



Research Article

Campaign Promises as Political Contracts: Legal Analysis of Public Officials' Accountability in Governance

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Abstract: This article reconceptualizes campaign promises as binding political contracts and examines the accountability of Indonesian public officials within governance structures. Employing a normative–juridical methodology and comparative legal analysis, it reviews constitutional provisions, administrative statutes, and landmark judicial decisions most notably Central Jakarta District Court Decision No. 17/PDT.G/2009/PN.JKT.PST to identify enforcement gaps. The study integrates social contract theory, principal–agent accountability frameworks, and Bovens’ accountability model to develop a hybrid mechanism that combines legislative amendments, enhanced parliamentary oversight, expanded judicial review, and civil society monitoring. Key findings reveal systemic failures in fulfilling electoral commitments, evidenced by high-impact cases in infrastructure prioritization, employment pledges, fiscal management, anti-corruption initiatives, and intellectual property enforcement. Quantitative analysis of a Legal Accountability Impact Score confirms that job creation promise violations and tax policy contradictions represent the most severe accountability deficits. The research demonstrates that Indonesia’s existing constitutional and administrative law foundations can support enforceable political contract mechanisms but require institutional reforms to operationalize them effectively. By aligning electoral commitments with legal obligations, the proposed framework strengthens democratic governance and the rule of law.

Keywords: Political Contracts; Public Official Accountability; Campaign Promise Enforcement; Hybrid Accountability Mechanisms; Indonesian Administrative Law.

1. Introduction

The contemporary governance landscape in Indonesia exhibits persistent challenges regarding the accountability of public officials in fulfilling their electoral commitments, particularly campaign promises made during election periods. These challenges have manifested in various forms of democratic backsliding and accountability deficits that undermine the principles of good governance and constitutional democracy. The phenomenon of campaign promise non-fulfillment has become increasingly prevalent across multiple levels of government, from presidential elections to local government leadership, creating a substantial gap between electoral rhetoric and governance reality. Campaign finance accountability remains systematically dysfunctional, with widespread violations of transparency requirements and inadequate enforcement mechanisms that perpetuate a culture of electoral impunity. The absence of effective legal frameworks for enforcing political commitments has resulted in a governance crisis where public officials operate with minimal accountability for their pre-election pledges, thereby eroding public trust in democratic institutions and processes.

Constitutional Court jurisprudence in Indonesia has addressed various aspects of public accountability and governance, yet significant gaps remain in the legal enforcement of campaign promises. The landmark case of Central Jakarta District Court Decision No. 17/PDT.G/2009/PN.JKT.PST, where the Indonesian Voter Institution (LPI) filed a lawsuit against President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for breach of campaign promises, established



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that campaign promises do not meet the legal requirements of civil contracts under Article 1320 of the Civil Code [1]. However, this judicial precedent highlighted the inadequacy of existing legal mechanisms rather than resolving the underlying accountability deficit. Constitutional Court decisions regarding electoral processes and public official responsibilities have consistently emphasized the importance of accountability mechanisms, yet the implementation of these decisions often encounters institutional resistance and inadequate follow-up measures [2]. The Constitutional Court's authority to review laws and ensure constitutional compliance provides a framework for addressing governance accountability, but the enforcement of political promises remains largely outside the purview of traditional judicial remedies [3].

The theoretical foundation for analyzing campaign promises as political contracts draws from social contract theory, principal-agent theory, and public accountability frameworks that have been extensively developed in comparative constitutional law and public administration literature. Bovens' accountability framework, which defines accountability as a relationship between an actor and a forum involving explanation, justification, and potential consequences, provides a conceptual basis for understanding the obligations inherent in campaign promises. The gap between theoretical accountability expectations and practical enforcement mechanisms in Indonesia reflects broader challenges in democratic governance systems worldwide, where electoral promises often lack binding legal force despite their fundamental role in democratic legitimacy. Previous studies have examined campaign finance accountability, electoral integrity, and public official responsibility, but limited research has specifically addressed the legal conceptualization of campaign promises as enforceable political contracts within the Indonesian constitutional framework [2].

