

## Stakeholder Roles in Strengthening Religious Moderation: A Case Study of Socio-Religious Conflict in Mesanggok Village, Gerung Subdistrict, West Lombok Regency

**Abdurrahman**

Universitas Pendidikan Mandalika Mataram

Email: [abdurbanyu50@gmail.com](mailto:abdurbanyu50@gmail.com)

**Fibrian Khotmul Aula Putra**

Universitas Islam Negeri Mataram

Email: [feri.khot13@gmail.com](mailto:feri.khot13@gmail.com)

### Abstract

Religious moderation denotes a perspective, disposition, and practice of religiosity that foregrounds justice, balance, respect for human dignity, and commitment to the national civic compact. Yet in rural communities with entrenched religious traditions, the entry of preaching currents that label local practices as *bid'ah* may generate delegitimation, polarization, and conflict escalation. This article addresses three questions: (1) how the chronology and dynamics of socio-religious conflict escalation unfolded in Mesanggok Village, Gerung Subdistrict, West Lombok; (2) how stakeholders (village government, police, the Indonesian Ulama Council/MUI, the Office of Religious Affairs/KUA, the Religious Harmony Forum/FKUB, Lakpesdam NU, religious counsellors, faith-based organizations, youth, and academics) contributed to strengthening religious moderation and post-conflict recovery; and (3) how cross-actor *musyawarah* (deliberative consultation) produced consensus and programmes to prevent recurrent conflict. Using a qualitative case-study design, data were collected through observation, in-depth interviews, document review, community deliberations (*sarasehan*), and focus group discussions, and were analysed thematically and iteratively through coding and case-narrative construction with source and method triangulation. The findings show that stakeholder collaboration operated through four stages: (1) de-escalation and security protection, (2) mediated dialogue and norm clarification, (3) the formation of community consensus and rules of engagement, and (4) the institutionalisation of inclusive religious programmes (routine cross-group study circles) that frame differences as manageable *kebilāfiah* (legitimate interpretive disagreement) rather than identity-threatening disputes. In conclusion, the Mesanggok conflict emerged not merely from theological disagreement but from struggles over legitimacy and the delegitimation of local religious traditions. Recovery proved most effective when religious moderation was enacted through collaborative, deliberative governance that distributed stakeholder roles protection, mediation, norm production, and programme institutionalization in a synergistic and sustained manner. The study recommends: establishing inclusive village-level deliberation protocols; strengthening public literacy on *ikhtilāf* and the ethics of *da'wah* through MUI, KUA, Lakpesdam NU, religious counsellors; developing mediation-oriented community policing; and extending cross-group programmes to the hamlet/RT level to prevent renewed escalation.

**Keywords:** Stakeholders; Religious Moderation; *Musyawarah*; Collaborative Governance; Socio-Religious Conflict; West Lombok.

## **Abstrak**

Moderasi beragama merupakan cara pandang, sikap, dan praktik keberagamaan yang menekankan keadilan, keseimbangan, penghormatan martabat manusia, serta komitmen pada kesepakatan kebangsaan; namun dalam konteks masyarakat desa yang tradisi keagamaannya kuat, masuknya corak dakwah yang menilai praktik lokal sebagai bid'ah dapat memicu delegitimasi, polarisasi, dan eskalasi konflik. Artikel ini bertujuan menjawab tiga rumusan masalah: (1) bagaimana kronologi dan dinamika eskalasi konflik sosial-keagamaan di Desa Mesanggok, Kecamatan Gerung, Lombok Barat; (2) bagaimana peranan stakeholder (pemerintah desa, kepolisian, MUI, KUA, FKUB, Lakpesdam NU, penyuluh agama, ormas, pemuda, dan akademisi) dalam membangun moderasi beragama dan pemulihan konflik; serta (3) bagaimana mekanisme musyawarah lintas-aktor menghasilkan konsensus dan program pencegahan konflik berulang. Penelitian menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan desain studi kasus; data dikumpulkan melalui observasi, wawancara mendalam, telaah dokumen, sarasehan, dan FGD, kemudian dianalisis secara tematik-iteratif melalui pengodean dan penyusunan narasi kasus dengan triangulasi sumber serta metode. Temuan menunjukkan kolaborasi stakeholder bekerja melalui empat tahapan: de-eskalasi dan proteksi keamanan, dialog mediatif serta klarifikasi norma, pembentukan konsensus/aturan main komunitas, dan institusionalisasi program keagamaan inklusif (pengajian rutin lintas kelompok) yang menempatkan perbedaan sebagai khilafiyah yang dikelola, bukan ancaman identitas. Kesimpulannya, konflik di Mesanggok berkembang bukan semata karena perbedaan teologis, melainkan karena kontestasi legitimasi dan delegitimasi tradisi lokal; pemulihan paling efektif terjadi ketika moderasi beragama dibumikan sebagai tata kelola sosial berbasis musyawarah kolaboratif yang membagi peran aktor (proteksi–mediasi–produksi norma–institusionalisasi program) secara sinergis dan berkelanjutan. Rekomendasi penelitian menekankan protokol musyawarah inklusif di tingkat desa, penguatan literasi ikhtilaf dan etika dakwah oleh MUI–KUA, Lakpesdam NU, penyuluh, pengembangan community policing berbasis mediasi, serta perluasan program lintas-kelompok hingga level dusun/RT untuk mencegah eskalasi berulang.

