Al-Jāmi‘ah: Journal of Islamic Studies - ISSN: 0126-012X (p); 2356-0912 (e)
Vol. 57, no. 1 (2019), pp.1-24, doi: 10.14421/ajis.2019.571.1-24

MUHAMMADIYAH’S MODERATION STANCE
IN THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTION
Critical Views from Within
Haedar Nashir; Zuly Qodir; Achmad Nurmandi; Hasse Jubba;
Mega Hidayati
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia
email: haedarnashir@umy.ac.id
Abstract
This study focuses on the way in which Muhammadiyah, one of Indonesia’s
largest Islamic organizations, stood in the 2019 General Election. Like its
counterpart Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah has marked the moderation
of Islam in Indonesia, different from Islam elsewhere in the Middle East.
Since its establishment, Muhammadiyah has urged its members not to join
any specific political party, but rather to take a moderate position in political
pragmatism and support patriotism in broader national interest. Likewise,
in the 2019 election, Muhammadiyah did not organizationally support any
candidates, citing its “middle way” approach. However, this study identifies
a dualism in the political attitudes of Muhammadiyah’s elites. Even without
official orders or prohibitions from the central leadership, some Muhammadiyah
members got involved and carried their organization’s attributes to support
certain candidates, resulting in political division within the organization.
Some members of the organization took a clear political stance, whereas
others remain neutral. This created tension within the organization in both
elite and grass-root level. The main data for this study were collected through
interviews, unstructured discussions, and focus group discussions with several
Muhammadiyah elites.
[Artikel ini melihat posisi yang diambil salah satu organisasi Islam terbesar
di Indonesia, Muhammadiyah, dalam Pemilu 2019. Bersamaan dengan

Haedar Nashir et al.

Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah menjadi penanda moderasi Islam
di Indonesia yang berbeda dengan Islam di tempat lain. Sejak didirikan,
Muhammadiyah telah menandaskan untuk tidak berafiliasi dengan partai
politik tertentu, tetapi mengambil posisi moderat dalam perpolitikan
dan mendukung patriotisme demi kepentingan nasional yang lebih luas.
Demikian juga, dalam Pemilu 2019, Muhammadiyah secara resmi tidak
mendukung calon mana pun berdasarkan konsep “jalan tengah”. Namun,
penelitian ini mengidentifikasi adanya dualisme dalam sikap politik para elit
Muhammadiyah. Tidak adanya perintah atau larangan resmi dari pusat,
banyak anggota Muhammadiyah yang membawa atribut organisasi dan
terlibat aktivitas politik serta mendukung kandidat tertentu. Ini berakibat
munculnya keterbelahan politik dalam Muhammadiyah. Beberapa anggota
mengambil sikap politik yang jelas, sedangkan yang lain tetap netral. Ini
menimbulkan ketegangan dalam organisasi, baik di tingkat elit maupun akar
rumput. Data utama untuk penelitian ini dikumpulkan melalui wawancara,
diskusi tidak terstruktur, dan diskusi kelompok terfokus dengan beberapa
elit Muhammadiyah.]
Keywords: Indonesian general election, Muhammadiyah, Islamic politics,
Islamic movement
A. Introduction
Muhammadiyah, as Indonesia’s second-largest Islamic organization
after Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), has become a major force in Indonesian
society.1 These two organizations have worked to develop a moderate
understanding of Islam in the country.2 Established on November 18,
1912, Muhammadiyah has survived because of its solidarity, extensive
networks, and activities in the fields of education, health, and poverty
alleviation.3 Nonetheless, its political involvement is reflected more in
1

Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
2
Alpha Amirrahman, Andar Nubowo, and Azaki Khoirudin (eds.), Islam
Berkemajuan untuk Peradaban Dunia: Refleksi dan Agenda Muhammadiyah ke Depan (Bandung:
Mizan, 2015), p. 23.
3
Mitsuo Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the
Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town, c.1910s-2010, 2nd edition (Singapore:

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national politics than in political parties.4
Alfian mentions that Muhammadiyah is a non-political movement
and as such it must be distinguished from organizations that make politics
their profession. It tries not to involve itself in politics directly and
openly. Previously, Muhammadiyah had been involved in such political
movements as Syarikat Islam and Parmusi, with its political role being
determined by a sort of situational logic.5 In the 1955 General Election,
Muhammadiyah was part of the Masjumi Party.6
Muhammadiyah has long been assumed to follow a “middle way”
in its political activities, not prohibiting members from being active in
political parties but also not encouraging such membership. This reflects
Muhammadiyah’s moderate view towards its members. Muhammadiyah
remains political, but is not about which not a political party the members
should join and, in other words, it does not support a particular political
party.7 It instead concentrates its activities on national politics for the
sake of a broader national interest in keeping the unity and harmony
of the nation.8 Nonetheless, there has been a ‘tug of war’ between
Muhammadiyah members who desire political participation and those
who do not.
B. Muhammadiyah’s Political Involvement
Although Muhammadiyah has not always been politically active,
its contributions to Indonesian Islamic thought and movement have
ISEAS Publising, 2012), p. 175; Robin Bush, A Snapshot of Muhammadiyah Social Change
and Shifting Markers of Identity and Values, Working Paper, no. 221 (Singapore: Asia
Research Institute, NUS, 2014), p. 3.
4
Saleh Partaonan Daulay and Abd. Rohim Ghazali (eds.), Muhammadiyah dan
Politik Islam Inklusif: 70 tahun Ahmad Syafii Maarif (Jakarta: Maarif Institute for Culture
and Humanity, 2005), p. 35.
5
Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The political behavior of a Muslim modernist organization under
Dutch colonialism (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989), p. 169.
6
Syaifullah, Gerak Politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1997).
7
Zuly Qodir, Achmad Nurmandi, and M. Nurul Yamin (eds.), Ijtihad Politik
Muhammadiyah: Politik sebagai Amal Usaha (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar & Jusuf Kalla
School of Government, 2015), pp. 133–43.
8
Suaidi Asyari, ‘Gerakan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia’, Miqot:
Jurnal Ilmu-ilmu Keislaman, vol. 35, no. 2 (2011), pp. 295–313.