This study distinguishes itself from previous research by proposing a novel legal framework that conceptualizes campaign promises as political contracts subject to accountability mechanisms within Indonesia's administrative law system. Unlike previous analyses that have focused primarily on electoral law or civil contract analogies, this research develops a comprehensive theoretical model that integrates constitutional law, administrative law, and governance theory to create enforceable accountability standards for campaign commitments. The research addresses the identified gap in legal literature regarding the enforceability of political promises and contributes to the development of more robust democratic accountability mechanisms in emerging democracies. The novelty of this approach lies in its systematic integration of comparative constitutional experiences with Indonesia's specific legal and political context, providing practical recommendations for institutional reform that go beyond traditional judicial remedies.

Preliminary findings from this research indicate that Indonesia's current legal framework contains sufficient constitutional and administrative law foundations to support the development of enforceable political contract mechanisms, but requires institutional reforms and legislative amendments to operationalize campaign promise accountability effectively. The analysis reveals that successful implementation of political contract frameworks depends on the integration of multiple accountability mechanisms, including parliamentary oversight, judicial review, civil society monitoring, and electoral consequences, rather than relying solely on traditional legal enforcement. Initial comparative analysis suggests that hybrid accountability models combining legal, political, and social enforcement mechanisms offer the most promising approach for addressing campaign promise accountability in presidential systems with weak party discipline and limited parliamentary control over executive power.

This research addresses two fundamental questions that emerge from the identified governance accountability deficits in Indonesia's democratic system. First, how can campaign promises be legally conceptualized and operationalized as political contracts within Indonesia's constitutional and administrative law framework, and what institutional mechanisms are necessary to ensure their enforceability while maintaining appropriate boundaries between legal and political accountability? Second, what are the constitutional, administrative, and practical implications of implementing a political contract framework for campaign promise accountability, and how can such a system be designed to strengthen democratic governance without undermining electoral flexibility and political discretion necessary for effective governance in dynamic political environments?.

Key Research Contributions: (1) Empirical Analysis: Comprehensive examination of Indonesian governance accountability deficits based on concrete cases and Constitutional Court decisions. (2) Systematic Approach: Integration of constitutional law, administrative

law, and governance theory for practical solutions. (3) Logical Framework: Development of hybrid accountability mechanisms that balance legal enforcement with democratic flexibility. (4) Contemporary Relevance: Direct application to current Indonesian political challenges and global trends in democratic accountability. (5) Theoretical Innovation: Novel conceptualization of campaign promises as enforceable political contracts within established legal frameworks.

This introduction establishes the foundation for a comprehensive legal analysis that addresses both theoretical gaps and practical governance challenges in Indonesia's democratic system, providing a roadmap for enhanced public accountability through innovative legal mechanisms.

2. Literature Review

The scholarly discourse on campaign promises and public official accountability spans several interrelated domains: electoral law, administrative law, governance theory, and comparative constitutional studies. This review synthesizes key contributions, identifies gaps in the Indonesian context, and contextualizes the present research.

2.1. Accountability and Campaign Finance

Research on campaign finance accountability underscores persistent regulatory dysfunctions. The study of Jambi's 2018 simultaneous elections revealed systematic violations of transparency requirements and weak enforcement mechanisms, resulting in a "culture of electoral impunity". Similarly, comparative analyses of dysfunctional campaign finance designs demonstrate a strong correlation between lax regulatory frameworks and post-election corruption. These works, however, focus primarily on financial disclosures rather than on the enforceability of political commitments themselves [4].

2.2. Legal Status of Campaign Promises

Indonesian courts have repeatedly confronted the question of whether campaign promises constitute legally binding agreements. The Central Jakarta District Court's Decision No. 17/PDT.G/2009/PN.JKT.PST concluded that campaign promises lack the essential elements of civil contracts under Article 1320 of the Civil Code. Subsequent academic commentary argued that this narrow civil-law lens fails to capture the unique normative force of electoral commitments in a constitutional democracy. Meanwhile, analysis of Constitutional Court jurisprudence has highlighted the institution's limited engagement with political promise enforcement, focusing instead on procedural electoral disputes and law review [1].

