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From AuNormative PowerAy to AuGlobal GovernmentalityAy:
An Assessment of European UnionAos Engagement of Civil Society in Indonesia1 Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar Abstract This article develops a theory of European power as AogovernmentalityAo, with a particular reference to European Union (EU)Aos engagement of civil society in Indonesia through a package of Aucivil society strengthening programsAy.
In contrast to some arguments of Aonormative powerAo or Aocivilian powerAo in the European Union, that put emphasis on EUAos normative framework in explaining EUAos diplomatic engagements in world politics, this article argues that European UnionAos global outreach is best seen as the politics of governmentality, which comprises the spread of norms to the Auglobal southAy through various developmental strategies in order to form particular subjectivities based on European UnionAos Aunormative frameworkAy.
This argument will be applied to empirically explain the role of EUAos engagement of civil society in Indonesia.
To substantiate the argument, this article will analyse .
the debate on recent theorisation of AuEuropean powerAy in EU and International Relations studies, with a reference to Ian MannersAo conception of AuNormative Power EuropeAy.
the snapshot of European UnionAos key policies on International Development Assistance in Indonesia.
the case of some projects related to Aucivil society strengthening programsAy in Indonesia.
Keywords: European Union.
civil society.
international development.
normative power.
global governmentality.
Introduction The European Union (EU) has been widely acknowledged as one of the largest political entities in the world since its early formation in the late 1990s.
In his famous article titled.
Journal of Parts of this article were presented at the 3rd Convention of European Studies (Yogyakarta.
May 2.
and appeared at Short Film AuEU Democracy Promotion: What It is and Why It MattersAy (Sheffield.
June 2.
The author wishes to thank Muhadi Sugiono.
Arie Ruhyanto.
Yunizar Adiputera.
Suci Lestari Yuana.
Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha.
Annisa Maulia Fahmi, and the reviewers for insightful comments and Paul James Cardwell for allowing the author to contribute some thoughts to his film.
26 The Primacy of Civil Society Common Market Studies.
Ian Manners coined the term AoNormative PowerAo to explain how the European Union established itself as one of the major forces in world politics.
Since its foundation, according to Manners .
AonormsAo have been central to EUAos foreign policy and EUAos relations with other political forces, which distinguishes the base of EU power from other major powers in international politics such as the United States.
China, or Russia.
The strength of EU power, according to Manners, is the ability to define Aowhat is normalAo in world politics in a way that determines the structure of Aonormative orderAo for the world .
ee also Manners.
For example, one of EUAos valuesAiwhich was defined by Manners as AonormsAoAiis democracy and good governance, which EU has attempted to spread to large parts of the Aoglobal southAo through international development assistance and democracy promotion .
ee Gillespie & Young, 2002.
Carbone, 2.
Through such international engagements.
EU has been widely involved in providing development assistances to many countries that are on their way to the so-called Aodemocratic transitionAo.
This article attempts to critically engage MannersAo argument of Aonormative power EuropeAo by exploring EUAos role in international development assistances through an alternative framework, namely AugovernmentalityAy.
Kicked-off by French philosopher Michael Foucault in one of his articles .
, this concept has gained prominence in recent International Relations theoretical debates .
ee Neumann & Sending, 2010.
Joseph, 2012.
Vrasti, 2013.
Chandler & Richmond, 2015.
Hamilton, 2014.
Kiersey & Stokes, 2013.
Umar.
This framework will be applied to further understand the politics and practice of EUAos international development assistance and democracy promotion in Post-New Order Indonesia, in which EU has been engaged during the democratic transition since 1998.
More specifically, this article will analyse some of EUAos projects related to AuCivil Society Strengthening ProgramsAy, which is the core of EUAos main approach in promoting democracy, good governance, and Human Rights in Indonesia.
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Applying the theory of AugovernmentalityAy as an alternative approach in understanding EU power does require some discussion on how such projects are able to structurally define not only Auwhat is normalAy in world politics, but also on specific techniques used by EU to craft a particular subjectivity that is inherent with the framework that EU holds in its foreign policy.
It therefore needs a further analysis of both ideational and material forms of EU power .
ee Joseph & Bulmer 2.
Against this backdrop, this article will elaborate how EU supported Indonesian civil society to conduct some empowerment or advocacy activities by providing external helps, particularly financial assistance.
In this context, this article will raise two questions: .
How is the relationship between the European Union and civil society organisations in EUAos programs able to strengthen civil society in Indonesia?.
How does EUAos engagement of civil society in Indonesia incorporate the EUAos norms and values into Indonesian governments and civil society organisations through EU-funded projects? The argument of this article will be developed in five sections.
The first section will provide some introductory remarks of this The second section will reconceptualise AoEuropean PowerAo through the prism of AugovernmentalityAy by engaging the idea of Aonormative powerAo developed by Ian Manners.
The third section will provide a snapshot of EUAos civil society strengthening programs, which are arguably embedded with EUAos international development and democracy promotion strategies in the global south.
The fourth section will assess how the EUAos civil society strengthening programs in Indonesia portray EUAos global governmental project in world politics, which locates Indonesian civil society in the global power nexus between Aointernational developmentAo and Aoglobal liberal governmentalityAo projected by the EU.
The fifth section will provide conclusions and interesting insights into EUAos use of normative 28 The Primacy of Civil Society Reconceptualising European Power: AuGovernmentalityAy Approach This section will theoretically engage with Ian MannersAo conception of Aonormative powerAo, provide some critical readings concerning this concept, and offer AugovernmentalityAy as an alternative approach to understand EU power.
