

## Discourse network analysis of broadcasting policy in Indonesia: Case of ASO 2 November 2022

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### Abstract

*This study aims to identify actors, dominant discourses, and discourse coalitions in the debate surrounding the implementation of analog switch-off (ASO) in Indonesia on November 2, 2022 until the implementation of total ASO on August 17, 2023. This study employs discourse network analysis method with data sources in the form of 283 articles from 12 national online news outlets. The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Kominfo) became the most dominant actor, followed by the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI), West Java citizens, Central Java citizens, and East Java citizens. The dominant discourses centered on criticisms of set-top box (STB) distribution performance; the perceived benefits of digitalization for the public; critiques of ASO implementation that overlooked citizen and stakeholder readiness; and repeated calls for intensified government socialization efforts. The debate produced six discourse coalitions—two supporting ASO and four criticizing it. While these coalitions revealed clear alignments and contestations, their influence remained limited, shaping only the level of discourse structuration rather than affecting policy outcomes.*

## Introduction

The analog switch-off (ASO) was one of the efforts to realize broadcasting digitalization. ASO referred to a country's policy to terminate television broadcasts based on analog signals and replace them with digital broadcasting (Dwita et al., 2022). The urgency of ASO had even become a global agenda agreed upon by 120 countries at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Conference in Geneva in June 2006, in which Indonesia was a participant (Dwita et al., 2022).

Although Indonesia had initiated digital terrestrial television (DTT) as early as the mid-2000s (Anggraeni, 2014; Wardahnia et al., 2020), the country was only able to realize ASO after the passage of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (UU Cipta Kerja) on October 5, 2020, by the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI). The law included Article 60A, paragraph 2, which required analog television broadcasting to be terminated within two years. Based on this mandate, Kominfo (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology) set November 2, 2022, as the deadline for ASO implementation (Dwita et al., 2021). However, Indonesia's realization of ASO meant that it missed the ITU's 2015

deadline, placing the country behind its neighboring states such as Brunei Darussalam, which completed ASO in 2017; Singapore and Malaysia in 2019; and Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar in 2020 (Nariswari, 2021). The delay occurred because, prior to the passage of the Omnibus Law, the government lacked sufficient legal standing to enforce ASO (Habibi, 2023; Nurizar, 2020).

In practice, the implementation of ASO encountered a range of issues. Kominfo revised its plan several times, beginning with a five-phase design, later reducing it to three phases, and ultimately adopting a multiple ASO scheme based on regional readiness. Multiple ASO became Kominfo's final approach, and Indonesia initiated the ASO on November 2, 2022 at midnight (i.e., 00:00 Western Indonesian Time on November 3, 2022), with the target of completing full analog termination by August 17, 2023 .

However, resistance emerged from major actors in the broadcasting industry. Two national private television conglomerates, MNC Group and Viva Group, opposed ASO, arguing that the Constitutional Court (MK) had suspended the enforcement of the Omnibus Law. Specifically, MNC Group opposed ASO on several grounds. First, a survey conducted by Poltracking Indonesia revealed that more than 40% of respondents opposed ASO. Second, disparities in digital signal quality across regions and the high cost of set-top boxes remained problematic. Third, a member of Commission I of House of Representatives (DPR), Nurul Arifin, stated that ASO policy would burden the majority of Indonesians. Fourth, various protests against ASO surfaced on social media (Prabowo et al., 2024, p. 10). One platform where these protests emerged was Twitter, represented by the hashtag #AnalogSwitchOff, which gained traction leading up to the ASO launch on November 2, 2022. The hashtag even trended nationally, signaling the intensity of public debate around ASO (Fadhillah et al., 2023).

Despite the objections voiced by MNC Group and Viva Group, both eventually complied with ASO on November 2, 2022. This compliance came after the government issued a warning through a letter of revocation of their broadcast licenses (CNN Indonesia, 2022). Thus, broadcasting digitalization in Indonesia was realized through ASO and continued until the achievement of total ASO on August 17, 2023.

