Muslim Politics Review
Vol. 4 No. 2, 2025, 376-410
https://doi.org/10.56529/mpr.v4i2.512

When Religious Conservatism Intertwines with
Anti-Scientism: Friday Prayers in the Time of Corona in
Semarang, Indonesia
Wijayanto1, Muhammad Adnan1, Aniello Iannone1, Yanwar Pribadi2
1
Department of Politics and Government, Universitas Diponegoro,
Indonesia
2
Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII) & State Islamic
University (UIN) Sultan Maulana Hasanuddin Banten, Indonesia
Email: wijayanto@live.undip.ac.id
Abstract
This article discusses the implementation of Friday prayers during the
early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia. By examining the
contents of 67 Friday prayers’ sermons from 67 mosques in Semarang,
Central Java, in-depth interviews with ʿulamāʾ, and journalistic reports, we
argue that, firstly, a growing trend of religious conservatism influenced the
reasons behind the performance of Friday prayers. Secondly, most Islamic
preachers, mosque administrators, and religious leaders ignored
scientists’ advice on appropriate COVID-19 health protocols. Finally, there
was a sense of bewilderment at mosques, caused by poor communication
and ambiguous messages from the government and Islamic mass
organizations.
Keywords: Friday prayers; Covid-19 pandemic; religious conservatism;
anti-scientism

When Religious Conservatism…

Introduction

After the fall of Suharto’s New Order administration (1966-1998),
the socio-political state of affairs of post-New Order Indonesia has been
marked by the fascinating dynamics of democratization across the
country. In recent years, however, Indonesia has been deeply affected by
democratic decline,1 a turn towards greater illiberalism,2 and an increase
of religious nationalism3 that are influencing the quality of democracy and
the strength of civil society. In relation to the 2019 coronavirus disease
(COVID-19) pandemic, the Indonesian government struggled with
inconsistency to formulate and implement appropriate health, social
welfare, and other policies. Meanwhile, at the grassroots level, average
citizens were increasingly influenced by the views and behaviors of
religious leaders, who were seen by many as role models in facing the
pandemic, even though they often contradicted the appeals and
prohibitions aimed at reducing the spread of COVID-19.
Prominent Islamic preachers demonstrated a range of different
reactions to the COVID-19 protocols issued by scientists, the government,
and ʿulamāʾ (religious leaders) organizations, including the country’s top
Muslim clerical organization, the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis
Ulama Indonesia, MUI). On the one hand, some renowned puritan and
conservative preachers were among those who actively propagated
COVID-19 protocols, including Felix Siauw, Hanan Attaki, Adi Hidayat, and
Salim Fillah of Barisan Bangun Negeri (Country Building Front, an urbanbased Islamic movement focusing on socio-religious activism) Bachtiar
Nasir; and Aa Gym. On the other hand, Habib Luthfi and Gus Baha, two
respected and well-known traditional and moderate preachers of the
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, initially
seemed to ‘overlook’ the appeals, although in a later phase they shifted
1

Edward Aspinall, Fossati D, Muhtadi B and Warburton E, 2020, pp. 505–526; Thomas P. Power,
2018, pp. 307–338.
2
David M. Bourchier, 2015; Rachael Diprose, et al, 2019, pp. 691–712.
3
David M. Bourchier, 2015, pp. 713–733.

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their attitudes and supported the protocols. At the local level, the
differences between prominent Islamic preachers frequently generated
perplexities among lower-level preachers, mosque administrators, and
other religious elite who found themselves caught in the midst of
dissenting opinons, particularly in their decisions whether or not to hold
and attend Friday congregational prayers.
This article discusses the persistence of Islamic preachers, mosque
administrators, and religious leaders in holding and attending Friday
prayers during the early stages of the pandemic despite prohibitions on
social activities and appeals to follow COVID-19 health protocols from
various parties. We investigate the reasons why they ignored these
protocols, focusing on the early days of the pandemic (when it was only
rumoured that the virus had arrived in Indonesia) until the first weeks after
the official arrival of the virus in the country. We explore how men of
religion responded to the spread of the pandemic as reflected in the Friday
prayer sermons (khuṭbah). The retrieval of research data began on 28
February 2020 and continued every Friday until 3 April 2020 in 67
mosques located in nine of 16 randomly-chosen sub-districts in Semarang
City, the capital of Central Java Province. At each mosque, we recorded the
sermons, and subsequently examined their contents. In addition to the
sermon transcripts, we interviewed the preachers (khaṭīb) who delivered
the sermons as well as several ʿulamāʾ from different religious
organizations who had issued fatwā (non-binding religious opinions) on
the guidance of worship during the pandemic. Even though the mosque
administrators of the 67 mosques in question continued to hold Friday
prayers, not all sermons discussed the pandemic. We found that, in total,
preachers from only 31 of the 67 mosques discussed the pandemic.
Deeply impacted by democratic regression, there are three primary
areas which predetermined Indonesia’s poor handling of the COVID-19
pandemic. These three areas are rising religious conservatism, increasing
anti-scientism, and state actors’ recurring poor communication
performance and ambiguous messages. On the basis of materials
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When Religious Conservatism…

gathered from the field, along with a number of journalistic reports, we
argue that, firstly, there is a growing religious conservatism in Indonesia
that strongly influenced the reasons why Islamic preachers, mosque
administrators, and religious elite continued to hold and attend Friday
prayers during the pandemic. Secondly, these religious elites largely
ignored circulated scientific advice on health protocols on the basis of
religious grounds, indicating an increasing trend towards anti-scientism.
Thirdly, there was a sense of bewilderment among religious figures at
mosques, caused by poor communication and ambiguous messages from
the government and Islamic organizations on health protocols,
particularly at the local level. All in all, these ambiguous religious factors
and bureaucratic shortcomings signify that anti-scientism and
increasingly conservative forms of Islam have found channels in which
they can emerge and spread in contemporary Indonesia in the midst of
democratic decline.
In developing the argument, this article is organized into several
substantive sections. The next section provides a review of the relevant
scholarly literature and outlines the methodological approach that guides
the study. We then examine Indonesia’s national and local dynamics of the
pandemic, situating the country’s experience within its broader political
and socio-religious contexts. The subsequent sections analyze three key
thematic areas in greater depth, each illuminating different dimensions of
the country’s pandemic governance. Throughout the analysis, we contend
that these dynamics cannot be understood in isolation from the context of
ongoing democratic backsliding and the intensifying influence of
conservative Islamic currents, both of which significantly shaped
Indonesia’s inadequate and uneven response to the COVID-19 crisis. The
final section of the article presents the conclusion.