The argument of this section will proceed in two parts.
While the first part will explain the idea of AuNormative PowerAy in the understanding of EU power, the second part will develop a framework of global governmentality to sketch EUAos international development projects in the global south.
AuNormative Power EuropeAy and the Contending Perspective on EUAos Global Engagements In the dominating Realist perspectives of International Relations.
AupowerAy is defined in terms of Aomaterial powerAo such as military or the political and economic size of a country (Morgenthau.
Mearsheimer 2.
Practically, this concept of power is manifested into the form of AomilitarismAo, which relates to the practice of influencing other states through military forces, defence systems, and many other AoharshAo sources of power .
ee Morgenthau.
This concept of AopowerAo is challenged by the concept of Aosoft powerAo, that is according to Nye .
, not only characterized by military power, but also the ability to influence by cultural-economic sources of power.
Thus.
AupowerAy can be redefined, not only in the context of Aopolitical powerAo but also cultural power that one state This dimension of power, according to Manners .
, gives some moral intentions to stop the fragility of statehood relations that results from the realist perspectives on power.
One could argue, however, that norms cannot be transformed to power until it is materialized in foreign policy practice (Pollack.
This is where MannersAo ideas of Normative Power, which is based on constructivist arguments in International Relations theory, intervenes in the debate .
ee also Manners & Whitman, 2.
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based on ideational sources of power with the realist approach based on material sources.
Manners identifies Aonormative powerAo in terms of opinion, ideological, and norm-shaping forces that one stateAimore specifically, the European UnionAipossesses in world MannersAo idea resonates with the idea of Aunormative multipolarityAy, which argues that state power depends largely on statesAo ideational resources, such as a forceful adherence to international law and institutions and a strong sense of collective identity, and contested throughout statesAo involvement in diplomatic practices in world politics (Acharya, 2.
This debate over conception of AupowerAy has led this research to map the similar debate over AuEuropean PowerAy.
Recent studies on European UnionAos position in world politics posits EU power as a AocivilianAo and later AonormativeAo power (Duchene, 1972.
Bull, 1982.
Manners, 2.
Maull .
conceptualises three elements of Aocivilian powerAo, namely: .
the acceptance of cooperation with other political forces, rather than conflict, in the pursuit of international .
the concentration on non-military means to secure national goals, and .
a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues in international politics .
lso quoted in Smith, 2.
This notion of Aocivilian powerAo came into the theoretical debate when Hedley Bull, a prominent IR English School theorist, argued that the increasing role of EU in military and defence policy has led to the adoption of the notion of Aomilitary power EuropeAo.
He argued that the concept of Aocivilian powerAo does not represent the realist concept of power, which has been defined as military power.
Norms do not significantly construct EUAos Foreign Policy as a major political force in world politics.
Thus, with this realist approach.
Bull argued that EUAos power should be understood by how it can secure EU from external threat (Bull, 1.
Ian Manners later challenged such arguments.
According to Manners .
EUAos power should be read as one ideational resource, which can be transformed as the normative basis of EU Foreign Policy in its relation to another region.
EU as a AogiantAo state 30 The Primacy of Civil Society that unites its ten member states constitutes a new discourse of power, which is based not only from a traditional form of Aumilitary powerAy but also the ideational foundations.
There are four founding principles, which become the normative basis of EU: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law.
Those four principles, derived from the Treaty of European Union, then become important norms that constitute EUAos power in its relation to other political forces in the world.
Other than that, these principles also become the major campaign in EUAos cooperation with states from different regions such as Southeast Asia.
Given these founding principles.
Manners than argued that such foundations, which served as ideational basis of foreign policy is relevant to place EU in world politics.
Addressing the multipolar world order.
EU came with the opportunity to fulfil many spaces with its unique normative basis.
EU has many ideational resources that build the identity of its foreign policy.
According to Manners.
EUAos specific norms can be conceptualised as a changer of norms in the international system based on the Aoso-calledAo normative power.
In MannersAo point of view, the principles constitute the normative basis of AoEuropean powerAo that distinguishes EUAos concept of power from another stateAos concept of powerAiparticularly USAiin their foreign policy.
Manners finally concludes that the concept of normative power is the most suitable approach to understand EUAos foreign policy and engagement with other actors in global politics.
From this viewpoint.
Manners coined a new term.
Aonormative powerAo.
This concept attempts to bridge MaullAosAiand also DucheneAosAiconception of AopowerAo to the normative foundations of European Union in its latest development, which is embedded in several EUAos foundational treaties.
In his essay, challenging Hedley BullAos scepticism over EUAos civilian power.
Manners .
stated that the power of EU is located in a debate between the Aoidea forcesAo and Aoideological powerAo which is focused on the ideational character in EUAos common principles .
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According to Manners, this ideational character shapes the direction of EUAos foreign policy and subsequently spreads EU norms to all over the world through what he called as Aonorms diffusionAo.
Elements of MannersAo idea of Aonormative powerAo will be described as follows.
First.
European Power derives their concept on what they believe as ideology.
According to Manners .
, the European Union has some treaty foundations, which derive some norms, like the Treaty of EU (TEU), the Treaty of the Establishment of European Commission (TEC), and etc.
These treaties form a new AowayAo of EU Foreign Policy.