The polemical implementation of ASO could be understood as the consequence of the multiple interests raised by policy actors. Hajer (1993) argued that the interests of actors were inevitable in every policy process. Interests correlated with policy beliefs, which reflected certain preferences and convictions articulated by actors regarding policy phenomena (Leifeld et al., 2022). These differences in policy preferences then triggered debates among actors in the policymaking process (Leifeld, 2017). Policy actors used various discourses as an effort to frame their policy preferences. This was done to influence other actors to adopt the ideas they promoted. As a result, debates tended to be dominated by discourses coming from certain actors (Hajer, 1993).

Policy actors could influence debates through discursive practices (Hajer, 2006), one of which was through news media (Eriyanto & Ali, 2020). News media provided opportunities for policy actors to articulate their discourses, thereby potentially generating both alignment and opposition from other actors. This created the possibility of relations between actors and discourses, leading to the formation of discourse networks (Leifeld, 2017). Thus, policy discourses disseminated in the media potentially reflected relations among actors as well as relations between the discourses they promoted (Fisher et al., 2013).

Through the Discourse Coalition Framework (DCF), Hajer (1993) further conceptualized policymaking as a struggle among policy actors through discursive

practices, in order for their policy beliefs to be more widely accepted. Actors employed various strategies in discursive practices such as constructing discourses, using metaphors, or developing specific storylines to build discourse coalitions that could strengthen their policy beliefs in policy debates (Hajer, 1993).

Actors could regard their discourse coalitions as successful if they reached discourse structuration and discourse institutionalization (Hajer, 1993, 2002). Discourse structuration referred to a condition when various policy actors highly relevant to a policy—such as the government, target publics, or interest groups—began to endorse an actor’s discourse on a policy issue, thereby potentially abandoning their previous beliefs (Hajer, 2002). When discourse structuration occurred, the range of discourses dominating the debate tended to become more limited, so that certain discourses could potentially reach discourse institutionalization. Discourse institutionalization referred to a condition in which policymakers adopted the dominant discourse as the basis for determining policy directions (Hajer, 1993). In this way, discourse coalitions also served as instruments for policy actors to influence the trajectory of policymaking (Eriyanto & Ali, 2020).

In applying the DCF, this study translates Hajer’s concepts of structuration and institutionalization into empirically observable indicators within media-reported discourse networks. Discourse structuration is identified when a discourse exhibits high degree, betweenness, or closeness centrality—indicating that it is articulated by actors from multiple sectors (Sumirat & Eriyanto, 2023, pp. 12–14), such as government agencies, legislators, private broadcasters, civil society organizations, and citizen groups. Discourse institutionalization, by contrast, is observed when a dominant discourse is explicitly adopted or echoed by authoritative policy actors—ministries, regulators, or legislators—and subsequently becomes a reference in policy decisions or policy justifications during the debate period. These indicators allow the study to distinguish between coalitions that shape discursive dynamics (structuration) and those that exert influence over policy outcomes (institutionalization).

The Discourse Coalition Framework (DCF), together with the increasingly prominent methodological innovation of Discourse Network Analysis (DNA) (Leifeld, 2017), has gained traction in Indonesian policy communication research. Scholars have used this combined approach to examine how discourse coalitions materialize in media-reported controversies—such as debates on COVID-19 mitigation (Eriyanto & Ali, 2020), Borobudur Temple entrance fees (Rosalia, 2023), Pertamina’s fuel pricing (Sofura, 2023), Papua’s provincial expansion (Sumirat & Eriyanto, 2023), and revisions to the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (Hamanduna & Widjanarko, 2023). Yet despite growing scholarly interest, research on broadcasting digitalization has not fully leveraged the analytical advantages offered by DNA.

Previous studies on broadcasting digitalization in Indonesia were constrained by narrow empirical scopes. Research by Budiman (2020), Rahayu (2018), and Wahyuni (2014) for example, relied heavily on interviews and observations involving only a limited group of highly visible stakeholders—legislators, regulators (Indonesian Broadcasting Commission/KPI), government agencies (Kominfo), and broadcasting associations (such as ATVSI and ATVLI). This focus overlooked broader publics that also potentially shape broadcasting discourses, including civil society groups, academics, and ordinary citizens. Although Fadhillah et al. (2023) attempted to incorporate public participation by analyzing Twitter debates on ASO, difficulties in validating user identities limited the reliability of mapping grassroots involvement. Meanwhile, document-based studies (Habibi, 2023; Maulana, 2019) reproduced the viewpoints of institutional authors, leaving the broader discursive contestation occurring in the public sphere largely unexamined.