**Kata Kunci: Stakeholder; Moderasi Beragama; Musyawarah; Collaborative Governance; Konflik Sosial; Lombok Barat.**

## **Introduction**

Religious moderation fundamentally refers to a perspective, attitude, and practice of religiosity that emphasises justice, balance, respect for human dignity, and obedience to the constitution as a shared national covenant, thereby enabling peaceful social relations within plural societies (Fathurrahman, 2021). In Indonesia's plural context, religious moderation has become a strategic issue because the diversity of local religious traditions, religious authorities, and interpretive differences in reading sacred texts is a social reality that cannot be avoided. Such diversity can serve as a source of social cohesion when managed through an ethic of tolerance and mutual respect, but it may also become a source of tension when accompanied by exclusive truth claims, delegitimation of others' practices, and unilateral judgments that foster public labelling of others as "deviant/infidel" (Fathurrahman, 2021).

One context that illustrates these dynamics is Mesanggok Village, Gerung Subdistrict, West Lombok Regency. The village sustains socio-cultural traditions and communal religious practices transmitted across generations both cultural traditions such as *nyongkolan*, *begawe*, and *naekan dulang*, and religious traditions such as *yasinan*, loud *dbiker* (*zikir jabr*), *tablilan*, *nyinvaq*, *nyatus*, and various other socio-religious rites. Within rural social structures, such traditions function not merely as “habits” but as mechanisms that bind solidarity, transmit values, and produce shared meanings. Consequently, shifts in religiosity especially those articulated through harsh criticism that brands local practices as *bid'ah* or deviance may transform discursive differences into social conflict, ranging from rejection and segregation to symbolic and physical violence.

The development and dissemination of Salafi-Wahhabi discourse in Indonesia is often explained through preaching networks, educational institutions, and the circulation of religious literature that shapes specific religious orientations across regions (Affan, 2016). In many cases, this contestation does not stop at theological disagreement; it may generate social friction when it includes the delegitimation of local religious traditions. Empirically, conflicts associated with sectarian differences have occurred in various places, such as tensions in Pamekasan triggered by mass reactions to study circles perceived as disparaging local traditions (Affan, 2016) and conflict between Salafi groups and NU in the Griya Indah Serpong housing complex, Bogor, marked by mutual accusations, restrictions on preaching, and attempts to expel study circles during 2016 (Putra, 2018). At a more extreme level, media reported BNPT statements related to the Makassar Cathedral Church bombing (28 March 2021), linking perpetrators to exposure to particular ideologies; within that media narrative, the issue was associated with labelling local religious traditions as *bid'ah* and “misguidance” (Tim Detikcom and detiknews, 2021). These illustrations suggest that differences in religious orientation can develop into conflict when managed without dialogical ethics, without literacy on *khilāfiah*, and without social mechanisms that sustain tolerance.

Similar dynamics were also recorded in Mesanggok Village. Based on field data, polarisation emerged between residents who maintained local religious traditions (including those connected to local *tuan guru* networks) and groups introducing Salafi-Wahhabi study circles that deemed several local practices *bid'ah*. Tensions culminated in a series of incidents (2008–2009), including the stoning of a study-circle venue (14 May 2008) and further incidents in February 2009 indicating escalation at the community level. These facts underscore that the conflict was not merely theological disagreement but a social problem

involving power relations, struggles over legitimacy, and collective responses to perceived threats to identity and social order.

In such circumstances, stakeholders play a pivotal role in building religious moderation as social governance. Stakeholders include the village government and hamlet apparatus, security actors (police), religious and state institutions (MUI and KUA), religious counsellors, harmony forums (FKUB), civil society organisations such as NU (through Lakpesdam) and Nahdlatul Wathan, as well as youth and academics. Their presence opens strategic opportunities for conflict de-escalation, facilitated dialogue and *musyawarah*, and the creation of joint religious programmes that treat differences as realities to be managed fairly and proportionately (Fathurrahman, 2021). Therefore, examining stakeholder roles in Mesangkok is relevant not only for describing the conflict chronology but also for explaining how religious moderation can be operationalised through *musyawarah*, consensus-building, and sustainable recovery programmes at the village level. Accordingly, this article asks: How did the socio-religious conflict in Mesangkok unfold, and what factors triggered escalation? How did stakeholders (village government, security actors, religious institutions, mass organisations, youth, academics) strengthen religious moderation and facilitate recovery? How did *musyawarah* and cross-actor collaboration produce consensus and programmes to prevent recurrent conflict?

