

THE CONFLICT DYNAMICS OF AHMADIYYA LOMBOK: PUBLIC SERVICES AND NEGATIVE STIGMA



Abdul Gaffar¹ 

*Correspondence:

Email:
abdulgaffar@uinbukittinggi.ac.id

Author Affiliation:

¹Universitas Islam Negeri
Sjeh M. Djamil Djambek
Bukittinggi, Indonesia

Article History:

Submission: April 18, 2024
Revised: May 24, 2024
Accepted: June 25, 2024
Published: June 30, 2024

Keywords: Ahmadiyya,
Stigma, Public Services,
Conflict, Lombok.

Kata Kunci: Ahmadiyah,
Stigma, Pelayanan Publik,
Konflik, Lombok.

Abstract

The conflict of Ahmadiyya Lombok has advanced significantly since the 1980s when the fatwa of MUI (the Indonesian Ulama Council) was issued. Ahmadiyya Lombok refugees who migrated to the Transito Dormitory faced discrimination and negative stigma, as well as problems acquiring their citizenship rights, including freedom of worship based on their beliefs and limited access to public services. This study aims to answer several critical concerns, including how Ahmadiyya residents have gained access to public services since taking refuge at the Mataram Transito Dormitory, the negative stigmas they have faced, and the deviant assessments they have received. This study employs a qualitative research method using in-depth interviews with the Ahmadiyya Congregation residing at the Transito Dormitory and observations of the Transito Dormitory. The findings reveal that the Ahmadiyah Congregation faced discrimination while residing at the Transito Dormitory, characterized by limited access to public services, negative stigma stemming from heretical fatwa, and perceptions of exclusivity due to their resistance to local community preferences.

Abstrak

Konflik Ahmadiyah Lombok telah menempuh jalan panjang dari tahun 1980an sejak dikeluarkannya Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia. Pengungsi Jamaah Ahmadiyah Lombok yang mengungsi di Asrama Transito mengalami diskriminasi dan stigma negatif, serta sulit memperoleh hak-haknya sebagai warga negara, termasuk kebebasan beribadah sesuai keyakinannya, termasuk secara umum terbatasnya akses terhadap layanan publik. Penelitian ini berupaya menjawab beberapa pertanyaan krusial seperti bagaimana akses pelayanan publik yang didapatkan warga Ahmadiyah sejak mengungsi di Asrama Transito Mataram, bagaimana stigma negatif yang mereka alami, dan penilaian menyimpang yang mereka terima. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dengan menggunakan teknik wawancara mendalam kepada Jemaah Ahmadiyah yang mengungsi di Asrama Transito dan observasi di Transito Asrama. Temuan penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa selama berada di Asrama transito, Jemaah Ahmadiyah mengalami diskriminasi berupa akses terhadap layanan publik yang sulit dijangkau, mereka juga mengalami stigma negatif akibat fatwa sesat, serta dianggap eksklusif karena tidak terbuka terhadap hal-hal yang tidak diinginkan komunitas lokal.

INTRODUCTION

A group of unknown people attacked the Ahmadiyya Housing in Ketapang, West Lombok. The triggering factor of the conflict involving the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation in Lombok was the differences in beliefs about Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as Imam Mahdi or even as a Prophet (Al – Marwan et al., 2021). The beliefs about Mirza Ghulam Ahmad resulted in the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Congregation being considered deviant through the fatwas of MUI (the Indonesian Ulama Council) in 1980 and 2005 and the Joint Decree (SKB) of the three Ministers number 3 of 2008 detailing several



things that would affect the freedom of the Ahmadiyah Congregation in carrying out worship activities according to their beliefs, which specifically the Joint Decree of the three ministers mentions the prohibition of spreading the beliefs of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation (Asriyani & Qodir, 2016).

Since the 1980s, the Indonesian Ahmadiyya in Lombok has experienced several attacks in East Lombok, Central Lombok, and in 2000, ended up taking refuge at the Transito Dormitory. After migrating several times throughout Lombok, the Lombok Ahmadiyya Congregation built housing in Ketapang, West Lombok, which was the location of the attack and has remained in the Mataram Transito Dormitory since early 2006. In 2010, they attempted to return to their housing but were again evicted by the local community, and they have since taken refuge in the Mataram Transito Dormitory.

The conditions when residing at the Transito Dormitory made them depressed and discriminated against in several ways, including limited access to public services, false verdicts, and societal stereotypes of their beliefs. A study on Ahmadiyya about the difficulties of minority groups in obtaining their rights conducted by Jessica Soedargo (Soedirgo, 2018) revealed that the problems of minority groups such as Ahmadiyya are caused not only by formal institutions, as in other studies, but also by a network of political power. This finding is further supported by Mohamad Baihaqi's research on Ahmadiyya in Lombok, which found that political issues impact violence against the Ahmadiyah Congregation in Gegerung, West Lombok (Baihaqi, 2020; Pamungkas, 2015; Umam, 2009).

