
10.6
4.46
10.2
33.77
57.5
8.43
6.61
13.27
22.74
26.42
2.5
17.8
14.94
31.83
10.24
1.85
18.35
17.78
15.15
9.17

83.21
0
208.55
41.3
116.8
198.61
145.44
66.19
96.98
23.4
102.29
90.46
78.58
59.42
139.18
33.05
83.68
55.71
215.07
93.34
205.11
84.46
178.57
79.15
50.61
17.8
101.95
87.46
94.91
108.55
63.08
130.49
106.08
65.64
45.13
62.52
147.46
68.04
34.95
86.32
82.57

1.26
11.62
0.94
42.58
2.79
0.62
1.4
11.79
1.26
1.39
1.3
1.09
0.95
1.1
1.05
0.82
1.77
0.99
0.5
0.95
0.29
1.95
1.18
0.36
0.4
0.93
0.68
0.51
0.49
0.82
2.08
0.44
0.39
1.51
8.19
0.62
0.55
0.89
8.42
0.5
4.85

0.52
0.81
0.49
0.75
0.49
0.43
0.56
0.57
0.44
0.62
0.52
0.55
0.49
0.67
0.5
0.74
0.45
0.67
0.53
0.49
0.45
0.54
0.51
0.55
0.61
0.7
0.47
0.48
0.54
0.5
0.57
0.45
0.53
0.55
0.57
0.57
0.49
0.56
0.61
0.52
0.59

5.59
5.53
5.77
5.61
5.39
5.47
5.49
4.93
5.07
5.65
4.88
5.32
5.21
4.93
5.38
5.11
5.52
5.05
5.3
5.18
5.2
5.3
5.3
5.2
5.2
4.86
5.01
5.2
4.87
5.32
5.51
5.11
5.2
5.66
4.93
5.08
5.04
5.51
5.34
5.34
5.63

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73
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79
80
81
82
83
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85
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0
0
0
0.5
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0.25
0
0
0.77
0
0.12
1.17
0.5
3.39
0
0
0
0.64
0
0
0.5
2.6
0.5
0
0.5
0
2.6
0.03
0.5
0
16.54

8.4
6.06
14.52
14.5
13.82
17.4
22.15
4.9
19.97
30.33
1.5
7.56
16.38
17.97
31.25
10.95
7.48
24.2
11.74
17.44
14.61
18.94
8.31
20.55
14.06
12.05
16.98
13.48
7.95
25.78
12.98
13.77
18.77
7.76
9.01
10.95
13.77
15.52
18.77
7.76
33.99

0
0
0
4.1
1.71
0.12
0
1.4
0
0.75
0.5
1.57
0
1.25
0
0.75
0.5
0
0.25
0
0.25
1.19
0.5
0.25
2.01
0
0
1.14
0
2.6
1
0
1
2.28
0
0
0
1.22
1
2.28
0.52

0
0
3.23
1
3.91
0.94
2.76
0
0
1.25
1
1
2.2
1.49
0
2.52
1
0.25
0.38
0
1
2.16
1
0.75
4.02
0
0
1.5
0.5
0
1
0.87
0
0
0.5
3.65
0.87
0.48
0
0
4.91

3
3.03
7.53
31.69
17.91
26.5
36.04
4.2
32.51
31.17
1
13.36
9.89
8.84
8.93
8.57
1
0.75
9.25
17.44
9.16
28.82
0.5
6.76
4.02
6.02
12.46
7.93
1.5
18.23
18.36
28.63
1
6.85
16.88
18.25
28.63
1.7
1
6.85
32.7

38.26
260
109.89
22.05
114.06
85.8
40.38
78.99
52.63
25.8
64.6
56.66
97.25
77.67
140.62
46.53
105.1
92.99
61.12
10.47
51.13
29.2
124.24
96.5
79.52
14.46
269.16
45.76
56.7
74.48
63.18
156.24
86.61
57.76
53
20.44
156.24
126.85
86.61
57.76
19.41