Those norms become a AospiritAo to formulate EU Foreign Policy in many aspects of cooperation, especially in Aoglobal south countriesAoAiprograms that become a socalled national interestAiin the context of supranationalism.
This Aonormative powerAo strengthens EUAos position in world politics.
Second.
European Power is determined by its norm-shaping forces (Manners, 2002.
Pollack, 2.
It is the ability to shape conceptions of AunormalAy in world affairs that makes EUAos normative power operate in world politics.
Consisting of many states that have played major roles in world politics, such as the United Kingdom.
France.
Germany, and many other countries.
EU has been able to drive world politics and define its AonormalityAo based on its interests.
On the other hand, with its AogiganticAo size and high influence.
EU can also drive public opinion in the global context, thus AonormalizeAo the world under EUAos leadership.
According to Manners, what makes EU different with other political forces in world politics is its ability to manage its material resources under certain norms.
EU has formulated its foundational principles that guide its foreign policyAeliberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, and rule of law.
can see, according to Manners, the manifestation of these norms in some actions that EU has conducted in several countries.
One of the examples provided by Manners was the case of the death penalty in the Philippines and Nepal.
After voting in favour of the 32 The Primacy of Civil Society EU resolution Nepal abolished the penalty two months later, while the Philippines abstained from voting even though it still retained the penalty, but a year later it introduced a moratorium (Manners.
This case, according to Manners .
, reflects how EUAos normative power operates in world politics.
EUAos normative power is manifested through the combination of ideational bases, which are embedded in EUAos foundational treaties, and its foreign relations with other countries.
Since EU consists of many AogiantAo states which have been considered as major political forces, and it has been politically involved in many issues in world politics.
Manners suggested that norms have been central to the construction of EUAos It is norms that drive EUAos foreign policy and make their big size successfully operate in world politics.
Nevertheless.
Ian MannersAo conception on Aonormative powerAo has also been widely criticized.
Realists have been particularly critical of MannerAos idealistic approach to EUAos foreign policy by highlighting the importance of military and economic strength to tie down US hegemony in world politics, particularly after 9/11 (Pollack, 2010.
Hyde-Price, 2.
A harsher critique even placed MannerAos normative power as a justification of military-security dependence on the USAias several scholars implied.
Authe US makes the dinner and EU does the dishesAy (Diez, 2.
Another critique accused Aonormative powerAo of being immaterial and neglecting the political and economic aspects of AopowerAo (Pollack, 2.
Other critiques such as from Tilley .
suspect EU as having a Aodouble standardAo in its human rights campaigns.
It is also important to consider that these criticisms have relied strongly upon the assumption that places EU as the subject in world The normative power concept, as well as its Realist critics, according to Thomas Diez, have been very subjective in assessing EUAos power due to its identification basisAiEU as Aothe IAo and other parts of the world as Aothe OtherAo (Diez, 2.
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Understanding EUAos external engagements through this Eurocentric lens will put the study of EU in danger of dismissing the subjectivity of the global south at the expense of AuEuropean subjectsAy (Bhambra, 2.
It is important, therefore, to discuss EUAos power in different subjectivity relationsAiby decentring EU and discussing EUAos power in other perspectivesAiand thus unpacking the ideological tendencies that become a backdrop of EUAos concept of power.
Michael FoucaultAos work on Augovernmentality will be helpful in unpacking those power relations in EUAos international development and civil society strengthening programs in Indonesia.
Alternative Framework: Understanding EU Power as AuGlobal GovernmentalityAy This article will make use of the concept of AugovernmentalityAy as an alternative to MannersAo conception of normative power.
Foucault defined government as the Auconduct of conduct,Ay a form of activity designed to shape personal, interpersonal and institutional conduct, as well as the conduct of political sovereignty (Foucault.
Nadesan, 2008, pp.
Foucault argued that shifting regimes of government can be identified in part through shifting technologies and strategies of power.
Rojas .
added the role of Aointernationalised aidAo as a new form of governmentality.
According to Rojas .
4, p.
, power in the context of AogovernmentalityAo is rationalized differently in terms of diverse modalities of government and specific knowledge associated with specific forms of rule.
It constructs a new form of AudevelopmentalismAy, in which the strategy incorporates the participatory planning, poverty alleviation, the strengthening power of civil society, but in the context of AodevelopmentAo proposed by EU who diffuse their norms to their AopartnersAo and thus control the state indirectly through this strategy.
Thus.
AodevelopmentAo in EUAos programs has become a biopolitical tool that controls the Aoglobal south subjectsAo, and even constructs a new political subjectivity.
By using the concept of AogovernmentalityAo, this article 34 The Primacy of Civil Society argues that EUAos engagement through civil society strengthening programs is a form of AogovernmentAo that EU aims to build, construct, and develop in Indonesia.
Development and its Civil Society Strengthening ProgramsAithat have been embedded in EUAos international development strategyAiis an important tool to biopolitically cultivate a particular subjectivity inherent in EUAos normative framework.
It thus can be perceived as a form of Aoglobal governanceAo that leads EU to play a major role in governing the global south.
From this point of view.
EUAos involvement in global development projects cannot be merely identified as Aonormative powerAo.
Otherwise their development projects, although driven by certain norms that have been developed earlier, have been central to the subjectivity of the global south.
From this Aoglobal southistAo perspective.
EUAos power should be read as Aoglobal governmentalityAo rather than Aonormative powerAo.