Another study on Ahmadiyya in the news frame demonstrates that in some news, the Ahmadiyya Congregation is perceived as a marginal group against unequal power between the majority and the minority, which leads to discrimination against the Ahmadiyya Congregation (Sari, 2018). Media coverage in Lombok also perpetuates the stigma of Ahmadiyya as heretical (Maula, 2022). This perspective has caused the Ahmadiyya Congregation in several places to be ejected, such as in Greneng Village, East Lombok, where the Ahmadiyya Congregation was expelled in 2018 due to mass rejection of its existence (Wahab & Fakhrudin, 2019). Such incidents are also inseparable from the similarity of political interests (Suryana, 2019). Studies on the Ahmadiyya have paid little attention to the consequences of violence or discrimination experienced by Ahmadiyya residents, including the impact of limited public services and restrictions on personal and organizational movement while seeking refuge in the Transito Dormitory.

This study examines the Ahmadiyah Congregation from the perspective of direct and structural violence (Galtung, 2020). As a group that faces discrimination as a result of differences in beliefs that prevent the Ahmadiyah Jamaah from obtaining their rights as citizens, both in the form of material, the right to life, and stereotypes against them have been considered as direct violence and structural violence through regulations that affect the rights of Ahmadiyah.

Through the Joint Decree of three Ministers No. 8 of 2008, it can be seen as a form of structural violence, while the community engages in direct violence as a result of the MUI Fatwa in 1980. The direct violence carried out by the community through persecution to the destruction occurred in Gegerung Village, West Lombok, in 2005. The MUI, including its fatwa on the Indonesian Community, can be considered an ideological state apparatus (Althusser, 2014). The MUI Fatwa and the Three Ministers' Joint Decree No. 8 of 2008 impacted the Ahmadiyya Congregation. Several local governments, including East Java, West Nusa Tenggara, and West Java, have issued regional rules prohibiting the Ahmadiyya Congregation (Sulistiyati, 2015).

This article attempts to answer the problems of the Ahmadiyya Congregation, who are refugees in the Mataram Transito Dormitory, how public services are provided in that place, the verdict that they are heretical, and how exclusive stereotypes about them are.

This study was conducted at the Mataram Transito Dormitory, where the Ahmadiyya Congregation took refuge. It employs a qualitative research method, including in-depth interviews and observations as data collection techniques. The interviews were carried out with residents of the Mataram Transito Dormitory. The questions were based on their experiences and limitations while residing in the Transito Dormitory. This method allows research informants to open up about their experiences thus far, particularly those relating to the dynamics of life in the Transito Dormitory.

Observations were carried out on all residents of the Transito Dormitory by observing daily activities. This method will show to what extent daily activities can describe the limitations and obstacles they face, both personal and organizational limitations, in carrying out organizational activities.

AHMADIYYA AS PASSIVE OBSERVERS: LIMITED ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICES

Since the early 2000s, Ahmadiyya residents have faced personal and organizational challenges as a result of prejudice and persecution. Because of these limits, Ahmadiyya residents, personally and organizationally, do not receive their rights proportionally; for example, they have difficulty meeting basic needs due to limited space for movement while living in the Transito Dormitory. As a result, Ahmadiyya residents have always been regarded as passive observers of government policies that are difficult for them to access.

Indonesia, as a modern country that adheres to democracy, constitutionally guarantees the lives of its citizens without discrimination in various fields. Every country, including Indonesia, creates programs to support the lives of the community, especially the poor or lower class, which the authorized government implements every year to guarantee various adequate needs for its citizens (Eko, 2016).

In the constitution, Indonesia guarantees its citizens' lives regardless of their background. However, the state sometimes intentionally or unintentionally discriminates against citizens, individuals, and specific community groups. In Indonesia, cases of discrimination against groups with different beliefs than the majority group are common, and the state frequently loses to community groups in discriminating or even committing violence against specific groups due to pressure from the majority group (Alnizar et al., 2021).

As a distinct group from the mainstream Islamic group in the last few decades, Ahmadiyya has often been the target of the majority group, which has implications for state discrimination at the insistence of the majority groups. Cases of differences in belief frequently trigger violence against a group, predominantly minority community groups, and directly attract the government to participate in violence, the types of violence of which vary. From belief to security issues, public issues require the state to mediate conflicting community groups and have implications for differences in the treatment of minority community groups (Mustafa et al., n.d.).

The Ahmadiyya case began with differences in beliefs (Zuldin, 2016) and their implications in the context of beliefs. However, it also had an impact on Ahmadiyya residents' access to public facilities, specifically accessibility to government programs that they are unable to obtain due to administrative requirements.

Nkmn, an Ahmadiyya citizen, stated that based on their previous experiences, they believe the state no longer considers them to be citizens. Moving places and public spaces access several times, because they could not make a KTP (residential identity card), was one of the reasons they expressed this. Mbh said:

My parents moved to Kendari, indeed, maybe the situation here is already complicated; those in Ketapang are already in Kendari, those from Praya, those from Pancor, many have moved there, the government there is fair... in Transito, it is just like this... here, when will we get a quota from the government, there is none... BLT (direct cash assistance) or anything else is a government program (Mbh, interview, September 16, 2021).