1.1
3.22
1.65
0.84
0.93
0.46
0.4
1.45
0.77
34.25
25.57
0.99
0.42
0.65
0.71
1.73
11.07
0.57
0.68
0.08
0.58
1.41
0.69
0.38
2.79
2.44
0.73
2.26
0.83
5.1
1.53
0.83
2.73
1.9
0.86
1.44
0.83
0.83
2.73
1.9
0.55

0.57
0.41
0.46
0.63
0.52
0.5
0.58
0.43
0.59
0.74
0.73
0.61
0.52
0.49
0.49
0.61
0.53
0.49
0.44
0.74
0.51
0.54
0.52
0.48
0.59
0.74
0.41
0.48
0.7
0.59
0.57
0.48
0.51
0.62
0.6
0.66
0.48
0.39
0.51
0.62
0.52

5.09
4.89
5.12
5.07
5.39
5.25
5.09
4.88
4.91
5.17
6.4
5.37
5.42
5.28
4.94
5.52
5.3
5.08
4.97
4.88
5.13
5.09
5
5.39
5.12
5.32
4.96
5.27
5.56
5.3
5.38
5.21
5.02
5.65
5.36
5.26
5.21
5.19
5.02
5.65
4.4

Rizka and Handoko
95
96
97
98
99
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

0
14.35
0.25
0
0

9.47
38.08
33.04
12.3
20.33

Complexity
5.34
5.24
5.2
5.07
5.13
5.6
5.1
5.05
5.35
5.7
5.61
5.1
5.59
5.53
5.77
5.61
5.39
5.47
5.49
4.93
5.07
5.65
4.88
5.32
5.21
4.93
5.38
5.11
5.52
5.05
5.3
5.18
5.2
5.3

0.12
2.69
1.22
0
0
Activity
49.71
42.57
50.73
45.88
46.32
47.94
45.77
50.86
51.19
49.55
49.86
51.17
50.4
33.51
51.92
-36.29
47.76
51.26
49.89
28.31
49.94
46.38
48.88
49.75
49.84
48.92
51.66
48.91
47.57
47.77
47.56
48.38
52.62
46.59

3.12
3.93
2.27
8.2
0

9.61
35.96
19.53
16.39
0

Optimism
54.88
61.74
51.69
56.69
51.95
56.94
57.03
51.09
57.35
55.76
43.36
53.57
52.95
56.04
53.28
63.35
54.66
49.85
55.43
60.65
52.15
56.14
54.69
53.73
53.28
52.09
55.25
51.24
53.1
54.99
50.79
52.45
50.11
51.94

91.91
21.77
11.94
18.03
88.45
Certainty
49.42
44.36
43.59
46.99
46.7
39.33
47.67
44.36
51.88
49.63
48.95
42.83
49.26
30.6
53.48
38.2
56.22
56.46
49.18
42.85
44.63
44.1
42.18
45.43
46.78
45.83
53.29
65.36
50.35
45.24
53.06
48.88
53.34
49.23

0.06
0.56
6.19
0.74
0.71

0.47
0.46
0.68
0.62
0.53

Realism
43.75
42.76
41.94
46.67
47.29
35.5
44.38
43.42
44.81
40.76
39.87
45.58
42.69
44.82
45.85
43.33
45.51
43.03
45.25
44.67
43.94
44.1
43.66
45.26
44.6
43.67
46.3
62.56
45.16
50.26
49.87
43.61
44.88
43.88

5.33
4.2
5.09
4.57
5.32

Commonality
54.72
50.3
47.24
52.81
49.63
56.81
49.8
51.67
51.76
53.52
51.52
51.53
50.77
26.41
51.09
50.29
51.75
52.2
50.76
49.77
49.73
46.89
54.23
46.77
53.24
50.14
53.58
50.16
51.79
57.95
54.04
51.29
48.19
51.74

229

Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business - May-August, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2020
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