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Literature Review

Extensive studies on the spread of COVID-19 based on mathematical
models have been conducted in both high-income and low- and middleincome countries. Indeed, according to Rabajante (2020), the probability
that Indonesia had experienced infection long before it was formally
announced on 2 March 2020. This finding was confirmed by De Salazar et
al. (2020), who found that according to mathematical modeling, the virus
had arrived in Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia before the Indonesian
government made it known to the people.
In this research, the underlying assumption is that when someone is
infected with a virus, it is a biological event. However, in this work, the
important correlation is not the spread the illness, but the spread between
people even though they are aware that these risks exist. Indeed, how
individuals infect other people and when that illness becomes a global
pandemic is mostly due to human negligence in anticipating it.4 This
research analyzes the correlation between religious, in particular Islamic,
conservatism and anti-scientism.
Several studies show that anti-scientism is closely related to
religious conservatism. Durant,5 Gauchat,6 and Ellison and Musick7 argue
that religious conservatism is often correlated with an ‘attitude’ of antiscientism. This means the more religious people are, the more antiscientist they are. In this case, there is a kind of fear that science and
modernity will endanger human nature, that they negatively affect human
life and deviate from nature.
4

Romadhon, Dimas Iqbal. “Gagalnya Sistem Kesiapsiagaan Membawa Dunia pada Pandemi
COVID-19.”
The
Conversation,
2020,
https://theconversation.com/gagalnya-sistemkesiapsiagaan-membawa-dunia-pada-pandemi-covid-19-137613
5
Darrin Durant, “Who are you calling ‘anti-science’? How science serves social and political
agendas,” The Conversation, July 31th, 2020, https://theconversation.com/who-are-you-callinganti-science-how-science-serves-social-and-political-agendas-74755.
6
Gordon William Gauchat, 2008, pp. 337-357.
7
Christopher G. Ellison, and Musick MA, 1995, pp. 245–262.

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When Religious Conservatism…

Other scholars see anti-scientism in relation to government policy.
Suhay (2017), for instance, considers that anti-scientism occurs when
politicians and other political actors decide to discredit scientific
conclusions or bend the science to support certain policy positions. In this
case, politicians use science to justify the policies they design,
‘manipulating’ the methodological research findings of scientists.
In this article, anti-scientism is defined as tendencies among people
who hold anti-scientific views and do not accept science as an objective
method that can produce universal knowledge. Such individuals also
believe that scientific reductionism is an inherently limited means of
achieving an understanding of the complex world. In relation to religious
conservatism, science is considered as an anti-spiritual and materialistic
force that destroys traditional values, identity, and wisdom that support
reason. The basis for anti-scientific sentiment is often religious belief with
a literal interpretation of sacred texts. In this case, scientific theories that
conflict with what is considered to be divinely-inspired ‘science’ are
considered to be flawed (Holton, 1993; Miller et al., 2006).
In relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, anti-scientism can be
applied to the government, the ʿulamāʾ, and the people. In terms of the
government and ʿulamāʾ, they can be considered to have anti-scientific
views if their policies and appeals to the public are produced without
considering scientific research or attention is paid to scientists’ advice
only when the advice is treated as a justification for existing or
forthcoming policies and appeals. In terms of the public, people can be
considered to hold anti-scientism views if they, in addition to ignoring
science, see science as a threat to their ‘normal’ lives.
Methodology

This study employs a multi-layered qualitative research design to
examine the potential relationship between the use of Friday prayers as a
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Wijayanto, Adnan, Iannnone, Pribadi

vehicle for political communication—particularly anti-scientism
discourse—by puritanical-conservative Muslim preachers during the
initial and most critical stage of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia. The
research commenced with an extensive nationwide literature review, with
a specific focus on case studies relevant to the socioreligious dynamics of
Semarang.
To investigate the strategic deployment of Friday sermons as
instruments of political mass communication in opposition to the
Indonesian government’s science-based assessment of COVID-19
severity—despite formal restrictions on communal worship at the time—
the study conducted a qualitative content analysis of 67 Friday prayer
sermons (khuṭbah) delivered across nine mosques in Semarang. Data
collection was undertaken through direct audio recordings, during which
researchers participated as congregants (jama’ah). All recordings were
subsequently transcribed verbatim and systematically coded for thematic
analysis.
Complementing the sermon analysis, eight semi-structured
interviews were conducted with khaṭīb and ʿulamāʾ affiliated with two
major Muslim organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Indonesian
Ulama Council (MUI). These interviews contextualize the ideological,
institutional, and motivational factors shaping sermon content and to
capture the perspectives of influential religious authorities on the use of
Friday prayers as a site of political communication.
The integration of sermon transcripts and interviews enables a
critical examination of the mechanisms through which Friday prayers
functioned as a strategic communicative arena during the pandemic. By
centering the insights of NU leadership and comparing them with
observed sermon practices, the study elucidates the discursive,
organizational, and political dynamics underpinning the propagation of
puritanical-conservative narratives in Semarang during the pandemic’s
early phase.
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The COVID-19 Outbreak

Asian countries managed the COVID-19 pandemic through a variety
of approaches, some successfully and others less so. Arguably, Indonesia
can be placed in the latter category. Indonesia was one of the slowest
countries to respond to the pandemic and its overall management was
poor. Wariness about the potential for a pandemic could have begun when
news first emerged that a new virus had been found in China, as reported
on 31 December 2019 by Deutsche Welle8 and Reuters9. This news was
followed by reports that the virus had spread outside China on 20 January
2020 and arrived in Singapore on 23 January 2020, infecting hundreds of
Singaporeans.10 However, although other Southeast Asian countries had
begun to anticipate national outbreaks at this point, the Indonesian
government was convinced that the virus would not reach the country.11
At the end of January 2020, it was Pikiran Rakyat, a daily newspaper
based in Bandung, which reported that the pandemic had reached
Indonesia.12 The news amplified the statements of Indonesian parliaments
who voices their concerns over the credibility of the epidemiologists of the
Eijkman Molecular Biological Institute (LBM Eijkman), a major Indonesian
8