## **Research Method**

This study adopts a qualitative approach with an intrinsic case-study design to develop an in-depth understanding of stakeholder roles in strengthening religious moderation in the context of Salafi-Wahhabi contestation in Mesangkok Village, Gerung Subdistrict, West Lombok Regency. This design was selected because the study focuses on explaining social processes conflict chronology, escalation and de-escalation dynamics, and cross-actor collaboration mechanisms that produced consensus and recovery programmes rather than measuring the magnitude of a phenomenon (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2018). Data were collected from primary and secondary sources through purposive selection of informants, which could be expanded via snowball sampling. Informants included village officials and hamlet heads, security actors, MUI, KUA, religious counsellors, FKUB, religious organisations (e.g., NU via Lakpesdam and Nahdlatul Wathan), community leaders, youth, and affected/involved parties, complemented by documentary sources such as deliberation minutes, village/institutional archives, activity reports, and media coverage (Patton, 2015;

Bowen, 2009). Data collection techniques comprised semi-structured in-depth interviews to elicit event narratives and handling strategies, participant/non-participant observation of interactions and moderation programmes, FGDs/*sarasehan* to capture meaning-making and public deliberation, and document review to verify chronology and formal-informal decisions. Data analysis proceeded thematically and iteratively through transcription, open coding, axial coding, case-narrative construction, and analytic inference based on thematic linkages (Miles, Huberman and Saldaña, 2014). Trustworthiness was ensured through source and method triangulation, limited member checking with key informants, and an audit trail. The study also applied ethical principles of informed consent, anonymisation, and caution due to the sensitivity of conflict-related issues (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

## **Theoretical Framework**

### **Religious Moderation as Public Ethics and a Framework for Local Conflict Prevention**

Religious moderation is conceptualised as a way of viewing, practising, and embodying religion that affirms justice (*'adl*), balance (*tawāzun*), and respect for human dignity, thereby enabling differences in belief and religious expression to be managed peacefully in the public sphere (Kementerian Agama RI, 2019). In plural societies, religious moderation is not merely a moral exhortation; it functions as public ethics—a shared normative framework that guides intergroup interaction, reduces symbolic violence (e.g., labelling others as deviant/infidel), and reinforces national commitment as the basis for coexistence (Kementerian Agama RI, 2019). This framework is pertinent for understanding Mesanggok, where tensions surfaced when local religious practices were contested exclusivistically and framed as deviation, causing discursive differences to shift into social conflict.

Theoretically, within socio-conflict studies, religious moderation can be positioned as a strategy for conflict prevention and conflict management. Conflicts commonly move from latent disagreement to manifest collective action when identity delegitimation occurs, grievances accumulate, and communication channels weaken (Galtung, 1969). Religious moderation thus operates on structural-cultural dimensions: strengthening dialogue channels, regulating interaction norms, and establishing reasonable boundaries of difference (“agree to disagree”) so that conflict does not escalate into violence (Galtung, 1969). In Mesanggok, *musyawarah* and joint study circles can be interpreted as efforts to build village-

level “peace infrastructure” that transforms hostile relations into coexistence. Religious moderation is also associated with the formation of deliberative spaces that enable differences to be addressed through argumentation and agreement rather than coercion or violence. In the theory of communicative action, potentially destructive conflict can be contained when actors are willing to test truth claims dialogically, prioritise communicative rationality, and seek solutions acceptable to all parties (Habermas, 1984). Village *musyawarah*, police-facilitated dialogue, and forums such as FKUB and organisational FGDs can be read as deliberative arenas that produce shared norms: which domains of *ikhtilaf* are tolerable and which boundaries are non-negotiable (e.g., prohibitions against provocation and violence).

At the practical level, religious moderation requires institutionalisation: moderate values must be translated into routine and accessible social mechanisms across groups. Regular study circles that emphasise harmony, mutual aid, and *rahmatan lil ‘alamin* represent internalisation through social repetition habituating encounters, correcting prejudice, and building trust as social capital for peace (Putnam, 2000). Therefore, the moderation framework in this article not only articulates what is normatively desirable, but also explains how moderate values are produced through dialogue channels, shared rules, and sustainable socio-religious programmes at the local level (Kementerian Agama RI, 2019; Putnam, 2000).

### **Stakeholder Roles and Cross-Actor Collaboration in the Governance of Religious Conflict**

A stakeholder framework views conflict and its recovery as multi-actor processes involving parties with different interests, resources, and forms of legitimacy. From this perspective, conflict resolution is unlikely to be effective if it relies on a single actor (e.g., security forces), because socio-religious conflict also involves moral, cultural, and everyday social relations that require both formal and informal authorities (Freeman, 1984). In Mesanggok, stakeholders include the village government, religious leaders, MUI, KUA, FKUB, police, religious counsellors, mass organisations (NU/Lakpesdam, Nahdlatul Wathan), youth, and academics each contributing distinctive capacities: security protection, normative authority (fatwas/appeals), social mediation, and public education.