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Haedar Nashir et al.

been significant.9 The organization’s involvement in shaping the state is
also apparent.10 Muhammadiyah members, who are spread throughout
Indonesia—even in rural areas of Java—seem to concentrate more on
developing moderate and progressive Islamic da’wah activities.11
Muhammadiyah claims to have 25 million members, 10,000 schools
and kindergartens, 174 universities, and 5000 hospitals. As such, since its
establishment in 1912, Muhammadiyah has shown significant concern
for education, health, and human development.12
Muhammadiyah’s considerable size has attracted many politicians
and political parties. However, given the organization’s focus on nonpolitical activities, members who become active in practical politics do
not officially use Muhammadiyah attributes; this was seen, for example, in
the 2019 General Election. Although, Muhammadiyah members are seen
as using a particular party—the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat
Nasional)—to channel Muhammadiyah’s organizational aspirations,
the organization has still clearly distinguished between members’ roles
as members and their political activities by not expressly supporting a
presidential candidate in the 2019 General Election.
Between 2016 and 2018, Indonesian national politics were shaken
by three large demonstrations protesting purportedly blasphemous
statements made by Jakarta’s incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaya
Purnama (Ahok) in the lead-up to the Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. The
first action, held at City Hall in October 2016, did not draw widespread
public attention. However, the second and third actions—labelled ‘Aksi
Bela Islam’ (Actions to Defend Islam), but popularly known as the 411
9

M. Syafi’i Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah kajian politik tentang
cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), pp. 119–25; Bahtiar Effendy,
Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Gagasan dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta:
Paramadina, 1998), pp. 79–84.
10
Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi tentang Pecaturan
dalam Konstituante (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi
dan Sosial, 1985), pp. 179–95.
11
Ahmad Najib Burhani, Muhammadiyah Berkemajuan: Pergeseran dari Puritanisme ke
Kosmopolitanisme (Bandung: Mizan, 2016), pp. 35–7; Hyung-Jun Kim, Reformist Muslims in
Yogyakarta Village: The Islamic Transformation of Contemporary Socio-religious Life (Canberra:
ANU E Press, 2007), pp. 123–4.
12
Bush, A Snapshot of Muhammadiyah, p. 3.

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Action and 212 Action—caught the attention of the Indonesian public
and even foreign observers. Many people identified these protests,
attended by 5–7 million people dressed in white, as “people power
movements” and populist Islamic movement. Such undercurrents
of Islamic populism were revealed by Vedi R. Hadiz in his study of
demonstrations in the Middle East and Indonesia.13
These protests—among the numerous conflicts between moderate
and intolerant Muslims that have occurred since the fall of President
Soeharto in 199814—gained widespread attention due to several factors,
including political, economic, legal, citizenship, and cultural ones. Muslims
from various regions and organizations attended these protests, urging
the government to take firm action against the alleged blasphemy. Some
participants stated that President Joko Widodo was a weak leader unable
to enforce the law and guarantee the public welfare. Similar claims were
made by the orators, most of whom were antagonistic against the ruling
government. This perceived weakness led to reduced public satisfaction
with Joko Widodo’s government. According to one survey by the
Indonesian Survey Institute, 46,4% of respondents were not satisfied
with the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla government.15
In the lead-up to the 2019 General Election, national and local
political conditions remained tense. Sensitive issues, such as religion
and communism, became commodities for demonstrations, and hate
speech was common on the internet. Supporters of the two presidential
candidates, Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, were highly polarized.16
13

Vedi R. Hadiz, Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015).
14
Noorhaidi Hasan, “Religious Diversity and Blasphemy Law: Understanding
Growing Religious Conflict and Intolerance in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, Al-Jami’ah:
Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 55, no. 1 (2017), pp. 105–26.
15
Abraham Utama, “Poltracking: Sistem Komunikasi Publik Jokowi
Harus Dibenahi”, CNNIndonesia-Nasional, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/
nasional/20150419175143-32-47730/poltracking-sistem-komunikasi-publik-jokowiharus-dibenahi, accessed 17 May 2019.
16
Alexander R. Arifianto, “Is Islam an increasingly polarizing political cleavage
in Indonesia?”, Brookings (25 Apr 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2019/04/25/is-islam-an-increasingly-polarizing-political-cleavage-in-indonesia/,
accessed 19 May 2019.

