



**Abstrak:** Penelitian ini mengeksplorasi diskursus filosofis Mullā Ṣadrā tentang keimmaterian jiwa (*tajarrud al-nafs*), dengan fokus pada karya monumentalnya, *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*. Mullā Ṣadrā, pendiri filsafat transenden (*ḥikmah muta'āliyah*), mengembangkan suatu sistem yang berakar pada prinsip-prinsip mendasar seperti prinsip primer keberadaan (*aṣālat al-wujūd*), gradasi keberadaan (*tashkīk al-wujūd*), dan gerak substansi (*ḥarakah jawhariyyah*). Metode filsafatnya mengintegrasikan pembuktian rasional (*burhān 'aqlī*), teologi (*kalām*), wawasan Qur'ani, dan mistisisme (*'irfān*), menciptakan kerangka kerja yang unik dan komprehensif. Penelitian ini mengisi kesenjangan dalam analisis sistematis terhadap artikulasi Mullā Ṣadrā mengenai keimmaterian jiwa dalam *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*, khususnya dalam bab ketiga (*mashhad*), di mana prinsip-prinsip metafisika berinteraksi dengan pembahasan tentang jiwa. Dengan menggunakan metodologi deskriptif, analitis, dan argumentatif, penelitian ini mengidentifikasi 14 argumen terstruktur yang disampaikan oleh Mullā Ṣadrā dan mengevaluasi koherensi serta kekuatannya. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa meskipun banyak argumen yang kuat dan terintegrasi dalam sistem filsafatnya, beberapa argumen, terutama yang berbasis pada bukti tekstual dan testimonial, memerlukan penyempurnaan lebih lanjut. Argumen-argumen ini berfungsi untuk memperkuat keyakinan filosofis tanpa mengurangi validitas logis. Penelitian ini memberikan kontribusi pada metafisika Islam dengan memberikan analisis terfokus pada *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*, yang menawarkan wawasan ke dalam teks yang relatif kurang dipelajari dalam filsafat Sadrian. Penelitian ini menjembatani pemikiran Islam klasik dengan penyelidikan filosofis kontemporer, yang menyoroti relevansi pandangan Mullā Ṣadrā tentang jiwa yang tidak berwujud dalam memahami antropologi metafisik dan eskatologi.

**Kata-kata Kunci:** *Al-Syawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah, Filsafat Islam, Ḥikmah Muta'āliyah, Keimmaterian Jiwa, Mullā Ṣadrā.*

## Introduction

Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Qawāmī Shīrāzī, commonly known as Mullā Ṣadrā, was a prominent Islamic philosopher and the founder of the transcendent philosophy (*ḥikmat al-muta'āliyah*). This philosophical school is also referred to as the Ṣadrian School. Mullā Ṣadrā's intellectual stature is considered on par with other great Islamic philosophers, such as the founders of the peripatetic (*mashshā'ī*) and illuminationist (*ishrāqī*) schools. Moreover, he is often seen as comparable to Western philosophers who established various philosophical schools from antiquity to modernity (Khosiah 2020, 83–100; Salam and Usri 2021, 539–51; Dhiuddin 2013, 45–47).

The system of transcendent philosophy established by Mullā Ṣadrā is grounded in several foundational principles (*mabānī*), such as the principality of existence (*aṣālat al-wujūd*), the Gradation of Existence (*tashkīk al-wujūd*), and substantial motion (*ḥarakah jawhariyyah*), among others ('Ubūdiyyat 2010, 21). The method of Transcendent Philosophy integrates multiple approaches, including rational demonstration (*burhān 'aqlī*), theology (*kalām*), the Qur'an, and mysticism (*'irfān*). This method is employed to establish and substantiate the arguments and reasoning within the transcendent philosophy system ('Ubūdiyyat 2010, 22–24).

This combination of methods makes transcendent philosophy unique, intriguing, and extraordinary.

In addition to being a philosopher, Mullā Ṣadrā was also a prolific writer. Historical records indicate that he authored approximately 40 works, many of which remain accessible today (‘Ubūdiyyat 2010, 6–7; Muṣṭafawī 2006, 12–14). One of his monumental works is the book *Ḥikmat al-Muta’āliyah fī Asfār al-Arba’ah* (*Transcendent Philosophy in Four Journeys*), which is considered his magnum opus. Another book, *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*, serves as a summary of his views expressed in his magnum opus. This book is intended as an introduction to studying *Ḥikmat al-Muta’āliyah fī Asfār al-Arba’ah*, and the two books share a similar structure of chapters (Muslih, Syamil, and Kusuma 2025, 158–86).

*Al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah* consists of five main chapters (*mashhad*). Discussions on the science of the soul (*‘ilm al-nafs*) are specifically found in the third chapter (*mashhad*). In this book, the science of the soul is discussed in the context of metaphysics (*mā ba’da al-ṭabī’ah*) and is placed before the discussion on eschatology (*‘ilm al-ma’ād*) (Shīrāzī 2007, 276–341). This is in contrast to most other philosophical texts that position the science of the soul earlier, within the chapter on physics (*bāb al-ṭabī’ah*).

Previous research on *tajjarud al-nafs* has predominantly focused on the general perspectives of Islamic philosophers, with limited emphasis on Mullā Ṣadrā’s specific contributions in *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*. For instance, scholars have discussed the immateriality of the soul about substantial motion (*ḥarakah jawhariyyah*) or its connection to eschatological themes (Walid 2024, 407–26). However, there exists a research gap in systematically analyzing how Mullā Ṣadrā articulates the immateriality of the soul in *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*, particularly given the dispersed nature of his discussions within the text.

This study aims to fill this gap by conducting a comprehensive analysis of Mullā Ṣadrā’s arguments and reasoning concerning the immateriality of the soul as presented in *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*. The novelty of this research lies in its focused examination of the third chapter (*mashhad*) of *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*, where discussions on the soul are intricately linked with metaphysical principles. Unlike previous studies, this article seeks to provide a cohesive understanding of Mullā Ṣadrā’s perspective on the immateriality of the soul (*tajjarud al-nafs*) by identifying and resolving apparent contradictions or ambiguities in his arguments (Shaker 2020, 485–505).

The objectives of this research are to elucidate Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical reasoning on the immateriality of the soul, thereby contributing to the broader discourse on Islamic metaphysics and anthropology. Specifically, this study will first analyze the foundational principles underlying Mullā Ṣadrā’s perspective on the soul. Second, it will

examine how these principles are employed to substantiate arguments about the soul's immateriality. Third, it will attempt to address and critique any potential inconsistencies in Mullā Ṣadrā's reasoning to offer a unified interpretation.

This research is significant for several reasons. First, it enhances our understanding of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical system, particularly his integration of rational demonstration (*burhān 'aqlī*), theology (*kalām*), the Qur'an, and mysticism (*'irfān*). Second, by focusing on *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*, it provides insights into a relatively understudied yet pivotal text in Ṣadrian philosophy. Finally, the findings of this study have implications for contemporary debates on the nature of the soul, bridging classical Islamic thought with modern philosophical and theological inquiries.

The research method employed is a literature review with descriptive, analytical, and argumentative approaches to elaborate on Mullā Ṣadrā's perspective in this article (Hāfizniyā 2014, 196).

## **Discussion on Arguments for the Immateriality of the Soul**

### **First Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on the Potential and Faculty (*Quwwah*) of the Rational Subject (*'Aqliyyah*) in Humans**

According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the human soul possesses a spiritual potential (*quwwah rūḥāniyyah*) referred to as the rational faculty. This potential enables the abstraction of the essence or quiddity (*māhiyyah*) in its universal (*kullīyyah*) form from material elements and substances. For example, human universal understanding of humans, things, and the distinction between male and female, which we can observe in daily life. All of this understanding is a result of abstraction. It also separates attributes related to materiality, akin to how the digestive faculty in animals isolates the essence or nutrients from fiber, waste, or external layers and categorizes the results into four levels of digestion (*mujarrad*) (Shīrāzī 2007, 299; Muṣliḥ 1987, 309–10; Kabīr 2011, 875–76; Muṣṭafawī 2006, 230–31).

Every act of perception (*idrāk*) is achieved through a process of separating form from matter. In this context, a relationship exists between the perceiving subject (*mudrik*) and the perceived object (*mudrak*). Human faculties perform distinct functions related to perception (*mujarrad*). The human mind possesses a remarkable array of faculties that allow it to engage with and comprehend the world around it, each with its unique role and capabilities.

First, there is the sensory faculty (*quwwah al-ḥissiyyah*), which serves as the foundation of perception. This faculty can extract the form of perceivable objects from their material existence. However, it requires

the presence of the material object during the act of perception; without the physical object present, this faculty cannot function.

Building upon this, the imaginative faculty (*quwwah al-khayāliyah*) takes perception further. It can retain and manipulate the perceptible forms even when the material objects are absent. Beyond this, it can abstract certain material attributes, such as spatial position, location, and time. Yet, it does not extend to abstracting form and quantity, indicating its specific limitations and focus.

Next is the estimative faculty (*quwwah al-wahmiyyah*), which delves deeper into abstraction. This faculty not only separates forms from matter but also distances them from all material attributes, while still preserving their relationship to the material world. It has a unique capacity to perceive particular meanings, such as feelings of love or hostility, associated with specific individuals. Unlike imagination, which focuses on images like a person's face, estimation is concerned with the underlying emotional or relational significance (Parıldar 2020, 21–43).

Finally, there is the intellectual faculty (*quwwah al-'aqliyyah*), the pinnacle of human cognitive abilities. This faculty transcends all conditions and limitations, perceiving forms and concepts in their pure, universal essence. It transforms perceptible forms (*maḥsūs*) into universal intellectual concepts (*ma'qūlāt*), entirely independent of matter or external constraints. Through this, the intellectual faculty enables the mind to grasp abstract ideas and engage with them on a purely conceptual level (Shīrāzī 2007, 299; Muşliḥ 1987, 309–10).