To explain how multiple actors can work together, this article adopts a collaborative governance lens: collaboration among institutions and communities to address complex public problems. Collaborative models emphasise that collaboration emerges when there are (1) a shared forum, (2) agreed rules of engagement, (3) commitment to public goals, and (4)

face-to-face dialogue that builds trust (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Repeated *musyawarah* (2008–2009) and routine cross-group study circles (from 2021 onward) can be interpreted as “collaborative arenas” that gradually shift conflict from competitive truth claims to procedural agreement: stopping provocation, stabilising communication channels, and strengthening joint programmes as conflict prevention.

Cross-actor collaboration can also be analysed through functional stakeholder roles in conflict governance: (a) protection (police/security contain escalation), (b) mediation (village government, community leaders, FKUB facilitate dialogue), (c) norm production (MUI/KUA/counsellors/organisations develop moderate narratives and boundaries of *ikhtilaf*), and (d) institutionalisation (routine study circles, *sarasehan*, FGDs as preventive devices) (Ansell and Gash, 2008). This functional differentiation highlights that religious moderation is not “the task of one institution” but a collective product requiring coordination between formal authority (state) and moral-cultural authority (leaders/organisations).

Finally, stakeholder collaboration can be understood as conflict transformation a process emphasising changes in social relations and opportunity structures rather than simply “ending riots.” Conflict transformation entails changing communication patterns, reconstructing perceptions of the other, and creating shared mechanisms that prevent recurrence (Lederach, 1997). In Mesanggok, strengthening *musyawarah* and routine cross-group study circles reflects an effort to transform an “arena of conflict” into an “arena of coexistence” through social agreements, repeated encounters, and strengthened politico-ethical literacy of religiosity. In this framework, stakeholder roles are not merely for short-term conflict resolution but for designing village-level social governance of religious moderation (Lederach, 1997; Ansell and Gash, 2008).

### **Mesanggok’s Socio-Geographical Context and the Ecology of Local Religious Traditions**

Mesanggok Hamlet (Mesanggok Village, Gerung Subdistrict, West Lombok) occupies a relatively strategic position due to its proximity to the regency administrative centre and mobility routes from Lembar Port. This geographical closeness means Mesanggok is not fully “isolated” as an agrarian village; rather, it is a social space continually interacting with flows of people, ideas, and new authorities. In everyday life, the local economy is

supported by diverse occupations farmers, traders, carriage drivers, and civil servants—forming dense communal networks of mutual dependence (Field notes, 2021).

In the local religious structure, traditional authority in Mesanggok is anchored in the figure of the *tuan guru* (*mursyid*), who functions not only as a source of religious knowledge but also as a moral regulator and guardian of social stability. Local narratives position TGH Muhammad Arif (d. 1946) as a central figure who strengthened *tarekat* traditions and established an “authority line” that produced networks of *tuan guru* across Lombok. Such authority patterns are common in Sasak society, where religious leadership intertwines with social and symbolic leadership; religious practice is embedded within community governance rather than standing apart from it (Cederroth, 1981).

In this context, communal rituals (e.g., *sarakalan/Barzanji*, loud *dhikr*, *talqin*, *maulid*, *qunut*, and social traditions such as *begawe*) are not seen as optional add-ons but as infrastructure of togetherness: spaces where identity, solidarity, and moral legitimacy are reproduced. Sociologically, collective rituals strengthen cohesion and “collective consciousness” (Durkheim, 1912; Turner, 1969). Therefore, when a local practice is publicly labelled negatively (e.g., “*bid'ah*” or “deviant”), the effects often extend beyond theology to touch collective dignity and the stability of social relations.

### **The Entry of Salafi-Wahhabi Study Circles and the Shift of Discursive Authority**

The spread of Salafi-Wahhabi movements across Indonesian regions is commonly linked to preaching networks, the transmission of religious literature, and broader educational-religious connections. In modern history, purification ideas are often traced to reform currents associated with Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, emphasising the correction of practices deemed to lack sound textual foundations according to particular standards (Salihima, 2015). In Indonesia, Salafi dissemination is also discussed in relation to institutional networks, scholarships, and the production and circulation of books and references that extend influence across regions (Aswar, 2016).

At the local level in Mesanggok, these dynamics appeared through the figure of H. Mukti Nasehat, who around May 2008 began hosting study circles at his home and teaching a Salafi-Wahhabi orientation to family members, workers, and congregants from other areas. Initially, the study circle functioned as an internal space, but it later became a networking node, as some followers from other hamlets—who had previously faced social rejection used the site as an alternative venue for learning and gathering (Field notes, 2021).

As the study circles expanded, tensions emerged not simply due to “differences of *madhhab*” but because the articulation of difference moved toward delegitimation of local traditions. Longstanding practices such as loud *dhiker*, *talqin*, *Dalā’il al-Khayrāt*, and *maulid* commemorations were called *bid’ah* or deviance. In a community where tradition supports solidarity, such delegitimizing language is readily perceived as a threat to collective honour and local religious authority. Consequently, friction shifted into contests over legitimacy: who has the authority to define “true Islam” within Mesanggok’s social space (Hasan, 2006; Field notes, 2021).