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In this highly charged atmosphere, Indonesian Muslims were
similarly polarized. Muslims, including members of Muhammadiyah,
got involved in practical political movements, supporting presidential
candidates and their policies. 17 Muslims were pushed apart, and
mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU
were stuck in the middle,18 caught between political involvement and
neutrality. The democracy in Indonesia, where Muslims are a majority,
was becoming less tolerant.19
Muhammadiyah chose neutrality. However, it still faced significant
challenges. Members were polarized by their political ideologies and
different understandings of Islam. At the central and regional level,
Muhammadiyah members were interested in new Islamic broadcasters
(including short online videos) and leaders (such as those in new
Islamic mass organizations). The Deputy of the Tarjih Council at the
Muhammadiyah Central Leadership, MA Fatah Santoso discussed this
issue:
Muhammadiyah is currently facing a serious challenge to its da’wah, to its
spreading Islam rahmatan lil alamin and Islam wasathiyah (moderate Islam).
This has happened because a number of Islamic broadcasters are spreading
understandings of Islam that are not the same as Muhammadiyah’s, but
have attracted Muhammadiyah members from the central to the regional
level. If not handled properly, in the future many members and leaders
of Muhammadiyah will have non-Muhammadiyah ideologies.20

That has helped influence Muhammadiyah’s political attitude.
Even though the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership did not campaign
for candidates, in reality members still supported them. Some leaders
even openly became part of candidates’ campaign teams. “The different
political attitudes of Muhammadiyah’s leaders and members come from
17

Alexander R. Arifianto, “Practicing What It Preaches? Understanding the
Contradictions between Pluralist Theology and Religious Intolerance within Indonesia’s
Nahdlatul Ulama”, Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 55, no. 2 (2017), pp. 241–64.
18
Achmad Zainal Arifin, “Defending Traditions, Countering Intolerant
Ideologies: Re-energizing the Role of Modin in Modern Java”, Al-Jami’ah: Journal of
Islamic Studies, vol. 55, no. 2 (2017), pp. 265–92.
19
Jeremy Menchik, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without liberalism
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 120–2.
20
MA. Fatah Santoso, FGD interview (16 Feb 2019).

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a non-Muhammadiyah Islamic understanding, which tends to be a Salafi
jihadist or political mode of Ihkwanul Muslimin or tarbawi.”21
C. Muhammadiyah’s Political Attitude
Muhammadiyah, as a major Islamic organization in Muslimmajority Indonesia,22 asserts that Islam in Indonesia does not require
numerous imams. Rather, Indonesian Islam requires Muslim leaders who
can demonstrate political views and be good political representatives
of Muslims. In present-day Indonesia, political parties with Islamic
ideologies such as the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera,
PKS) and the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan,
PPP) have committed criminal acts of corruption and other improper
acts, and as such have been argued to not represent Muslims accurately.
The Central Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Dadang Kahmad,
firmly stated that:
Our respectable imam as an organization is the Chairman of
Muhammadiyah Central. We do not know the term ‘High Priest of
Islam’ in Indonesia. We view all scholars as respected leaders. However,
there are no ‘high priests’ or ‘low priests’. All of them contribute to the
progress of the nation and Indonesia’s Muslims. We do not need various
titles to help Muslims who are suffering from various national problems.
Muhammadiyah is more interested in developing the nation’s society and
social welfare, rather than religious titles.23

When involved in practical politics, religious leaders (Islamic
organizations) cannot call themselves “Muhammadiyah” or “NU”.
There’s is a self-representation, wherein individuals join political and
party activities of their own will. Moreover, Muhammadiyah did not
support any candidates in the 2019 General Election. Muhammadiyah’s
General Secretary stated that:
Muhammadiyah gives its members rights in both local and general
21

Syafiq Mugni, interview (18 Mar 2019).
Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat: Islam, budaya demokrasi, dan partisipasi politik di
Indonesia pasca Orde Baru (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama-Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan
Masyarakat- Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina- Freedom Institute-Kedutaan Besar Denmark,
2007), pp. 233–5.
23
Dadang Kahmad, interview (18 Mar 2019).
22

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Haedar Nashir et al.
elections. There is no prohibition, or order to choose a specific candidate.
Muhammadiyah members are smart and politically mature. There is no
need for direction or political mobilization.24

Even though Muhammadiyah lets followers choose their own
candidates, this does not mean the organization ignores the nation’s
problems. Muhammadiyah questions the neutrality of the Indonesian
National Armed Forces and the Indonesian National Police, which seem
to have stemmed peaceful protests such as istighosah. The Chief of
Police even recommended that citizens avoid political activities before the
election or hold istighosah in their respective regions.25 It also maintained
excellent collaboration with the Joko Widodo – Jusuf Kalla government;
the General Secretary identified Widodo as having visited the most often.26
Muhammadiyah, as a modern socio-religious organization, issued a
circular before the election that urged members to focus on bigger issues
rather than peaceful protests. However, this circular received suboptimal
responses from leaders at the provincial, regency, and district levels.
Many Muhammadiyah followers and leaders—mostly from West Java,
Yogyakarta, Central Java, and Bali—joined the protests in Jakarta. Some
considered these actions as defending Islam and as a form of jihad, rather
than a protest of Widodo’s regime.
Muhammadiyah’s General Secretary, Abdul Mu’thi, stated that the
organization would not become involved in practical politics, support
candidates, or do similar actions. It would focus on national politics. Any
political activities could not be done in the name of Muhammadiyah. As
such, Muhammadiyah members involved in the activities of the National
Movement to Guard the Fatwa of Ulama (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal
Fatwa, GNPF) and Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI)
were officially acting as individuals—even when they claimed to represent
Muhammadiyah. This was, of course, detrimental to the organization.
24