Each of these faculties represents a layer in the intricate structure of human perception and understanding, moving progressively from the tangible to the abstract, from the material to the universal.

In its acts of perception and universal abstraction, the intellectual faculty does not involve material characteristics such as state, position (*wad'*), or quantity. Thus, universal concepts cannot be confined to the number of objects or specific individuals in external reality (*mişdāq* and *afrād*). Conversely, the sensory faculty relates only to particular (*juz'ī*) and partial objects (Shīrāzī 2007, 299; Muşliḥ 1987, 309–10; Kabīr 2011, 875–76; Muştafawī 2006, 230–31).

Based on the above explanation, it can be concluded that any faculty capable of rationalizing (*ta'aqqul*) forms and concepts universally is an entity separate from matter or immaterial (*mujarrad*) (Shīrāzī 2007, 299; Muşliḥ 1987, 309–10; Kabīr 2011, 875–76; Muştafawī 2006, 230–31; Kabīr 2009, 233–36; Āmulī 2006, 120–23, 191–93; Diyāyī 2019, 205; Muhammad 2020, 139–64).

The term “universal” in this context refers to the highest concepts or meanings (*mafāhīm*) related to universal understanding (Muẓaffar 1995, 51; Sajjādī 2000, 418; Işfahānī 2011, 408–9; Sajjādī 1996, 623–27; Maḥalātī 2010, 151–54).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that this topic fundamentally pertains to the demonstration of the potential and faculty (*quwwah*) of the rational subject (*aqliyyah*) within human beings. This potential and faculty exist in every human soul, necessitating the immateriality of the human soul. Such faculties and potential can't reside in a material human soul, as this would imply that something immaterial depends on material properties, such as condition, position (*wad'ī*), weight, or quantity. Similarly, there must be congruence between the container and the contained, just as immaterial knowledge must reside in an immaterial human soul. The contrary would lead to an impossibility, such as immaterial knowledge residing in a material human soul.

In the author's view, it can be concluded that without the immateriality of the human soul, this topic becomes futile, as the immateriality of the soul serves as the foundation and must necessarily preexist for this topic to be meaningful. As for refuting and criticizing the arguments and reasoning related to this topic, the author finds it extremely challenging and sees no apparent weaknesses in the arguments presented (Kerwanto 2015, 81–96).

### **The Second Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on the Differentiating Faculty (*Quwwah Mufāriq*)**

Mullā Ṣadrā asserts that one of the proofs of the immateriality of the human soul is the existence of the *quwwah mufāriq* (differentiating faculty). This faculty enables the soul to comprehend concepts that are logically impossible to manifest in external reality (*mumtani'*). An example is the simultaneous union of two opposites within a single entity, such as existence and non-existence coexisting in one object, or the presence of two mutually exclusive attributes, such as knowledge and ignorance, within the same entity. This phenomenon is referred to as *'adam malaka* (a relational void or relative complement) or relative complement (Sarūdelīr 2010, 218; Dahbāshī 2011, 383; Ṣalībā 2002, 246; Markaz Muṭāla'āt wa Taḥqīqāt Islāmī 1997, 192).

Such concepts cannot exist in external reality because the negation (*adam*) of being (*wujūd*) in material objects depends on the human ability to first conceive or imagine those attributes. In other words, it is impossible to establish a judgment about something without first imagining it. The soul, with its capacity, can imagine and understand such phenomena, thus concluding that these attributes lack existence in the material world (Shīrāzī 2007, 299; Muṣliḥ 1987, 310; Kabīr 2011, 873–74, 876; Maḥalātī 2010, 151, 154; Muṣṭafawī 2006, 232).

Through this faculty, the soul can also comprehend concepts such as motion, time, and infinity, which are inherently impossible to be present in matter or the physical world (Shīrāzī 2007, 299; Muṣliḥ 1987, 310;

Kabir 2011, 873–74, 876; Maḥalātī 2010, 151, 154; Muṣṭafawī 2006, 232).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that, in addition to proving the existence of the faculty of differentiation (*quwwah mufāriq*) in the human soul, it also necessitates something new, namely the immateriality of the soul. The reasoning for this remains similar to the first argument for the immateriality of the soul.

However, the distinction of the faculty of differentiation (*quwwah mufāriq*) lies in the fact that, aside from being present in the human soul, this faculty is identical to the conception of secondary intelligible (*ma'qulātī thāni mantiq*). These conceptions, in their essence and characteristics, exist only in the mental realm (*dhihnī*) or within the human soul. This aligns with the foundational principles of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical system (Baghirov 2024, 3575–85).

In the author's view, it can be concluded that without the immateriality of the soul, this topic becomes meaningless, as the immateriality of the soul serves as the foundation and must necessarily preexist for this topic to hold significance. As for refuting or criticizing this topic, the author finds it extremely challenging and perceives no apparent weaknesses in the arguments presented (Kharabi 2020, 59–83).

### **The Third Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on the Perception of Absolute Unity and the Understanding of Simple Intellectual Meanings (*'Aqliyyah*)**

Mullā Ṣadrā argues that one of the proofs of the rational faculty (*quwwah 'aqliyyah*) is the soul's ability to comprehend absolute unity (*waḥdah mutlaqah*) and perceive simple intellectual meanings. These simple meanings refer to entities devoid of intellectual (*'aqliyyah*) composition and incapable of division in any form. By contrast, all material entities can be divided according to their physical properties. Thus, it can be inferred that the intellectual subject, which perceives and comprehends, is not a material entity nor tied to matter (Shīrāzī 2007, 300; Muṣliḥ 1987, 310; Kabir 2011, 874, 876; Maḥalātī 2010, 151, 154–55; Muṣṭafawī 2006, 200).

If an objection is raised suggesting that the perception of absolute unity might occur in material objects and be divided according to their properties, Mullā Ṣadrā responds by asserting that material unity, such as the existence of an object, is divisible potentially, not actually. Material unity is akin to the existence of an object, which results from relations or extensions (*imtidād*). Therefore, material unity can be divided in potentiality but not in actuality (Shīrāzī 2007, 300; Muṣliḥ 1987, 310–11; Kabir 2011, 874, 876–77; Maḥalātī 2010, 151, 154–55).

The absolute unity (*waḥdah mutlaqah*) referred to here is a unity that cannot be divided in any way, whether in its substance or its attributes. This unity is pure (*mujarrad*) and separate from all material aspects. It does not pertain to material unity but rather to the concept of unity

itself inherent in its essence and substance. This unity is the essence of existence, which is independent of any material dependency (Shīrāzī 2007, 300; Muşliḥ 1987, 311; Kabīr 2011, 874, 877).

Every meaning or reality, when understood in its pure essence, cannot be divided into two distinct entities. The rational soul possesses the capacity to perceive this unity abstractly, detaching it from all material properties. If the perception of unity were to follow the properties of material objects, which are divisible, such division would entail separating certain components. This separation would imply that parts of the components exist in one place without the others. However, since the unity discussed here is immaterial, such division is irrelevant. Division, in a material sense, involves separating an entity into distinct parts, whereas absolute unity cannot be divided in any manner (Shīrāzī 2007, 300; Muşliḥ 1987, 311; Maḥalātī 2010, 151, 154–55).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that there are two demonstrations within this topic. The first demonstration pertains to the perception of absolute unity, while the second involves the comprehension of simple meanings related to intellect (*'aqliyyah*). Both demonstrations are present in the human soul. From these two demonstrations, a new finding emerges: this topic necessitates the immateriality of the human soul (Faruque 2024, 104–16). The reasoning remains similar to the first and second arguments for the immateriality of the human soul. The distinct characteristic and differentiator of this topic lies in the fact that the perception of absolute unity and the comprehension of simple meanings are truly immaterial. These two elements negate any material aspect and material attributes (Homazadeh 2020, 367–90).

In the author's view, it can be concluded that without the immateriality of the soul, this topic becomes meaningless, as the immateriality of the soul serves as the foundation and must necessarily preexist for this topic to have significance. As for refuting or criticizing this topic, the author finds it extremely challenging and perceives no apparent weaknesses in the arguments presented (Hairunnisa and Heriyanto 2021, 28–54).

### **The Fourth Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on the Potential Substance that Separates Rational Concepts from Matter and Material Attributes**

Mullā Ṣadrā argues that one of the proofs for the immateriality of the soul lies in the existence of a potential substance within the essence of humans. This substance possesses the capacity to separate rational concepts (*ma'qūlāt*) or universal forms related to mental phenomena (*dhihnī*) from matter and its attributes. In other words, the rationalization process carried out by this essence occurs in a state detached from matter and its properties.

Regarding the nature and mechanism of this separation, an essential question arises: Does this separation stem from the substance itself, from something derived from it, or from a potential inherent within it that enables such separation? (Shīrāzī 2007, 300; Muşliḥ 1987, 312; Maḥalātī 2010, 160).

First Assumption: If the separation originates from the substance itself, then all individuals derived from that essence must be entirely detached from matter and material attributes. Consequently, no individual of this essence could exist in external reality alongside matter or its properties. This is due to the essential nature (*dhātī*) of something that does not change, does not admit contradiction, and cannot conflict with itself (Shīrāzī 2007, 300; Muşliḥ 1987, 312; Maḥalātī 2010, 160).

Second Assumption, if the separation results from something derived from the substance, this assumption would lead to a contradiction (*tanāquḍ*). If the immateriality of the substance's potential is solely based on the removal of material attributes, then the existence of those attributes becomes a condition for its immateriality. Consequently, the substance would be both immaterial and material. This arises because the potential substance is considered immaterial due to the absence of certain attributes, yet also material because those attributes are required to define its separation (Shīrāzī 2007, 301; Muşliḥ 1987, 312; Kabīr 2011, 874–75, 879–80; Maḥalātī 2010, 160–61).