Deutsche Welle, “China investigates SARS-like virus as dozens struck by pneumonia.” DW,
December 31th, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/china-investigates-sars-like-virus-as-dozensstruck-by-pneumonia/a-51843861.
9
Reuters,“Chinese officials investigate cause of pneumonia outbreak in Wuhan,” Reuters.
December 31st, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-pneumonia/chineseofficials-investigate-cause-of-pneumonia-outbreak-in-wuhan-idUSKBN1YZ0GP.
10
Zhaki Abdullah and Hidayah Salamat, “Singapore confirms first case of Wuhan virus,” Channel
News Asia. January 23rd, 2020, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/ news/singapore/wuhanvirus-pneumonia-singapore-confirms-first-case-12312860.
11
Tim Lindsey and Tim Mann “Indonesia was in denial over coronavirus. Now it may be facing a
looming
disaster”
The
Conversation
Indonesina,
April
8,
2020
https://theconversation.com/indonesia-was-in-denial-over-coronavirus-now-it-may-be-facinga-looming-disaster-135436
12
Karima, Annisa, “Pemerintah diminta optimalkan LBM Eijkman demi cegah penyebaran virus
corona di Indonesia,” Pikiran Rakyat, January 29th, 2020, https://www.pikiranrakyat.com/nasional/pr-01335177/pemerintah-diminta-optimalkan-lbm-eijkman-demi-cegahpenyebaran-virus-corona-di-indonesia.

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research institute, who stated that Indonesia was very likely to already be
experiencing infections13.
If we look at the data, Indonesia is one of the countries with the worst
handling of the pandemic, even when compared to other members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Research conducted by
the Deep Knowledge Group on the level of national security (in relation to
the pandemic) placed Indonesia at number 97 out of the world’s 100
safest countries, far below other ASEAN countries such as Singapore (4),
Vietnam (2), Malaysia (30), Thailand (47), the Philippines (55), and
Myanmar (83).14
Since the first case was officially identified in Indonesia on 2 March
2020, the number of COVID-19 patients continued to increase. In
Semarang, by 17 April 2020, 46 medical workers at Kariadi Hospital were
reported to be affected by COVID-19.15 In addition, the percentage of
death in Semarang was in line with that of Central Java as a whole, with the
mortality rate reaching 8.43 percent by July 2020,16 much higher than the
national average of 5 percent and the global average of 4.72 percent.17

13

BBC Indonesia “Eijkman dilebur ke BRIN: Deteksi Covid-19 bisa ‘terganggu’, pengembangan
vaksin Merah Putih juga ‘terhambat “ 4 Jenuari 2022
14
Deep Knowledge Group, “COVID-19 regional safety assessment,” Deep Knowledge Group, 2020,
https://www.dkv.global/covid-regional-assessment.
15
Warta Ekonomi, “Miris! 46 tenaga medis RSUP Dr Kariadi Semarang positif corona gara-gara
pasien
bohong,”
Warta
Ekonomi,
April
17th,
2020,
https://www.wartaekono
mi.co.id/read281610/miris-46-tenaga-medis-rsup-dr-kariadi-semarang-positif-corona-garagara-pasien-bohong.
16
Eviyanti, “Angka kematian akibat COVID-19 di Jawa Tengah melonjak, lampaui angka nasional
dalam satu bulan,” Pikiran Rakyat, July 9th, 2020, https://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/nasional/pr01590963/angka-kematian-akibat-covid-19-di-jawa-tengah-melonjak-lampaui-angkanasional-dalam-satu-bulan.
17
Ochi Amanaturrosyidah, “Mortality rate due to Corona in Indonesia 5% higher than global,”
Kumparan, July 5th, 2020, https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/tingkat-kematian-akibatcorona-di-indonesia-5-lebih-tinggi-dariglobal1tkGAAughyV/full?shareID=yfBSPOgyQEhV&utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=whatsa
pp&utm_source=kumMobile.

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When Religious Conservatism…

These circumstances highlight the outbreak of COVID-19 in
Indonesia at the national level and the local level of Semarang. The next
three sections focus on three areas that highly influenced the state’s poor
handling of the pandemic: rising religious conservatism, increasing antiscientism, and recurring state actors’ poor communication and
ambiguous messages. Attention is focused on Semarang and the
implementation of Friday prayers by mosque administrators, the sermons
given by Islamic preachers, and the statements made by religious leaders.
Rising Religious Conservatism

Limited autonomous and strong civil society, frequent ethnic and
religious violence, and prevalent corruption, clientelism, populism, and
religious conservatism are among the crucial factors that have disrupted
the quality of democratization in Indonesia. Populism and religious
conservatism have become intertwined since the 2014 presidential
elections which resulted in the election of Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo. The
rising number and influence of supporters of these socio-political
phenomena has led to some observers categorizing the country as more
religiously conservative.18 One of the most critical incidents was the series
of 2016-2017 demonstrations around the Jakarta gubernatorial elections
by hard-liner Islamist groups that contributed to the defeat of the thenincumbent Chinese-Christian Governor of Jakarta, Basuki ‘Ahok’ Tjahaja
Purnama.19
In this article, religious conservatism is defined as tendencies among
certain religious individuals or groups which are characterized by a very
strict and literal understanding and application of certain sacred texts,
dogmas, or ideologies, as well as strong feelings about the importance of
preserving distinctions between certain religious groups. These beliefs are
18

Michael Davis, 2002, pp. 12–32.; Hadiz Vedi R., 2019, pp. 271–290.; Martin Van Bruinessen, 2013.
Hadiz Vedi R., Loc. cit.; Marcus Mietzner, Muhtadi B and Halida R, 2018, pp. 159–187.; Marcus
Mietzner and Muhtadi B, 2018, pp. 479–497.
19