### **Conflict Escalation (2008–2009) and Recovery Pathways through Musyawarah**

The chronology shows repeated escalation. On Wednesday, 14 May 2008 at 22:00 WITA, H. Mukti’s house used as a study-circle venue was stoned by residents during a Qur’anic exegesis session attended by dozens of congregants. Security actors responded promptly to prevent wider violence by securing involved parties and deploying personnel at the site (Field notes, 2021). At this stage, community rejection indicates that the conflict had shifted from discursive contestation to collective action, as the study circle was perceived as a channel for spreading teachings that “disturbed” local traditional order.

Tensions recurred on Thursday, 19 February 2009 (around 22:00 WITA) in a similar pattern: stoning during a study session followed by security intervention. The situation escalated further on Saturday, 21 February 2009 (17:05 WITA), when broader damage occurred, affecting residential property. The triggering narrative was multi-layered: residents’ frustration that study activities continued, resistance to leaflets/references perceived as blaming local traditions, and deteriorating communication due to the absence of certain parties from dialogue forums facilitated by security actors (Field notes, 2021).

From a conflict governance perspective, recovery did not occur in a single decisive moment but through staged *musyawarah* involving multiple actors. Initial dialogue on 17 May 2008 brought together village elements, security actors, religious leaders, and representatives of the study-circle side. Subsequent mediation on 26 February 2009 highlighted the role of formal institutions (MUI, local government, police) in attempting to build social agreement. However, more preventive recovery became visible later when on 2 November 2021 the village head encouraged a routine cross-group public study programme as a “shared space” to sustain harmony, improve communication, and instil more balanced public religious ethics (Field notes, 2021). Conceptually, this aligns with the Indonesian framework of religious

moderation emphasising balance, respect for human dignity, and the management of differences within the national civic order (Kementerian Agama RI, 2019).

### **Conflict Resolution/Recovery by Stakeholders**

#### **Recovery I: Early Dialogue and De-escalation (Saturday, 17 May 2008)**

Following the conflict incident, initial recovery efforts were undertaken through a dialogue forum that brought residents together with members of the affected Salafi-Wahhabi study circle. The meeting was held at Daarud Dakwah Mosque, Mesanggok, with study-circle representatives accompanied by a local religious figure (H. Muspihad) and two daughters of H. Mukti Nasehat. The forum also involved formal and religious authorities, including the Gerung Police Chief (AKP H. Ahmad), representatives of the subdistrict Ministry of Religious Affairs office, the Gerung Subdistrict Head, the Chair of MUI West Lombok (TGH Shafwan Hakim), and village apparatus acting as facilitators (Gapuk Village Head and Mesanggok Hamlet Head) (Internal document/minutes of deliberation, 2008; Field notes, 2021).

Substantively, the dialogue functioned as a de-escalation mechanism: reducing collective emotions, preventing renewed violence, and reopening minimal communication channels between the disputing parties. In conflict resolution theory, such a phase is often framed as “stabilisation” and “interrupting cycles of violence” before substantive negotiation becomes possible (Galtung, 1996; Fisher, Ury and Patton, 2011). Yet the forum also demonstrated that the conflict was not merely about doctrinal differences; it concerned boundaries of social authority and the legitimacy of local traditions.

The dialogue outcomes show that the community’s position remained firm: the majority demanded the cessation of study-circle activities perceived as generating tension and requested that H. Mukti Nasehat leave the hamlet. These demands were presented as a continuation of an earlier residents’ deliberation attended by community representatives (around 60 people) and were recorded in official minutes stating a prohibition on teachings considered contrary to local tradition and custom (Internal document/minutes of deliberation, 2008). At this point, stakeholders primarily served as security stabilisers, early mediators, and facilitators of *musyawarah*, although the resulting agreement was still heavily shaped by local community pressure.

### **Recovery II: Formal Mediation at the Regency Level (Thursday, 26 February 2009)**

The second recovery stage involved formal mediation at the West Lombok Police Headquarters, led by the Police Chief (AKBP Agus Supriyanto). The forum brought together representatives of Mesangkok residents and the Salafi-Wahhabi side, and involved cross-institutional stakeholders such as MUI West Lombok, the regency government, Bakesbanglinmas, the Ministry of Religious Affairs office (Kandepag), and the Gerung Subdistrict Head (Field notes, 2021). Institutionally, this mediation reflects an attempt to move grassroots conflict into a more formal governance arena so that outcomes are not dictated solely by mass emotion, but are driven by security governance and more structured social agreement.

During the meeting, residents through their negotiators expressed objections to the circulation of materials perceived as condemning local religious practice (e.g., photocopied *Furqon* magazine). At the same time, residents reaffirmed previous demands: cessation of Salafi-Wahhabi teachings in Mesangkok and restrictions on H. Mukti Nasehat's mobility, as referenced in community *amiq-amiq* (customary village regulations) compiled by residents (Internal document/community regulations, 2009; Field notes, 2021).