To overcome these limitations, this study applies DNA elaborated with the DCF to systematically identify actors, dominant discourses, and the formation of discourse coalitions in debates surrounding ASO in Indonesia, as reported in news articles from November 2, 2022 until the nationwide completion of analog signal switch-off on August 17, 2023. Unlike interview-based or document-based approaches, which capture only a subset of actors or a narrow temporal window, DNA enables the extraction and aggregation of all actors who publicly articulated policy preferences over an extended period. Through network-based analysis of hundreds of attributed actor statements, DNA uncovers patterns that conventional methods tend to miss—such as the emergence of hidden discourse coalitions, the concentration of discursive influence within specific actor groups, and the measurable dominance of particular discourses across government, industry, civil society, and citizen actors (Leifeld, 2017). In the context of ASO, where contestation involved diverse sectors and unfolded rapidly across multiple regions, this approach illuminates blind spots in earlier understandings: for example, how civil society actors became structurally central in the debate despite their limited institutional authority, or how Kominfo consolidated its discursive influence through repeated framing practices rather than through formal regulatory power alone. By revealing these previously obscured dynamics, the use of DNA in this study offers a significant methodological advancement for research on broadcasting digitalization in Indonesia.

## Method

This study adopted a constructivist paradigm combined with the Discourse Network Analysis (DNA) method. This study began with defining data sources and units of analysis. In DNA, news articles function as data sources because they contain attributed statements from actors, while the analytical unit is the actor's statement itself (Eriyanto & Ali, 2020; Leifeld, 2020). Articles were collected using automated Python-based scraping from 12 national online media outlets using the following keywords: 1) ASO; 2) *digitalisasi penyiaran* (broadcast digitalization); and 3) analog switch-off. These articles were published after midnight on November 2, 2022 (or November 3, 2022 at 00:00 Western Indonesian Time)--when Indonesia initiated multiple ASO phases -- up to August 17, 2023, the date of the full analog switch-off.

The researchers manually reviewed each collected article to ensure that it contained at least one attributed statement and that each actor's statement was unique—meaning that the actor had not previously expressed the same concept or discourse (Elislah, 2023, p. 229). The researchers then exclude the article in which contains no unique statement. In total, this study used 283 articles as the data source. The distribution of these articles across media outlets is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Distribution of the number of articles across media (source: author's analysis, 2025)

No	Media	Article	No	Media	Article
1.	Detik	103	7.	Liputan6	10
2.	Kompas	46	8.	Jawa Post	8
3.	Antara News	44	9.	Beritasatu	7
4.	Okezone	27	10.	TVRI News	2
5.	Bisnis	22	11.	Vivanews	1
6.	CNBC Indonesia	12	12.	MetroTV News	1



The selection of 12 outlets was purposeful. Five of them represent the largest media conglomerates that dominate Indonesia's broadcasting and digital news ecosystem—MNC Group, Viva Group, CT Corp, Media Group, and EMTEK—which collectively shape much of the discourse surrounding broadcasting policy (Habibi, 2023; Rahayu, 2018). Three additional conglomerates—Kompas Gramedia, Jawa Pos Group, and Beritasatu—were included due to their ownership of broadcasting-related businesses and national online news portals. This ensures representation across major corporate actors in Indonesia's media landscape. Only one online outlet was selected from each conglomerate because newsrooms under the same corporate umbrella commonly duplicate or clone content across platforms (Dailey et al., 2005). Choosing one representative outlet improves efficiency without compromising data diversity, as the unit of analysis in DNA is the actor statement, not the article.

To complement these outlets with distinct editorial orientations, two business-focused portals—CNBC Indonesia and Bisnis.com—were included to capture economic framings of digital broadcasting. Finally, Antara News and TVRI News were added to represent perspectives from state-owned media, allowing governmental and public-interest views to enter the network.

From these articles, 690 unique statements were identified. This amount is methodologically normal, as DNA studies often analyze anywhere from several dozen to several thousand statements depending on issue complexity and time span (for example, see Amrihani et al., 2024; Kammerer & Ingold, 2023; Karter et al., 2023; Silalahi, 2023; Sumirat & Eriyanto, 2023).