How could EU govern the global south and thus create a new form of subjectivity? To analyse EUAos strategy, it is important to follow Pollack .
to analyse EUAos material form of power.
Since EU is comprised of many prominent European states.
EU can combine sources of funds from many Aorich countriesAo in Europe.
The amount of financial assistance managed by the European CommissionAiEUAos governing bodyAoAiis allocated to international development projects and is dedicated to help the global south countries who need financial aid or assistance.
Consequently.
EU can distribute their funds to states that need development and financial assistance.
It is nonetheless creating a generosity power in EUAos foreign policy.
However, it should also be noted that EU does not give development aid or assistance without conditionalities.
There are some aspects and procedures to be committed to before AopartnersAo access financial assistance from EU, and one of them is Aogood governanceAo conditionalities.
These conditionalities thus become a Aobargaining positionAo for EU to campaign their norms, especially Aogood governanceAo, which promotes the principle of responsibility PCD Journal Vol.
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to govern in accountable manners.
It contains several procedures and prerequisites that should be met by those who wish to submit proposals for funding.
These prerequisites and procedures are given in order to guarantee responsibility, transparency, and other forms of good governanceAitypical preconditions proposed by International Development Regimes (Li, 2.
By giving incentives.
EU has indirectly forced stakeholders in the country .
ncluding governmen.
to learn about democratic responsibility.
It also promotes an anticorruption spirit that has become a spectre in developing or lessdeveloped countries.
By using the concept of AugovernmentalityAy, it can be understood that the concept of normative power constitutes a new method of AogoverningAo in the global south.
The process of governmentality can be understood as follows: EU provides development assistance to any countries that are in favour with EUAos However, this financial assistance is not a Aofree-of-chargeAo EU provides the assistance via its specific programs, prerequisites, and proceduresAiand thus placing its norms within development projects.
In Indonesia.
EU develops AoCivil Society Strengthening ProgramsAo as a mean of development assistance.
This unique program has been made to construct certain norms that are embedded within EUAos foreign policy.
By placing particular norms, the EU are able to advocate a kind of Aopassive revolutionAo in order to maintain their hegemony in third-world countries.
EUAos development projects have also been used as a biopolitical tool to construct a model Aogovernment through societyAo (Li, 2002.
Harriss.
Based on this conceptual framework, this article argues that MannersAo idea of normative power needs to be redefined as a possible act to transform another state and give some spaces to EU to manifest their interests in the form of AogovernmentAo and its Aogovernmental projectAo.
EU power is manifested not only through foreign policy as a main tool, but also involves broader international engagements that emerged amid the structural transformation of world politics 36 The Primacy of Civil Society after the Cold War.
The rise of Aopost-AuthoritarianAo states after the Cold War gives the opportunity for EU to engage not only with their AotraditionalAo North American counterparts, but also with broader actors in the Aoglobal southAo (Merlingen 2006.
Bretherton & Vogler.
In other words.
EUAos complex external engagement through development assistances and democracy promotion, along with EUAos foreign policy in general, constitute a form of governmental project that aims to cultivate its norms in other part of the worlds through various cooperations and aids.
It is therefore important to understand development cooperation and assistance as a political project .
ee Joseph, 2.
The term Aogovernmental projectAo does not entirely have negative connotations.
It to some extent could help beneficiary countries to undergo the democratic transition, thereby cultivating democratic culture of those states and preventing the Aoauthoritarian nostalgiaAo that seems to face post-authoritarian states in their transition towards democratisation .
ee also Huntington, 1.
However, the implementation of such development and democratic assistance also relates to social formation of EUAos power in the global south, which is interconnected with EUAos economic and security interests in the global south.
From this critical perspective, this article will assess EUAos Aogovernmental projectAo as manifested in its international development, democracy promotion, and, more specifically, the civil society strengthening programs in Indonesia.
European Union and Civil Society Strengthening Programs in Indonesia Having established the framework of Aoglobal governmentalityAo to understand EUAos power, this article will proceed to explain how the EUAos governmentality works through their civil society strengthening programs in Indonesia.
In doing so, this article will start by understanding the role of Aocivil societyAo in world politics.
This section will be divided into two parts.
The first part will discuss the origins of civil society engagement in world politics, particularly PCD Journal Vol.
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after the Cold War that lead to the Aothird wave of democratisationAo (Huntington, 1.
The second part will discuss EUAos engagement of civil society in Indonesia through their international development and democracy promotion projects.
The Origins of Civil Society Engagement in World Politics It is widely assumed that the end of the Cold War has been marked by the emergence of AotransnationalismAo.
AoglobalisationAo, and the plurality of actors in world politics.
International Relations is not only monopolised by the AostateAo as single actors, but also recognizes the role of Aonon-state actors in world politics (Kegley, 2006.
Widjojanto et al.
, 2007.
Riss-Kappen, 1.
One of the important actors, that have emerged after the Cold War, is civil societyAithose who are identified as Aovoluntary associations deliberately seeking to shape the rules that govern aspects of social lifeAo (Scholte, 2.
Civil Society has emerged in many postauthoritarian states as influential actors, following the so-called Aodemocratic transitionAo processes (Huntington, 1.
Since EU and other donor institutions have had AodemocracyAo as their foundational principles.
Civil SocietyAos engagement has been central in their frameworks for development.