For the impoverished, government assistance in any program is critical for cutting spending. Most Ahmadiyya residents are poor (Rahman, 2018); according to the government's criteria for providing community assistance, all Ahmadiyya residents must receive assistance from the government, but they never get it directly due to various reasons. Several issues, such as where they live and discrimination from the government due to indirect pressure from the majority group, make it difficult for them to receive government support.

The majority of Ahmadiyya residents living in Transito are poor, especially when they leave their original homes; they automatically leave jobs and other resources. Many of them left their shops due to attacks by the Pancor Lombok Timur community on Ahmadiyya residents. Most started from the bottom when moving from one place to another.

The Ahmadiyya residents' jobs include motorcycle taxis, market traders, odd – job construction workers, barbers, and other jobs that can support their lives. Adapting to a new type of job is not an easy matter. According to the Ahmadiyya residents, it took them two years to get the right job to support the economy while they lived in Transito.

For instance, Shd fled the Jambu Mente Sambielen garden after being attacked by a mob in 2001. Shd and his family had to start a new life and move from several locations in NTB (Nusa Tenggara Barat). Shd works as a motorbike taxi driver every morning to support his two young children.

They have never received any form of government policy (Burhani, 2020); instead of receiving assistance in the form of public housing for the impoverished, for example, they were evicted from their homes. They do not receive many other types of assistance due to discrimination as a result of perceived differences in beliefs with the majority of Islam (Ismail, 2014).

Ahmadiyya residents who live in Transito are only assisted by the Social Affairs Office for a few months. Ahmadiyya never complains about government assistance because the most essential thing is the ability to worship like other Muslim communities. Promises to return them to their place of origin have never been fulfilled; even if they return independently, there is no guarantee of security from the community resistant to them, who could immediately attack them when they return home. For example, in 2010, when they returned to Ketapang, they were evicted again and relocated to the Transito Dormitory. (Gaffar, 2022).

The local government has been unable to do much for the Ahmadiyya community, and attempts such as discussion have yet to be successful. The NTB government once promised to relocate them to one of the areas. However, this promise was never realized because it was only a temporary promise to suppress the aspirations of the Ahmadiyya community. The government never seriously followed up on these promises (Nurhikmah, 2018).

Several cases have occurred among Ahmadiyya locals; for example, several residents are sick but have never been treated in a hospital due to a lack of cash. Considering that they are poor people, they should be able to get help through government programs in the health sector. As previously stated, administrative obstacles to getting this help were never encountered while they were taking refuge in the Transito Dormitory.

In several elections, such as regional head elections and presidential elections, they merely observe and cannot participate fully as citizens. Even if they can participate, it is due to the struggle and assistance of several related parties, such as LPSK (Witness and Victim Protection Agency), Ombudsman, Komnas HAM (National Human Rights Commission), and LSM (Non – Governmental Organization) (Meta Paramita Nur Azizah, Mulia Kurnaiti, 2019)

NA, who has been a mentor to Ahmadiyya residents in Transito, voiced his wishes and sarcasm toward the government, which is unaware of the predicament of Ahmadiyya residents in AT, hampered by the poverty they have been facing all this time. NA revealed that they only request security guarantees from the security forces when they return to their original homes.

Ahmadiyya community who live in Transito have only watched government programs meant for the impoverished. NA even insinuated that they were deemed wealthy by the government, so they did not receive government assistance. NA considered this a prayer for Ahmadiyya residents to become rich so that they would not need help from the government through programs for the poor. Shd also expressed the same thing:

The case of Ahmadiyya is similar to that of citizens who are disregarded and left off the list due to their lack of identification, which is a prerequisite for gaining public access. They can only observe how state programs for the impoverished benefit other individuals. They do not feel many government policies aimed at assisting poor people in the same way felt by other majority communities, even though from an economic standpoint, they are very worthy and entitled to receive government assistance to support their financial lives. Furthermore, the fact that they are refugees makes them even more deserving, and the government should put them on the main list of people eligible for assistance. They endure not only direct physical violence, such as the incident at the Ahmadiyya Housing in West Lombok, but also indirect violence as a result of their confinement to the Transito Dormitory (Jondar et al., 2022).

AHMADIYYA AND BASELESS VERDICTS: FROM HERESY TO LEGAL VIOLATION

In terms of quantity, Ahmadiyya's development in Indonesia is not particularly important, considering their presence in the country since the 1920s, over a century. The Ahmadiyya Congregation's organizational development is firm (Hidayat, 2019); the solidarity between one member and another is so binding (Al – Marwan, Hajam, and Farah, 2021), and this is one of the differences between the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation (JAI) and the Lahore Ahmadiyya, which is centered in Yogyakarta and does not prioritize the congregation but instead prioritizes things like education. Therefore, the Lahore Ahmadiyya in Yogyakarta has many educational institutions.