A single coder (the first author) then conducted qualitative content analysis on the 690 statements using Discourse Network Analyzer software version 3.0.11 (Leifeld & Haunss, 2012). Coding followed the four standard DNA variables (Leifeld, 2017): (1) Actor (the individual who delivered the statement); (2) Organization (the organization with which the actor was affiliated); (3) Concept (the abstraction/essence of the idea conveyed by the actor in the statement); and (4) Agreement (the position taken by the actor in delivering the concept, i.e., positive/pro or negative/contra).

After completing the qualitative content analysis, the researchers exported the coded data in *graphml* format and processed them in Visone version 2.28.1 to generate network maps of actors, discourses, and affiliations. Visone was also used to conduct centrality analysis to identify dominant actors and discourses and modularity analysis to detect debate clusters. The resulting dominant actors/discourses and modularity-based clusters were then examined further to identify discourse coalitions (Eriyanto, 2022; Sumirat & Eriyanto, 2023).

## Results and Discussion

This study aimed to identify dominant actors and discourses in the debate on the implementation of the analog switch-off (ASO) in Indonesia, from November 2, 2022, until the completion of the total ASO on August 17, 2023. To achieve this objective, this study employed the DNA method with the assistance of Visone software to generate network maps of the debate on ASO implementation in Indonesia. Actor networks and discourse networks were produced to facilitate the analysis of the influence of actors/discourses within the ASO policy debate.

The actor network represents the relationships among policy actors in the debate. In this network, actors are connected (linked by edges) when they expressed the same discourse. Therefore, the actor network contained only one type of node: the actor. In this

study, the actor network was constructed based on the combination of organizations and the discourses they conveyed. Thus, the nodes in the network consisted only of organizations or actors articulating discourses (Eriyanto, 2022).

Meanwhile, the discourse network connects discourses expressed in the debate. Two discourses were connected when they were articulated by the same actor (organization). Hence, the discourse network consisted of only one type of node: discourses or the concepts.

Centrality analysis was conducted on both the actor network and the discourse network to identify the influence of actors/discourses in the debate. Three centrality metrics were used in this study: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality. Degree centrality indicates the number of relations that an actor/discourse has with others (Eriyanto, 2022). A higher degree centrality score reflects a greater number of relations, which increases the potential of an actor/discourse to influence others. Thus, degree centrality was used to identify dominant actors/discourses in the debate (Eriyanto, 2022).

Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which an actor/discourse serves as an intermediary in the formation of relations among others. A higher betweenness centrality score means that more relations among actors/discourses were bridged by that actor/discourse (Eriyanto, 2022).

Closeness centrality measures the proximity of an actor/discourse to all others in the network. A higher closeness centrality score indicates that an actor/discourse is more easily reachable or can more easily disseminate information across the network. In the case of actors, higher closeness centrality reflects their capacity to more efficiently access or spread information to other actors (Eriyanto, 2022).

### Dominant Actors

During the period from November 3, 2022, to August 17, 2023, this study identified 276 individual actors who articulated discourses regarding the implementation of ASO in Indonesia. These actors were spread across 104 organizations. The organizations engaged in the debate on ASO implementation were distributed into nine categories, as presented in Table 2. Collectively, these organizations formed an actor network, which is illustrated in Figure 1, while the results of the centrality analysis on this network are presented in Table 3.

Table 2. Distribution of the number of organizations within organizational categories  
(source: author's analysis, 2025)

No	Category	Number of Organization
1	Association	6
2	Regulatory Body	9
3	Educational Institution	4
4	Legislative Body & Political Party	5
5	Civil Society	13
6	Non Government Organization	4
7	Local Government	43
8	Central Government	3
9	Enterprise/Corporation	17




Figure 1. Actor network in the debate during the implementation of ASO (source: author’s analysis, 2025)

Table 3. Results of actor network centrality analysis in the debate during the implementation of ASO (source: author’s analysis, 2025)