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Wijayanto, Adnan, Iannnone, Pribadi

considered to ultimately lead to the purity of religion and the desire to
return to the ideal aspirations stated in the sacred texts. The rejection of
the diversity of opinions as applied to established dogmas and ideologies
as well as their interpretations, which are considered as basic religious
guidelines, often occurs due to such conservative tendencies.20 In relation
to the pandemic, religious conservatism was one of the most notorious
factors that hindered the efforts made by the government, scientists, and
religious organizations in implementing health protocols, especially in
relation to guidance on congregational worship.
As the capital city of Central Java Province, Semarang is one of
Indonesia’s major cities. The city has an area of 373.7 square kilometers
and a 2017 population of 1,729,426 people. Islam is the majority religion,
with 84.37 of the population identifying as Muslim.21 The large number of
Muslims in Semarang has resulted a larger number of mosques and small
mosques (mushala) than other places of worship, with 1,161 mosques and
1,151 mushala in 2015.22 In addition, there were 183 Islamic boarding
schools (pesantren) with 8,977 pupils (santri) in 2019.23 In terms of
Muslim typology, based on research conducted by the Alvara Research
Center in 2015, at least four categories of Muslims were documented in
Semarang, including cultural-moderate (50.5 percent), culturalconservative (19.1 percent), puritan-moderate (25.5 percent), and
puritan-conservative (4.8 percent).24
As in most other areas of Java, the Islamic aspects of Semarang are
also colored by hybrid cultural practices that maintain local Islamic
20

Bob Altemeyer and Hunsberger B, 1992, p. 113-133.; Bruce Hunsberger, 1995, pp. 113-129.;
Jonas R. Kunst, Thomsen L and Sam DL, 2014, pp. 337-348.
21
http://satudata.semarangkota.go.id/adm/file/20180925121717JumlahPendudukMenurutKeca
matandanAgamayangDianutdiKotaSemarang2017.pdf
22
https://jateng.bps.go.id/statictable/2016/08/19/1274/jumlah-tempat-peribadatan-menurutkabupaten-kota-di-provinsi-jawa-tengah-2015.html
23
https://ditpdpontren.kemenag.go.id/pdpp/statistik?id=33%205.%20Jumla
24
Alvara Research Center, “The Portrait of Urban Moslem: Gairah Religiusitas Masyarakat Kota,”
Alvara Rsearch Center, 2015.

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traditions, such as dugderan (religious festivities to welcome the holy
month of Ramadan),25 nyadran (annual religious activities manifested by
a pilgrimage to the graves of ancestors before the holy month of Ramadan
by bringing food),26 and suroan (traditional ceremonies welcoming the
Javanese new year).27 In addition, based on people’s preferences for
Islamic organizations, most Semarang citizens feel close to NU (58.8
percent), and thus many Islamic traditions in Semarang are closely related
to NU’s religious rituals, such as tahlilan (prayers performed on six
consecutive nights to facilitate a deceased person entering paradise) and
mauludan (the observance of the birthday of Prophet Muhammad,
commemorated in Rabīʿ al-ʾAwwal, the third month of the Islamic
calendar).28
Despite their cultural-moderate tendencies, their feeling of
closeness to NU as the guardian of sacred tradition by maintaining the four
maḏhab (Islamic schools of law) teachings, and their preferences in
preserving hybrid religious traditions, many Muslims in Semarang showed
a large degree of religious conservatism in terms of performing communal
Friday prayers during the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on our findings,
many preachers boldly stated that Friday prayers could not be performed
at home. Some preachers even incorrectly pointed to Wuhan, where the
pandemic is alleged to have first emerged, that Muslims in Wuhan were
not affected by COVID-19. For instance:
Friday prayers are mandatory for Muslim men. Friday prayers cannot be
performed at home. From the information I read, in Wuhan, China, the
people protected from this disease are those who take refuge in the house
of Allah. If we draw closer to Allah, Allah will help and protect us.29
25

Cahyono, 2018, p. 339-362.
Kastolani and Yusof A, 2016, p. 51-74.
27
Damar Safera and Huda MC, 2020, p. 66-79.
28
https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/52495/hasil-survei-588-muslim-kota-mengaku-nu
29
Sermon, 6 March 2020.
26

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In Indonesia, many early statements about the pandemic from
religious figures mentioned Wuhan. Among the first influential figures to
take up the topic was Ustadz Abdul Somad, a renowned conservative
preacher. He stated that coronaviruses are ‘soldiers of God’ sent to China
to defend Uyghur Muslims from oppression.30 Although he later shifted his
view, notably after receiving much criticism, this narrative affirmed the
views already held by many Muslims. It was not only Ustadz Abdul Somad
who initially downplayed the threat of the virus, with other famous
preachers who are considered more moderate very strong in voicing
similar opinions. For example, Habib Luthfi bin Yahya, a respected sufi
guru and NU preacher, stated that the pandemic would not affect
Indonesian Muslims. Habib Luthfi was so convinced of this that on 20
March 2020, he organized a congregation called Pengajian Kliwonan at
his residence in Pekalongan, Central Java; the event was attended by
thousands of people from all over Java. Habib Luthfi boldly sent a clear
message to Indonesian Muslims that the pandemic should not prevent
them from normal activities, especially praying.31 Despite this, he later
changed his mind and supported the government’s health protocols on
social distancing and partial lockdown.
What was common in the contents and tones of the preachers was
that many of them related the pandemic to people’s sins, suggesting that
people must repent in order to avoid COVID-19. This belief is closely
related to theological fatalism, a philosophical doctrine that emphasizes
the conquest of all events or actions for fate or destiny32, and is generally
30

Adib Auliawan Herlambang, “Ustaz Abdul Somad: Virus korona merupakan tentara Allah
melindungi
Muslim
Uighur,”
Ayo
Semarang,
February
29th,
2020,
https://www.ayosemarang.com/read/2020/02/29/52975/ustaz-abdul-somad-virus-koronamerupakan-tentara-allah-melindungi-muslim-uighur.
31
Radar Pekalongan, “Habib Luthfi: Waspadai bahaya syirik karena corona,” Radar Pekalongan,
March 20th, 2020. https://radarpekalongan.co.id/100598/habib-luthfi-waspadai-bahaya-syirikkarena-corona/.
32
Hunt, David P. 1998