From negotiation theory, this phase shows the shift from “incident” to “norm dispute”: what is at stake is not only individual behaviour but the definition of legitimacy for religious practice in the hamlet's public space. Therefore, mediators (state and religious authorities) are crucial to reduce violence risk while safeguarding basic rights and social stability (Fisher, Ury and Patton, 2011; Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009). However, the data also suggest limits to mediation: agreements did not fully resolve root issues because interpretive differences and social legitimacy struggles persisted.

### **Recovery III: Institutionalising Conflict Prevention through Communal Programmes (Tuesday, 2 November 2021 onward)**

The final recovery stage moved toward a more preventive approach through the institutionalisation of socio-religious programmes. In this phase, the Mesangkok Village Head (H. Muharar), who possessed historical knowledge of local dynamics, promoted the establishment of a public study programme attended by cross-group participants (Salafi-Wahhabi and non-Salafi). The programme was not designed as an arena for debating *furū'iyah* issues, but as a shared learning space emphasising harmony, mutual cooperation, social ethics, and principles of religious moderation (Field notes, 2021). This model aligns with conflict transformation approaches that shift conflict from hostile relations to

coexistence by creating regular, safe, repeated interaction spaces—reducing prejudice, improving communication, and restoring shared norms (Lederach, 1997). In Indonesia’s policy context, the content of cross-group study circles also resonates with the national framework of religious moderation, emphasising justice, balance, respect for human dignity, and civic commitment (Kementerian Agama RI, 2019).

Accordingly, this stage marks a transition from “handling conflict” to “building a social system for conflict prevention.” Stakeholders are no longer primarily enforcers but architects of social governance who provide deliberative platforms, strengthen public religious literacy, and regulate boundaries of difference so that disagreement does not trigger violence (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Lederach, 1997).

### **Consolidating Collaboration: FKUB Sarasehan and Lakpesdam FGD (November 2021)**

Recovery was further strengthened through cross-actor forums. The West Lombok FKUB *sarasehan* (4 November 2021) at Nurul Madinah Islamic boarding school became a space for stakeholders to exchange ideas on managing interpretive diversity and preventing conflict. Recommendations emphasised the need for guidelines/modules for monitoring *kebilafiyah*-related conflict risks, strengthening local harmony-watch organisations down to the hamlet/RT level, and engaging youth through cross-identity activities to reduce exclusivism (Field notes, 2021). This aligns with collaborative governance, which addresses complex public issues through cross-institution coordination and civil society participation (Ansell and Gash, 2008).

Subsequently, the Lakpesdam PCNU West Lombok FGD (14 November 2021) served as a forum to consolidate a public-ethics-based narrative of religious moderation. Speakers emphasised strengthening common ground: not inflating *furū’iyyah* debates, prioritising shared humanity, and expanding perspectives through mutual learning of interpretive methods across groups (Field notes, 2021). From conflict resolution perspectives, this strategy increases the possibility of reconciliation by reducing divisive truth-claim intensity and building a shared language as a prerequisite for coexistence (Galtung, 1996; Fisher, Ury and Patton, 2011).

### **Analysing the Conflict–Recovery Phases: Religious Moderation as Public Ethics and Preventive Infrastructure**

First, Mesanggok’s dynamics indicate that conflict did not stem solely from theological difference but from communal identity delegitimation when local traditions (loud *dhikir*, *talqin*, *Dalā’il al-Khayrāt*, *maulid*, *tablil*, and socio-religious rites) were publicly labelled “*bid’ah*” or deviant. In this phase, interpretive disagreement shifted into issues of collective dignity and the hamlet’s “moral order,” prompting residents’ resistance as a mechanism of social identity protection. Theoretically, this accords with explanations that conflict escalation intensifies when communication channels weaken, truth claims are imposed publicly, and other groups’ practices are delegitimised; conflict then moves from latent to manifest forms of collective action (Galtung, 1969; Kementerian Agama RI, 2019). In other words, *bid’ah* served as a discursive trigger, but escalation was accelerated by the manner of articulation and its social impact on communal solidarity.

Second, de-escalation measures (security protection and early dialogue) illustrate religious moderation as public ethics rather than moral rhetoric. When security actors prevented renewed violence and facilitated dialogue, the primary function was to interrupt cycles of violence so that conflict would not become destructive or diffuse. This aligns with conflict resolution approaches emphasising “stabilisation” and the creation of “safe spaces” before substantive negotiation can proceed more rationally (Galtung, 1996; Fisher, Ury and Patton, 2011). Here, moderation did not demand uniformity of belief; it set ethical boundaries: restraining provocation, protecting vulnerable parties, and restoring minimal communication so that deliberation becomes possible (Kementerian Agama RI, 2019).

Third, formal mediation at the regency level marked a shift from “incident” to a normative dispute over what counts as legitimate religious practice in the hamlet’s public sphere. Residents objected to materials perceived as condemning tradition; the study-circle side defended its preaching legitimacy; and formal institutions sought to balance social stability, citizens’ rights, and public order. In negotiation and mediation theory, such patterns highlight the need for norm clarification and agreed rules of engagement to prevent renewed escalation; *musyawarah* matters not to declare winners but to formulate coexistence procedures (Fisher, Ury and Patton, 2011; Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009). From the standpoint of religious moderation, this underscores that unavoidable differences must be relocated into the domain of manageable *kebilafiyah*, so truth claims do not translate into social exclusion (Kementerian Agama RI, 2019).