No	Name	Variable	Frequency	Degree (%)	Betweenness (%)	Closeness (%)
1	Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Kominfo)	organization	55	3,71	0,24	1,61
2	House of Representatives (DPR)	organization	30	2,99	0,08	1,37
3	Citizens of West Java	organization	14	2,61	0,05	1,27
4	Citizens of Central Java	organization	12	2,20	0,03	1,18
5	Citizens of East Java	organization	9	2,12	0,03	1,16

Note: frequency refers to the number of discourses articulated by the organization

Based on the degree centrality analysis, the most dominant actors were Kominfo, followed by DPR, citizens of West Java, citizens of Central Java, and citizens of East Java. The dominance of these five actors in the ASO debate was further reinforced by the results of the betweenness and closeness centrality analyses. Both metrics produced similar findings, showing Kominfo as the top actor, followed by DPR, citizens of West Java, citizens of Central Java, and citizens of East Java. Thus, these five actors not only held extensive connections with other actors in the network but also played the most influential role in mediating relations among actors and in being the most closely connected to others in the network.

Kominfo’s position as the most dominant actor in the debate is attributable to its central responsibility for the implementation of ASO. Of the 55 discourses articulated by Kominfo, only four carried negative sentiment, indicating that the ministry consistently

framed ASO implementation and its surrounding aspects in a positive light. This pattern demonstrates an intentional effort by Kominfo to shape how other actors perceived and evaluated the ASO process. In effect, Kominfo exercised substantial discursive power by circulating affirmative narratives that positioned ASO as both necessary and beneficial.

Indirectly, Kominfo attempted to “impose” its will to accelerate the ASO in Indonesia. This finding aligns with Fasta et al. (2023), who argued that Kominfo’s dominance in the digital broadcasting transition resulted in a form of “enforcement” that often neglected broader societal interests.

Thus, Kominfo’s attempt to “enforce” the implementation of ASO can be understood through Hajer’s concept of discourse institutionalization. Because Kominfo simultaneously functioned as both the principal producer of ASO-related discourse and the authoritative policymaker responsible for implementing the transition, its preferred discourse entered the public debate already predisposed toward institutionalization. In Hajer’s terms, Kominfo’s narratives did not compete on equal footing with those of other actors; rather, its institutional authority allowed its discourse to operate as the default frame for policy justification. This asymmetry created a discursive environment in which alternative or critical coalitions faced structural disadvantages from the outset. Consequently, even when competing actors articulated negative evaluations of ASO, their discourses were far less likely to gain institutional traction. The implications of Kominfo’s dominance for the configuration and relative strength of competing discourse coalitions become clearer in the subsequent section on coalition dynamics.

Beside Kominfo, other dominant actors also emerged from the grassroots, namely the citizens of West Java, Central Java, and East Java. Their prominence becomes particularly salient when contrasted with Kominfo’s structurally advantaged position described above. While Kominfo’s dominance was rooted in institutional authority and discursive power, the prominence of these citizen actors resulted from the cumulative frequency and consistency with which individuals from these regions appeared in news reports. Importantly, these actor labels do not represent unified provincial populations; they are methodological constructs produced through the coding procedures of DNA. In DNA, each quoted individual—such as “A, a resident of Central Java,” or “B, a resident of Central Java,”—is coded as a distinct individual actor but grouped under the same organizational category when their affiliations are similarly reported in the news. As a result, numerous separate individuals from these provinces collectively generated high degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality for their respective organizational categories. This outcome aligns with the logic of DNA, in which structural prominence may emerge from aggregated individual voices connected through a shared organizational label rather than from coordinated collective action (see Patria et al., 2024; Silalahi, 2023).

This dominance of citizen actors, in fact, reflects widespread public dissatisfaction with the ASO implementation. Most citizen statements appear consistent with the public criticisms identified in previous studies (Fadhilah et al., 2023; Prabowo et al., 2024, p. 10), including frustrations over set-top box (STB) distribution, perceived burdens placed on low-income households, and concerns about unequal access to digital infrastructure. This pattern of grassroots resistance was further echoed by DPR, which also emerged as a dominant actor in the network. Several DPR members articulated negative discourses, generally opposing the ASO policy on the grounds that it imposed disproportionate burdens on society and overlooked pressing public needs—an alignment that becomes even more apparent when contrasted with Kominfo’s tendency to push for ASO realization without adequately accommodating the needs of broader stakeholders (Fasta et al., 2023).