Abdul Mukti, interview (18 Mar 2019).
See Fx Ismanto, “Forum Ulama BPI KPNPA RI Gelar Istighosah Di Jambi
Berikan Rasa Aman & Damai”, Tribunnews.com (24 Mar 2018), https://www.tribunnews.
com/nasional/2018/03/24/forum-ulama-bpi-kpnpa-ri-gelar-istighosah-di-jambiberikan-rasa-aman-damai, accessed 17 May 2019.
26
“Dalam Sejarah, Jokowi Presiden Terbanyak Silaturrahmi Ke Muhammadiyah”,
Getar.id (6 Apr 2019), http://getar.id/2019/04/06/dalam-sejarah-jokowi-presidenterbanyak-silaturrahmi-ke-muhammadiyah/, accessed 18 May 2019.
25

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Muhammadiyah’s Moderation Stance in the 2019 General Election
Muhammadiyah is aware of the difficulty. When Muslims want to
carry out practical political work, engaging in supportive action means
supporting a presidential candidate. Muhammadiyah, however, stands
by its choice to focus on national politics. Such politics are very noble,
though not without risk. We know that Muhammadiyah will be a topic
of conversation, but we are sure to not get involved in practical politics.
Muhammadiyah invites its members to get involved in practical politics,
but not on behalf of Muhammadiyah.27

According to the General Secretary’s statement, Muhammadiyah
did not officially support the Aksi Damai (Peace Action) held on March
30, 2019, in Jakarta or similar protests. However, Muhammadiyah activists
from various parts of Indonesia were present and involved. Some
members regretted the organization’s neutrality; for example, Dahnil
Anzar Simanjuntak—the former chairman of the Muhammadiyah Youth
Organization (Organisasi Pemuda Muhammadiyah)—took part in the Aksi
Damai as the spokesperson for Presidential Candidate Prabowo Subianto.
Likewise, some Muhammadiyah leaders from Jakarta, West Java, and Bali
participated in the peaceful protests before the 2019 Presidential Election.
Recognizing members support for candidates, the Muhammadiyah
Central Chairperson stated that the organization felt that the need to
avoid using Muhammadiyah attributes was significant. Similarly, the
General Secretary of Muhammadiyah highlighted the importance of
maintaining neutrality:
We are part of Muhammadiyah, from the central to the branch level.
If you feel uneasy with Muhammadiyah and disagree with the Islamic
ideology promoted by Muhammadiyah, please choose another group.
If you are interested in HTI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI/
Indonesian Mujahedeen Council), PKS, Salafi, or something similar,
please leave Muhammadiyah. Let us take care of leaders and followers
who agree with Muhammadiyah’s organizational lines. Muhammadiyah
never ‘fires’ its followers. But it does not mean bringing other ideologies
into Muhammadiyah will be acceptable. Such behavior is a violation of
organizational ethics.28

The statement above implies that there is a “struggle for Islamic
27
28

Abdul Mukti, interview (18 Mar 2019).
Ibid.

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ideology” within Muhammadiyah, specifically between its ideology of
moderate (wasatiyyah) Islam and political Islamic ideologies that tends
to belittle the government. As a result, Muhammadiyah members were
divided between practical political movement and cultural activities.
Ustaz (scholars of Islam) who attend and even promote political
protests, including Abdul Somad, Bahtiar Nasir, Yusuf Mansur, Adi
Hidayat, Hanan Ataqi, are popular among Muhammadiyah members,
even more so than ustaz such as Yunahar Ilyas, Hamim Ilyas, Faturrahman
Kamal, and Gunawan. This can be seen in members involvement in
Muhammadiyah activities. This was confirmed by members in West
Java, who stated:
One day, the West Java PWM invited the Central Chairperson of
Muhammadiyah to speak at its Mujahidin Mosque. We had expected
some 2000 people, but only around 200 people registered. Finally, the
committee asked the Muhammadiyah hospitals, middle schools, and high
schools in Bandung to attend the recitation because we were ashamed.
The Chairperson was received by so few people. Meanwhile, when Bahtiar
Nasir and Amien Rais came, 5,000 Muhammadiyah members attended,
some even coming from outside Bandung.29

D. Division of Political Power
Muhammadiyah’s leadership has become a standard for determining
the division of power. Under the Joko Widodo government, there must
be alternative means of accommodating the thoughts and political
aspirations of the ummah.
Looking at the roles of Muhammadiyah, there are two applicable
and profitable strategies. The first involves political activities oriented
towards a “low” politics (real politics, practical politics) struggle for
power, as done by political parties and formal political forces at the
national level. The second involves community activities as well as
indirect political activities (“high” politics) that offer the moral authority
to improve people’s lives.30
29

Muhammadiyah Regional Leadership, PDMP, and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, Focus
Group Discussion (West Java, February 24, 2019).
30
Haedar Nashir, Muhammadiyah Gerakan Pembaruan (Yogyakarta: Suara
Muhammadiyah, 2010), pp. 2–5.