The development of the Ahmadiyya Congregation is also directly related to the rise of allegations or more severe slander against their group. Since they arrived in Indonesia, they have been the target of growing allegations of adultery, as evidenced by

various debates between Islamic and Ahmadiyya figures—both Indonesian and those who traveled directly from overseas to spread Ahmadiyya to Indonesia (Saefullah, 2016).

Following the MUI fatwa in 2005 and the Joint Decree of the Three Ministers in 2008, accusations of infidelity escalated into physical violence against the Ahmadiyya group. The case in Lombok is the first to arise in Keruak, East Lombok, since the 1980s (Budiwanti, 2009), and it is inseparable from the decision letter of the East Lombok District Attorney, which prohibited the existence of Ahmadiyya in East Lombok. The consequences were genuinely devastating; the community and religious leaders expelled all Ahmadiyya residents in Keruak as legitimacy for violence and expulsion of Ahmadiyya residents.

Ahmadiyya children who live in Transito and attend school in the surrounding area face discrimination not only from their peers but also from the educational institutions where they attend. Due to the accusations made against them that they are unbelievers, only children who pass a test proving they can read the Qur'an are allowed to enroll in school; other kids are not subject to this condition. In addition, Ahmadiyya children's report cards are colored differently than other children's (observation on September 9, 2021).

Differences in the treatment of Ahmadiyya children occur in various places, not only on the island of Lombok but in all areas where Ahmadiyya children attend school in buildings that Ahmadiyya does not directly own. However, this has only sometimes happened as frequently in recent years as when they first moved to Transito because they reported to the Ombudsman to resolve this problem (Teja, 2011). Following the Ombudsman's intervention, Ahmadiyya children experienced fewer incidents of this matter.

The labels of heretic and infidel now define every Ahmadiyya member's identity. These designations cause individuals to be treated differently in every community, and public venues such as markets where they make a living are not immune to discrimination. Such incidents are prevalent and affect all Ahmadiyya members (Indriani, 2022).

The 1965 PNPS Law, which was used as a legitimacy to accuse Ahmadiyya members of blasphemy, has not yet been submitted to the court as an authorized party as if the law was only a legitimacy to continue to attack Ahmadiyah members and even violence. Religious leaders also support it as reinforcement that Ahmadiyya is blaspheming Islam. In several cases, NA stated: "The Ahmadi family is slandered, accused, criticized, their prophet is not the prophet Muhammad, on the other hand, we are accused, but we practice the teachings of the prophet Muhammad... it came from the elite, not from the grassroots" (NA, interview on September 9, 2021).

Ahmadiyya also experienced baseless verdicts after the issuance of the Joint Decree of the three ministers. In addition to being accused of being heretical and infidel based on the MUI fatwa, they were also accused of violating regulations such as Joint Decrees, even without reason, and of breaking the law through banners and protests carried out by opposition groups against them.

The issuance of the Joint Decree and all the considerations issued also impacted the development of Ahmadiyya institutionally; they were prohibited from preaching and conveying the right to reply to the accusations leveled against them. It made Ahmadiyah not only individuals increasingly depressed but also inhibited the organization's development because their limited space for movement made them unable to carry out activities freely.

NA revealed:

Yes, we get more baseless verdicts through banners and seminars. What baseless verdicts, demonstrations carrying banners, seminars, exposure of Ahmadiyya violating the Joint Decree of the three ministers, Ahmadiyya violating the law, violating this, all of those verdicts are through, that, baseless verdicts, demonstrations, banners, and seminars. The state of law should violate or not, guilty or not, committing blasphemy in court. (NA, interview on September 9, 2021).

NA's recognition as the NTB Ahmadiyya Preacher is a problem faced by Ahmadiyya residents thus far. They have no bargaining position against the related parties, considering the many pressures on the government regarding Ahmadiyya. Ahmadiyya engages in activities similar to those of other communities. The accusations against them have never been proven.

Ahmadiyya residents are unconcerned about restrictions that would harm them because they have been subjected to them for years. Their primary concern is the freedom to practice their religion without community groups or local government interference.

Discrimination and unilateral verdicts by society are a series of events that occur to them, not standing alone, but instead derived from the MUI fatwa that has been deeply rooted regarding the fatwa of heresy against Ahmadiyya. Furthermore, regional and national governments also legitimize the fatwa through various regulations that invariably damage Ahmadiyya and frequently intimidate Ahmadiyya institutionally from engaging in activities that are regarded as different from the majority of Islam.

Since they emigrated, their problems have not decreased; instead of finding solutions, they have become more severe due to the many derivative branches of their problems. Starting from the MUI fatwa, the community rejected their existence, significantly when the government also legitimized the community that committed violence, making Ahmadiyya even more depressed. The state lost to the majority; the government could not adequately handle baseless accusations that had fatal consequences for Ahmadiyya.