## Dominant Discourses

The implementation of ASO in Indonesia triggered diverse responses from various actors. The responses articulated by these actors in relation to policy implementation were correlated with policy beliefs, which reflected certain preferences and convictions regarding the policy phenomenon (Leifeld et al., 2022). Differences in policy preferences subsequently gave rise to debates among actors during the policy process (Leifeld, 2017). Policy actors employed discourses as a means of framing their policy preferences, aiming to influence other actors with the ideas they promoted. Consequently, the debate tended to be dominated by discourses articulated by particular actors (Hajer, 1993).

Figure 2 illustrates the network of discourses articulated by actors in the debate on ASO implementation in Indonesia. In total, 78 concepts (discourses) were identified. The results of the centrality analysis of the discourse network are presented in Table 4.




Figure 2. Discourse network in the debate during the implementation of ASO (source: author's analysis, 2025)

Table 4. Results of discourse network centrality analysis in the debate during the implementation of ASO (source: author's analysis, 2025)

<i>Degree Centrality</i>				
No	Name	Variable	Frequency	Degree (%)
1	C14	Concept Label	15	1,88
2	C60	Concept Label	21	1,83
3	C19	Concept Label	10	1,83
4	C115	Concept Label	11	1,80
5	C45	Concept Label	20	1,77

<i>Betweenness Centrality</i>				
No	Name	Variable	Frequency	Betweenness (%)
1	C14	Concept Label	15	0,04
2	C9	Concept Label	11	0,03
3	C115	Concept Label	11	0,02
4	C93	Concept Label	8	0,02
5	C60	Concept Label	21	0,02
<i>Closeness Centrality</i>				
No	Name	Variable	Frequency	Closeness (%)
1	C14	Concept Label	15	1,59
2	C60	Concept Label	21	1,55
3	C19	Concept Label	10	1,55
4	C115	Concept Label	11	1,51
5	C45	Concept Label	20	1,51
Note: frequency refers to the number of organizations that articulate the discourse				

The degree centrality analysis showed that discourse C14 (the achievement of free STB distribution, both by Kominfo and private broadcasting company), articulated by 15 actors (organizations), received the highest score at 1.88%. The discourses with the second to fifth highest degree centrality scores were, respectively, C60 (the benefits of digitalization for society), C19 (digitalization oriented toward the interests/readiness of various stakeholders), C115 (the need to intensify public outreach), and C45 (societal readiness for digital transition). The analysis also revealed three other discourses with the same score as C45, namely C61 (the benefits of digitalization for the state), C37 (the implications of digitalization for society), and C52 (mux operators' commitment to STB distribution), which occupied the sixth to eighth positions in the degree centrality ranking.

The betweenness centrality analysis similarly showed that discourse C14 obtained the highest score at 0.04%. The discourses ranked second to fifth in betweenness centrality were C9 (ASO drives the sales of electronic devices (TV/STB)), C115, C93 (the need to ensure the availability of STB stock in the market), and C60. Six other discourses shared the same score as C60, namely: (1) C45; (2) C19; (3) C56 (broadcasting institutions have prepared the infrastructure); (4) C120 (digital TV); (5) C61; and (6) C116 (the availability of certified STB stock in the market). These six discourses therefore ranked sixth to eleventh in the betweenness centrality analysis.

Meanwhile, the closeness centrality analysis produced similar results to the degree centrality analysis. C14 again ranked highest with a closeness centrality score of 1.59%. The second to fifth highest discourses were C60, C19, C115, and C45. The analysis also found that discourse C37 shared the same closeness centrality score as C45.

Based on the analysis of degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality, discourse C14 was the most dominant. Additionally, several discourses were found to be relatively dominant, as they consistently ranked within the top five in degree centrality, namely C60, C19, C115, and C45, and also obtained significant scores in betweenness and closeness centrality. Discourses C61, C37, and C52 also shared similar degree centrality scores with C45 at the fifth rank and were therefore considered relatively dominant. However, these discourses were not regarded as highly dominant as C45 because their betweenness and closeness centrality scores did not place them in the top five.