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Muhammadiyah does many social events for its members, holding
that the social aspect of community empowerment is no less critical and
strategic than the political aspect of power. The creation of community
leaders and strong civil society is a main pillar of Muhammadiyah’s
organizational struggle; meanwhile, power struggles are intended to
form governments and formally and directly done by political parties and
state political institutions through the prevailing political system. These
are interconnected within a healthy political system by national forces
working towards the realization of the country’s goals.31
In the context of nationalism and the ummah, Muhammadiyah’s
leadership must respond to all of the nation’s problems, either at the
level of “low” politics or “high” politics. Muhammadiyah is expected to
create figures who possess integrity and professionalism, through which
it could unite Muslims at both the central and regional levels. As such,
even with its organizational neutrality, Muhammadiyah has a strategic
and vital role in national politics.
In present-day Indonesia, many outside Muhammadiyah have
appeared and tried to attract the sympathy of the masses. This has
hindered Muhammadiyah’s activities. Before the general election, mass
organizations such as FPI and GNPF MUI dominated the news cycle with
their protests. Interviews with regional leaders in West Java suggested that
Muhammadiyah was still unable to respond to Muslims’ needs and the
real condition of public politics in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah’s political
position is seen as problematic, being neither prohibitive or supportive:
Muhammadiyah’s current leadership needs character management in its
development of cadres. Such figures will strengthen the Islamic Ghiroh
for Muslims. From there, Muhammadiyah can emerge as a leader, not
FPI. If FPI were the leader, responsibilities would not be unclear. Unlike
the Fajr Congregation Movement and Sharia Cooperative of 212 driven
by the GNPF MUI, Muhammadiyah can draw positive energy from the
Islamic ummah and propagate its struggle while responding to current
national conditions.32

Furthermore, in a meeting with the Muhammadiyah Regional
31

Sidang Tanwir Muhammadiyah, Khittah Muhammadiyah dalam Kehidupan
Berbangsa dan Bernegara (PP Muhammadiyah, 2002).
32
Muhammad Ikhsan, interview (18 Mar 2019).

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Leadership in West Java, members expressed their view that
Muhammadiyah should take a political stance, seeing the 2019
General Election as a moment for Muhammadiyah to reformulate its
approach to politics. Other mass organizations had taken advantage of
Muhammadiyah’s slow response to the alleged blasphemy to seize the
political stage and lead Indonesia’s Muslims. Muhammadiyah certainly
did not expect Rizieq Shihab to become the leader of Indonesia’s ummah,
let alone a “high priest”.
Based on the above analysis, Muhammadiyah elites’ attitudes
towards the organization’s central leadership can be seen in their
recommendations. See, for example, the below quote:
First, Muhammadiyah needs to place cadres appropriately and choose
cadres with organizational competency. Second, it is necessary to
reformulate Muhammadiyah’s attitudes towards politics, economics,
law, religion, and education. Third, “allocative politics” – the division of
power. There needs to be a change in Muhammadiyah’s attitude towards
politics (from neutrality to allocative and advocative/responsive politics)
both at the level of low politics and high politics. Muhammadiyah must
take part in ‘allocative politics’ within the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches.33

It seems that Muhammadiyah elites want the organization to act
in both high and low politics. However, support for high politics is
stronger than that for low politics, and as such some Muhammadiyah
members felt unrepresented in the organization’s neutrality in the 2019
General Election.
Muhammadiyah is better at national politics, which nurtures all citizens
and helps the weak, rather than being political ‘lipstick’ that looks red
but has no taste. Muhammadiyah must therefore work towards playing
‘salty’ politics. If so, it would not be invisible.34

Discussion with Muhammadiyah’s regional leaders in West
Java and Bali showed that members have different perceptions at the
regional level. For example, in the above-mentioned provinces, members
rejected the organizational neutrality asserted in Press Statement of the
Muhammadiyah Central Leadership Number: 552/PER/I.0/A/2016
33
34

12

Zulkarnaen, interview (18 Mar 2019).
Ahmad Syafii Maarif, interview (20 Mar 2019).

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Muhammadiyah’s Moderation Stance in the 2019 General Election

(dated November 4, 2016) regarding Peaceful Demonstrations and its
statement regarding the 2019 General Election. Followers asked two
fundamental questions: What is Muhammadiyah’s political formula? What
is Muhammadiyah’s position regarding Indonesia’s political situation?
Muhammadiyah is considered less strict in its political attitudes,
a perception that is motivated by its responses to Indonesia’s current
political conditions. Problems have included, as stated by M. Busro
Muqodas:
•
•
•

The Indonesian government’s cooperation with China, as shown by
several Chinese investments and news about Chinese foreign workers.
The relationship between the government and Shia, including Iran
Indonesia’s lack of concern for the bombing of Aleppo and the
Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar
Issues with minority and arrogance power, with senior politicians
being perceived as arrogant and as spreading rumor in the mass
media and on social media.
Conflict within the ummah, including between Muhammadiyah/NU
and MUI/ FPI.
Disappointment with uncontrolled price increases, tax increases, and
electricity bills.