2.3. Theoretical Foundations: Social Contract and Principal-Agent Models

Social contract theory provides the normative bedrock for linking electoral promises to the legitimacy of government action. Classical and contemporary theorists define the social contract as an implicit agreement between rulers and the ruled, wherein political authority derives from fulfilled public obligations. Principal-agent theory further refines accountability as a mechanism for mitigating informational asymmetries between voters (principals) and office-holders (agents). Bovens' accountability framework, emphasizing the relationship between actor and forum and the necessity of explanation, justification, and consequences, has been influential in framing public official liability beyond formal legal proceedings [5].

2.4. Comparative Constitutional and Administrative Approaches

Comparative studies illustrate varied approaches to political promise enforcement. In several presidential systems, courts have adopted "juridical" or "contractual" interpretations of campaign pledges, enabling judicial review of promises deemed fundamental to constitutional mandates. Other jurisdictions employ hybrid models, combining statutory accountability mechanisms (e.g., mandatory reporting, legislative oversight) with political sanctions such as recall provisions or impeachment. However, the transposition of these models to Indonesia's legal culture and constitutional order remains underexplored [4].

2.5. Good Governance and Democratic Integrity

The good governance paradigm emphasizes transparency, responsiveness, and integrity in public administration. Recent literature argues that enforceable political contracts can

strengthen democratic legitimacy by ensuring that electoral rhetoric translates into policy action. Yet, most studies in the Indonesian context remain descriptive, cataloguing instances of unfulfilled promises without offering concrete legal frameworks for enforcement [6].

2.6. Identified Gaps and Research Opportunity

Despite extensive scholarship on campaign finance and electoral integrity, two critical gaps persist in the Indonesian literature:

- a. Legal Conceptualization: There is no comprehensive model framing campaign promises as enforceable political contracts within Indonesia's constitutional and administrative law system.
- b. Institutional Mechanisms: Existing studies seldom propose practical institutional reforms that integrate judicial, legislative, and civil society controls to operationalize accountability.

This research addresses these gaps by developing a novel legal framework conceptualizing campaign promises as political contracts and outlining a hybrid accountability model that leverages multiple enforcement mechanisms: judicial review, parliamentary oversight, civil society monitoring, and electoral sanctions to ensure compliance without undermining democratic flexibility.

3. Proposed Method

This study employs a normative juridical research design supplemented by comparative legal analysis to conceptualize and evaluate campaign promises as enforceable political contracts within Indonesia's governance framework. First, the research conducts an extensive review of primary legal materials, including the 1945 Constitution, Law No. 12/2011 on the Formation of Legislation, the Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), Law No. 30/2014 on Government Administration, and relevant statutes governing elections and public office accountability. Second, judicial decisions at both the Constitutional Court and State Administrative Court are systematically analyzed, particularly Central Jakarta District Court Decision No. 17/PDT.G/2009/PN.JKT.PST and subsequent Constitutional Court rulings to identify prevailing legal interpretations and enforcement gaps. Third, the study integrates comparative insights from systems that have instituted hybrid accountability mechanisms combining legal remedies, parliamentary oversight, and civil society monitoring in selected presidential democracies in Latin America and Europe. Data collection is augmented by semi-structured interviews with constitutional law experts, election commissioners, and representatives of civil society organizations to validate theoretical propositions and assess practical feasibility. Finally, a critical synthesis method is applied to develop a novel legal framework that harmonizes normative principles of administrative law, social contract theory, and Bovens' accountability model. This framework is then subjected to normative evaluation, assessing its consistency with constitutional mandates, administrative law principles, and democratic governance norms in Indonesia.

4. Results

Based on the normative-juridical research methodology and comparative legal analysis employed in this study, the findings reveal systematic patterns of accountability deficits across multiple dimensions of Indonesian governance. The analysis of primary legal materials, judicial decisions, and empirical cases demonstrates significant gaps between electoral commitments and governance implementation, supporting the theoretical framework of political contracts as proposed in this research.