For example, imagine a block of ice. The “substance” in this analogy is the ice itself, and the “something derived from the substance” could be the temperature that causes the ice to melt. Now, if we argue that ice's immaterial state (e.g., water vapor) is solely defined by the absence of solid properties (like hardness and rigidity), then those very solid properties must exist first to establish their absence.

This leads to a contradiction: the ice (substance) would need to be both solid (material) to possess the attributes being removed and not solid (immaterial) because the removal of those attributes defines its new state. This duality – being material and immaterial simultaneously – creates the logical inconsistency.

Another example can be drawn from language. Consider a written word on paper. The substance is the ink forming the letters, and “something derived” could be the meaning the letters convey. If the meaning of the word is said to depend on the removal of the ink's material presence (erasing the letters), then the ink must exist materially to establish its absence. Yet, for the meaning to persist immaterially (in memory or concept), the ink must simultaneously not exist materially. Again, this creates a contradiction, as the substance cannot exist both and not exist in the same respect.

Third Assumption, which is the conclusion, since the first two assumptions are untenable, Mullā Şadrā concludes that the immateriality

of rational forms (*'aqliyyah*) originates from the potential of the substance itself. The existence of this potential substance is neither corporeal (*jismānī*) nor dependent on or centered in material objects. Therefore, its existence is termed immaterial (Shīrāzī 2007, 301; Muşliḥ 1987, 312; Kabīr 2011, 874–75, 879–80; Maḥalātī 2010, 160–61).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that this topic essentially relates to the demonstration of the existence of a potential substance that separates rational concepts from matter and material attributes. Alternatively, it can be explained that the process of rationalizing these essences enables them to become universal forms associated with mental states (*dhihnī*), distinct from matter and its attributes. This process occurs in a state separated from matter and its properties (Seif-Farshad, Kheire, and Madayen 2021, 109–19).

As for the state, process, and mechanism of this separation, they originate from the potential of the substance itself. The immateriality of rational forms derives from this potential, not from the substance itself, and not from something extracted from it. This, therefore, necessitates the immateriality of the human soul (Hakimelahi and Hamdani 2016, 73–92). The reasoning remains consistent with the first, second, and third arguments. In the author's view, refuting or criticizing this topic is extremely challenging and reveals no apparent flaws in its reasoning or arguments.

### **The Fifth Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on the Unity of the Human Soul**

Mullā Ṣadrā elaborates on the philosophical debate regarding the number of souls within a human being. Some argue that humans possess three distinct souls: the vegetative soul, the animal soul, and the rational soul. However, the majority of philosophers (*ḥukamā'*) agree that humans have only one soul, which is the rational soul (*nafs nāṭiqah*) or the soul capable of universal thought. This single soul, through its actions and faculties, gives rise to various functions and sensations (*mashā'ir*), serving as the source of diverse activities (Shīrāzī 2007, 314; Muşliḥ 1987, 336; Shīrwānī 2005, 408–10; Kabīr 2011, 932, 936; Maḥalātī 2010, 242; Muşṭafawī 2006, 410; Khājawī 2004, 123-25; Āmulī 2006, 89-91).

For example, humans often say, "*I feel*," "*I am angry*," "*I understand*," or "*I move*." All these actions are attributed directly to their essence or self. Thus, the source of all these actions is singular: a conscious soul that connects all actions and activities with self-awareness and knowledge. Consequently, each human has one soul, and all faculties are merely the manifestations (*lāzim*) of this singular soul's existence. This soul is immaterial (Shīrāzī 2007, 314; Muşliḥ 1987, 336; Shīrwānī 2005, 408–10; Kabīr 2011, 932, 936; Maḥalātī 2010, 242; Muşṭafawī 2006, 410; Mu'allimī 2019, 191).

Since the human soul originates from a realm higher than the material realm, namely the spiritual realm (*'ālam malakūt*), it possesses a unique unity called comprehensive unity (*waḥdat jāmi'*). This unity simplifies the various aspects of the soul concerning matter, vegetation, animalistic attributes, and rational faculties. Furthermore, this unity reflects a shadow (*ẓillī*) of divine unity, encompassing all levels of existence. Thus, in its essence, the soul is intellect, imagination, sensation, bodily growth, and bodily movement, encompassing the natural tendencies (*ṭabī'āt*) that govern the body (Muṣliḥ 1987, 337; Shīrwānī 2005, 408–10; Kabīr 2011, 932–33, 937; Maḥalātī 2010, 243–45).

Prominent philosophers highlight that the soul has three primary aspects: vegetative, animal, and rational. However, this division is symbolic and used for practical purposes (*tasāmuḥ*), not literal. According to them, the soul is simple and indivisible. These aspects are merely degrees and positions of the soul. The soul is a sign of divine grace, reflecting both shadowed and divine unity. Within its singular essence, the soul contains various degrees and levels. Sometimes, it descends from its highest rank to the level of external senses (Muṣliḥ 1987, 337; Shīrwānī 2005, 408–10; Kabīr 2011, 932–33, 937; Maḥalātī 2010, 243–45).

This point is reinforced by the author of *Muthārātāt* in responding to someone who doubted the immateriality of the soul. The skeptic argued that physical actions such as “*I enter*,” “*I exit*,” or “*I stand*” are merely bodily outcomes and metaphorical expressions (*majāzī*). According to this view, such phrases cannot serve as standards for understanding reality or investigating intellectual matters (Shīrāzī 2007, 316; Muṣliḥ 1987, 339; Kabīr 2011, 934; 940; Maḥalātī 2010, 249–50; Muṣṭafawī 2006, 407–9; Kabīr 2009, 289–92).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that Mullā Ṣadrā's reasoning regarding every human possessing a single soul is profoundly strong, and this necessitates the immateriality of the soul. According to the author, there are two reasons for this.

The first reason is that all sources of human actions and deeds originate from a single entity: the conscious soul. This soul connects all actions and activities to knowledge and self-awareness, with all faculties being merely consequences (implications) of the existence of this singular soul (Hannani and Soleh 2024, 1–10). This means that Mullā Ṣadrā does not reject the existence of faculties within the soul. The second reason is that the human soul originates from a realm higher than the material world, namely the *'ālam al-malakūt*. This distinguishes Mullā Ṣadrā's argument from other philosophers. Furthermore, the human soul possesses a unity referred to as *waḥdat jāmi'* (comprehensive unity). This is an essential unity that simplifies or negates the multiplicity of the soul's ranks related to matter, vegetation, animals, and rational aspects (Mehraki 2025, 1–16).

This unity also reflects the comprehensive shadow (*ẓillī*) unity of

divine unity, encompassing all levels of existence. Therefore, the human soul can't experience multiplicity, either vertically or horizontally. As for refuting or criticizing this topic, the author finds it exceedingly difficult and perceives no apparent weaknesses in its reasoning or arguments.

### **The Sixth Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on The Human Soul as a Substance by Its Essence**

According to Mullā Ṣadrā, understanding or perceiving something means producing or acquiring the form and image (*ṣūrah*) of the perceived object (*mudrak*). Consequently, anyone who comprehends their essence or substance must necessarily exist independently of a locus. The essence must exist by its reality. If the existence of something depends on a locus, then the image and form of its essence would only exist in that locus and not in the substance of the soul itself. However, this would contradict the assumption that the essence of the soul is an independent, immaterial substance (Shīrāzī 2007, 300; Muṣliḥ 1987, 313; Kabīr 2011, 880, 882; Maḥalātī 2010, 162; Kabīr 2009, 240-43).

Humans perceive their essence through their essence, not through something external. This is because humans are never unaware of their self-awareness. Awareness of one's essence is inherent within oneself. If a person understood their essence through something other than the essence itself, there would be moments when they would forget or lose awareness of it. This is because a mediator or external cause does not always operate continuously. However, knowledge, attention, and awareness of one's essence stem directly from the essence itself, which is intrinsic to human existence (Shīrāzī 2007, 300; Muṣliḥ 1987, 313; Kabīr 2011, 880, 882-83; Maḥalātī 2010, 162-63; Muṣṭafawī 2006, 229).

Humans are never absent from awareness of their essence, even in states of sleep, coma, or unconsciousness. Although physical organs, whether internal or external, may not always be fully sensed, the essence of a human remains present and aware of its existence. This is one of the rational proofs for the immateriality of the soul (Shīrāzī 2007, 300-302; Muṣliḥ 1987, 314; Kabīr 2011, 881, 884; Maḥalātī 2010, 167-68).

In the argumentation about the assumption of existence without the senses, imagine a person at the beginning of their creation, before having any contact or relationship with other beings in the world. In this state, their body is healthy, and their intellect is intact, but they are in an open space with no part of their body in contact with another. In such a situation, they cannot use either external or internal senses to perceive or understand anything. However, they would still be aware of their essence without any intermediary. The essence of the human soul in this scenario remains separate from the body and its attributes (Shīrāzī 2007, 302; Muṣliḥ 1987, 314-15; Kabīr 2011, 881, 885; Maḥalātī 2010, 167-68).

Some object to this claim by arguing that in such a state, a person

understands their essence through certain actions or deeds. This objection is addressed by explaining that the assumption of existence without intermediaries is intended to demonstrate the soul's existence before any action or deed. Thus, the soul does not depend on assumptions or actions to prove its existence (Shīrāzī 2007, 302; Muşliḥ 1987, 315; Kabīr 2011, 881, 885–86; Maḥalātī 2010, 167–69).