Fourth, institutionalising cross-group study circles (2021 onward) reveals a more sustainable prevention mechanism: moderation becomes routine social practice. This fits the thesis that conflict prevention is most effective when moderate values are translated into repeated, inclusive, accessible social infrastructure reducing prejudice, improving relationships, and producing more peaceful interaction norms (Putnam, 2000; Kementerian Agama RI, 2019). *Musyawarah* and joint study circles function as public education spaces that reinforce the ethics of disagreement, mutual aid, and *rahmatan lil 'alamin*. Thus, moderation in Mesanggok is not a slogan but a governance device for regulating difference so it does not become an existential threat (Habermas, 1984; Kementerian Agama RI, 2019).

### **Analysing Stakeholder Mechanisms: Cross-Actor Collaboration, Functional Differentiation, and Co-optation Risks**

First, the Mesanggok case confirms that village-level religious conflict is a multi-dimensional public problem and cannot be solved by a single actor. A stakeholder lens helps clarify how each actor brings distinct resources and legitimacy: village government provides administrative authority and social proximity; police provide protection capacity; MUI/KUA/counsellors provide normative authority; organisations (NU/Lakpesdam, Nahdlatul Wathan) provide education and mobilisation networks; FKUB provides cross-identity channels; and youth/academics contribute community energy and literacy frameworks (Freeman, 1984). This explains why recovery became effective when these roles were synergised rather than monopolised by one actor.

Second, this synergy can be explained through collaborative governance, where public problems are addressed through shared forums, agreed rules, and trust-building dialogue (Ansell and Gash, 2008). The sequence of forums (village dialogue, police mediation, FKUB *sarasehan*, Lakpesdam FGD) served as collaborative arenas producing two main outputs: (1) a bridging narrative that differences are manageable *khilāfiyah*, and (2) procedural guardrails to prevent provocation and violence. Repeated face-to-face meetings increase the likelihood of trust and commitment to common goals, as previously suspicious parties acquire more stable communication channels (Ansell and Gash, 2008).

Third, functional differentiation among stakeholders in this case operated through four complementary roles: protection (violence prevention), mediation (dialogue/*musyawarah*), norm production (clarifying *khilāfiyah* boundaries and *da'wah* ethics), and institutionalisation (routine cross-group programmes). This pattern aligns with conflict

transformation, which emphasises changing social relations and creating shared mechanisms rather than merely stopping riots (Lederach, 1997). Hence, routine cross-group study circles can be read as a transformation outcome—from hostile relations to coexistence—where repeated social encounters build new social capital capable of containing future escalation (Putnam, 2000; Lederach, 1997).

Fourth, although stakeholder collaboration proved productive, it also carries risks: (a) majoritarian domination in deliberation that suppresses minority rights; (b) “empty formalisation,” where *musyawarah* becomes administrative ritual without relational repair; and (c) political co-optation, where sectarian issues are instrumentalised for local power interests. Theoretically, collaborative governance is stable only when participation is inclusive, relatively equal, and bounded by clear norms against delegitimising speech; otherwise, forums may become arenas of social pressure that reproduce inequality (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Therefore, recommendations emphasising inclusive deliberation protocols, literacy on *ikhtilaf/ khilafiyah*, and ethical limits on *da'wah* are essential so religious moderation not only cools conflict but also safeguards social justice and dignity over the long term (Kementerian Agama RI, 2019; Habermas, 1984).

## Conclusion

This article draws three main conclusions aligned with the research questions. First, the chronology of socio-religious conflict in Mesanggok Village indicates a staged escalation: the introduction of Salafi-Wahhabi study circles (around May 2008) generated tension because several local religious practices (e.g., loud *dhikir*, *talqin*, *Dalā'il al-Khayrāt*, *tahlil*, *maulid*) were labelled as *bid'ah* or deviation; tensions then transformed into repeated collective actions, including stoning and property damage on 14 May 2008 and again in February 2009. The primary drivers of escalation were not merely interpretive differences, but the delegitimation of tradition in the public sphere, accumulated social grievance, weakened communication channels, and competing claims to local religious authority allowing discursive disagreement to develop into open conflict. Second, stakeholders played a crucial role in strengthening religious moderation and facilitating recovery through complementary functional divisions. Police performed protection and de-escalation to halt violence and prevent diffusion; village government and community leaders facilitated mediation and *musyawarah*; MUI, KUA, religious counsellors, FKUB, and organisations (NU/Lakpesdam and Nahdlatul Wathan) contributed to norm production and moderate narratives (ethics of