•
•
•

This study also finds that Muhammadiyah elites hope the
organization can improve its leadership and urge the government to
take a firmer stance. Some think that Muhammadiyah needs to adjust its
political stance, to incorporate resistance and seize existing opportunities.
Muhammadiyah’s Institute of Hikmah and Public Policy (Lembaga
Hikmah dan Kebijakan Publik) has an essential role in uniting followers
behind existing political attitudes, and as such cannot remain silent on
political matters.
The following quote illustrates how Muhammadiyah’s political
stance as an organization sometimes differs significantly from those of
its members. Members seem to expect the organization’s leaders to be
assertive, while leaders have held that Muhammadiyah may not become
involved in practical politics. As stated by the General Secretary of
Muhammadiyah’s Central Leadership:
All this time, the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership has repeatedly
stated that Muhammadiyah does not practice (party) politics, but does

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Haedar Nashir et al.
politics nationally.35
This has happened since the leadership of Ahmad Syafii Maarif in
2000–2005, which coincided with the 2004 Presidential Election. At
the time, Amien Rais, the former Chairman of Muhammadiyah, ran for
president. The central leadership did not officially support Amien Rais.
Rather, Muhammadiyah prioritized national politics and humanity.36

Such firmness is key to Muhammadiyah’s political stance. Even
though it may not practice politics, Muhammadiyah is able to critique
the government37 without being dragged into practical politics (even
as members are involved in such “low” politics). Previous efforts to
get Muhammadiyah institutionally involved in practical politics were
unsuccessful (as reflected in its official political stance).38
Differences in the political perceptions of Muhammadiyah
members and leaders have resulted in a “tug-of-war” during Indonesia’s
four presidential elections since the fall of the New Order regime (i.e.
in 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019). Muhammadiyah seems to have asserted
political resistance, thereby affecting the organization’s political direction.
The Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Busyro Muqqodas, stated that
Muhammadiyah will remain critical of the government, especially in
politics.
Muhammadiyah, as a massive Islamic organization, has never been afraid
of the state government. It is not rebelling, because Muhammadiyah
believes that criticism and cooperation with the State/Government are
both necessary for national progress.39

E. Positioning of the Ummah Leadership
As a major Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah certainly hopes to
play a major role in national development and progress. Muhammadiyah
35

Abdul Mukti, interview (18 Mar 2019).
Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam dalam Bingkai Keindonesiaan dan Kemanusiaan: Sebuah
Refleksi Sejarah (Bandung: Mizan & Maarif Institute, 2009), pp. 177–80.
37
Haedar Nashir, Ideologi Gerakan Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Suara
Muhammadiyah, 2001), pp. 35–6.
38
Nashir, Muhammadiyah Gerakan Pembaruan, pp. 225–7.
39
M. Busyro Muqoddas, interview (20 Mar 2019).
36

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shapes society through its socio-religious and educational activities,
including the creation of hospitals and orphanages. However, Muslims—
even members—are still questioning Muhammadiyah’s representation
of Muslims. Muslims often see Muhammadiyah as not present on the
political stage, and as slow to respond to the emerging problems of
Muslims. It is possible that Muhammadiyah members and other Muslims
do not understand Muhammadiyah’s political activities or observe said
activities directly. Muslims and Muhammadiyah members seem to hope
that, rather than high politics, Muhammadiyah should actively practice
low politics.
If Muhammadiyah fails to actively respond to the problems of the
Indonesian people, members will be unable to understand its political
struggles. Muhammadiyah needs to provide an example to Indonesia’s
significant Muslim population—who comprise 87,2 % of Indonesia’s
254 million residents.40 To do so, it must also strengthen its bonds
with other Islamic organizations that share Muhammadiyah’s vision.
Some Muhammadiyah members argue that, in the current situation,
Muhammadiyah needs to mainstream its leadership activities. It should
“go with the flow”, have an explicit political stance, and be independent
of other organizations; in other words, it should choose a practical
political path.
The public has lost its interest in political parties because of
their identification with corruption and money politics. As such,
Muhammadiyah needs to work together with NU to strengthen its
political attitudes. It must have cadres—not leaders—who can maneuver
themselves politically while still showing integrity.
We have found arguments that Muhammadiyah’s political stance
must be firm. When it does not become involved in politics, other
organizations will take advantage. As such, Muhammadiyah must urge
its cadres to step forward and thereby abandon its stance of neutrality.
Politics is full of risks; however, Muhammadiyah must be involved in
less risky politics.
Din Syamsuddin’s statement below shows the firmness of
Muhammadiyah’s political stance within the context of Muslims’ political
40

“Agama”, Indonesia.go.id, https://www.indonesia.go.id/profil/agama, accessed
17 May 2019.

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Haedar Nashir et al.

revival:
Muhammadiyah may not be neutral in Indonesian politics. Muhammadiyah
must make a stance. We members of Muhammadiyah have long been
a part of Indonesian politics, even if we don’t form political parties.
Politics does not have to mean political parties, or at least contributions
to political parties. We must not be silent in politics. Politics is not neutral.
We must take a side.41

Syamsuddin’s statement above implies that Muhammadiyah should
not only simply wait for the government. Even though it is not a political
party, Muhammadiyah must be active in national and party politics.
Indeed, Muhammadiyah has long been involved in national politics, and as
such it cannot be identified as apolitical. Syamsuddin, a former politician
with the Golongan Karya Party, seems to have taken a different political
stance than the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership, who have avoided
bringing Muhammadiyah into practical politics.
The issue of national and regional leadership must also be
formulated based on fikih siyasah, as adapted to local conditions. For
example, in Denpasar, Bali, Muhammadiyah could not make its choice
based on religious identity, as most locals are Hindu. This does not mean
that Muhammadiyah avoided becoming involved in politics. Politics
means risk, and thus Muhammadiyah must take risks.
Political developments in Indonesia since 1999 showed that
Muhammadiyah members had used the National Mandate Party (Partai
Amanat Nasional, PAN) as a vehicle for their political activities. Although
members had the freedom to support other political parties, until
2014 Muhammadiyah members only gained executive power through
PAN. Muhammadiyah members thus used PAN as a vehicle for their
aspirations.42
Muhammadiyah members, especially those involved in PAN, thus
required clarity about the organization’s political stance. This is especially
true in the lead-up to general and regional elections throughout Indonesia,
when Muhammadiyah members had difficulty entering parliament as
41