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When Religious Conservatism…

associated with the view that humans are powerless to do anything other
than what they actually do and that they do not have the power to
influence the future or even the results of their own actions.
The calamity that befell the people of Moses now repeats again. Although
not similar, the disaster now comes in the form of the coronavirus. It turns
out that the calamity occurs because many people are arrogant. Therefore,
Allah reminds us so that we all will immediately realize and return to the
path of Allah before Allah inflicts more terrible disasters.33

Conservative beliefs also include the glorification of the Islamic past.
Mohammed Ayoob suggests that the reappropriation of the past and the
‘invention of tradition’ in terms of a romanticized idea of a largely mythical
golden age, lies at the heart of the instrumentalization of Islam.34 It is
exactly the invention of tradition that provides the tools for dehistoricizing Islam and separating it from the various contexts. As a result
of this glorification, many Muslims in Indonesia are now also influenced by
the growing global trend of religious conservatism that has appeared as a
challenge to liberal democracy.35
During the pandemic, the government relied upon MUI, NU,
Muhammadiyah, and other leading Islamic organizations to convey its
messages and support its missions36. What we find in the field, however,
indicates that these organizations were largely unable to persuade their
followers to obey COVID-19 health protocols. This occurred for several
reasons, such as the limited clarity of the messages, the difference of
knowledge between leaders and followers, and the difference of local
circumstances in each area.
33

Sermon, 20 March 2020.
Mohammed Ayoob, 004, pp. 1-14.
35
Diego Fossati, 2019, pp. 119-148.
36
Aisyah Putri Rahvy and Ilham Akhsanu Ridlo, 2021
34

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In sum, preachers’ sermons during the pandemic were primarily
encouragements for people to keep up their usual prayer practices.
Religious doctrines causing religious conservatism played a significant
part in terms of influencing the public to perform congregational prayers
during the pandemic. Therefore, as religion plays a significant role in many
countries around the world, any strategy being pursued to contain and end
the COVID-19 pandemic (and any future pandemics) must be developed
in close consultation with religious leaders to ensure that the
implementation will be effective. Otherwise, as the findings above show, it
is not uncommon for religious leaders and state officials to utilize religious
appeals and rhetoric to convey certain perspectives, even if they are
flawed, contradictory, or simply inaccurate.37
Increasing Anti-Scientism

Studies show that anti-scientism is closely related to religious
conservatism. This is evident in the works of Durant,38 Gauchat,39 and
Ellison and Musick.40 The essence of their argument is that religious
conservatism is often correlated with anti-scientism attitudes. This means
that the more religious people are, the more anti-scientism they are. They
fear that science and modernity will endanger human nature.
Other scholars see anti-scientism in relation to government policy.
Suhay, for instance, views that anti-scientism occurs when politicians and
other political actors decide to discredit science in which a conclusion is
37

Alexander Arifianto, and Jonathan Chen, “An uneasy partnership? Islam and the COVID—19
response
in
Indonesia,”
The
LSE
Religion
and
Global
Society,
2020,
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/religionglobalsociety/2020/05/an-uneasy-partnership-islam-and-thecovid-19-response-in-indonesia/. Accessed on June 21th 2020.
38
Darrin Durant, “Who are you calling ‘anti-science’? How science serves social and political
agendas,” The Conversation, July 31th, 2020, https://theconversation.com/who-are-you-callinganti-science-how-science-serves-social-and-political-agendas-74755.
39
Gordon William Gauchat, 2008, pp. 337-357.
40
Christopher G. Ellison, and Musick MA, 1995, pp. 245–262.

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When Religious Conservatism…

based or bend the science to support their policy position.41 In this case,
politicians use science to justify the policies they design and ‘manipulate’
methodological research findings that.
In this article, anti-scientism is defined as tendencies among people
who hold anti-scientific views and do not accept science as an objective
scientific method that can produce universal knowledge. Such individuals
also believe that scientific reductionism is an inherently limited means of
achieving an understanding of the complex world. In relation to religious
conservatism, science is considered as an anti-spiritual and materialistic
force that destroys traditional values, identity, and wisdom that support
reason. The basis for anti-scientific sentiment that often arises is religious
belief with a literal interpretation of sacred texts. In this case, scientific
theories that conflict with what is considered to be ‘divinely-inspired’
science are considered to be flawed.42
In relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, anti-scientism can be taken
up by the government, the ʿulamāʾ, and the people. In terms of the
government and the ʿulamāʾ, they can be considered to have antiscientific views if their policies and appeals are produced without
considering scientific research or if they pay attention to scientists’ advice
only when the advice is treated as a justification to already-formulated
policies and appeals. Meanwhile, the public can be regarded to hold on to
anti-scientific views if they, in addition to ignoring science, see science as
a threat to their ‘normal’ life before the pandemic.
Semarang is known as a city which it is relatively free from socioreligious conflicts. One of the likely reasons behind this is the preservation
of the local tradition of srawung. Srawung is a meeting held by more than
one person or group with the aim of building a feeling of togetherness.
Therefore, harmonious relations between different communities in
41

Elizabeth Suhay, 2017.
Gerald James Holton, 1993; Jon D. Miller, Scott Eugenie Corol and Okamoto Shinji, 2006, pp.
765-766.
42

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Wijayanto, Adnan, Iannnone, Pribadi

Semarang are maintained43 and that people have a medium to express
their communal concerns.
However, our field work findings from Semarang show that during
the pandemic, many preachers firmly used anti-scientism jargon in their
sermons by referring to fatwā of Islamic mass organizations. The
communal meeting of srawung lost its importance because people did not
discuss the pandemic in the meetings.
Prior to today’s sermon assignment, I had already informed the mosque
administrators about the MUI fatwā. In fact, I also shared a video by ʿulamāʾ
about Friday prayers. There is also a wise view of the NU which considers
that as long as the area has not been classified by the red or dangerous
zone, Friday prayers can still be held, as long as the congregation is told to
wash their hands first. We also need to tell [worshippers] about physical
distancing by instructing them to bring their own prayer mat.44

The above sermon shows that the preacher was aware of the MUI
fatwā (this fatwā is described in a later section) on congregational worship
during the pandemic. However, he used a more ambiguous NU fatwā (also
described in a later section) to justify his decision for the mosque to
continue holding Friday prayers. Nevertheless, we were unable to identify
any official information about which areas of Semarang were defined as
green or red zones on 27 March 2020 when the relevant Friday prayers
were held.
The same tone was present in another sermon, which also ignored
scientific advice and was highly influenced by religious conservatism:

43
44

Stefanus Wawan Setiawan and Sibarani R, 2021, p. 194-204.
Sermon, 27 March 2020.