The Ahmadiyya congregation not only received a fatwa of heresy due to differences in belief but also experienced epistemic injustice. Miranda Fricker divides epistemic injustice into two: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice is defined as unfairness toward a person or group by looking at their background, and hermeneutical injustice is defined as the inability or lack of concepts used in explaining the position of Ahmadiyya by the MUI (Fricker, 2007).

EXCLUSIVE OR BEING EXCLUDED: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

As an Islamic community that is considered slightly different from mainstream Islam, Ahmadiyya has different customs and beliefs, including the most extreme recognition of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a Prophet, Imam Mahdi, and Prophet Isa and still receiving revelations, which is very different from the majority of Muslims. This matter makes them exclusive in terms of belief and also being excluded due to significant differences with mainstream Islam.

As expressed by NA:

The emergence of oblique issues is being raised; Ahmadiyah is exclusive... definitely not exclusive, but it is being excluded. So, why is it exclusive? Because Ahmadiyah in NTB did not exist 2–3 years ago, it was in 1956... a new policy emerged from the West Lombok government. Ahmadiyah wanted to be relocated

to an island called Gili Tangkong Island. The more exclusive they were, the more isolated they were, right? (NA, interview on September 9, 2021).

The request to return home cannot be granted because security authorities cannot ensure security. Instead, they will be relocated to a remote location; the Ahmadiyya group believes they are being excluded by the government's methods in dealing with the Ahmadiyya problem thus far.

As in the previous case, when they moved to Transito, they needed several years to adjust to the environment. Most importantly, jobs in a new place were challenging for Ahmadiyah residents to obtain. Even Gili Tangkong, the planned location for Ahmadiyah, is a tranquil area inhabited only by a few heads of families from Bali, far from the hustle and bustle. This matter is undoubtedly a dilemma for Ahmadiyah, not only regarding a new life, jobs, and, most importantly, the long-term fate of their children who are still in school.

The most significant incident in 2001 – 2002 in Pancor, East Lombok, was the most severe case for Ahmadiyya Lombok, not only in Lombok, but the most serious when compared to the incidents of Ahmadiyya expulsions throughout Indonesia. Their children had to move schools outside the area and were separated from their families at a young age.

This issue was certainly not raised by the government; rather, the Ahmadiyah issue concerns the residence of Ahmadiyah residents who are still refugees in government-owned facilities, as well as the government's inability or unwillingness to ensure the security of Ahmadiyah residents who will return. In reality, when evaluated, the load on the region for Ahmadiyah inhabitants is smaller when they are returned to their original houses, with no additional fees or duties, instead of being relocated to a distant place. According to Ahmadiyah residents who visited Gili Tangkong after the government announced its plans to remove them, the cost of visiting the island per person can reach IDR 250,000. It is a complicated and expensive choice, and they have to complete compensation for the homes and land of Ahmadiyya residents. Furthermore, the most important thing is the future of their occupation, and their children are inevitably unable to attend school since there are no schools in that area or options, as they were separated from their parents in 2001 – 2002 to attend school.

The government's plans to resolve the Ahmadiyya problem are less severe and also more detrimental to Ahmadiyya residents and Ahmadiyya as an organization. Since they have lost many of their rights as people, for instance, and have spent years living in camps for refugees, they cannot lead productive lives. Ahmadiyya residents are already poor, and having to evacuate renders them worse, poorer, and unable to do anything. Therefore, there needs to be reconciliation with the local community so that Ahmadiyya residents can return to their original homes (Burhani, 2014).

Organizationally, many central and regional government regulations prevent them from carrying out activities as before the issuance of these regulations. NA, for example, expressed the hope:

In the past, before there was a Joint Decree, we could hold seminars at universities. We also appeared several times at the DPR. However, everywhere, it was not... yes, but now, with the issuance of the regulation, we are not allowed to speak, we do not have the right to reply, in the newspaper, whoever beats us, while intolerant groups are continuously protected, attacking, destroying, being beaten by groups, Ahmadiyya people are executed everywhere, including those in Transito, but we are tied up and not allowed to fight back either (NA, interview on September 9, 2021).

The expressions of NA are the hopes of all Ahmadiyya members. They want the same thing as other organizations, which have the freedom to carry out their activities. However, this is undoubtedly difficult to make a reality, considering the deep –rooted problems of Ahmadiyya. The SKB of the three ministers makes them unable to do anything related to the organization they have.

People who commit violence, either directly or indirectly, are treated as if they have been released from any legislation that could trap them. Hasan's death was the first case of an Ahmadiyya being killed as a result of a communal attack, but the perpetrator was released due to public outcry. It is the first case reported not just in Lombok but also in Indonesia.

Ahmadiyya, with the SKB, appears to have no right to respond and cannot report several incidents they have encountered thus far; additionally, the security forces' reluctance to follow up paralyzes them. As expressed by NA, they were paralyzed and faced violence without being able to report to the security forces. The violence against Ahmadiyya, in particular, makes it appear that the law does not apply and cannot protect its residents due to the strength of the masses who are opposed to Ahmadiyya members.