Din Syamsuddin, interview (17 Mar 2019).
Rosyida Prihandini, ‘Relasi Partai Amanat Nasional dengan Muhammadiyah
di dalam Struktur DPD PAN Surabaya Periode 2010-2015’, Jurnal Politik Muda, vol. 3,
no. 3 (2014), pp. 357–68.
42

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their political activities were not formally supported. Muhammadiyah’s
neutrality meant that it remained distant from political parties and
forbade its leaders and administrators from becoming involved in
practical political positions; such a stance could not readily be accepted
by politicians involved in the organization.
Members hoped that the Muhammadiyah would not prohibit them
from becoming involved in practical politics. This was particularly difficult
for the organization’s leaders, who were required to remain neutral and
thus avoided politics. It was hoped that, by allowing members to become
active in practical politics, the organization could communicate politically
with members in parliament (if elected).
Did this mean that Muhammadiyah must allow its members, and
even its leaders, to become politicians? If so, would this cause difficulties
for Muhammadiyah at the regional level? Of course, this issue received
serious attention from Muhammadiyah’s leaders at the national and
regional levels.
Muhammadiyah’s Chief Secretary in West Java, who expressed
hope that the organization would be involved in practical politics, stated:
It is better for Muhammadiyah’s Central Leaders to free leaders at the
regional (provincial/regency) level to do politics. This would benefit
Muhammadiyah. If Muhammadiyah’s Central Leaders prohibit their
cadres from practicing politics, it would be challenging to get them into
political parties.43

However, these desires have not received the official support of
Muhammadiyah’s Central Leadership. The organization has avoided
formally approving members’ political involvement. Muhammadiyah
has remained distant from political parties, but it has not prohibited
cadres from practicing politics. Muhammadiyah’s Central Leadership only
prohibits its leaders at the regional leaders from becoming party leaders.
Muhammadiyah’s attempt to keep a distance from all political
parties, and to avoid explicitly providing political support to candidates,
suggests that it fears risks. Conversely, this political neutrality could
adversely affect the political attitudes of successful candidates and inform
their selection of cabinet members.
The idea of Muhammadiyah’s charitable political efforts (amal
43

M. Rizal Fadillah, interview (18 Mar 2019).

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Haedar Nashir et al.

usaha politik) needs serious attention from the organization’s leadership.
Syamsuddin’s idea of Muhammadiyah members and activists becoming
involved in practical politics, such as by joining political parties or
becoming members of parliament, is positive; this is not the freedom
to become a PAN politician, but rather to join any party. Such allocative
politics were suggested by Din Syamsuddin ten years ago, even before
he became the Chairman of Muhammadiyah’s Central Leadership.
In this regard, Muhammadiyah politicians recommend that
the organization do the following: (1) improve political education;
(2) encourage young people to become active in General Elections
Commission, political parties, etc.; (3) practice allocative politics; (4) be
active in legal, political, economic, religious, and educational activities.
The Muhammadiyah Youth Leader of West Java stated that:
We can’t just be quiet. We must encourage potential Muhammadiyah
members to become politicians, not prohibit it, and the struggle must be
real. Politics cannot always be good and fair to everyone. If Muhammadiyah
continues to be that way, politicians will leave Muhammadiyah.44

F. The Resurrection of Islamic Politics?
The 2019 General Election left many questions unanswered for
Muslims and for Muhammadiyah. Is it true that there has been a political
revival of Muslims? Is it true that Muslims’ political pendulum has swung
from the high politics of Muhammadiyah to the low or “real” politics of
Islamic organizations such as FPI, MUI, and GNPF? Muhammadiyah
has also faced serious questions as a large Islamic organization that has
a progressive mission of wasathiyah (moderation).45
In the 1980s, the New Order government under President Soeharto
had implemented a single principle policy, whereby political parties and
religious organizations had to recognize Pancasila as their sole founding
principle. Any socio-political or faith-based organizations that failed to
recognize Pancasila were closed or labelled subversive, being branded as
rejecting the state’s single national principle. Muhammadiyah and NU also
took Pancasila as their organizational principle, even though they retained
44

Iu Rusliana, interview (18 Mar 2019).
Amirrahman, Nubowo, and Khoirudin (eds.), Islam Berkemajuan untuk
Peradaban Dunia: Refleksi dan Agenda Muhammadiyah ke Depan.
45