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When Religious Conservatism…

Pandemic disease is a disease that spreads throughout the country. Now
COVID-19 attacks almost 182 countries. In Indonesia alone, there are
around 600 people who are infected, and around 50 people who have died.
But the situation is extraordinary; we are not afraid of the devil, but we are
very afraid of this tiny virus. We abandon the congregational prayers. Why
do we abandon congregational prayers? Why do we trust COVID-19 more
than Allah? This is the house of Allah (the mosque). This is not the place
where we will be infected by the virus.45

From the scientific point of view of global health, a pandemic is not a
natural event but is rather caused by the failure to apply a pandemic
preparedness system from the beginning. The underlying assumption is
that when someone is infected with a virus, it is a biological event.
However, how they infect other people and when the infection transforms
into a global pandemic, is mostly due to human negligence in
anticipation.46 The above sermon clearly shows that the preacher was
aware that the outbreak was already in hundreds of countries, including
Indonesia, yet nevertheless neglected to share the danger with his
congregation.
The probability that the pandemic had already arrived in Indonesia
long before the government announced it is strengthened by Jomar F.
Rabajante’s research, which used mathematical modelling to show that
Indonesia had already been affected by COVID-19 as early as the
beginning of 2020.47 This finding was confirmed by research result from
De Salazar, Niehus, Taylor, Buckee, and Lipsitch, who also found that
according to mathematical modelling, the virus had arrived in Singapore,

45

Sermon, 27 March 2020.
Dimas Iqbal Romadhon, “Gagalnya sistem kesiapsiagaan membawa dunia pada pandemi
COVID-19,”
The
Conversation,
2020,
https://theconversation.com/gagalnya-sistemkesiapsiagaan-membawa-dunia-pada-pandemi-covid-19-137613.
47
Jomar Rabajante, “Insights from early mathematical models of 2019-Ncov acute respiratory
disease (COVID-19) dynamics,” Arxiv, 2020, https://arxiv.org/abs/ 2002.05296.
46

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Wijayanto, Adnan, Iannnone, Pribadi

Thailand, and Indonesia before the Indonesian government made it known
to the public.48
Since the government initially neglected scientific reports on the
spread of the virus, it is not surprising that the majority of Indonesian
citizens followed the same path and denied scientific advice on health
protocols. Anti-scientific attitudes in Semarang show that the
government, ʿulamāʾ, and the public all often ignored scientific views and
tended to follow conservative religious views. If conservative religious
views conflict with scientific views, then conservative religious views are
usually followed. In the case of COVID-19, this mean that many members
of the public did not follow the recommendations of scientists and the
government’s health protocols.
Recurring Poor Communication and Ambiguous Messages

One of the important findings from this study is the ignorance of
many Islamic preachers and lower-level ʿulamāʾ in complying with the
health protocols due to ambiguous and indecisive messages disseminated
by the government that confuse the wider public. The Indonesian
government’s pattern of communication in the case of the pandemic is
characterized by denial, undermining, lack of responsiveness, lack of
coordination, lack of consistency, lack of transparency, and lack of
accuracy.49
In crisis communication theory, before a crisis occurs—the ‘pre-crisis
stage’—communication is key to provide initial knowledge to and raise
awareness with the public about the upcoming crisis, so that the public
understands and is prepared when the outbreak arrives.50 However, in the
48

Pablo M De Salazar, Niehus R, Taylor A, Buckee C and Lipsitch M, “Using predicted imports of
2019-nCov cases to determine locations that may not be identifying all imported cases,” In
MedRxiv: The Preprint Server for Health Sciences, (2020).
49
Wijayanto et al, 2021.
50
Barbara Reynolds and Seeger MW, 2005, pp. 43–55.

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When Religious Conservatism…

case of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indonesian government failed to
provide adequate initial knowledge and preparation. The government’s
poor communication during this phase—which primarily focused on
denying and undermining—reflected the government’s lack of
responsiveness when the pandemic first emerged; this continued until the
government was finally forced to admit that the pandemic had spread
because people tested positive to COVID-19 after initially being diagnosed
with other illnesses.51 Based on our findings and journalistic reports, it is
clear that the Semarang government was equally ignorant as the central
government in the way they neglected the importance of clear and bold
public communication, by failing to inform the people about safe zones
and the danger of joining public prayers.
The ambiguous, unclear, and inconsistent government messages
and poor communication caused confusion and misunderstanding among
the general public. As a result, many Islamic preachers did not know that
performing Friday prayers during the pandemic was risky. At one mosque,
for instance, a preacher insisted that government’s messages were
unclear:
The connection with this problem (the pandemic) is real due to the lack of
socialization by the government. Why are there many people who conduct
Friday prayers? It is because the people feel safe due to the absence of
people who are affected by the disease. Obeying the government can be
realized by carrying your own prayer mat and bringing hand sanitizer. We
are already aware of the danger of coronavirus, that is why I am very careful
about that.52

51

Joshua Nevett “ Coronavirus: I watched the president reveal I had Covid-19 on TV” 6 May 2020
BBC https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52501443
52
Sermon, 3 April 2020/