The presence of these five dominant discourses provides insights into the overall landscape of the debate. Discourse C14 (the achievement of free STB distribution by Kominfo and private broadcasting company), as the most dominant, was articulated negatively by 11 actors and positively by 4 actors. This indicates that many actors criticized the government (Kominfo) and private broadcasting company for their performance in distributing free STBs to low-income households.

Discourse C60 (the benefits of digitalization for society) was articulated negatively by 1 actor and positively by 21 actors, indicating that the majority supported ASO implementation as a step in digital broadcasting, considering it beneficial for the wider society.

Discourse C19 (digitalization oriented toward stakeholders' interests/readiness) was framed negatively by 8 actors and positively by 2 actors. This reflects concerns that the government (Kominfo) paid insufficient attention to the readiness of the public and other stakeholders affected by ASO.

Discourse C115 (the need to intensify public outreach) was articulated positively by all 11 actors who raised it. This shows that many actors urged Kominfo to intensify its outreach efforts so that the public would be better prepared for ASO.

Meanwhile, discourse C45 (societal readiness for digital transition) was framed negatively by 16 actors and positively by 6 actors. This indicates that many actors opposed ASO implementation, as they believed that a significant portion of the public was not yet prepared for the transition.

From these five dominant discourses, it can be concluded that the ASO debate was largely characterized by criticism. Many actors consistently criticized and opposed ASO, framing it as a policy with wide-ranging societal impacts. Nevertheless, some actors supported ASO implementation, arguing that it was beneficial as part of the digital broadcasting transition. With ASO, digital TV broadcasting could be optimized by stations, thereby providing audiences with higher-quality content and a wider variety of programs.

These findings are consistent with Fadhilah et al. (2023), who showed that ASO implementation in Indonesia triggered polarized opinions on social media. Pro-ASO actors argued that ASO benefited society, while anti-ASO actors believed it disadvantaged the public, particularly those not economically prepared to purchase STB devices. Similarly, this study found that anti-ASO actors criticized the government for neglecting public readiness in implementing ASO. This is reinforced by the finding that the government and private broadcasting company, as the entities responsible for procuring and distributing free STBs to low-income households, had not yet carried out their responsibilities optimally.

### **Discourse Coalitions and Their Influence on ASO Implementation**

This study also aimed to identify the formation of discourse coalitions and their influence on ASO implementation in Indonesia. A discourse coalition is a group of actors who articulate discourses within a particular sentiment, thereby forming a coherent storyline related to specific issues or aspects of policy (Sumirat & Eriyanto, 2023). Discourse coalitions serve as a means for policy actors to reinforce their policy beliefs in policy debates, which in turn may influence policy directions (Eriyanto & Ali, 2020; Hajer, 1993).

This study referred to affiliation networks to identify discourse coalitions, as such networks link actors with the discourses they articulated (Eriyanto, 2022). Modularity analysis was then applied to identify clusters of actors and discourses based on proximity and cohesiveness (Eriyanto, 2022). These clusters were further analyzed to determine the existence of discourse coalitions in the debate surrounding ASO implementation in Indonesia.

To ensure effective analysis, the affiliation network excluded discourses that were only expressed positively by all actors who issued them. Figure 3 illustrates the affiliation network and the clusters formed through modularity analysis.




Figure 3. Clusters in the affiliation network focusing on discourse in the debate during the implementation of ASO (source: author's analysis, 2025)

The figure shows that the affiliation network was divided into seven clusters. Cluster 1 consisted of one discourse (C55) and eight actors, representing groups such as: (1) industry associations (AIPTI and Gabel); (2) educational institutions (ITS); (3) technology communities (Komunitas Gadtorade); (4) local government agencies (Parungpanjang Fire Department, Polsek Gandus Palembang, and the North Jakarta and Thousand Islands Fire and Rescue Agency); and (5) technology companies (PT Pampas–Nextron Teknologi Indonesia). Five actors framed C55 positively, arguing that certified STBs were unlikely to be defective and that reported cases of explosions were due to electrical short circuits or uncertified STBs. These actors tended to have technical expertise in electronic devices. Meanwhile, three local government actors framed C55 negatively by citing cases of exploding STBs.