230

5.3
5.2
5.2
4.86
5.01
5.2
4.87
5.32
5.51
5.11
5.2
5.66
4.93
5.08
5.04
5.51
5.34
5.34
5.63
5.09
4.89
5.12
5.07
5.39
5.25
5.09
4.88
4.91
5.17
6.4
5.37
5.42
5.28
4.94
5.52
5.3
5.08
4.97
4.88
5.13
5.09

50.19
53.59
51.39
51.78
53.27
49.32
50.04
51.08
48.42
50.84
51.97
49.45
34.87
51.39
51.3
49.35
37.63
51.81
42.5
48.23
44.79
50.67
51.42
50.98
51.23
48.92
50.03
52.31
-21.92
1.38
50.33
52.88
51.87
50.33
50.81
31.53
52.97
50.85
57.2
52.55
46

56.4
52.48
52.2
54.82
49.84
51.82
52.15
55
56.61
51.71
50.87
54.44
59.02
51.72
50.75
57.03
57.06
53.16
55.87
51.77
53.96
54.79
54.46
55.09
52.27
51.8
51.95
51.71
60.92
62.77
57.85
51.54
52.7
53.2
52.75
55.22
52.01
52.82
54.16
52.97
54.41

52.6
46.66
44.71
42.3
45.1
51.98
49.57
52.81
47.04
51.25
48.04
46.65
43.64
49.96
51.7
44.91
45.43
50.32
49.4
40.42
47.83
51.76
46.17
52.87
52.49
47.66
40.91
45.15
39.31
39.18
50.38
47.11
49.31
55.49
46.96
39.33
49.7
48.6
45.13
49.69
46.49

45.34
43.28
47.27
47.01
45.52
44.66
49.44
43.52
42.37
47.59
42.51
41.79
46.01
45.28
47.2
44.55
43.36
43.6
41.2
44.71
45.33
47.86
46.72
45.71
48.44
48.43
43.03
47.7
41.55
32.79
43.82
44.98
45.83
45.38
44.75
43.27
46.7
47.77
43.06
46.28
46.73

51.45
47.72
50.91
49.96
50.88
51.91
49.23
47.77
50.97
51.28
53.63
48.58
53.08
51.53
49.67
51.86
50.12
50.92
49.45
50.23
48.35
52.6
50.34
51.52
54.07
49.41
53.92
51.45
50.56
51.14
51.59
52.42
49.5
49.86
51.84
50.84
47.09
50.47
49.17
49.39
50.11

Rizka and Handoko
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

5
5.39
5.12
5.32
4.96
5.27
5.56
5.3
5.38
5.21
5.02
5.65
5.36
5.26
5.21
5.19
5.02
5.65
4.4
5.33
4.2
5.09
4.57
5.32

51.87
50.26
45.9
46.12
50.1
47.23
50.53
43.28
49.47
48.03
45.95
45.32
48.22
53.08
48.03
50.29
45.95
45.32
48.51
50.14
49.09
36.9
49.56
55.78

52.2
55.55
51.52
57.8
51.68
54.93
50.79
57.3
56.25
53.68
52.59
56.64
54.99
58.29
53.68
51.47
52.59
56.64
49.59
48.66
42.8
50.48
52.79
51.21

45.1
50.52
47.16
40.95
50.5
50.53
41.43
49.5
48.79
48.39
45.58
45.15
51.47
47.32
48.39
54.06
45.58
45.15
48.21
45.04
46.68
42.03
35.21
51.9

45.05
45.85
44.06
45.06
45.29
45.88
36.58
42.35
45.17
46.31
44.9
42.34
44.74
48.76
46.31
45.31
44.9
42.34
53.01
45.36
49.6
42.75
48.85
45.43

49.1
52
54.26
48.74
51.43
53.25
50.07
54.64
49.17
53.73
51.02
50.24
52.79
50.92
53.73
51.88
51.02
50.24
50.93
51.82
50.05
42.9
53.44
49.43

231