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The ignorance shown by Islamic preachers in responding to the
pandemic in Indonesia was in line with the perception of state leaders. The
footprint of the Indonesian government’s denial and neglect can be
documented as follows. On 27 January 2020, President Jokowi expressed
his optimism that the virus would not be detected in Indonesia, although
this statement was unfortunately not accompanied by a serious effort to
conduct widespread testing.53 When the World Health Organization and
Harvard University criticized these comments and said that the virus could
have arrived in Indonesia but was undetected due to the lack of ability of
the government to test, then-Minister of Health was angry and regarded it
as an insult.54
Next, the Minister of Transportation even joked that Indonesians
were immune to the virus because they liked nasi kucing (small portions of
rice with side dishes).55 Just one month later, the minister himself
contracted COVID-19, becoming case #76 and the highest-level
government official to be struck down by the virus at that point in time.56
Even the Head of the National Disaster Management Agency made a
statement that Indonesia was free of the virus because the citizens liked
to drink jamu (herbal medicine), and suggested that herbal medicine
should be more strongly promoted because of this.57 The tone of denial

53

Esthi Maharani, “Jokowi: Virus corona tak terdeteksi di Indonesia,” Republika, January 27th,
2020, https://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/q4r2pi335/jokowi-virus-corona-tak-terdeteksi-diindonesia.
54
Ihsanuddin, “Menkes: Ahli Harvard suruh ke sini, lihat langsung alat deteksi corona,” Kompas,
February 11th, 2020, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/02/11/ 17080231/menkes-ahliharvard-suruh-ke-sini-lihat-langsung-alat-deteksi-corona?page=all.
55
Andri Saubani, “Kelakar Menhub: Kita kebal corona karena doyan nasi kucing,” Republika
February 17th, 2020, https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/ 20/02/17/q5ul4k409kelakar-menhub-kita-kebal-corona-karena-doyan-nasi-kucing.
56
The Jakarta Post, “BREAKING: Indonesian transportation minister tests positive for COVID-19”,
March 14th, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/03/14/breaking-indonesiantransportation-minister-tests-positive-for-covid-19.html
57
Sania Mashabi, “Indonesia masih aman dari virus corona, kepala BNPB: Apa mungkin karena
sering
minum
jamu?”
Kompas,
February
24th,
2020,

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When Religious Conservatism…

and neglect was also conveyed by then-Vice President Ma’ruf Amin, when
at the end of February 2020 he stated that Indonesia was free of the virus
because the citizens were fond of reading the qunut nazilah (a special
prayer to get rid of dangerous diseases) during dawn prayers.58
We found empirical evidence that the equally poor communication
performance of the central government was followed by the Semarang
government. On 26 February 2020, media reported that a COVID-19
suspected patient was being treated at Semarang’s Kariadi Hospital, the
largest hospital in Central Java.59 At that time, coverage suggesting that
COVID-19 had arrived in Indonesia began appearing in the media.
However, in the same tone as the central government, the Semarang
government did not confirm the spread of the illness; as a result, the
patient—who later died of COVID-19—was not officially recognized as the
first case in Indonesia. Even after Jokowi’s official announcement of the
outbreak in early March, the Semarang government did not hesitate to
give permission to a cruise ship carrying foreign passengers to dock in
Semarang.60 Despite the local government’s claim that the passengers of
the cruise had undergone medical checks, one passenger was in fact
hospitalized due to lung-related illness.61
The Semarang government announced the city’s first official case of
COVID-19 on 15 March 2020. Two days later, it was reported that a patient
had tested positive then subsequently died had already been hospitalized
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/02/24/12141771/indonesia-masih-aman-dari-viruscorona-kepala-bnpb-apa-mungkin-karena-sering.
58
Adhi M Daryono, “Ma’ruf Amin: Banyak kiai baca doa qunut, corona minggir dari Indonesia,”
Kumparan, February 28th, 2020, https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/maruf-amin-banyakkiai-baca-doa-qunut-corona-minggir-dari-indonesia-1svX6HuXHFB/full.
59
Angling Adhitya Purbaya, “Pasien suspek corona meninggal, ini kata RS Kariadi Semarang,”
Detik, 25 February 25th, 2020, https://health.detik.com/berita-detikhealth/d-4914369/pasiensuspek-corona-meninggal-ini-kata-rs-kariadi-semarang.
60
https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/03/14/06330871/ribuan-turis-asing-kapal-pesiarcolumbus-boleh-turun-di-semarang-ini?page=all
61
https://www.liputan6.com/regional/read/4201694/satu-penumpang-kapal-pesiar-dirawatdi-rs-semarang-night-carnival-2020-ditunda

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Wijayanto, Adnan, Iannnone, Pribadi

for 10 days, meaning that the patient might have been exposed to COVID19 as early as 7 March 2020, or even earlier due to COVID-19’s long
incubation period.62 Nevertheless, the Semarang government only made
its first official appeals on its website for the public to follow health
protocols on 15 March 2020.
Based on data gathered from various sources, as of 26 March 2020,
at least 46,018 people departed Jakarta to return home to various towns
in Central Java. This was because Jakarta was severely affected by the
pandemic since the first official case was announced on 2 March 2020.
However, as of 29 March 2020, unlike Jakarta, the local government of
Semarang did not have a proper pandemic monitoring system that
mapped the distribution of people with suspected or diagnosed COVID-19
at the level of urban neighborhoods (kelurahan). Not only was the data
incomplete, but the COVID-19 website of the Semarang government also
frequently malfunctioned.
In line with the poor communication and ambiguous messages of the
central and local governments, many Islamic mass organizations shared
the same attitude. The government heavily relied on these organizations
to assist the fight against COVID-19: Jokowi appealed to Islamic mass
organizations early on in the pandemic, in the expectation that they would
encourage their congregations to practice social distancing and would
discourage participation in large-scale religious gatherings.63 While many
Islamic leaders largely complied with the central government’s directive,
the situation was not so clear-cut with the country’s major Islamic
organizations, including MUI, NU, and Muhammadiyah. For example, the
state depended on MUI’s statements to convince the public to worship
62