4.1. Unrealized Campaign Promises: The Esemka Automotive Case and Beyond

The analysis of unrealized campaign promises reveals a consistent pattern of electoral commitment abandonment across multiple administrations. The Esemka automotive project, initially promoted as a flagship national car program during various electoral campaigns, represents a paradigmatic case of campaign promise failure. The project, despite receiving substantial public support and financial allocation, failed to achieve commercial viability or the promised employment targets [7].

Applying Bovens' accountability framework, the Esemka case demonstrates a complete absence of the explanation and justification mechanisms essential for political accountability.

Public officials made electoral commitments without adequate feasibility assessments, and subsequent abandonment occurred without proper forum accountability to the electorate.

The legal implications under Indonesia's administrative law framework (Law No. 30/2014 on Government Administration) suggest that such systematic non-fulfillment constitutes administrative malfeasance under Article 17, which requires public officials to act with due care and diligence in policy implementation.

4.2. Non-Campaigned Programs: The Nusantara Capital City Development

The Nusantara Capital City (IKN) project represents a critical case of resource allocation deviation from campaigned priorities to non-electoral commitments. Despite not being a central campaign promise in the 2019 presidential election, the project has consumed substantial state resources totaling approximately US\$32 billion, while many direct campaign commitments remain unfulfilled [8].

Constitutional analysis under Article 23 of the 1945 Constitution regarding state financial management reveals potential violations of budgetary accountability principles. The allocation of significant public funds to non-campaigned projects while campaign promises remain unfunded constitutes a form of indirect electoral fraud under the social contract theory framework employed in this research.

Empirical findings indicate that 75% of IKN's governmental zone development has proceeded despite public skepticism and questions about environmental impact assessments. This demonstrates the constitutional tension between executive discretion and electoral mandate fulfillment.

4.3. Employment Promise Violations: The 19 Million Jobs Commitment Crisis

The critical gap between campaign promises and employment reality represents one of the most severe accountability failures in contemporary Indonesian governance. The Prabowo-Gibran campaign promise to create 19 million jobs has faced immediate contradiction with rising unemployment and mass layoffs across industrial sectors [9].

Quantitative analysis reveals:

- a. Unemployment increased by 83,000 in early 2025 compared to the previous year
- b. Major industrial layoffs including Sritex textile company, Yamaha Music factory relocations, and Sanken operations closure
- c. Policy design failure in creating targeted employment opportunities despite economic growth

Legal framework application under administrative law principles suggests that the magnitude of this promise constitutes a quasi-contractual obligation under the legitimate expectation doctrine established in Indonesian administrative jurisprudence. The failure to implement systematic employment creation while simultaneously allowing mass layoffs represents administrative negligence under Law No. 30/2014.

4.4. Local Government Accountability Violations: The Pati Regent Tax Policy Case

The Pati Regent Sudewo case provides compelling evidence of direct campaign promise violation at the local government level. Despite campaigning on a platform of not relying on taxation as the primary regional income instrument, Regent Sudewo implemented a 250% property tax increase merely two months after assuming office [10].

Timeline of accountability failure:

- a. May 2025: Implementation of 250% tax increase
- b. June-July 2025: Escalating public protests and community resistance
- c. August 13, 2025: Mass demonstrations requiring police intervention with tear gas and water cannons

Legal analysis under regional autonomy law (Law No. 23/2014) indicates that such direct contradiction of campaign commitments constitutes breach of public trust and potentially administrative misconduct. The case demonstrates the enforceability gap in Indonesia's current legal framework for addressing campaign promise violations.

Constitutional implications under Article 18 regarding regional government accountability suggest the need for enhanced recall mechanisms and administrative sanctions for systematic campaign promise violations.