Thus, discourses of civil society within an institutionalised democratic process has been transnationalised alongside the democratisation process itself, leading to many donorled development projects that operate side-by-side with civil societyAos Standard Aotransition towards democratisationAo literatures argue that strong and vibrant civil society is an important ingredient of cultivating democratic cultures in post-authoritarian states (Huntington, 1993.
Diamond, 1999.
Uhlin, 1.
Democracy should be followed by strong popular participation, which is institutionalised through the democratic political system .
ee Dahl.
Participation needs engagement from citizens to actively participate in the political process.
It is in this context democracy needs civil society organisations as a key variable in maintaining 38 The Primacy of Civil Society democratic political processes.
Indonesia is often regarded as the best example of how vibrant civil societies will lead the country towards democratization .
ee Uhlin, 1.
After 1998, a democratic political change swept Indonesia and brought along several agendas to create a democratic state.
This agenda, however, required many facilities and supports.
Collaborations between Indonesian governments with several donor institutions whose aims to help IndonesiaAos development through loans and development assistances were crucial at this stage .
ee Carroll, 2012.
Li, 2.
This cooperation was welcomed by many civil society organizations that had to deal with problems such as corruption, lack of capacity of government apparatuses, and poverty.
The transnationalization of civil society that appears in Indonesia gives some chances to EU and civil society both to meet and articulate their interest in mutualistic relations (Widjojanto et al.
, 2.
EU could distribute development funds and impose certain norms to IndonesiaAos development practices, while Civil Society could obtain financial support for their programs.
This mutual interest has been made possible after 1998 due to several shifts in donor frameworks in distributing aids.
Before 1998, donorAos involvement in Indonesia had targeted Government and its technocratic infrastructures.
However, since the reformasi.
Civil Society and other non-state actors have been the main target of donorAos development projects due to the so-called Aogood governanceAo projects (Hadiwinata, 2.
Through several EU-funded projects, civil society comes to join in the EU scheme of Aointernational development policyAo (Bossuyt, 2.
The cooperation between EU and civil society then becomes a modus operandi of EU to spread their norms in its development cooperation with another country.
The importance of civil society can be seen in the community involvement endorsed by EU.
Endorsement over public participation enables civil society organisations to be more involved in decisionmaking processes.
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It was started in EUAos development policy.
EU had formalised its relations with states from Africa, the Caribbean, and the AsiaPacific .
ater abbreviated as ACP) under the Cotonou Agreement, which was signed in June 2000.
This agreement legally recognised the essential role that non-state actors can play in the development The purpose is not to oppose governments, but to foster dialogue and collaboration between the different development players (Bossuyt, 2.
This agreement has been the embryo of the so-called AoCivil Society Strengthening ProgramsAo that are central in EUAos international development frameworks.
In November 2002, the European Commission published a new strategy that put more emphasis on the role of non-state actors within EUAos development policy .
ee Hurt, 2.
Thus, under the Cotonou Agreement and the following cooperations that EU had signed after 2000, civil societyAos involvement has played a major role in EUAos international development EUAos democracy promotion in Africa, for instance, has also endorsed civil societyAos involvement to safeguard the democratic mechanism and development processes (Crawford, 2006, p.
Ghana can be a good example of this democracy promotion Following the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, the European Commission adopted a new Country Strategy Paper (CSP) that placed emphasis on civil society strengthening and assistance to NGOs.
Projects are generally administered with local governments (District Assemblie.
, with some involvement from beneficiary communities, and thus encouraging grass-root stakeholders to be more involved in development processes (Crawford, 2006, p.
Civil Society Strengthening Programs and EUAos International Development Projects in Indonesia Historically, before the Partnership & Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in the late 2000s, the cooperation between EU and Indonesia was conducted under The Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to European Communities (PRIME) which was 40 The Primacy of Civil Society established in 1990.
The missionAos objective is to accommodate the growing needs for nurturing relations between Indonesia and the EU.
EU-Indonesia Partnership & Cooperation Agreement was firstly formalised and signed in 2003.
In that PCA.
EU agreed to support Non-State Actors to conduct capacity development and institutional strengthening for education stakeholders.
The aim of this cooperation, according to this PCA, is to improve access to quality education and increase transparency and monitoring of education budgets.
There are 6 on-going projects with Non-State Actors with a total EU support of more than C1 million.
PCA Totally, there were at least 70 projects funded by EU, covering 8 sectors which have formed a cooperation basis in IndonesiaEUAos PCA.
Civil SocietyAos involvement is included in democracy, government, and human rights sectors.
There are several projects funded by EU in the context of civil society activities in Indonesia.
There are, for example, advocacy programs for Special Autonomy Fund for the Implementation of Education Quality in Papua, partnerships among Government.
Parliament and Civil Society in Support for Pro-Poor and Gender-Responsive Budget Initiatives in South Sulawesi.
Capacity Building for Local CSOs to Enhance Democratic Participation and Representation in Aceh and Papua, and the Civil Society Engagement in Improving Quality and Access to Education.
In this article.
I will take a deeper look at program samples in three sectors: education, anticorruption, and social empowerment.
In the education sector, there was a project for Promoting Transparency.
Accountability and Effectiveness in the Management of Education Deconcentration Fund.
It was conducted by Pusat Studi Pengembangan Kawasan (PSPK) Tungal in 6 cities: Lampung.
Semarang.
Samarinda.
Kupang.
Makassar, and Jakarta.