Another argument, the continuity of the soul's essence, is said the human soul remains constant and unchanging, even as the body transforms. Factors such as innate heat, illness, or metabolic processes may cause the body to decompose or regenerate. Parts of the body dissolve or diminish and are replaced by new nutrients. However, the essence and reality of human beings remain the same from childhood until the end of life. This demonstrates that human existence does not rely on the body. The human soul is an immaterial and eternal substance (Shīrāzī 2007, 302; Muşliḥ 1987, 315; Kabīr 2011, 881, 886; Maḥalātī 2010, 167, 169; Muşṭafawī 2006, 210–11).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that the proof of the human soul's existence as a substance based on its essence automatically necessitates the immateriality of the human soul. Mullā Şadrā's reasoning is exceptionally strong and difficult to criticize, let alone refute (Faiq and Farhan 2023, 169–82). The key arguments are as follows:

Anyone who understands something must necessarily separate that thing from the place where it resides. Similarly, when someone understands their essence or substance, it must be separated from its location. However, humans comprehend their essence through their essence itself, not through anything else. On the one hand, it has been proven that the soul is an independent immaterial substance, not residing in a body or other material forms.

Furthermore, the human soul is never devoid of awareness of its essence, and this self-awareness is inherent within humans. This indicates the immateriality of the soul. Humans do not need external or internal senses to perceive or understand their essence; they can remain conscious of their essence without any intermediaries (Hadi 2024, 33–53).

This evidence and strong reasoning affirm the existence of the soul, which precedes any action or deed. Thus, the essence of the human soul demonstrates its separation from the body and its attributes. While changes in the human body and physical form are indisputable through experimental research and science, the essence and reality of a human being remain constant from childhood to the end of life. This highlights that human existence is immaterial and does not depend on the body (Riahi, Tabatabaei, and Jafarzadeh 2015, 19–30).

## The Seventh Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on the Existence of an Immaterial Soul in All Animals

Mullā Ṣadrā argues that the reasoning used to prove the existence of an immaterial soul in humans can also be applied to animals. Based on this reasoning, it can be asserted that all animals possess an immaterial soul. For instance, a horse is a living being whose body, including its internal organs, undergoes constant decay and deterioration due to various factors. This is a fact that is both evident and universally accepted (Shīrāzī 2007, 302; Muṣliḥ 1987, 315–16; Shīrwānī 2005, 384–85; Kabīr 2011, 881, 886–87; Maḥalātī 2010, 170–71; Āmulī 2009, 28).

To elaborate, the continuous regeneration and decay of cells in a horse's body, as observed in biological studies, illustrate the transient nature of its physical components. According to modern biology, most cells in an animal's body undergo replacement over time, with some tissues regenerating entirely within weeks or months. For example, red blood cells in mammals have an average lifespan of about 120 days, after which they are replaced. This biological process highlights the impermanence of the physical body and raises questions about the persistence of identity despite these material changes.

As noted by several philosophers, if the soul of a horse were dependent on its physical body—such as soft material or a decomposable hot mass (*jirm bukhari*)—and if the soul were to follow the changes in bodily organs that require digestion and metabolism, the essence and identity of the horse would change continuously. In other words, the horse would become substantially different being each day, week, or year. However, through rational speculation (*ḥadsī*) and scientific analysis, this assumption is found to be incorrect. This aligns with Mullā Ṣadrā's principle of substantial motion (*al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah*), which posits that the essence of a being is in constant flux while maintaining continuity through its immaterial aspect. Therefore, it must be concluded that animals, like humans, also possess a soul distinct from matter (Shīrāzī 2007, 302; Muṣliḥ 1987, 315–16; Shīrwānī 2005, 384–85; Kabīr 2011, 881, 886–87; Maḥalātī 2010, 170–71; Ḍiyāyī 2019, 108-9; Khājawī 2004, 39; Yazdī 2014, 172).

According to Mullā Ṣadrā, after examining discussions on the soul and considering its positions, degrees, and levels, it becomes evident that animals have an immaterial (*mujarrad*) soul originating from a non-physical realm, rather than the imaginal (*mithālī*) realm or merely imaginal forms. This soul is referred to as the imaginal soul (*mutakhayyilah*), which, in some respects, resembles the human soul. Animals, like humans, possess a level of imagination referred to as the imaginal soul (*mutakhayliyah*), enabling them to perceive sensory objects (*maḥsūs*) directly without being limited by physical constraints. This

perception occurs in imaginal forms that are intrinsic to the substance of the animal's soul (Shīrāzī 2007, 303; Muşliḥ 1987, 316; Shīrwānī 2005, 384–85; Kabīr 2011, 881–82, 887; Maḥalātī 2010, 170–71).

Furthermore, certain arguments only demonstrate the separation of the soul from the physical body and its attributes, as evidenced by the last three arguments in the sixth discussion. These arguments do not fully prove that the soul is free from all forms, including analogous imaginal forms (*khayālī mithālī*). Nevertheless, the soul of an animal, detached from the physical body and its characteristics, can still be categorized as an immaterial soul. From a modern neuroscientific perspective, this can be analogized to studies on animal cognition, which suggest that animals possess awareness and a sense of self, independent of their changing physical states. These findings resonate with Mullā Ṣadrā's assertion of an immaterial soul, as the internal capacity for self-awareness, perception, and imagination cannot be reduced to mere physical processes. This type of soul exists in all animals with an internal capacity to be aware of their existence, which, in one respect, is similar to the human soul (Shīrāzī 2007, 303; Muşliḥ 1987, 316; Kabīr 2011, 881–82, 887; Maḥalātī 2010, 170–71).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze those animals also possess an imaginal soul (*nafs mutakhayyilah*). This imaginal soul is capable of directly perceiving sensory objects without being enveloped by material attributes, and such perception takes the form of imaginal representations inherent to the substance of the animal itself. This necessitates the existence of such understanding as originating from a non-physical realm or the imaginal realm (*'ālam al-mithāl*), which is acknowledged and established in the gradation of existence (*tashkīk al-wujūd*) within Ṣadrian philosophy.

In this regard, it bears similarities to humans. Thus, from the perspective of Ṣadrian philosophy, the imaginal soul and the imaginal perception found in both humans and animals are immaterial. Moreover, this topic concerning the imaginal soul and imaginal perception distinguishes Ṣadrian philosophy from other philosophical perspectives, such as that of the Peripatetics, who argue that both are material.

Furthermore, the author asserts that rejecting or refuting this notion would give rise to new issues with other topics and lead to contradictions within the Ṣadrian philosophical system, given its highly systematic nature.

### **The Eighth Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on the Existence of the Soul Beyond Matter and Space**

Before delving into this discussion, it is essential to clarify that the immateriality of the soul, in terms of being beyond matter or place, implies that the soul, by its very nature, does not require a physical location for

its existence. Furthermore, the soul, in its essence, is not situated in any particular place. The term “place” is commonly referred to as Maḥallī (‘Amīd 1995, 1064; Pazhūheshqarān 2009, 298; Pazhūheshqarān 2007, 250).

To prove the Soul as an immaterial substance, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, every property or form (*ṣūrah*), such as color, pattern, and size, found in the human body, arises through external causes and effects rather than originating from the body’s essence. When these properties or forms disappear, the body is devoid of those attributes. To regain these attributes, the body requires new causes and effects. Without such causes, the body cannot autonomously restore or reproduce the lost properties or forms (Shīrāzī 2007, 303; Muṣliḥ 1987, 316–17; Kabīr 2011, 889–91; Maḥalātī 2010, 173–74; Ḍiyāyī 2019, 111, Āmulī 2006, 77).

This observation demonstrates that such properties and forms are not intrinsic to the body’s essence. Rather, these properties and forms are produced by the soul, which possesses the power, will, choice, and authority to create rational forms (*‘aqliyyah*). The soul can generate rational forms and understanding scientific matters through learning, contemplation, and reflection (*ta’ammul*). Even when these forms disappear from memory, the soul can recall them without repeating the process of learning or thinking. This indicates that the soul surpasses physical or material entities in nature. The soul is a spiritual (*rūḥāniyyah*) existence that transcends and is independent of matter and space (Shīrāzī 2007, 303; Muṣliḥ 1987, 316–17; Kabīr 2011, 889–91; Maḥalātī 2010, 173–74).

Regarding the soul as a spiritual tablet capable of unlimited knowledge, unlike material substances, which cannot integrate multiple forms and images within a single essence, the soul is a spiritual substance that can encompass infinite forms of knowledge, creativity, and expertise. Within the soul’s essence are embedded ethics, manners, goals, intentions, and diverse purposes. The soul may be likened to a “celestial tablet” (*lawḥ malakūtī*) that records various forms of knowledge and spiritual values without overlapping or mutual exclusion, unlike material entities (*hayūlāniyyah jasmāniyyah*), where the existence of one form tends to obstruct or negate another. Conversely, the soul is of a celestial (*malakūtī*) nature, free from physical dimensions, and is predisposed to receive unlimited forms and knowledge. This underscores the immaterial nature of the soul (Shīrāzī 2007, 303–4; Muṣliḥ 1987, 317–18; Kabīr 2011, 890–92; Maḥalātī 2010, 173–75).

As for the Soul as a repository of knowledge and perfection, we can say that at times, the soul appears to lose its potential for understanding or its capacity to propel itself toward spiritual and physical perfection. Such instances occur when the soul’s attention is disrupted by external factors, such as fear, sorrow, or preoccupation with a desired object.

Nonetheless, the images and forms of knowledge, as well as perfection, remain preserved within the soul's essence as a treasury unaffected by external conditions, such as accidents or other incidents (Shīrāzī 2007, 303–4; Muşliḥ 1987, 317–18; Kabīr 2011, 890–92; Maḥalātī 2010, 173–75; Āmulī 2009, 29).