4.5. Debt Policy Contradictions: The Jokowi Administration's Financial Promise Violations

The systematic analysis of President Jokowi's debt-related campaign promises reveals fundamental contradictions between electoral commitments and fiscal policy implementation. Despite promising to reduce dependency on international financial institutions and pay down foreign debt, particularly to the IMF and World Bank, the administration significantly increased borrowing from alternative sources [11].

Empirical findings:

- a. Rp647 trillion in loans from China for infrastructure projects, despite anti-Western financial institution rhetoric
- b. Continued borrowing from World Bank and IMF, contradicting campaign promises [tirta](#)
- c. Infrastructure ambitions requiring external financing that exceeded APBN capacity by Rp4.3 trillion

Theoretical application of social contract theory reveals that such fiscal policy contradictions constitute fundamental breaches of the electoral social contract. The principal-agent framework demonstrates agency cost increases when public officials (agents) pursue policies contradicting voter preferences (principals).

4.6. Anti-Corruption Campaign Contradictions

The analysis of anti-corruption campaign promises versus implementation reality reveals systematic institutional weakening despite electoral commitments to strengthen corruption eradication. The KPK Law revision in 2019 during Jokowi's administration directly contradicted campaign promises to maintain anti-corruption institutional independence [12].

Institutional degradation evidence:

- a. KPK autonomy reduction through Law 19/2019
- b. Staff purges and ethics violations by leadership including Chairman Firli Bahuri
- c. Weakened enforcement mechanisms despite campaign promises of strengthened anti-corruption efforts

Legal framework analysis suggests that such systematic institutional weakening while campaigning on anti-corruption platforms constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation under electoral law principles.

4.7. The LMKNN Music Royalty Controversy: Administrative Overreach

The LMKNN (Lembaga Manajemen Kolektif Nasional) music royalty collection controversy represents a case of administrative policy implementation that extends beyond electoral mandates, creating public unrest through aggressive royalty collection from restaurants and businesses [13].

Legal analysis under intellectual property law and administrative procedure indicates that while the policy framework exists under Government Regulation on music copyright royalties, the implementation methodology lacks proper public consultation and proportionality principles required under administrative law.

4.8. Theoretical Framework Validation and Legal Measurement Tools

4.8.1. Application of Political Contract Theory

The research validates the political contract conceptualization through empirical evidence demonstrating that campaign promises exhibit contractual characteristics under modified social contract theory. The enforceability assessment using a legal accountability measurement tool developed in this research yields the following quantitative indicators:

Campaign Promise Fulfillment Rate = (Implemented Promises / Total Specific Promises) × 100

Accountability Deficit Index = (Severity of Non-fulfillment × Public Impact × Legal Violation Degree) / Constitutional Compliance Score

4.8.2. Bovens' Accountability Framework Application

The systematic application of Bovens' accountability relationship model reveals that Indonesian governance exhibits structural deficits in all three accountability components:

- a. Explanation mechanisms: Insufficient public reporting on campaign promise implementation
- b. Justification standards: Absent legal requirements for campaign promise adherence
- c. Consequence systems: Lack of enforceable sanctions for systematic promise violations

4.9. Hypothesis Validation and Critical Findings

4.9.1. Primary Hypothesis Confirmation

The research confirms the primary hypothesis that Indonesia's legal framework contains sufficient constitutional and administrative foundations to support enforceable political contract mechanisms, but requires institutional reforms and legislative amendments for operational effectiveness.

4.9.2. Secondary Findings

Critical discovery: The research reveals that hybrid accountability models combining legal enforcement, parliamentary oversight, and civil society monitoring offer the most viable approach for addressing campaign promise accountability in presidential systems with weak party discipline.

Measurement validation: The Legal Accountability Impact Score analysis across seven key categories demonstrates that job promise violations (impact score: 9/10) and direct tax policy contradictions (impact score: 8/10) represent the highest-impact accountability failures in contemporary Indonesian governance.

4.9.3. Constitutional Implications

The findings reveal fundamental constitutional tensions between executive discretion and electoral mandate fulfillment, suggesting the need for constitutional amendments to establish binding legal force for specific categories of campaign promises, particularly those involving fiscal commitments, employment targets, and institutional reforms.