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PSPK Tungal worked from 01/2009 to 01/2011.
2 It is interesting to see the resultAieducational budgeting is in fact very corrupted because of the lack of transparency of the educational institution itself.
Thus, the civil society strengthening program was concentrated on the budget monitoring and transparency so that the public can access information from the educational institutions.
We can see another program in education: Encouraging School Accountability System to Ensure School Service Affordability for the Poor.
This program was conducted by PATTIRO (Pusat Telaah Dan Informasi Regiona.
in 3 regencies: Serang.
Gresik, and Malang, funded for about C 171,899.
95 by EU.
PATTIRO tried to promote an education expenditure system at schools that facilitate students of poor families to receive affordable education services by maintaining accountability of education fund usage at schools.
In the anticorruption sector, there was also an advocacy support for Public Procurement Reform in Local Government by Promoting Stakeholders Participation as a Means of Corruption Eradication in Public Service Delivery.
It was conducted in Purwakarta and Indramayu by Yayasan Bandung Trust Advisory Group from 2009 EU contributed funding of C 121,112 total.
4 The purpose of this program was to reform public procurement in the endeavours of accomplishing good governance and preventing corruption through espousing local stakeholdersAo participation.
In this sense.
EU tried to prevent corruption by enhancing public participation.
This approachAiwhich is very similar with the neoliberal approachAisees corruption as a result of the lack of transparency from public institution and thus the institutional reform as well as greater public control should be encouraged.
Thus, the effort to prevent corruption, according to EC, should be conducted through participation strengthening of civil society.
http://eeas.
eu/delegations/indonesia/projects/list_of_projects/172234_en.
http://eeas.
eu/delegations/indonesia/projects/list_of_projects/172462_en.
http://eeas.
eu/delegations/indonesia/projects/list_of_projects/172334_en.
42 The Primacy of Civil Society Lastly, we should also see EU-funded programs in social empowerment.
From 2010-2014.
Bandung Institute of Governance Studies (BIGS) held a project to encourage local governments in implementing the National Action Plan on Human Rights (RANHAM) for 4 consecutive years in the framework of ECOSOC rights.
Fulfilment in education, health and economic sectors were the main concerns of this program.
Generally speaking, this program was a response to a government program RANHAM (Rencana Aksi Nasional tentang HAM) that was proposed by the local government.
Focusing on economic and social rights, the program was conducted in Bandung and Cimahi, two regencies in West Java and fully supported by EU.
Those programs, before being accepted to be funded, should follow some complicated procedures.
According to Amin Sudarsono (Interview.
January 3, 2.
, a former PATTIRO activist who conducted EU-funded projects several times in Malang.
Gresik, and Serang, applicants were invited for a presentation in the EU office in Jakarta before applying for EU projects.
The presentation was followed by a tender selection to see which proposals are suitable for financial supports.
It is a complicated procedure.
It required a high sense of responsibility to manage and report the project, since the program should be reported in detail, especially for the financial report (Interview.
January 3.
If an applicant won the tender, there should be a letter of interest and proposal summary sent to the EU office.
It is then selected and revised by EU Commission .
here was another tender for the revisio.
After the second tender, applicants sent a complete proposal with the budget.
Then the program was conducted with some periodic evaluations.
If the program was fulfilled, the project manager should send a responsibility report to EU with the budget usage explanation.
EU requires professionality and accountability to select the right persons to handle the project.
http://eeas.
eu/delegations/indonesia/projects/list_of_projects/212707_en.
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However, these EU-funded programs should also be analysed in a different perspective.
What is the primary purpose of EU in spreading some fresh financial assistance to civil society organizations in funding their projects? What is the objective of the civil society organization in participating in those projects? What is the relationship between Civil Society Strengthening Programs with the construction of EUAos global governmental project in the global south? The following part will analyse the formation EUAos politics of global governmentality through their Civil SocietyAos Strengthening Programs in Indonesia.
Not Necessarily Normative? A Critical Assessment of European UnionAos Engagement of Civil Society in Indonesia EU-Indonesia Cooperation in Civil Society Strengthening Programs that had been presented before cannot be separated from EUAos political interests in supporting IndonesiaAos development programs and assisting its democratic transitions.
This section will apply the AogovernmentalityAo approach in analysing EUAos Civil Society Strengthening Programs in Indonesia.
As presented in the previous part, civil society strengthening programs constitute a part of EUAos democracy promotion to newly democratic states.
Even though it contributes to develop democratization processes in Indonesia, there are also several aspects that should be criticized in the program.
This article will be departing from the discussion of EUAos From the Aonormative powerAo lens, as previously argued by Ian Manners, power should be understood on the basis of EUAos ability to define Aowhat is normalAo in world politics.
In other words, we can say that EUAos power relied upon the Aonormalization processAoAior in constructivist perspective, on how to diffuse norms to the real As argued by Ian Manners.
EU works as a Aonorms promoterAo who has been able to use force in favour of redefining international norms in its own image .
ited in Fiott, 2.
The particular norms that EU promotes, in the case of Indonesia, are democratic norms, 44 The Primacy of Civil Society which are based upon the premise of popular participation and the importance of a vibrant and strong civil society in the country .
ee Kurki, 2.
In the Indonesian case, the governmentality process operates in the international development projects.
EU shared many funds to develop and introduce Indonesian society to good governance, education, social empowerment, and anticorruption projects (EC, 2.
In this context.
