PCD Journal Vol.
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Book Review: Islamic Political Discourse in the Reform Era Dimpos Manalu1 Received: 26 July 2018 | Accepted: 3 December 2018 | Published: 30 January 2019 Berebut Wacana: Pergulatan Wacana Umat Islam Indonesia Era Reformasi [Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Society.
Ideas, and Value.
Author : Carool Kersten Bandung : Mizan, 2018 Introduction The connection between the state and Islam is a dynamic and important theme in Indonesian political discourse, a situation inseparable from some MuslimsAo aspirations for Islam to become the ideology .
of the state.
In the important political events that have occurred, such polemics have often emerged and become sources of serious political tensions.
Carool KerstenAos book, an Indonesian-language translation of Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Society.
Ideas, and Values .
, examines the contestations of discourses and actors during IndonesiaAos Reform Era within the relationship of the state and religion (Isla.
This book comprehensively explains how two groupsAiprogressive Muslims and conservative .
MuslimsAihave continued their predecessorsAo struggles.
It focuses specifically on the first group, as well as the diverse sub-discourses included therein.
Dimpos Manalu.
Secretary of Board The Study Group for PeopleAos Initiative Development (KSPPM).
Parapat.
North Sumatra, 2018-2021.
doctoral candidate in Political Sciences.
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences.
Universitas Gadjah Mada.
336 Book Review: Islamic Political Discourse in the Reform Era Progressive Muslims and Conservative Muslims The term progressive Muslims is used as a new category to describe the groups that have promoted the substantive values of Islam in social and national life, including democracy, socioeconomic justice, human rights, equality, etc.
Conservative Muslims, meanwhile, are described as those seeking the formalisation of Islamic sharia .
, either in the form of the state itself or through the passage of Islamic/laws.
This new terminology is quite refreshing, as Kersten has attempted to avoid the classical categorisations that may upset certain parties, including the labels AufundamentalistAy.
AuradicalAy.
AupuritanAy.
AusecularAy.
AuliberalAy, and AumoderateAy, all of which have shifted in meaning and become encumbered by insinuative interpretations.
Nonetheless, it is possible that KerstenAos categories may ultimately not be satisfactory, as such simplification cannot easily be avoided with such categorisations.
One of the most important contributions of this book is its mapping of how thoughts regarding Islamic reform emerged in the 1970s, supported by such leading figures as Nurcholish Madjid.
Abdurrahman Wahid.
Amien Rais.
Syafii Maarif, and Ahmad Wahib.
Using different emphases and slogans, these figures were on the frontlines, rejecting the formalisation of Islamic sharia and believing that the Quran does not specify any specific concept or model of nation.
For these figures, the Pancasila, as the national ideology of Indonesia, in no way contradicted with Islam.
They viewed Pancasila as the most appropriate means of overcoming the dichotomy of integralism vs.
separation of religion and state.
Nurcholish Madjid, for example, motored a Aorenewal movementAo .
erakan pembarua.
using the famous slogan AuIslam Yes.
Partai Islam NoAy (Islam Yes.
Islamic Parties N.
This slogan was part of his discourse of secularism, which remains debated even Abdurrahman Wahid promoted an Auindigenisation of IslamAy .
ribumisasi Isla.
Meanwhile, the Muhammadiyah leaders Amien PCD Journal Vol.
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Rais and Syafii Maarif emphasised an Islamic ethos, social justice, democracy, and egalitarian society in their works.
Abdurrahman Wahid, quoting a Nahdlatul Ulama fatwa in his Ilusi Negara Islam [The Illusion of the Islamic Stat.
(Wahid, 2.
argued that the concept of Islamic government (Khilafah Islamiya.
had no theological basis in the Quran or in the Hadiths.
It is the thought of these figures that were inherited by progressive Muslims in subsequent generations, who also offered not only more sophisticated arguments but also sharp criticism.
In the Reform Era, the heirs of these thinkers were the ones who promoted ideas of secularism, liberalism, and pluralism.
Over these three concepts, they have fought fiercely with their opponents, i.
conservative Muslims.
Progressive Muslims have spread throughout various non-governmental organisations, andAino less importantlyAithe two largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.
Educational institutions, including the numerous State Islamic UniversitiesAiparticularly Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta and Sunan Kalijaga in YogyakartaAihave promoted progressive ideals through the AuCiputat SchoolAy .
ncluding thinkers as Harun Nasution.
Quraish Shihab.
Azyumardi Azra.
Komaruddin Hidayat, and Fachry Al.
and the AuYogyakarta SchoolAy .
ncluding thinkers such as Mukti Ali and members of Limited Group such as Dawam Rahardjo.
Ahmad Syafii Maarif, and Ahmad Wahi.
The AuYogyakarta SchoolAy has also been supported by such intellectuals as Kuntowijoyo.
Moeslim Abdurrahman.
Abdul Munir Mulkhan, and M.
Amin Abdullah.
These two schools of thought have also produced many younger progressive thinkers, who now occupy strategic positions both in various universities and in general society.
Think tanks and non-governmental organisations identified by Kersten as progressive Muslim include the Institute for Economic and Social Research.