Thus, the soul maintains its existence as a spiritual entity, independent of physical or material conditions. It serves as a repository that preserves potential, knowledge, and perfection within its essence, rendering it imperishable despite changes or losses experienced by the body (Shīrāzī 2007, 303–4; Muşliḥ 1987, 317–18; Kabīr 2011, 890–92; Maḥalātī 2010, 173–75).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that if every attribute, characteristic, or form (*ṣūrah*) within the human body is produced through cause-and-effect relationships originating from external factors or from the body itself, and then these attributes or forms disappear from the human body, the body becomes devoid of these attributes and cannot restore, repeat, or recover them automatically. Instead, it requires a new cause-and-effect process. This is different from the attributes and forms produced by the human soul.

The human soul can generate rational forms and comprehend intellectual matters through learning, thought, and reflection (*ta'ammul*). When these forms fade from memory, the human soul can recall them without needing to repeat the process of learning or thinking. Thus, the human soul is inherently superior to physical entities and exists as an immaterial reality that does not depend on location (Aditya 2021, 1–44) (Kheire and Madayen 2021, 7901–10).

Furthermore, a material substance cannot simultaneously contain multiple forms and images within a single essence. Conversely, the human soul can encompass various forms of knowledge, creative works, and countless skills without these forms overlapping or obstructing one another. This indicates that the human soul is free from physical dimensions and spatial limitations (Supriatna 2020, 101–20).

Additionally, the human soul serves as a repository or treasury that stores potentialities, knowledge, and perfections within its very essence. It remains unaffected and imperishable even when the body undergoes changes or is influenced by external circumstances, such as accidents or other events.

According to the author, there are three arguments and proofs in this topic, and refuting or criticizing them is highly challenging and leaves no room for contention.

## **The Ninth Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on Lineage and Persuasive Topics Leading to the Conviction that the Soul Originates from Another Realm**

The existence of the soul originating from another realm serves as one of the arguments supporting the immaterial nature of the soul. Mullā Ṣadrā explains that the primary task for truth-seekers (*sālikīn*) is to abandon attributes, qualities, phenomena, and actions associated with the material realm. They choose to detach from worldly matters and purify their inner selves from vile and worthless occupations. As a result, at a certain point, the truth-seeker perceives their essence as a luminous substance, free from space, vessel, and worldly instruments, either through inner vision or celestial insight (*malakūti* vision) (Shīrāzī 2007, 304–5; Muşliḥ 1987, 319; Kabīr 2011, 893–94, 895–96; Maḥalātī 2010, 178–80).

When the soul is not preoccupied with regulating its material potential, the souls of truth-seekers can create grand objects such as celestial spheres (*falak*) and stars, even governing and organizing their existence. This phenomenon can be observed among those who engage in spiritual discipline (*riyāḍah*), where they achieve significant feats through self-discipline and soul purification while detaching from worldly dependencies (Shīrāzī 2007, 304–5; Muşliḥ 1987, 319; Kabīr 2011, 893–94, 895–96; Maḥalātī 2010, 178–80).

Although still living in the material world, their attention to world laws diminishes. This condition is particularly prominent among great souls, such as prophets and saints (*awliyāʾ*), who sever ties with material existence to immerse themselves in the grandeur and beauty of the Divine (Shīrāzī 2007, 304–5; Muşliḥ 1987, 319; Kabīr 2011, 893–94, 895–96; Maḥalātī 2010, 178–80).

When humans reflect on the mercy and blessings of Allah, as mentioned in the Qurʾan, their bodies may tremble, and their hearts are filled with light from higher spiritual dimensions. This phenomenon demonstrates that the soul surpasses the body and transcends worldly limitations (Shīrāzī 2007, 304–5; Muşliḥ 1987, 319; Kabīr 2011, 893–94, 895–96; Maḥalātī 2010, 178–80).

In the discussion of the immateriality of the soul and its relationship with the body, the soul and the body are opposites in terms of strength and weakness. The human body develops until it peaks around the age of forty, after which it gradually weakens. In contrast, the soul continually progresses toward perfection, gaining experience and knowledge through learning and reflection (Shīrāzī 2007, 304–5; Muşliḥ 1987, 319–20; Sajjādī 1996, 893–94, 895–96; Maḥalātī 2010, 178–80).

As the body weakens due to aging, the soul remains unaffected by these physical conditions. The body's decline is attributed to the increasing independence of the soul's activities. Consequently, the soul does not

require the body for its existence (Shīrāzī 2007, 304–5; Muşliḥ 1987, 320; Kabīr 2011, 893–94, 895–96; Maḥalātī 2010, 178–80).

The decline in perceptual abilities in the elderly, for instance, is not caused by the soul but by the weakening of sensory organs and neural systems. In many cases, elderly individuals retain superior intellectual capabilities compared to younger people. This confirms that the soul is not merely a product of physical processes but an independent and immaterial entity (Shīrāzī 2007, 305; Muşliḥ 1987, 320; Kabīr 2011, 894, 897; Maḥalātī 2010, 181–83).

We can look into the logical proofs for the immateriality of the soul. This argument aligns with the structure and potential of categorical conditional premises (*qiyās istithnāʿī*) in which the copula is a conditional proposition. This is then linked to a universal affirmative premise (*qaḍīyyah muttaṣilah kullīyyah*), wherein the contradiction of the copula is excluded, resulting in the rejection of the latter in the form of a particular negative conjunctive premise (*qaḍīyyah sālibah juzʿīyyah*). This leads to a conclusion that contradicts the proposition's premise. If, in this proposition, the essence of the copula (*ʿayn tāliʿ*) is excluded (*istithnāʿ*), no conclusion can be reached. This is an indisputable principle (*musallamāt*) established in the science of logic. To comprehend this, refer to discussions on propositions and their divisions, particularly conjunctive conditional propositions (*qaḍīyyah shartīyyah muttaṣilah*) and disjunctive conditional propositions (*qaḍīyyah shartīyyah munfaṣilah*), as well as the conditions for deriving conclusions within the science of logic (Muẓaffar 1995, 120, 224–36; Khurāsānī 2010, 398–402; Razī 2011, 299–301; Muşliḥ 1987, 320; Muẓaffar 1995, 120, 224–36; Kabīr 2011, 894, 897–98; Maḥalātī 2010, 181, 183).

Another proof of the soul's immateriality is a logical argument showing that the soul does not require material instruments to think or rationalize itself. The soul can comprehend its essence without intermediaries. If the soul depended on material instruments, it would be incapable of rationalizing either itself or the tools it employs (Shīrāzī 2007, 305; Muşliḥ 1987, 321; Kabīr 2011, 894–95, 898; Maḥalātī 2010, 184–85).

Furthermore, if the soul were merely a potential inherent in material entities, contradictions would arise. The soul would constantly observe and contemplate the forms reflected in its mirror. However, in reality, the soul can choose when to observe or not. This autonomy demonstrates that the soul is independent and does not rely on material instruments (Shīrāzī 2007, 305; Muşliḥ 1987, 321; Kabīr 2011, 894–95, 898–99; Maḥalātī 2010, 184–86; Kabīr 2009, 252–54).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that this topic encompasses several points:

First, the ultimate goal of truth seekers and those pursuing the essence (*sālik*) or spiritual wayfarers is to reach a more perfect immaterial

realm. This goal gives rise to a method, namely abandoning dependency on worldly matters, and results in the outcomes of their efforts: self-discipline and the purification of the soul. This can be observed in specific examples, such as the Prophets and saints.

Second, a condition arises in which the human body trembles, and the heart is filled with light from higher spiritual levels when listening to Qur'anic verses related to Allah's mercy and punishment.

Third, a contrasting condition exists between the soul and the human body. While the body weakens with age due to aging, the soul, on the contrary, becomes increasingly independent and perfected through learning and reflection. The weakening of human perception is not caused by deficiencies in the senses or brain nerves. This is evident in numerous cases where elderly individuals retain excellent intellectual abilities, often surpassing younger individuals, for instance, professional older chess players.

Fourth, there are foundational principles in drawing conclusions in the science of logic that remain unchallenged.

Fifth, the soul does not require material tools or devices for thinking and rationalizing itself. The soul can comprehend its essence without intermediaries. Furthermore, if the soul were merely a potential inherent in material entities, it would lead to a contradiction. The soul would constantly be observing and contemplating the forms present within its mirror. However, in reality, the soul has the autonomy to choose when to observe or not.

Thus, these five points demonstrate that the soul is an entity of an immaterial nature, unrestricted by physical dimensions, free from dependence on the body, and capable of transcending the limitations of the material world. This independent existence of the soul aligns with its noble spiritual nature.

### **The Tenth Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on the Novelty (*Hudūth*) of Human Souls**

Mullā Ṣadrā posits that the human soul is both corporeally novel (*jasmāniyyat al-ḥudūth*) and spiritually eternal (*rūḥāniyyat al-baqā*). This means that the soul initially arises as a novel entity, emerging from the materials and elements existing in the physical realm. At this stage, the soul exists as an entity that is established alongside the body. However, after attaining perfection, transitioning from potentiality to actuality, and traversing through the stages of existential perfection, the soul achieves a state of eternity (*rūḥāniyyat al-baqā*). At this level, the soul no longer requires the body for its essence to exist but instead exists independently, relying solely on its substance and acting without dependence on physical instruments or corporeal tools (Shīrāzī 2007, 309–10; Muṣliḥ 1987, 328–29; Fayāḍī 2014, 297–98; Shīrwānī 2005, 462–66; Kabīr 2011, 917–18;

Maḥalātī 2010, 216–18; Mu'allimī 2019, 105-10).