The number of perpetrators is small, and many people oppose the violent expulsion of Ahmadiyya citizens. The majority of society's strength stems not only from Tuan Guru's legitimacy but also from a silent majority that would rather keep silent than act to ban or plead for violence against Ahmadiyya (Barat, n.d.).

In addition to being excluded (Wartini & Shulhan, 2016), Ahmadiyya excludes itself in various ways, including through the language used to communicate with its group and the larger community. This matter often makes them considered exclusive by other community groups, and they are accused of refusing to socialize with other communities.

Ahmadiyya occasionally uses the terms "we" and "they" to refer to other communities. In the instance of Ahmadiyya, the languages "we" and "they" have contributed to the ongoing controversy. Indeed, it is not uncommon for them to be accused of arrogance by opposing parties.

When they are questioned about the differences between Ahmadiyya and mainstream Islam, they always use the term "brother," but in cases where they experience violence, they no longer say brother. Furthermore, in terms of belief, when they are accused of being different from other Muslims, they firmly say that there is no difference between Muslims and Islam Ahmadiyya. However, in other matters, they accuse mainstream Muslims who do not recognize Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as Imam Mahdi and Prophet Jesus as someone who does not accept the truth.


This type of issue contributes to the escalation of rejection and violence against Ahmadiyya. Violence committed by the community, for any cause, should not occur under the applicable legal framework, particularly against communities that commit direct violence, and security authorities cannot ensure the safety of Ahmadiyya citizens.

In post – colonial theory, *the other* has huge implications for two groups that differ from each other, not only the belief in one religion such as Ahmadiyya in Islam, religious differences, skin color, and many others. In the case of Ahmadiyya, this type of dilemma is not the primary issue but rather one that can complicate the solution.

The main problem of Ahmadiyya due to differences in beliefs in one religion is not much different from the discrimination during the colonial era. Although in a different form, the consequences of the discrimination are relatively the same as those experienced by Ahmadiyya with colonized citizens in the past.

In this context, Ahmadiyya can be said to be a *contradiction in dictie*. On the one hand, they put forward similarities by rejecting the alleged differences against the Ahmadiyya faith, but on the other hand, they differentiate themselves from other Muslims. The fact that the terms employed vary depending on the circumstances is a contradiction. Finally, the Ahmadiyya issue is not a simple problem to solve; in addition to external factors from Ahmadiyya through the MUI fatwa, the Joint Decree of the three ministers, and several government regulations, there are also internal problems from Ahmadiyya which often contradict each other in using terms in communicating with the community and government representatives.

Scheme: Forms of State Violence against Ahmadiyya Post – Conflict



Losing identity, as experienced by Ahmadiyya, is no different from losing citizenship. Many things related to rights and obligations as citizens cannot properly function because there is no identity among Ahmadiyya. They cannot do many things, including administrative matters, as a prerequisite to carry out many things. This problem makes Ahmadiyya unrecognized citizens. Without identity, Ahmadiyya citizens are treated as if they lack legal citizenship because there is no proof that they are Indonesian citizens.

They no longer have a problem with the deviant label attached to them for too long. They ask that the contents of the Joint Decree of the three ministers regarding the prohibition of committing violence or anarchic be obeyed so that they can return to their homes and baseless verdicts and false accusations do not happen again. The people who know them, personally and in the Ahmadiyya faith, have no problem with the community (Sulistiyati, 2017). The problem so far is that they are the ones who accuse but never confirm the news they hear. They only hear accusations from religious figures who have authority in religious matters and solid legitimacy in society (Khodijah & Aula, 2007).

CONCLUSION

The rejection and expulsion by the community based on the MUI fatwa through Tuan Guru made the state unable to take firm action against the perpetrators of violence. Instead of enforcing the law, the state became part of the violence. The state

has tolerated this through the police, and the lack of law enforcement has made Ahmadiyya increasingly dejected in society due to a lack of protection. As a result of derivatives such as the Joint Decree of the three ministers, regional head regulations, and related agencies, Ahmadiyya has also been unable to do much; they are opposed from all directions. Through the ideological and repressive apparatus, the state apparatus has become part of the violent actions against Ahmadiyya, whose rights are guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

Many accusations of slander as a derivative of the MUI fatwa have never been clarified directly to the Ahmadiyya. Ahmadiyya has no right to respond to the allegations and fatwas of the MUI. Ahmadiyya has become a common enemy. Several similarities between Ahmadiyya and mainstream Islam that have never been clarified have become slander for Ahmadiyya. In addition to similarities, Ahmadiyya also directly recognizes some differences. In Islamic belief, these differences are highly fundamental, such as the recognition of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who still receives revelations as a prophet, as Imam Mahdi and Prophet Isa simultaneously. These things made them expelled, and in the end, they had to live in the Transito Dormitory refugee camp.