Education, and Enlightenment (Lembaga Penelitian.
Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 338 Book Review: Islamic Political Discourse in the Reform Era LP3ES), the Paramadina Foundation, the Institute for Religious and Philosophical Study (Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat.
LSAF), the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial.
LKiS), the Association for the Development of Boarding Schools and Society (Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat.
P3M), the Institute for Human Resources Research and Development (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia.
Lakpesda.
, the Institute for Boarding Schools and Human Resources Research (Lembaga Kajian Pesantren dan Sumber Daya Manusia.
LKPSM), the Fahmina Institute, the Freedom Institute, the Indonesia Institute, the Reform Institute, the Centre for Islamic and State Studies (Pusat Studi Islam dan Kenegaraan.
PSIK), the International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), the Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity, the Wahid Institute, and .
o less importantl.
the Network of Young Muhammadiyah Intellectuals (Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah.
JIMM) and the Liberal Islamic Networks (Jaringan Islam Liberal.
JIL).
Meanwhile, among conservative Muslims, the heirs of Mohammad Natsir and Muhammad Rasyidi have included various members of the Indonesian Council for Islamic Proselytisation (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia.
DDII).
This body was established as an alternative to the Masyumi Party, which had been disbanded by Sukarno and prohibited from reforming by Soeharto.
Prominent thinkers since Natsir have included Imaduddin Abdulrahim and Endang Saefuddin Anshari.
Interestingly, according to Kersten, where Islamic educational institutions run by the state have become bastions of progressive thought, secular universities such as the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) and Bogor Agricultural University (IPB) have become the basis of the proselytisation movement.
Compared to progressive Muslims.
Kersten does not give much attention to institutions of conservative Muslims.
These include, for example, the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas dengan PCD Journal Vol.
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Dunia Islam.
KISDI), once led by Ahmad Sumargono, and the Indonesian Muslim StudentsAo Action Union (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia.
KAMMI).
One main figure in DDII, and vocal critic of progressive Muslims, is Adian Husaini, who was also active in Muhammadiyah.
Husaini also joined the Institute for Islamic Research and Study (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam.
LPPI) established by Mohammed Amin Djamaluddin.
Kersten also categorises Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as part of conservative Islam, mentioning such people as Farid Wadjdi.
Shiddiq al-Jawi.
Ismail Yusanto.
Rokhmat S.
Labib.
Hafidz Abdurrahman, and Fahmi Amhar.
The Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.
PKS), despite having recently shifted its position and taking a more inclusive approach, is similarly identified as having infiltrated Muhammadiyah-run mosques, schools, and campuses, and made them more conservative.
Finally, although both NU and Muhammadiyah are popularly known as AumoderateAy Islamic organisations, they include within them conservative factions.
In other words, neither organisation is Looking Back The discourses of political Islam in Indonesia can be traced back through history.
In the 1940s.
Sukarno debated Mohammad Natsir regarding the topic in Panji Islam.
2 Sukarno supported the separation of religion and the state, while Natsir did not.
It may be said that Sukarno represented a secular nationalist ideology, while Natsir represented a religious nationalist ideology.
Both may be identified as AunationalistAy because, despite coming from opposite positions, they both supported and fought for Indonesia becoming independent nation-state.
Referring to the experiences of Turkey under Kemal Attaturk and the democratic countries of Europe, all of which formally See, among others.
Suhelmi .
340 Book Review: Islamic Political Discourse in the Reform Era separated religion and the state.
Sukarno firmly believed that integrating the two would transform religion into a tool of power, a tool of the political elite.
The integration of religion and the state, he argued, would betray democracy and create a AuCaesaro-papistAy government with absolute power.
Sukarno argued that democracy was necessary for the Indonesian archipelago, recognising that a nation-state would unite diverse ethnic groups, religions, and regional cultures.
Meanwhile.
Natsir, who was famed as a Muslim reformist, believed that Islam offered a comprehensive way of life .
and thus needed to be integrated into the nation-state.
As a multidimensional ideology, he argued.
Islam provides guidance for the world .
, the afterlife .
, and all contained therein.
Natsir argued that secularist thought, including the separation of religion and the state, was opposed to Islamic principles.
Rather, he argued.
Islam should serve as the basis of the Indonesian stateAi especially since most of its residents are Muslim.
Furthermore, the state should enforce Islamic sharia.
The debate between Sukarno and Natsir continued to resonate through the independence era, and even into the present day.
In the meetings of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence (BPUPKI), and subsequently the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI), the nationalistsAi represented by such figures as Sukarno.
Hatta.
Soepomo.
Rajiman, and YaminAientered lengthy debates with Muslim groupsAias represented by people such as Ki Bagus Hadikusumo.
Kahar Muzakir.
KH.
Wahid Hasjim, and KH.
Ahmad Sanusi.
Several writers have described these debates, the substance of which was similar to the debate discussed above, as Autense and heatedAy.
To overcome such tensions.
Sukarno then offered Pancasila as the ideological foundation of the Indonesian state.
it was subsequently approved by the majority of BPUPKIAos members.