The proof supporting this claim is that any existence independent of matter does not contain accidental attributes close to its essence. As previously explained, the potential to receive or accommodate accidental properties applies only to entities whose essence is pure potentiality and devoid of activity (*fa'āliyat*). This condition pertains exclusively to prime matter (*hyle*; *materia*), which serves as the foundation of all material forms. Consequently, the notion that the soul is entirely immaterial before reaching its highest degree of perfection is untenable. Before achieving this state, the soul remains a locus for accidental attributes and remains dependent on matter (Shīrāzī 2007, 310; Muşliḥ 1987, 328–29; Shīrwānī 2005, 462–66; Kabīr 2011, 918; Maḥalātī 2010, 216–19).

Accidental attributes cannot exist without matter, claiming that the soul is entirely immaterial under all conditions, an assumption implying the soul's persistent dependence on matter. This assumption contradicts the essence of the soul's immateriality, which asserts its existence independently of matter. Such contradictions are also addressed in logic, particularly concerning the rejection of the concept of reincarnation (*tanasukh*). Therefore, it is inaccurate to state that the soul is fully immaterial in every state. If the soul retains accidental properties before transitioning from one body to another, as suggested by proponents of reincarnation, this will contradict the novelty of the soul (Shīrāzī 2007, 310; Muşliḥ 1987, 328–29; Shīrwānī 2005, 462–66; Kabīr 2011, 918; Maḥalātī 2010, 216–19).

Thus, it can be concluded that the soul (*nafs*) is novel (*ḥādith*) based on the novelty of the body (*ḥudūth al-badan*). This demonstrates that the soul's existence is initially closely tied to material existence, although it ultimately attains a state of independence and eternity beyond bodily existence (Shīrāzī 2007, 310; Muşliḥ 1987, 328–29; Shīrwānī 2005, 462–66; Kabīr 2011, 918; Maḥalātī 2010, 216–19; Kabīr 2009, 272-77).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that this topic essentially concerns the origination (*ḥudūth*) of human souls. However, the author has identified a new aspect: in the process of proving and establishing the origination of human souls, the issue of the soul's immateriality also arises within this topic.

For the author, it is challenging to critique the immateriality of the soul within this topic, except by affirming and accepting it (*ta'yīd*). This is because the concept of the soul as corporeally originated (*jasmāniyyatul ḥudūth*) yet spiritually eternal (*rūḥāniyyatul baqā'*) is one of the foundational principles (*mabnā* or *mabānī*) of Mullā Şadrā's philosophy, particularly in the study of the soul and its relation to eschatological views. This perspective differs from other philosophical views, such as those that posit the human soul as material or as pre-eternal (*qadīm*).

If this notion were to be refuted or rejected, it would generate new

issues about other topics and lead to contradictions within the Sadrian philosophical system.

### **The Eleventh Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on Its Immortality**

Mullā Ṣadrā argues that a soul that has attained the level of the active intellect (*'aql bi-l-fi'l*) undoubtedly possesses immortality (*baqā' al-nafs*) after the destruction of the physical body (*fanā'*). According to him, a soul at this level exists and is realized based on its essence and identity (*huwiyyah*), independent of the body. The body serves as a veil and obstacle, hindering the soul from achieving intellectual perfection and the pure, luminous existence aligned with its essence (Shīrāzī 2007, 311–12; Muşliḥ 1987, 332–33; Fayādī 2014, 532–33; Shīrwānī 2005, 470–73; Kabīr 2011, 924; Maḥalātī 2010, 227–28; Diyāyī 2019, 135–36; Khājawī 2004, 360–65; Āmulī 2009, 30).

Mullā Ṣadrā explains that everything subject to destruction and decay is influenced by opposition, such as black replacing white. However, intellectual substances (*'aqlī*) do not encounter such opposition. Hence, the assumption that a soul reaching the intellectual level can perish is false. The soul does not depend on material causes, such as the four Aristotelian causes: efficient, final, material, and formal. This is because the soul lacks materiality, and its form constitutes its very essence and substance. In other words, the soul's form is inseparable from its substance (Shīrāzī 2007, 311–12; Muşliḥ 1987, 332–33; Fayādī 2014, 532–33; Shīrwānī 2005, 470–73; Kabīr 2011, 924; Maḥalātī 2010, 227–28; Mu'allimī 2019, 153–54; Yazdī 2014, 389–96).

Furthermore, the efficient and final causes of the soul stem directly from the essence of the Necessary Being (*wājib al-wujūd*), whose existence is imperishable (*fanā'*). Thus, the soul's essence is also eternal, deriving its permanence from the Necessary Being, the creator and sustainer of the soul. Based on this argument, the annihilation of intellectual substance is impossible (Shīrāzī 2007, 311–12; Muşliḥ 1987, 332–33; Fayādī 2014, 532–33; Shīrwānī 2005, 470–73; Kabīr 2011, 924; Kabīr 2009, 280–85).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that a new and unique aspect has been identified, namely, in the process of proving and establishing that the soul never dies or the immortality of the soul. This can be demonstrated through his statement that the essence of the soul is also eternal, based on the eternity of the *wājibul wujūd* (necessary existence), which is the creator and originator of the soul.

According to this argument, the annihilation of intellectual substance is impossible and cannot occur. Thus, this also serves as proof of the soul's immateriality. Furthermore, for the author, it is difficult to critique the immateriality of the soul in this topic; indeed, there are no gaps in his

argumentation, except to confirm and accept it (*ta'yīd*).

### **The Twelfth Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on the Qur'an and Renowned Hadiths**

Introduction before delving into the discussion of the soul's immateriality, Mullā Ṣadrā first explains the varying levels of human thought. According to him, some individuals are unable to transcend sensory perception to reach purely rational concepts (*ma'qūlāt maḥḍa*). Their understanding of knowledge remains confined to particulars, without engaging in rational reasoning or recognizing eternal and constant evidence. Their comprehension is limited to what is conveyed through transmission or reference, without affirmation or validation through reason and deeper observation (Shīrāzī 2007, 305–6; Muṣliḥ 1987, 321–24; Kabīr 2011, 904; Maḥalātī 2010, 187–215).

After providing this explanation, Mullā Ṣadrā proposes a method to help such individuals understand the immateriality of the soul. He suggests presenting this concept through the lens of Qur'anic verses and the sayings of Prophet Muḥammad (PBUH) and the imams, hoping that this approach will enhance their faith (Shīrāzī 2007, 305–6; Muṣliḥ 1987, 321–24; Kabīr 2011, 904; Maḥalātī 2010, 187–215).

There are several Qur'anic verses on the immateriality of the soul. Mullā Ṣadrā references several Qur'anic verses as evidence for the soul's immateriality in his work, including the following:

1. *"So, when I have proportioned him and breathed into him of My spirit."* (Q.S. Ṣād [38]: 72) (Qarai 2005, 642). This verse associates the soul directly with Allah, signifying the soul's noble and immaterial nature, distinct from matter.
2. *"And His Word that he cast toward Mary and a spirit from Him."* (Q.S. An-Nisā' [4]: 171) (Qarai 2005, 142). Here, the term spirit refers to an intellectual soul, highlighting its immateriality and elevated status.
3. *"Then We produced him as (yet) another creature, so blessed is Allah, the best of creators."* (Q.S. Al-Mu'minūn [23]: 14) (Qarai 2005, 476). This verse introduces the soul as a creative substance separate from matter and as the finest creation among all beings.
4. *"Immaculate is He who has created all the kinds."* (Q.S. Yāsīn [36]: 36) (Qarai 2005, 618). The soul is described as an essence whose existence transcends human understanding.
5. *"To Him ascends the good word and He elevates righteous conduct."* (Q.S. Fāṭir [35]: 10) (Qarai 2005, 608). This verse associates words as expressions of the soul, reflecting its inner conscience.
6. *"We certainly created man in the best of forms."* (Q.S. Al-Tīn [95]: 4)

(Qarai 2005, 854). This verse highlights the excellence of human creation, encompassing both external beauty and the soul's union with the body.

7. *"Returns to your Lord, pleased, pleasing!"* (Q.S. Al-Fajr [89]: 28) (Qarai 2005, 849). The soul's return to Allah suggests its pre-existence before union with the body (Shirāzī 2007, 306; Muşliḥ 1987, 321–23; Shīrwānī 2005, 455–57; Kabīr 2011, 904–5; Maḥalātī 2010, 187–99).

In its relation to hadiths, Mullā Şadrā also cites renowned hadiths supporting the soul's immateriality, including the following:

1. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said, *"Whoever knows his soul knows his Lord."* This hadith emphasizes that the soul is the greatest sign of Allah's existence.
2. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said, *"I know you by your souls; I know you by your Lord."*
3. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said, *"Whoever sees me has indeed seen the truth."*
4. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said, *"I am a plain warner and counselor."* The term plain here signifies the immaterial and pure state of the Prophet's sacred soul.
5. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said, *"I went to my Lord, spent time in His sacred presence, and enjoyed the blessings of His generosity, who fed me and gave me drink."* The nourishment mentioned in this hadith refers to spiritual, not physical, sustenance.
6. Prophet Isa (PBUH) said, *"One who is not born twice will never enter the kingdom of heaven."* The first birth refers to physical birth, while the second symbolizes the soul's liberation from material constraints (Shirāzī 2007, 306; Muşliḥ 1987, 323; Kabīr 2011, 907; Maḥalātī 2010, 200; 204).