After living in the Transito Dormitory, they could not do much, and many of their rights were taken away because of the incident, including the right to access public services, the right to defend themselves from negative stigma against them, and the right to practice worship according to their beliefs is limited in the refugee camp. It is tough for them to start a new life in the Transito Dormitory, even having difficulty finding a job that fits their skills.

REFERENCES

- Al-Marwan, Sahid, Hajam Hajam, and Naila Farah. 2021. "Paham Kenabian Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Menurut Perspektif Jamaah Ahmadiyah Lahore (Gai) Di Indonesia." *JURNAL YAQZHAN: Analisis Filsafat, Agama dan Kemanusiaan* 7(2): 205. doi:10.24235/jy.v7i2.9373.
- Alnizar, Fariz, Amir Ma'ruf, and Fadlil Munawwar Manshur. 2021. "The Language of Fatwa: Understanding Linguistic Violence in the Indonesian Ulama Council's Fatwa on Ahmadiyah." *Ahkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah* 21(1): 1–24. doi:10.15408/ajis.v21i1.20218.
- Asriyani, Delina, and Zulli Qodir. 2016. "Analisis Surat Keputusan Bersama Tiga Menteri Tentang Peringatan Dan Perintah Kepada Penganut, Anggota, Dan/Atau Pengurus Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia." *Journal of Governance and Public Policy* 3(2): 226–44. doi:10.18196/jgpp.2016.0057.
- Baihaqi, Muhamad. 2020. "Relasi Elit Lokal Dalam Konflik Keagamaan Di Lombok Barat." *Gastronomia ecuatoriana y turismo local*. 14(2): 235–54. <http://ejournal.uin-suka.ac.id/ushuluddin/SosiologiAgama/article/view/2163/1747>.
- Barat, D I Jawa. "Ryllian Chandra Keterlibatan TNI Dalam Penanganan 107." : 107–40.
- Budiwanti, Erni. 2009. "Working Paper Series No . 117 Pluralism Collapses : A Study of the Jama ' Ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and Its Persecution Erni Budiwanti." *Sciences-New York* (117).
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2014. "The Ahmadiyya and the Study of Comparative Religion in Indonesia: Controversies and Influences." *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 25(2): 141–58. doi:10.1080/09596410.2013.864191.
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2020. "Torn between Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyah in

- Indonesia: Discussing Erfaan Dahlan's Religious Affiliation and Self – Exile." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 48(140): 60 – 77. doi:10.1080/13639811.2019.1663678.
- Cahyo Pamungkas. 2015. "Social Resilience of Minority Group: Study on Shia Refugees in Sidoarjo and Ahmadiyya Refugees in Mataram." *Ulumuna* 19(2): 251 – 78.
- Eko, Hidayat. 2016. "Perlindungan Hak Asasi Manusia Dalam Negara Hukum Indonesia." *Asas: Jurnal Hukum dan Ekonomi Islam* 8(2): 80 – 87. <http://ejournal.radenintan.ac.id/index.php/asas/article/view/1249>.
- Fawaizul Umam. 2009. "Tera Ulang Peran Profetik Tuan Guru Dalam Konteks Kebebasan Beragama Di Pulau Lombok." *Ulumuna* 13(2): 6.
- Fricker, Miranda. 2007. "Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing." *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*: 1 – 208. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001.
- Gaffar, Abdul. 2022. "THE PUNISHMENT AND DICIPLINE OF AHMADI WOMEN : A CASE STUDY IN TRANSITO DORMITORY IN MATARAM." 06(01).
- Galtung, Johan. 2020. *Pax Pacifica Pax Pacifica: Terrorism, the Pacific Hemisphere, Globalization, and Peace Studies*. doi:10.4324/9781315632964.
- Hidayat, Fahri. 2019. "Perubahan Sosial – Keagamaan Di Komunitas Ahmadiyah Dusun Krucil Kecamatan Bawang Kabupaten Banjarnegara." *Jurnal Penelitian Agama* 20(1): 51 – 74. doi:10.24090/jpa.v20i1.2019.pp51 – 74.
- Indriani, Eva. 2022. "Konstruksi Sosial Keberadaan Jemaat Ahmadiyah Di Kota Medan." *Islam & Contemporary Issues* 2(1): 1 – 8. doi:10.57251/ici.v2i1.238.
- Ismail, Zaky. 2014. "Ahmadiyah Di Lombok Pemerintah Daerah Terhadap Hak – Hak Sipil Jemaat Di Mataram Pasca Skb 2008." *Jurnal Review Politik* 4(2): 293 – 317. [http://repository.uinsa.ac.id/id/eprint/422/1/Zaky_Ismail_Ahmadiyah di Lombok respon pemerintah daerah.pdf](http://repository.uinsa.ac.id/id/eprint/422/1/Zaky_Ismail_Ahmadiyah_di_Lombok_respon_pemerintah_daerah.pdf).
- Jondar, Aloysius, Agus Purbo Widodo, Johan De Fretes, Lukman Hakim, Susanto Susanto, and Muhammad Sujud. 2022. "Johan Galtung'S Concept of Peace Culture and Its Implementation in Indonesia." *Lire Journal (Journal of Linguistics and Literature)* 6(2): 230 – 52. doi:10.33019/lire.v6i2.163.
- Khodijah, Siti, Nurul Aula, and Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta. 2007. "Justifikasi Aliran Dan Paham Ahmadiyah Dan Al – Qiyadah Al – Islamiyah : Menilik Argumentasi QS . Al Ahzab (33) : 40 , QS . Al – An ' Am (6) : 153 Dalam Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) Bisa Melihat Dari Perspektif M . Quraish Shihab . Jihad Dimaknai Se." (33).
- Lois Althusser. 2014. 11 Sustainability (Switzerland) *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus*. London: Verso. http://scioteca.caf.com/bitstream/handle/123456789/1091/RED2017 – Eng – 8ene.pdf?sequence=12&isAllowed=y%0Ahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2008.06.005%0Ahttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/305320484_SISTEM_PE_MBETUNGAN_TERPUSAT_STRATEGI_MELESTARI.
- Meta Paramita Nur Azizah, Mulia Kurnaiti, R. S. R. H. (2019). Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia terhadap Warga Ahmadiyah dalam Novel Maryam Karya Okky Madasari. *Skripta*, 8(November), 9 – 25.
- Maula, Haris Fatwa Dinal. 2022. "Guide Them Back To The Right Path: Critical Discourse Analysis of The Ahmadiyah Community in West Nusa Tenggara Cyber Media." *Jurnal Studi Sosial Keagamaan* 2(1): 108.
- Mustafa, Islahuddiny, Ibrahim Kediri, and Lombok Barat. "Agama, Konflik Dan