*da'wah*, *khilāfiyah* literacy, and the ethics of disagreement), enabling differences to be treated as manageable domains rather than threats requiring elimination; meanwhile, youth and academics expanded educational space and social networks to sustain recovery. This pattern confirms that village-level religious moderation is most effective when enacted as multi-actor social governance rather than assigned to a single institution. Third, *musyawarah* and cross-actor collaboration produced consensus and prevented recurrence through four interlinked stages: (1) post-incident de-escalation and security protection, (2) mediated dialogue to restore communication and clarify norms, (3) formulation of community rules of engagement to limit provocation and violence, and (4) institutionalisation of inclusive programmes especially routine cross-group study circles and strengthened *sarasehan*/FGD forums that normalise encounter, build trust, and reframe differences as manageable *khilāfiyah*. Thus, *musyawarah* functions not only as a short-term settlement device but also as a conflict transformation process that moves relations from hostility toward coexistence through repeated and inclusive social mechanisms. The article recommends: (a) Village government should establish inclusive deliberation protocols (cross-group representation, anti-hate-speech rules, and follow-up mechanisms) and integrate moderation programmes into the village activity calendar; (b) MUI/KUA/religious counsellors should strengthen public literacy on *ikhtilāf/khilāfiyah*, the ethics of *da'wah*, and the ethics of disagreement through accessible community materials; (c) Police/security actors should develop mediation-oriented community policing focused not only on law enforcement but also on prevention and relationship repair; (d) FKUB and religious organisations should extend *sarasehan*/FGDs to hamlet/RT level, strengthen moderation cadres, and prepare conflict response guidelines grounded in local experience; and (e) Youth and community leaders should develop cross-community programmes (communal work, youth camps, social service) so interaction is fostered not only in ritual spaces but also in shared humanitarian spaces.

## References

- Affan, H. (2016) 'Aliran Wahabi dan wajah Islam moderat di Indonesia', *BBC News Indonesia*, 19 May.
- Ansell, C. and Gash, A. (2008) 'Collaborative governance in theory and practice', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18(4), pp. 543–571. doi:10.1093/jopart/mum032.

- Aswar, H. (2016) 'Politik luar negeri Arab Saudi dan ajaran Salafi-Wahabi di Indonesia', *JISIERA: The Journal of Islamic Studies and International Relations*, 1(1).
- Badan Litbang dan Diklat, Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia (2019) *Tanya Jawab Moderasi Beragama*. Jakarta: Kementerian Agama RI.
- Bercovitch, J. and Jackson, R. (2009) *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Bowen, G.A. (2009) 'Document analysis as a qualitative research method', *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9(2), pp. 27–40.
- Cederroth, S. (1981) *The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah: A Sasak Community on Lombok*. Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis.
- Creswell, J.W. and Poth, C.N. (2018) *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*. 4th edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
- Detikcom (2021) 'BNPT: Lukman Bomber Makassar Berideologi Salafi Wahabi yang Membidahkan', *detikNews*, 30 March.
- Durkheim, E. (1912) *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*. Paris: Félix Alcan.
- Fathurrahman, O. (2020) 'Moderasi Beragama', *detikNews* (Kolom), 22 December.
- Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (2011) *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*. 3rd edn. New York: Penguin Books.
- Freeman, R.E. (1984) *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*. Boston, MA: Pitman.
- Galtung, J. (1969) 'Violence, peace, and peace research', *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), pp. 167–191.
- Galtung, J. (1996) *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: SAGE.
- Habermas, J. (1984) *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Hasan, N. (2006) *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program.
- Hefner, R.W. (2000) *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia (2019) *Moderasi Beragama*. Jakarta: Kementerian Agama RI.

- Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia (2019) *Moderasi Beragama (Kerangka Kebijakan dan Penguatan Moderasi)*. Jakarta: Kementerian Agama RI.
- Lederach, J.P. (1997) *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G. (1985) *Naturalistic Inquiry*. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE.
- Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M. and Saldaña, J. (2014) *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook*. 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
- Patton, M.Q. (2015) *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods*. 4th edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
- Peneliti (2021) *Catatan lapangan penelitian di Desa Mesanggok, Kecamatan Gerung, Kabupaten Lombok Barat*. Dokumen tidak dipublikasikan.
- Pemerintah Desa Gapuk (2008) *Berita Acara Musyawarah Warga Dusun Mesanggok (14 Mei 2008)*. Dokumen internal (tidak dipublikasikan).
- Pemerintah Desa Mesanggok (2009) *Aniq-aniq/ Aturan Kampung Dusun Mesanggok (dokumen 10 butir aturan kampung)*. Dokumen internal (tidak dipublikasikan).
- Putnam, R.D. (2000) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Putra, D.H. (2018) *Fenomena Konflik Nabdhlatul Ulama dan Salafi: Studi Kasus di Perumahan Griya Indah Serpong, Gunung Sindur, Bogor*. Skripsi. Jakarta: UIN Syarif Hidayatullah.
- Salihima, S. (2013) 'Konsep pembaharuan Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab', *Jurnal Rihlah*, 1(1), pp. 160–175.
- Stake, R.E. (1995) *The Art of Case Study Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
- Turner, V. (1969) *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*. Chicago, IL: Aldine.
- Yin, R.K. (2018) *Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods*. 6th edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.