**Conclusion** Mullā Şadrā concludes that the immateriality of the soul is an established reality supported by Qur'anic verses and renowned hadiths. The soul is a substance separate from matter, endowed with a noble status, and serves as a manifest sign of Allah's grandeur. This understanding not only strengthens faith but also paves the way for a deeper comprehension of human nature and its relationship with the Creator (Shirāzī 2007, 306; Muşliḥ 1987, 323–24; Kabīr 2011, 907).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that Mullā Şadrā, in proving the immateriality of the soul based on the Qur'an and well-known hadiths, begins by explaining that some people are unable to transcend sensory perception toward pure rational

concepts (*ma'qulāt makḥṣ*). They only understand particular knowledge without recognizing rational arguments and eternal, constant proofs. Their understanding is limited to what is conveyed through transmission or reference, without acknowledgment or validation through reason and deeper observation (Arsyad 2017, 135–46; Idin 2022, 59–74).

Thus, Mullā Ṣadrā offers a solution to understanding the immateriality of the soul through a method suited to their level of comprehension, namely by referring to Qur'anic verses and the hadiths of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the imams. The immateriality of the soul is a fact supported by Qur'anic verses and well-known hadiths (Nurfadhilah 2022, 399–412).

The author's critique is as follows: for those capable of transcending sensory perception to reach rational concepts, is the evidence of the soul's immateriality from the Qur'an and hadith still necessary? According to the author, the number of Qur'anic verses and hadiths presented is not definitive, as there may be other verses and hadiths related to this topic. It is important to note that in Sadrian's philosophical methodology, the Qur'anic and theological (*kalām*) approach is recognized, wherein Qur'anic arguments and related hadiths are presented to achieve certainty. This distinguishes Sadrian philosophy from that of other philosophers. Similarly, in the science of logic, to achieve certainty, one can provide arguments and proofs that are well-known (*mashhūr*) and widely accepted (*maqbulāt*) (Muḥaffar 1995, 120, 224–36; Khurāsānī 2010, 239, 265, 270; Razī 2011, 461–64).

### **Thirteenth Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on the Statements of Ancient Philosophers**

The argument for the soul's immateriality can be traced back to the statements and expressions of ancient philosophers. A notable contributor to this discourse is Mullā Ṣadrā, who drew extensively on the thoughts of Aristotle. Regarding the question of whether Mullā Ṣadrā agrees with and endorses Aristotle's view on the soul, on one hand, Mullā Ṣadrā aligns with Aristotle's assertion regarding the immateriality of the soul. This agreement is evident in his indirect argument for the soul's immateriality, which is known as the "state of stillness." In other words, Aristotle's statement serves as a tacit affirmation (*ta'yīd*) of the soul's immateriality. In his work *Uthūlūjīyā (Ethology)*, Aristotle states:

Many times, I have secluded myself (*khalwat*) with my soul. I left my body and set it aside. In that state, I realized that I am substance-free and separate from my body. Thus, I found and understood myself in my essence. I am free and distinct from the body, as well as from everything except my essence. Consequently, I comprehended myself in the truth of my being, and so on (Shīrāzī 2007, 306–7; Muṣliḥ 1987, 324; Maḥalātī 2010, 206–7; Plotinus 2009, 35, 43).

This passage illustrates Aristotle's profound spiritual insight and his

status as a divine philosopher (*rabbānī*) and mystic of exceptional caliber.

Further, Aristotle's belief in the soul's immateriality and its immortality (*baqā al-nafs*) after the destruction of the physical body is expounded in his treatise *tuffāḥiyyah*. In this work, he asserts the soul's eternal nature following its separation from the body (Shīrāzī 2007, 306–7; Muşliḥ 1987, 324; Maḥalātī 2010, 206–7).

When discussing death, Aristotle also presented arguments and evidence regarding the superiority of philosophy and wisdom. He stated that wise and virtuous philosophers, upon the separation of their souls from their bodies, would receive great rewards as compensation for the knowledge and wisdom they attained through philosophy. This treatise, still available today, serves as proof of his thought (Shīrāzī 2007, 306–7; Muşliḥ 1987, 324; Kabīr 2011, 907–9; Maḥalātī 2010, 206–7).

When we want to see Mullā Şadrā's view on the concept of the soul according to Anazocles, Mullā Şadrā builds upon the ideas of Anazocles (also known as Anbādzigalas or Aynāzugales), an ancient Greek philosopher. Anazocles posits that the soul originates from a noble and exalted realm but descends into this world due to errors in avoiding divine displeasure. This descent transforms the material world into a refuge for souls influenced by illusions and imagination (Shīrāzī 2007, 306–7; Muşliḥ 1987, 324–25; Kabīr 2011, 909–10; Maḥalātī 2010, 206–7; Plotinus 2009, 35–36, 44).

Although Anazocles' explicit mention of the soul's descent into this world may relate to the story of Prophet Adam (AS), the father of humanity (Abū al-Bashar), who became a guardian for humankind and other souls tainted by worldly illusions, this perspective carries deeper philosophical dimensions. Anazocles appears to refer to the concept of the "intellectual realm" (*'aqlāniyyat*) as the highest, noble, and exalted place. In this view, the soul does not exist in the intellectual realm as a being tied to a body but rather as an intellectual existence. The soul's existence, dependent on the body, cannot reside in the Intellectual Realm because this realm is a non-material dimension free from bodily attachments. The errors and sins of the soul, in this context, refer to "ontological errors" or "existential errors"—the potentiality inherent in intellectual substance, which forms the basis of its separation from reality (*ḥaqīqah*). This differs from moral or legal transgressions (*taklif*), which are subject to divine commandments and prohibitions. The soul's fall, as described by Anazocles, represents its transition from divine rationality to the material world. However, this does not imply that rationality (*'aql*) loses its position. Instead, the soul projects its shadow and reflection in the material world. The soul's existence in this world is a reflection and shadow of its rational existence in the Intellectual Realm (Shīrāzī 2007, 306–7; Muşliḥ 1987, 324–25; Kabīr 2011, 909–10; Maḥalātī 2010, 206–8; Plotinus 2009, 35–36, 44).

Among the ideas worth mentioning here is the role of philosophers in

guiding humanity toward God. Some of these higher-level philosophers, including those previously mentioned, play an essential role in urging humanity toward God. They remind humans to abandon the material world and the physical home, calling for a return to the Intellectual Realm and divine glory. They also emphasize the importance of connecting with God through repentance and submission, making humans worthy of His boundless mercy and blessings (Shīrāzī 2007, 306–7; Muşliḥ 1987, 325; Kabīr 2011, 910; Maḥalātī 2010, 206–8).

In Agathademon’s perspective, Mullā Şadrā elaborates on the views of Agathademon (also known as Aaghāthādẓīmūn), a prominent Greek philosopher who collaborated with Anazocles in guiding humanity toward God. Agathademon urged humanity to abandon dependence on the material world. He conveyed his ideas through parables, symbols, and metaphors, often filled with hidden meanings and enigmatic formulas (Shīrāzī 2007, 306–7; Muşliḥ 1987, 325; Kabīr 2011, 910; Maḥalātī 2010, 206–7).

In Pythagoras’ perspective, Mullā Şadrā also references the views of Pythagoras (Fīthāghūras), a renowned philosopher and mathematician who regarded numbers as the origin of the universe. In his treatise known as *The Golden Teachings (Waşāya Dhahabiyyah)*, Pythagoras discusses the immateriality of the soul (Shīrāzī 2007, 306–7; Muşliḥ 1987, 325–26; Kabīr 2011, 910; Maḥalātī 2010, 206, 208–10). This treatise remains extant today. In his final counsel to Diogenes, Pythagoras states:

Whenever you leave the cage of this body and are in the boundless free space, you will soar in the open realm, free from bodily limitations. You will never return to the physical home of the human body. From that moment, death and decay will no longer encompass you (Shīrāzī 2007, 306–7; Muşliḥ 1987, 325–26; Kabīr 2011, 910; Maḥalātī 2010, 206, 208–10; Plotinus 2009, 44–45).

As for Plato’s perspective on the soul, Mullā Şadrā builds on Plato’s (Aflātūn) insights, a Greek philosopher known for his divine and transcendent thinking. In his work *Ethology (Uthūlūjiyā)*, Plato profoundly defines and explains the soul. He extensively discusses nature, characteristics, conditions, and levels of the soul, offering vivid portrayals. However, Plato’s definitions of the soul are varied. He neither entirely bases his views on sensory perception nor completely rejects the soul in all its aspects. According to Plato, the body is a “prison” for the soul, where it is confined and burdened, lamenting its condition. Plato likens the body to a “grave” for the soul, where the soul is buried and shackled (Shīrāzī 2007, 308; Muşliḥ 1987, 326; Kabīr 2011, 911–12; Maḥalātī 2010, 209–10; Plotinus 2009, 45–46).

As for the next philosopher, Mullā Şadrā further explores Empedocles’ (Anbāzqalas) perspective, which aligns with Plato’s belief in the connection between the soul and the body. Empedocles refers to the body as a “shadow” (*şadā*), symbolizing its reflective nature of the soul.

The body represents the soul in the material world, referred to as *ṣadāyā*. Empedocles suggests that the material world is a shadow and reflection of the spiritual realm (Shīrāzī 2007, 308; Muşliḥ 1987, 326–27; Maḥalātī 2010, 209–11; Plotinus 2009, 45).

Mullā Şadrā supports these philosophical views with Qur’anic verses such as: “*Nay! Rather, what they have earned has covered their hearts*” (Q.S. Al-Muṭaffifīn [83]:14), and “*Thus, their hearts were sealed*” (Q.S. Al-Munāfiqūn [63]: 3). According to Mullā Şadrā, these verses signify that the rust and impurities of the physical world obscure the face of the soul and human heart, preventing them from reflecting the radiance of divine light. Consequently, the soul becomes veiled by negligence, distance, and worldly barriers originating from the physical body and material realm (Shīrāzī 2007, 308; Muşliḥ 1987, 326–27; Maḥalātī 2010, 209–11).