- Kekerasa Politik." : 154 – 67.
- Nurhikmah, Nurhikmah. 2018. "Satu Dekade Jadi Rumpun Terasing : Narasi Identitas Dan Kekerasan Jemaat Ahmadiyah Di Lombok." *Retorik: Jurnal Ilmu Humaniora* 5(1): 339. doi:10.24071/ret.v5i1.1518.
- Rahman Dosen Fakultas Tarbiyah STAI–JM Tanjung Pura Langkat, Aulia. 2018. "Konsep Ekonomi Islam Menurut Ahmadiyah." *Jurnal Al-Makrifat* 3(2): 75 – 94.
- Saefullah, Chatib. 2016. "Ahmadiyah: Perdebatan Teologis Dan Masa Depan Dakwah." *ANIDA, Aktualisasi Nuansa Ilmu Dakwah* 15(2): 225 – 47. <https://journal.uinsgd.ac.id/index.php/anida/article/view/1170>.
- Sari, Wulan Purnama. 2018. "Analisis Wacana Kritis Kasus Penyerangan Terhadap Jemaah Ahmadiyah Di Cikeusik." *Jurnal Komunikasi* 10(1): 87. doi:10.24912/jk.v10i1.1507.
- Soedirgo, Jessica. 2018. "Informal Networks and Religious Intolerance: How Clientelism Incentivizes the Discrimination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia." *Citizenship Studies* 22(2): 191 – 207. doi:10.1080/13621025.2018.1445490.
- Sulistyati, Mardian. 2015. "Love For All, Hatred For None :." *Indo-Islamika* 2(2): 147 – 68.
- Sulistyati, Mardian. 2017. "The Dynamics of Socioreligious Relationship Between Indonesian Ahmadiyya Community and Non – Ahmadiyya Community." *LIPi: Jurnal Masyarakat dan Budaya* 19(1): 77 – 88. <https://jmb.lipi.go.id/jmb/article/view/381/323>.
- Suryana, Aan. 2019. "State Officials' Entanglement with Vigilante Groups in Violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a Communities in Indonesia." *Asian Studies Review* 43(3): 475 – 92. doi:10.1080/10357823.2019.1633273.
- Teja, Mohammad. 2011. "Hilangnya Hak Anak: Studi Kasus Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia." *Aspirasi: Jurnal Masalah-Masalah Sosial* 2(2): 191 – 208.
- Wahab, Abdul Jamil, and Fakhruddin Fakhruddin. 2019. "Menakar Efektivitas Skb Tentang Ahmadiyah: Sudi Kasus Konflik Ahmadiyah Di Desa Gereneng Lombok Timur." *Harmoni* 18(1): 443 – 59. doi:10.32488/harmoni.v18i1.356.
- Wartini, Atik, and Shulhan. 2016. "USIA DINI DALAM MASYARAKAT MINORITAS: Studi Toleransi Dalam Keluarga Ahmadiyah." *Palastren* 9(1): 119 – 36.
- Zuldin, Muhamad. 2016. "KONFLIK AGAMA DAN PENYELESAIAANNYA: Kasus Ahmadiyah Di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya, Jawa Barat." *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-ilmu Keislaman* 37(2): 438 – 48. doi:10.30821/miqot.v37i2.91.