Angling Adhitya Purbaya, “1 pasien positif corona meninggal di RS Kariadi Semarang hari ini,”
Detik, March 17th, 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-tengah/d-4942759/1-pasienpositif-corona-meninggal-di-rs-kariadi-semarang-hari-ini/1.
63
Alexander and Jonathan Chen “An Uneasy Partnership? Islam and the COVID—19 Response in
Indonesia”
May 2020
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/religionglobalsociety/2020/05/an-uneasypartnership-islam-and-the-covid-19-response-in-indonesia/

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When Religious Conservatism…

safely during the pandemic, while MUI relied on the state in determining
which areas were considered ‘safe’ for congregational worship; this
resulted in ambiguous appeals and prohibitions that, in turn, created
confusion among Islamic preachers, mosque administrators, and religious
leaders, impacting their decision making on whether to hold and attend
Friday prayers.
On 17 March 2020, MUI issued a fatwā on the obligation for Muslims
to observe prayer rituals under the circumstances of a pandemic. They
stated that Muslims were not obliged to perform Friday prayers in regions
that were considered ‘too risky’. However, Muslims were still encouraged
to do so in regions that were considered ‘safe’. The fatwā did not specify
which areas were deemed ‘safe’ or ‘risky’, thus allowing for arbitrary
interpretations and a lack of serious attempts at enforcement.64 NU also
issued a fatwā on what steps should be taken when facing the pandemic,
stating that during a pandemic, Muslims could forego praying in mosques,
and added that individuals who had been tested positive with COVID-19
were banned from attending congregational prayers and must stay at
home. Yet at the same time, NU also advised Muslims living in areas where
COVID-19 was considered to be under control to join Friday prayers. All
these fatwā, however, did not consider the weak capacity of both the
central and provincial governments in conducting mass and rapid testing.
Therefore the definition of ‘red’ (‘risky’) or ‘green’ (‘safe’) zones remained
unclear, further complicating the already-ambiguous fatwā.65 As a result,
many lower-level Islamic preachers in Semarang misunderstood the
messages of these organizations’ fatwā.
An interview with a top leader of the Central Java NU chapter
identifies the poor communication and ambiguous messages of the

64

Alexander Arifianto and Jonathan Chen, Loc. cit.
Syafiq Hasyim, Covid-19, “Islamic civil society and state capacity in Indonesia,” ISEAS Perspective
39,
2020,
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ISEASPerspective
_2020_39.pdf.
65

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Wijayanto, Adnan, Iannnone, Pribadi

government and Islamic mass organizations as being a key source of the
confusion:
Indeed, there are those who praise our decision and some who criticize. We
issued a fatwā for the mosque to hold Friday prayers in kelurahan that
appeared as green and yellow zones. We have not been able to expressly
forbid Friday prayers because the government itself has not yet made a firm
decision. Unfortunately, there is no information on the government
website about which areas are included in the green zone and which areas
are included in the red zone.66

This interview reflects that there was a serious communication
problem between the central government and religious leaders. This
regional NU leader believed that the government failed to provide a clear
and firm message whether or not Friday prayers could be performed at the
mosque. He also pointed towards the unavailability of updated Semarang
COVID-19 data on the government’s website. Nevertheless, the top
regional NU leader in Central Java insisted that Friday prayers must be
performed at the mosque. Furthermore, he was convinced that Central
Java NU’s fatwā scientifically-based. In this regard, it is clear that poor
communication performances go hand in hand with anti-scientific
attitudes, as in Semarang (and also possibly in many other parts of
Indonesia), many Muslims without adequate religious education
backgrounds were left in limbo, trying to decide who and what to follow
because they were in constant search of religious conformity and
knowledge.67

66
67

Interview, 29 March 2020.
Yanwar Pribadi, 2020, p.229.

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When Religious Conservatism…

Conclusion

This article has investigated why certain Islamic preachers, mosque
administrators, and religious leaders in Semarang, Indonesia, held and
attended Friday prayers despite COVID-19 health protocols issued or
spread by scientists, the government, and Islamic organizations. We
demonstrated, that, firstly, a rising religious conservatism in Indonesia
strongly influenced Islamic preachers, mosque administrators, and
religious leaders to continue holding and attending Friday prayers in the
time of the pandemic. Secondly, religious elite practiced anti-scientism,
ignoring widespread scientists’ advice and government health protocols
due to religious reasons. Thirdly, there was confusion among the wider
public caused by poor communication and ambiguous messages delivered
by the government and Islamic organizations on health protocols,
particularly at the local level, including in Semarang.
Despite showing their cultural-moderate characteristics, feelings of
closeness to NU’s religious rituals and thoughts, and a predilection in
preserving local Islamic traditions, many Muslims in Semarang now show
a large degree of religious conservatism and anti-scientism. Our findings
confirm this state of affairs. This trend towards religious conservatism is
influencing the way people think about science, including ignoring the
dangers of COVID-19 during the peak of the pandemic by continuing to
hold and attend congregational prayers. The COVID-19 situation
deteriorated because the Semarang and central governments and Islamic
organizations disseminated ambiguous, unclear, and inconsistent
messages and failed to properly communicate, resulting in
misunderstanding amongst the residents of Semarang.
These findings resonate with recent developments of religious
configuration in the middle of democratic decline in Indonesia. Our
arguments show that Islamic preachers, mosque administrators, and
religious leaders held and attended congregational prayers despite
COVID-19 health protocols from scientists, the government, and Islamic
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Wijayanto, Adnan, Iannnone, Pribadi

organizations because they were deeply influenced by strong religious
factors, a tendency to neglect science, and the poor and ambiguous
communication of the government and Islamic organizations. The
continuance of Friday prayers during the pandemic was in line with the
shift in religious thought and expression in line with conservative forms of
Islam that are widespread in contemporary Indonesia, influencing how
people hold on to religious reasoning.
The three areas we have explored in this article expose the inability
of the Indonesian government and Islamic mass organizations to succeed
against strong conservative religious factors and anti-scientism, even
during the COVID-19 pandemic. This severely damaged the country’s
health sector, both prior and during the pandemic. Certainly, the
pandemic revealed the weakness of many socio-economical-culturalpolitical systems in Indonesia, even the simple religious ritual of Friday
prayers.

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