There is also another point to draw our attention to, which is the liberation of the soul from the physical realm. Plato adds that the soul’s liberation can only be achieved through release from the constraints of the physical realm. This emancipation is likened to emerging from a grave or narrow hole. Once freed, the soul ascends to the intellectual realm and returns to its exalted position aligned with its true nature (Shīrāzī 2007, 308; Muşliḥ 1987, 326–27; Maḥalātī 2010, 209–11; Plotinus 2009, 45).

Based on the explanations and discussions above, the author can analyze that, to strengthen the arguments and evidence regarding the immateriality of the soul, Mullā Şadrā does not rely solely on rational arguments and references from the Qur’an and hadiths. He also opens another avenue by citing the opinions of previous philosophers, most of whom were esteemed Greek philosophers. According to the author, this approach represents a distinctive feature and diversity in argumentation and reasoning.

Not only that, Mullā Şadrā, in addition to quoting, also interprets the views of these philosophers. In this way, he simultaneously affirms and validates their perspectives while supporting his views on the immateriality of the soul. This is the case even though there may be differences in views and arguments on specific aspects related to or outside of this topic.

Mullā Şadrā’s method of citing is also a form and means to achieve certainty by employing arguments and reasoning that are well-known (*mashhūrāt*), widely accepted (*musallamāt*), and acknowledged (*maqbulāt*).

### **The Fourteenth Proof and Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul Based on the Statements of Mystics (‘Urafā) and Transcendent Philosophers (Muta’alihīn)**

This section discusses the perspectives of mystics (‘urafā) and transcendent philosophers (muta’alihīn) concerning the immateriality

of the human soul. Their statements reflect a view of the soul as separate from the material dimension, aligning with concepts of human happiness and salvation.

The first perspective to mention is the perspective of Abū Yazīd al-Baṣṭāmī. Mullā Ṣadrā cites Abū Yazīd al-Baṣṭāmī's views as an argument for the immateriality of the soul. Baṣṭāmī stated: "I searched for its essence in two realms and found it in neither of them." This declaration refers to the rational soul (*nafs nāṭiqah*), which transcends both the material realm ('*alam thabī'i*) and the imaginal realm ('*ālam mithāl*). From this statement, it can be concluded that the human soul possesses an independent (*mufāraqah*) existence from matter and is an immaterial substance (Shīrāzī 2007, 309; Muṣliḥ 1987, 327; Kabīr 2011, 913; Maḥalātī 2010, 214-15).

Bastami further remarked: "I came out of my skin, and then I saw and knew who I am." In this context, the metaphor "skin" represents the human physical body. This statement emphasizes that the rational soul is the essence of humanity, separate from the physical body, and thus not dependent on physical structures (Shīrāzī 2007, 309; Muṣliḥ 1987, 327; Kabīr 2011, 913; Maḥalātī 2010, 214-15).

The next perspective is of the mystic, Maṣṣūr al-Ḥallāj. Mullā Ṣadrā also references Maṣṣūr al-Ḥallāj's statement: "To love a single existence is to separate it from everything except Him." This assertion highlights the concept of divine unity (*tawhīd*) of God's essence, as elucidated by Amīr al-Mu'minīn Ali ibn Abi Talib in his renowned sermon. This unity emphasizes ultimate sincerity and devotion to God (Shīrāzī 2007, 309; Muṣliḥ 1987, 327; Kabīr 2011, 913; Maḥalātī 2010, 214-15).

Mullā Ṣadrā continues with the discussion on the sufi's union with God. Mystics further state: "A sufi is with God without time." This assertion illustrates that a sufi's union with God is not temporal, unlike the relationships among beings in this world. Dependence on time, space, and place is characteristic of material entities, thereby indicating that the soul of a sufi transcends the material dimension. The soul, as an entity free from space and time, is an immaterial (*mujarrad*) substance (Shīrāzī 2007, 309; Muṣliḥ 1987, 327; Kabīr 2011, 913; Maḥalātī 2010, 214-15).

Another statement, "A sufi is like 'where' without 'where,'" implies that a sufi can traverse and depart from the material realm without attachment to any place. This underscores that sufism represents a spiritual state unconnected to the physical body but rooted in the immaterial essence of the human soul (Shīrāzī 2007, 309; Muṣliḥ 1987, 328; Kabīr 2011, 914; Maḥalātī 2010, 214-15).

From here, we can see the relevance of mystic and philosophical statements with Mullā Ṣadrā's perspective. Mullā Ṣadrā argues that the statements of mystics and transcendent philosophers should not be underestimated. According to him, their expressions are equivalent

to rational arguments in establishing conviction. Logical reasoning and arguments merely serve as intermediaries to prepare the soul for understanding the truth. The ultimate cause of such understanding lies in a higher entity, namely, the active intellect and what transcends it. Hence, it is not inconceivable that the persuasive expressions of mystics suffice for truth-seekers to attain conviction and knowledge through Divine inspiration (Shīrāzī 2007; 309; Muşliḥ 1987, 328; Kabīr 2011, 914; Maḥalātī 2010, 214-15).

Based on the explanation and discussion above, the author analyzes that Mullā Ṣadrā cites several statements from mystics (‘urafā’) and transcendent philosophers (muta’allihīn). It should be noted that in the Sadrian philosophical method, arguments may also originate from the perspectives of ‘irfān. The purpose of these citations and references aligns closely with the previous analysis. In addition to affirming and confirming their views, they also serve to support Mullā Ṣadrā’s stance on the immateriality of the soul. Although there remains the possibility of differences in opinion and arguments on specific matters within or outside this context (Adnani 2023, 33-52).

An important, intriguing, and unique reason for quoting the views of mystics and transcendent philosophers lies in the fact that their arguments and reasoning are merely intermediaries for understanding the truth. However, the ultimate cause of such understanding originates from something higher, namely the Active Intellect and that which transcends it. Furthermore, this understanding is a form of conviction and knowledge acquired through Divine inspiration or the witnessing of the soul (Ghafari 2017, 125-39).

## **Conclusion**

The study of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical discourse on the immateriality of the human soul provides significant insights into Islamic metaphysics. First, Mullā Ṣadrā’s firm stance on the immateriality of the soul (*tajarrud al-naḥs*) is demonstrated through rigorous philosophical arguments, establishing the soul as an independent and immaterial entity. This concept forms a foundational basis for Islamic eschatology (*‘ilm al-ma’ād*), as it directly impacts the understanding of the soul’s journey and its ultimate destiny. Furthermore, Mullā Ṣadrā’s exploration of this topic, though dispersed across various chapters in *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*, reveals a multidimensional approach that enriches the analysis rather than fragmenting the discourse.

The analysis of the soul’s immateriality is conducted through two dimensions: the extrinsic relationship of the soul with material realities and its intrinsic nature as an independent essence. Mullā Ṣadrā employs a triadic methodological framework combining rational arguments (*burhān ‘aqlī*), scriptural evidence (*naqlī*), and testimonial support

from philosophers and mystics. This methodological rigor has led to the identification of 14 arguments supporting the immateriality of the soul, offering a comprehensive foundation for further philosophical exploration. The findings of this study not only enhance the discourse on the soul's immateriality but also provide a valuable starting point for future researchers to delve deeper into the metaphysical and eschatological dimensions of this subject within Islamic philosophy.

Based on the author's analysis of the discussions regarding the evidence and arguments for the immateriality of the soul in the book *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*, several conclusions can be drawn. First, there are a number of arguments and pieces of evidence presented by Mullā Ṣadrā that are robust, making them difficult to critique. Second, some of Mullā Ṣadrā's arguments and evidence serve as fundamental principles (*mabnā*) within his philosophical system, such as the concept of the corporeal origination and the immortality of the soul, the imaginal potential (*quwwah mutakhayyilah*) in animals and humans, and the intrinsic connection of each soul to a single body. Consequently, any critique of these arguments would have implications for other chapters or sections that are interrelated within this framework. Third, certain arguments exhibit weaknesses and are open to critique, particularly those related to textual references (*naqlī*) and testimonies from philosophers and 'urafa. However, the author prefers to categorize these as arguments requiring further refinement (*nāqis* or *ghayr tamām*). These arguments function as supplementary affirmations (*ta'yīd*), akin to widely accepted arguments (*mashhūrāt*), commonly accepted premises (*maqbulāt*), and established principles (*musallamāt*), which aim to strengthen conviction rather than diminish the validity of the reasoning. Fourth, the book not only presents a wealth of arguments and evidence but also demonstrates a diversity of approaches and methodologies, which constitute a unique and valuable contribution to Sadrian philosophy. The author acknowledges that this study does not comprehensively cover Mullā Ṣadrā's extensive views on the immateriality of the soul, given the breadth of his numerous works addressing this theme. The research is focused on a single foundational work, *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*, which underpins Sadrian philosophy. As such, this study is not without limitations and shortcomings, leaving room for improvement and further development.

As an implication, this research provides an initial contribution to understanding the concept of the soul's immateriality within the framework of classical Islamic philosophy and fosters dialogue between Islamic intellectual traditions and contemporary metaphysical discourse. Furthermore, the study highlights the importance of integrating rational, textual, and mystical methodologies in constructing cohesive arguments, as exemplified by Mullā Ṣadrā.

The author recommends future research to expand the scope by

exploring other relevant works of Mullā Ṣadrā and integrating perspectives from both Islamic and Western philosophers to enrich the analysis. Additionally, future studies could delve deeper into the relationship between the soul's immateriality and other themes in Sadrian philosophy, such as substantial motion (*ḥarakah jawhariyyah*) and eschatology (*'ilm al-ma'ād*).

The benefit of this research lies in providing a solid conceptual foundation for scholars interested in Islamic metaphysics, particularly in the discourse on the soul. These findings may also serve as a reference for fostering interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, theology, and mysticism, both within academic contexts and spiritual practices.

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