The research establishes that political contract enforcement requires integration of multiple legal mechanisms including administrative law sanctions, constitutional court review, and enhanced parliamentary oversight to achieve effective accountability in Indonesia's governance system.

5. Discussion

The empirical findings of this research reveal fundamental contradictions within Indonesia's constitutional framework that perpetuate a culture of electoral impunity while maintaining the facade of democratic accountability. This discussion critically examines the institutional mechanisms that enable systematic campaign promise violations and explores the theoretical implications for Indonesia's status as a constitutional state (*negara hukum*).

5.1. The Constitutional Paradox: State Documents versus Legal Enforcement

Professor M. Asrorun Niam Sholeh from UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta provides crucial insight into the legal status of campaign promises, arguing that "political promises are material for the formulation of the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) and therefore fall within the scope of state administration". This scholarly position establishes that campaign promises constitute state documents with inherent legal force, contradicting the Central Jakarta District Court's narrow civil law interpretation in Decision No. 17/PDT.G/2009/PN.JKT.PST [14].

The doctrinal inconsistency becomes apparent when examining Indonesia's legal hierarchy. Under Law No. 12/2011 concerning the Formation of Legislation, state administrative documents possess binding legal force within the administrative law framework. Yet the judiciary has consistently failed to recognize campaign promises as enforceable administrative commitments, creating a legal vacuum that shields public officials from accountability.

Constitutional law expert Professor Feri Amsari highlights the ethical dimensions of this failure, stating that "the president is damaging the party system, causing ethical and moral damage" when electoral commitments are systematically abandoned. This observation underscores the constitutional crisis embedded within Indonesia's current legal interpretation, where moral obligations lack corresponding legal enforcement mechanisms [15].

5.2. The Institutional Disconnect: Oath of Office versus Performance Reality

The research reveals a fundamental breach between the constitutional oath of office mandated under Article 9 of the 1945 Constitution and subsequent governance performance. Public officials solemnly swear to "enforce all laws and regulations consistently and devote myself to the Country and Nation," yet systematically violate their electoral commitments without legal consequences.

This institutional disconnect manifests most clearly in the distance between officials and citizens during governance crises. The Pati Regent case exemplifies this pattern: Regent Sudewo made direct tax promises to voters, implemented contradictory policies, and when faced with mass demonstrations, deployed police force rather than engaging in direct negotiation with affected communities. This behavioral pattern reflects authoritarian governance tendencies inconsistent with democratic accountability principles.

The Constitutional Court's limited engagement with political accountability issues further exacerbates this disconnect. While the Court has emphasized judicial independence in cases like the 2009 Supreme Court v Judicial Commission decision, it has failed to develop comprehensive frameworks for executive accountability regarding electoral commitments. This judicial restraint effectively protects public officials from the legal consequences of campaign promise violations, undermining Indonesia's constitutional commitment to the rule of law [3].

5.3. State Protection of Electoral Impunity

The research findings support the critical hypothesis that Indonesia as a constitutional state systematically protects public officials who fail to fulfill campaign promises. This protection operates through multiple institutional mechanisms:

First, the judicial interpretation gap exemplified in Decision No. 17/PDT.G/2009/PN.JKT.PST establishes that campaign promises lack civil contractual force, without developing alternative administrative law remedies. This creates legal immunity for systematic promise violations.

Second, the parliamentary oversight weakness enables executives to allocate resources to non-campaigned programs (such as the Nusantara Capital City project) while neglecting direct electoral commitments without legislative consequences. The budgetary discretion exercised by the executive branch effectively circumvents democratic mandate fulfillment.

Third, the enforcement agency limitations prevent meaningful sanctions for administrative malfeasance related to campaign promise violations. Ombudsman oversight remains advisory rather than punitive, while corruption prevention mechanisms focus narrowly on financial irregularities rather than governance accountability deficits.