However, representatives of Muslim groups asked that the first principle (AuBelief in the One and Only GodA.
include the clause PCD Journal Vol.
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AuA dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariAoat Islam bagi pemelukpemeluknyaAy (A with the requirement to follow Islamic sharia for the faithfu.
This clause was ultimately included in the Jakarta Charter on 22 June 1945 and formulated for the preamble to the 1945 Constitution.
However, the nationalists saw the Jakarta Charter as having the potential to become a Authorn in the sideAy of Indonesian unity and the ongoing struggle for independence.
Similarly, non-Muslim groups, including Protestants and Catholics, felt unhappy with the inclusion of these seven words.
In his autobiography.
Memoir (Hatta, 1.
,3 Muhammad Hatta told how he actively approached Islamic leaders such as Ki Bagus Hadikusumo.
KH.
Wahid Hasyim.
Mr.
Kasman Singodimedjo, and Mr.
Teuku Hasan and sought for these Auseven wordsAy to be removed.
As he wrote.
AuAt the time, we recognised that the spirit of the Jakarta Charter would not disappear by replacing the clause Aowith the requirement to follow Islamic sharia for the faithfulAo with the clause Ao Belief in the One and Only GodAoAy.
These Auseven wordsAy were ultimately and unanimously removed from the preamble and body of the 1945 Constitution.
This historical moment occurred during the PPKI meeting of 18 August 1945.
However, heated debate again emerged in the Constituent Assembly that was mandated to prepare a new constitution to replace the temporary constitution of 1950.
The marathon meeting ended with a dead lock.
Although the assembly was able to agree upon many things, it was forced to vote on the basis of the stateAii.
Pancasila or Islam.
Ultimately, 263 members of the assembly agreed with the presidentAos proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution as formulated on 18 August 1945.
203 opposed, including representatives of Islamic groups that wanted the Auseven wordsAy of the Jakarta Charter to be restored.
This vote, thus, was unable to Republished in 2011 with the title Untuk Negeriku: Sebuah Otobiografi [For My Country:
An Autobiograph.
hree volume.
by Kompas.
See the third volume.
Menuju Gerbang Kemerdekaan [Towards the Gates of Independenc.
, p.
342 Book Review: Islamic Political Discourse in the Reform Era achieve the necessary quorum .
/3 of all present member.
This was one of SukarnoAos reasons for ultimately issuing the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 (Maarif, 2006, p.
During the New Order, when the authoritarian and militaristic Soeharto was in power, this discursive contestation was no longer evident .
t least at the surfac.
, as the ruling regime gave no space for groups branded Auextreme leftAy and Auextreme rightAy to articulate their own politics.
De-ideologisation occurred systematically.
Meanwhile.
SoehartoAos resignation in 1998 offered greater political freedom, but this occurred asymmetrically.
While Islamic groups have been free in their activities and political articulations, this has not been true for leftist groups, whose ideology remains formally forbidden, see among others Suhelmi .
The New Face of Islamic Political Articulation in the Reform Era KerstenAos study underscores the conclusion reached by several political scientists: the discursive and ideological contestations in Indonesia, particularly as related to the relationship between religion and the state, are not only occurring between secular nationalists and Islamic nationalists, but also among Muslims.
This has occurred because Indonesian Islam is not a uniform or monolithic entity, but multi-vocal, particularly in its social and political articulation.
Political transformations have enabled various political articulations to surface, while information technology and social media have eased these political articulationsAo integration into public space.
Interestingly.
MuslimsAo discursive contestations in the Reform Era have not focused on formalising Islamic sharia by changing IndonesiaAos ideological foundation (Pancasil.
or Constitution.
Rather, they have attempted to enter through the Auback doorAy, using sharia bylaws and co-opting local political dynamics and electoral Facing this situation, the .
government has serious For comparison, see, for example Anwar, 2006.
Hilmy, 2009.
Munawar-Rachman, 2010.
and Boy ZTF .
PCD Journal Vol.
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anxieties, which it has never dealt with before.
Borrowing Sugata Bose and Kris ManjaparaAos circulation of ideas as well as Edward SaidAos travelling theory.
Kersten shows the links and intersections between IndonesiaAos Muslim thinkers and global intellectuals, both within and without the West, both within and without the Muslim world .
ee Kersten, 2018, p.
Another strength of the book comes from the authorAos ability to explain, in detail, the possibility that groups may express different views at one moment but share similar views at another moment.
As such, this book can reveal the diverse discourses and political articulations of Muslim groups in specific detail, without falling into the traps of oversimplification and monolithism.
Kersten also clearly presents diverse discourses and actors.
not only identifies the various institutions involved in the discursive contestations he explores, but also provides biographies of important In detail, he explores their thought, the philosophies that inspired them, and even the criticism of them.
The greatest shortcoming of this book, as mentioned earlier, is its limited examination of conservative Islam and Islamic groups, especially in comparison to its study of progressive Islam.
Nonetheless, this book offers an important reference for understanding the discourses of political Islam in Reform Era Indonesia.
344 Book Review: Islamic Political Discourse in the Reform Era
References