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Islam as their theological foundation. KH AR. Fachruddin, a cultural
leader from Muhammadiyah, identified Muhammadiyah’s acceptance
of Pancasila as a sort of “helmet diplomacy”. As the helmet protects
the rider’s head, so too did Muhammadiyah’s acceptance of Pancasila as
its sole organizational principle prevented the organization from being
branded an enemy of the authoritarian and repressive state.46
As a cultural movement, Muhammadiyah has operated schools,
hospitals, orphanages, and various economic institutions. It has also
constructed hundreds of mosques and educated thousands of Islamic
scholars. This has been part of what Hefner describes as the booming
of new santri among middle-class Muslims. Between 1979 and 1990,
the number of State Islamic Institute (IAIN) students across Indonesia
increased fourfold, from 28,000 to 100,000. In 1991, some 14% of high
school graduates attended one of Indonesia’s 14 IAINs. Likewise, the
number of mosques increased drastically, from 15,374 in 1973 to 17,750
in 1979, 20,648 in 1984, and 25,655 in 1990; of these, Muhammadiyah
owned 6,118. Meanwhile, NU was operating more than 30,000 Islamic
boarding schools by 2014; every year, 100 new boarding schools open
in Indonesia.47
Such cultural developments have not, however, been as prominent
in politics. Muslims in Indonesia have suffered politically for much of the
country’s history. In the 1955 elections, Islamic politicians—represented
by the Masjumi and NU parties—received a significant percentage of
votes. As such, Muslims enjoyed extensive political space. However,
following the rise of the New Order in the 1960s, Muslims’ did not
enjoy such political space. Indeed, some observers said that Muslims
experienced marginalization in the public sphere.48
Only in the 1990s, following the establishment of various facilities
for Muslims, did Muslims begin to enjoy access to vast political space
under Soeharto. Muslims were facilitated with the establishment of the
46

Imron Nasri (ed.), Meremajakan Pimpinan Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Suara
Muhammadiyah, 2010), pp. 12–3.
47
Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai
(Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1982),
p. 26.
48
Muhammad Rusli Karim, Negara dan Peminggiran Islam Politik (Yogyakarta:
Tiara Wacana Yogya, 1999), pp. 217–9.

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Haedar Nashir et al.

Muamalat Bank (1989), the acceptance of hijab in public schools and
government offices, and the recitation of the Qur’an at government
offices. The Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals was formed
in December 1990, and Suharto’s family went on the hajj pilgrimage to
Mecca that same year. Bahtiar Effendi described this phenomenon as an
accommodative political success for Muslims, who were no longer trapped
in a confrontational and violent relationship with the government. The
government changed its political attitude, giving Muslims more space
for political activities that accommodated and supported its policies.49
In the early 1990s, people were familiar with the term ‘political
flow’ (aliran politik). Many political parties and groups were created,
supporting extent parties such as PPP (established in the 1970s). Is
it true that the national political pendulum has swung from non-flow
politics to second-volume flow politics? Furthermore, is it true that there
has been a shift in Muslims’ political orientation from Muhammadiyah
and NU to non-mainstream groups such as FPI and HTI? If so, what
exactly must be done by Muhammadiyah as it carries the banner of Islam
rahmatan lil alamin?
Since the 1990s, there has been a significant shift in the political
regime’s attitude towards Muslims. While the state did implement a single
principle policy in 1984, this was accepted by Indonesian Muslims at
Muhammadiyah and NU. Now, Muslims have the opportunity to join
the bureaucracy, army, police, and finance sector. No longer are they like
‘ringwormed cats’—to borrow a term from Mohammad Natsir, one of
Indonesia’s prime ministers under President Soekarno and the former
chairman of Masjumi.50
In the 2019 General Election, as new and mature Islamic groups
intersected, there appeared to be a resurgence of political Islam that
resulted in sectarianism. Does this represent a substantial change in
Islamic politics? Does it signal the rise of political Islam? Is it true that
this type of political Islam is shifting from values of diversity, equality,
and Islamic modernism to something more radical, fundamentalist, or
49

Agus Riyanto, “Islam dan Negara: Metamorfosa Pemikiran Politik Islam
Indonesia”, Spektrum, vol. 1, no. 1 (2004), pp. 178–199.
50
Afan Gaffar, Politik Indonesia: Transisi menuju Demokrasi (Yogyakarta: Pustaka
Pelajar, 1999).

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artificial? Or, is the reverse happening?51
G. Concluding Remarks
The findings of this article suggest that Muhammadiyah will remain
an essential part of Indonesian politics as long as it can play its role
strategically and responsively. Many hope that Muhammadiyah, rather
than groups such as FPI, GNPF MUI, HTI, and MMI, will be a motor
of Muslim political and cultural activities. The organization remains
seen as a cornerstone of moderate and progressive Islam, as a means of
spreading a specific message rather than as a political party.
In the 2019 General Election, Muhammadiyah did not officially
support any presidential candidate or specific political party. It chose this
“middle way” even as some Muhammadiyah activists actively campaigned
for certain candidates or even ran for office themselves in the government.
Muhammadiyah has remained a non-partisan organization, an influential
force in society. Muhammadiyah only needs to redefine its role in politics
and be responsive to the nation’s problems.
Many political actors need a means of channeling their political
aspirations, and members of Muhammadiyah have found themselves
divided. A small minority wish that Muhammadiyah had become directly
involved in the 2019 elections; a majority of members, however, do
not desire this. Opponents to active political participation argue that
Muhammadiyah should remain a cultural entity, and that can use cultural
means to promote national integrity.
Indonesia’s Muslims need political clarity, particularly given that
some believe that Joko Widodo’s leadership is weak and unauthoritative.
As an Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah should remain active,
offering a counterweight to the political power, networks, and activities
of other countries.

51

Edward Aspinall and Ward Berenschot, Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism,
and the State in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019).

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