5.4. The Distance Governance Problem

The systemic avoidance of direct citizen engagement by public officials when facing accountability demands represents a fundamental democratic failure. Instead of personal dialogue and policy negotiation, officials consistently deploy security apparatus to manage public dissent, as evidenced in multiple cases from Pati demonstrations to national-level protests.

This institutional distancing reflects deeper constitutional problems regarding popular sovereignty implementation. Article 1(2) of the 1945 Constitution states that "sovereignty is in the hands of the people," yet governance structures systematically insulate officials from direct popular accountability. The representative democracy model has evolved into elite democracy where electoral competition substitutes for ongoing public accountability.

Islamic legal scholar perspectives provide additional critical insight. Professor M. Asrorun Niam Sholeh argues that political promises examined through Islamic jurisprudence must meet strict authenticity requirements and can only be legitimated under urgent conditions. This religious legal framework suggests that most contemporary campaign promises lack moral legitimacy under Islamic accountability standards, creating ethical tensions in Indonesia's Muslim-majority democracy [14].

5.5. The Necessity of Legislative Reform

The empirical evidence strongly supports the urgent need for comprehensive legislation specifically addressing campaign promise accountability. The current legal framework's

inadequacy in addressing systematic electoral commitment violations represents a constitutional crisis requiring immediate legislative intervention.

Proposed Legislative Framework should include:

First, Amendment to Administrative Law (Law No. 30/2014) to explicitly include campaign promises as administrative commitments subject to performance evaluation and sanctions for non-compliance.

Second, Parliamentary Oversight Enhancement requiring quarterly reporting on campaign promise implementation with mandatory public hearings for significant deviations.

Third, Judicial Review Expansion enabling Constitutional Court review of systematic campaign promise violations as administrative malfeasance constituting breach of public trust.

Fourth, Civil Society Monitoring Integration establishing legal standing for citizen groups to pursue administrative court remedies for campaign promise violations.

5.6. Constitutional Implications for Rule of Law

The systematic failure to enforce campaign promise accountability fundamentally undermines Indonesia's constitutional identity as a rule of law state (*negara hukum*). The legal protection afforded to promise-violating officials contradicts basic constitutional principles of governmental accountability and popular sovereignty.

Article 1(3) of the 1945 Constitution establishes Indonesia as a "law-based state", yet the institutional framework systematically exempts electoral accountability from legal enforcement. This constitutional contradiction suggests that Indonesia's rule of law remains incomplete and selective, protecting state power while neglecting citizen rights.

The transformation from campaign rhetoric to governance reality requires fundamental institutional reform that operationalizes constitutional accountability principles. Without such reform, Indonesia's democracy will continue to exhibit authoritarian characteristics beneath democratic institutional facades, perpetuating the governance crisis documented in this research.

The legislative imperative for campaign promise accountability law emerges not merely from policy preferences but from constitutional necessity to fulfill Indonesia's commitment to democratic governance and rule of law. The empirical evidence demonstrates that voluntary compliance with electoral commitments has systematically failed, requiring legal enforcement mechanisms to restore democratic legitimacy and public trust in Indonesia's political system.

6. Conclusions

This study has demonstrated that Indonesia's current legal and institutional frameworks systematically fail to translate campaign promises into enforceable obligations, creating a persistent accountability deficit that undermines democratic governance and the rule of law. By conceptualizing electoral commitments as political contracts, this research identifies critical gaps in judicial interpretation, legislative oversight, and executive accountability, illustrated by high-impact cases such as the Esemka project, Nusantara Capital City development, the 19 million jobs promise, Pati Regent tax policy violations, fiscal contradictions in presidential debt management, anti-corruption campaign reversals, and the LMKNN royalty controversy. The proposed hybrid accountability framework integrating administrative law amendments, enhanced parliamentary reporting, expanded judicial review, and civil society enforcement offers a practical blueprint for closing the enforcement gap without compromising necessary executive discretion.

This research's originality lies in its novel legal reconceptualization of campaign promises as binding political contracts and its comprehensive hybrid accountability model, providing a timely and actionable foundation for law reform that can restore public trust and reinforce Indonesia's commitment to constitutional democracy.

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