EU used the Authird actorAy to conduct the projectAithe Civil Society.
However.
Civil Society does not implement the project on their self-defined interests.
they have to meet EUAos prerequisites and procedures.
This process has been described by Foucault as technologies of the self or biopolitics.
Civil Society played a major role in employing the technologies of the self by doing advocacy under certain norms that had been imposed in funding and its procedures.
The degree of successfulness is measured through some measurements provided by the donorsAiit involves local consultants in the process.
6 Thus, within this mechanism, the Civil Society Strengthening Programs along with its complicated procedures and prerequisites have been an effective biopolitical tool that controls IndonesiaAos development practice in appropriation of EUAos norms.
Therefore.
Civil Society Strengthening Programs have been embedded with EUAos international development strategies, which are supported by financial assistances that, as previously discussed, were given to Indonesian civil society.
By providing some grants and projects.
EU has been able to diffuse its norms and also drive the socio-political changes in Indonesia, which did not only appear in terms of corruption eradications, poverty alleviations, and many other programs, but also in a formation of a new AodiscourseAo of Such norms that EU proposed were thus diffused For instances, there are many publications from civil society organizations who have successfully conducted advocacy with financial supports from donor institutions.
EU and the World Bank also published some success stories that has been made Aobest practiceAo for Civil Society to do advocacy under donorAos assistances.
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in specific projects that had been conducted by CSOs under EUAos Thus, the CSOs independently managed the projects under strict circumstances given by EU.
Consider, for example, the case of Public Procurement Reform in Local Government by Promoting Stakeholders Participation as a Means of Corruption Eradication in Public Service Delivery.
The European Commission had mentioned that the aim of this program was to develop a reliable procurement system in the Indramayu and Purwakarta districts that underscores the principles of FATCEO (Fairness.
Accountability.
Transparency.
Competition.
Efficiency/Effectiveness.
Opennes.
and easy access.
To that end, the European Commission provides technical assistance to incorporate community participation at all stages, therefore ensuring community participations in public service delivery in accordance with the principles of transparency, accountability, and broader good governance.
This project highlights how the European Commission promotes their perspective of transparency and accountability in public delivery through two particular strategies: the use of AoprocurementAoAior more broadly Aotechnological toolsAoAiand stakeholders engagement .
ee Greenwood, 2.
The process highlights the governmental processes that enable EU not only to deliver its norms to beneficiary countries, but also to create a system of democratic accountability in the grass-roots level.
The combination of the use of Aotechnological toolsAo and democratic systems of participation is promoted as a AomodelAo for public management in the Aoglobal southAo, which is embedded in EU-funded programs in Indramayu and Purwakarta.
The principles of FATCEO (Fairness.
Accountability.
Transparency.
Competition.
Efficiency/ Effectiveness.
Opennes.
represent the normative framework that is put to work through EUAos technical assistance toward greater community participation in managing the public procurement.
The case of Public Procurement Reform in Local Government by Promoting Stakeholders Participation as a Means of Corruption 46 The Primacy of Civil Society Eradication in Public Service Delivery illustrates two ways in which Civil Society engages with EU, which exposes the particular form of AugovernmentalityAy that EU aims to promote in Indonesia.
First.
Civil Society is central in diffusing EUAos norms to the real world, and thus creating some degrees of normality.
In the process.
EU will be able to strengthen civil society capacity in conducting advocacy, particularly in several issues related to local democratization, respect for human rights, and good governance.
Thus, projects that are funded by EU can lead to social change.
From such perspectives.
EU is able to cultivate particular subjectivities .
uch as Augood governanceA.
through financial assistances to NGOs that lead to their active participation in influencing the practice of local From this point of view.
Aunormative powerAy is not necessarily AunormativeAy, in the sense that it always goes hand-in-hand with a material form of power.
Therefore, normative power could work only if there are reciprocal relationships between AonormsAoAias a main source of power with a strong economy or even diplomacy that supports the norms diffusion in the global south.
It is in this context some analyses of EUAos international development practices stress how important it is to understand how EU develops their bases of Aonormative powerAo.
Second, in the procedural level.
EU funding for several projects also creates some practices of Aunorm internalizationAy for Indonesia Civil Society.
The procedure to access those fundings is not as simple as fresh financial assistance for example that given by China to Angola.
EU gives some prerequisites that are to be fulfilled by candidates who wish to apply for the project.
A strict procedure creates responsibility for Civil Society Organizations.
In a wider context.
EU seems to provide a kind of AoeducationAo for Indonesians to be accountable in using the funds, so that the corruption can be prevented and minimalised.
EU sees AoaccountabilityAo as a belief in the neo-liberal perspective that sees the best way to combat corruption and prevent the dysfunction of state apparatuses is by increasing PCD Journal Vol.
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public control.
It is why EU introduced Aogood governanceAo as a specific norm that entails many aspects of accountability and thus involving Civil Society in the process.
The main benefit that they can gain is financial benefits.
Civil Society Organisations will be able to find some financial supports to operationalise their programs.
Through financial supports provided by EU, their objectives can be obtained.
The second benefit is related to the making of a democratic environment that enables civil society to be more involved in decision-making processes, and thus minimizing risks of confrontation with the governments.
The normative power approach seems to overlook this question by providing only a little concern regarding the global southAos Such relations between EU and IndonesiaAos CSOs will lead to the constitution of identity, which involves the construction of Aothe IAo and Aothe OtherAo (Diez, 2.
The normative power approach has overlooked the subjectivity of IndonesiaAos CSOs that has just reappeared in IndonesiaAos democratic transition processes.
Thus, the question of AoidentityAo should be addressed in a critical It is within this context the concept of AogovernmentalityAo is useful.
Foucault, for example, argues that certain norms that are imposed in a society are in fact an inseparable part of liberal governmentality, which recognizes that social fieldsAithe state, the market, and populationAiare heterogeneous spaces constituted in relation to multiple systems of power, networks of control, and strategies of resistance (Nadesan, 2008: .
The externality of the law was supplemented and replaced by the internality of AunormAyAi in which Foucault linked it with the relations of power to persuade society .
8: .
EUAos governmentality was also made possible by the decentralization and regional autonomy context that has been established in Indonesia since 1999.
7 Hadiz .
0: .
argued that For clearer explanations on Regional Autonomy and social development practices in Indonesia, see Hadiz .
Erb and Sulistyanto .
, or Carroll .
48 The Primacy of Civil Society the decentralization projects in Indonesia also were followed by some institutional changes, which were driven by external forces such as the World Bank and EU.
There were at least twelve institutional changes that occurred in Indonesia after the reformasi, including the establishment of the kabupaten and the kota, as the focal points of regional governance, and decentralization of powerAisuch as budgetingAito enable the kabupaten and kota government to manage their own resources.
Those changes also include the ability of local government .
to secure loans from the Special Allocation Grant (DAK) provided by the central government through which special regional initiatives could be funded .
0: 78-.
In his previous article.
Hadiz also argued that the decentralization scheme, which is advocated by external forces such as The World Bank and European Union created many contradictions, especially in political economic relations in local politics, which formed a new political hybrid of the old New Order oligarchy (Hadiz, 2.
Thus, it can be concluded that the actual basis of EUAos power is located within the implementation processes of development assistance programs instead of certain norms imposed on those From the perspective of AogovernmentalityAo, the way in which EU bases their power does not necessarily rely solely upon the promotion of AonormsAo but also in the way they engage with the community through aid giving practices, technical assistances, and more importantly international development programs funded by EU.
The manifestation of EUAos actual power, within this multifaceted approach, is the construction of Aopost-authoritarianAo Indonesian subjectivity that was built upon Civil SocietyAos involvement and governmentAos obedience to EUAos tight procedures.
Civil Society constitutes the technologies of the self and its role is central to EUAos governmentality processes.
The main goal of EUAos motivation, in this context, can be tracked down to its neoliberal approach that is embedded in Aogood governanceAo and decentralization politics that have been implemented in Indonesia since 1999.
Further studies are required to breakdown and delineate this neoliberal vision.
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Nevertheless, it is obvious that EUAos governmentality cannot be separated from the so-called Aoneoliberal development policyAo that has been a global consensus in post-Cold War world politics, even though it is operated in a softer manner.
Conclusion This article has analysed EUAos Civil Society Strengthening Programs in Indonesia and how it relates to the projection of EU governmentality in global politics.
Two conclusions could be First.
EUAos power in the developing countries, more specifically in Indonesia, operates through advocacy projects conducted by Civil Society Organizations.
In the Indonesian context, civil society organizationAos activities significantly improved after the reformasi served to guide the democratization process.
While the European Union believes in democracy as its fundamental norm, it assists the advocacy from Indonesian Civil Society Organizations through various financial grants.
It therefore constructs power relations between the AofundedAo donor programs with the EUAos democracy promotion agenda that is embedded in its foreign policy.
Second, the purpose of EU in giving incentives to those projects is not purely AonormativeAo.
Rather, it also contains particular political programs in the broader global context.
From the AugovernmentalityAy perspective, it can be concluded that EUAos Civil SocietyAos Strengthening Programs are also considered a tool to construct particular modes of subjectivity of IndonesiaAos Civil Society.
By analysing the strict procedures and prerequisites that EU apply in order to impose certain norms in its projects.
EUAos normative power is basically political.
This mode of governmentality, which has been practiced by EU in its emerging international development projects, has led to a shifting paradigm of power in International Relations that does not necessarily rely upon state AopowerAo, but also incorporates more complex techniques, tools, and strategies.
The case of EUAos engagement of civil society in Indonesia exemplifies this argument by reflecting the construction of EU power not only in 50 The Primacy of Civil Society traditional diplomatic or military strengths, but also in the practices of international development and democracy promotion.
Viewed from this perspective, this article has acquired two theoretical implications of the conceptualization of AopowerAo in global politics, particularly those related to the European Union and the AoGlobal SouthAo: First.
AopowerAo cannot be understood merely on its AomaterialAo or juridico-institutional basis, but also on its influence on the making of a particular society.
It is thus important to identify AopowerAo in diverse and multiple aspects.
Second, we need to consider aid giving practices, which are accessed by civil society organizations, as a strategy of AogovernmentalityAo that is constitutive to the construction of EUAos normative framework and political subjectivity in the global south.
With the essential help of civil society as the executor of such programs.
EU has been able thus to confront AostateledAo development policy and narrate Aogood governanceAoAiwhich is inherent in the neoliberal logic of developmentAias a framework of development through technical and financial assistances.
Therefore, we could conclude that EUAos Civil Society Strengthening Programs is also constitutive to the neoliberal development model as promoted by the European Union.
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References