Cluster 2 consisted of four discourses (C15, C43, C49, and C52) and ten actors, including regulatory bodies (KPI Pusat, KPID West Java, KPID North Sumatra), private broadcasters (ANTV), regional communication agencies (e.g., Diskominfo Surabaya, Diskominfo Badung, and Diskominfo Blitar), and the central government (Kominfo). Most actors framed these discourses negatively, particularly criticizing free STB distribution by LPS as failing to meet targets. Only four actors expressed positive sentiment: Kominfo (C49), ANTV, Diskominfo Surabaya, and Diskominfo Badung (C52).

Cluster 3 contained eight discourses (C3, C25, C41, C47, C60, C99, C103, and C124) and 15 actors from various groups, including broadcasting associations (ATVLI), regulators (KPID South Sulawesi, KPID West Sumatra), law firms (Gede Aditya & Partners), legislatures (DPR, MPR), private broadcasters (Lombok TV, Indosiar), civil society (Citizen of West Nusa Tenggara), NGOs (PR2Media, ICT Institute), local government (North Sumatra Province), regional agencies (Diskominfo Batanghari), central government (Ministry of Home Affairs), and technology companies (Telkomsel). Negative sentiments dominated several discourses, particularly C3, C25, C41, C47, and C124, except for DPR, which framed



C3 positively. Meanwhile, discourses C60 and C103 were largely framed positively, though DPR and Citizens of West Nusa Tenggara articulated them negatively. Because of the coexistence of multiple, divergent storylines—support for ASO, criticism of multiple ASO phases, and objections to mux rental policies—Cluster 3 did not form a coherent coalition.

Cluster 4 consisted of six discourses (C4, C19, C24, C51, C73, C122) and ten actors, including broadcasting associations (ATVSI), professional associations (HIPMI), universities (ITB, Universitas Jakarta), civil society (Citizens of Riau Islands), student organizations (HMI), regional agencies (Diskominfo Lampung), the central government (Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs), and media companies (MNC Group, PT EMTEK). The majority framed these discourses negatively, criticizing ASO for ignoring stakeholder readiness, lacking legal clarity, and potentially reducing broadcasters' revenue.

Cluster 5 contained seven discourses (C33, C37, C45, C46, C66, C67, C116) and 18 actors, including regulators (KPID Bali, KPID Riau Islands), legislatures (Bekasi DPRD), research institutions (CISSREC, Nielsen Media Indonesia, Poltracking Indonesia), civil society from nine provinces (e.g., Bali, Banten, Lampung), regional agencies (Diskominfo Lebak), and local governments (Padawaras Village, Tasikmalaya). Most discourses were framed negatively, criticizing ASO due to limited public understanding, scarce and expensive certified STBs, and public unpreparedness. However, several actors—including KPID Bali, Nielsen, electronics retailers, and some residents—expressed positive sentiment.

Cluster 6 consisted of five discourses (C14, C18, C31, C40, C106) and 14 actors, including legislatures (DPD), civil society (Gorontalo residents), political parties (Golkar), regional agencies (e.g., Diskominfo Buleleng, Diskominfo Ciamis, Diskominfo Grobogan), and local governments (e.g., Pandanan Village, Tenjolaya Village, Busungbiu District). Most discourses in this cluster were framed negatively, particularly criticizing the shortcomings of the free STB program. However, seven actors expressed positive sentiment, such as regional agencies and local governments acknowledging progress in STB distribution.

Cluster 7 contained four discourses (C16, C17, C30, C102) and 17 actors, including regional agencies (e.g., Diskominfo Gresik, Diskominfo Gunungkidul, Diskominfo Jayapura), logistics company (PT Pos Indonesia), and local governments (e.g., Dandim Lamongan). In contrast to Cluster 6, most actors here framed discourses positively, highlighting progress in free STB distribution through government cooperation and local involvement.

Based on the analysis of these seven clusters, discourse coalitions were identified in all clusters except Cluster 3. Importantly, the composition of pro-ASO and anti-ASO coalitions reveals notable asymmetries in terms of expertise, institutional leverage, and the types of arguments advanced.

The pro-ASO coalitions—primarily reflected in Cluster 1 and Cluster 7—were composed of technical experts, technology companies, local implementers, and regional agencies. These actors tended to advance technocratic and operational narratives, such as the safety of certified STBs or progress in local-level STB distribution. While these coalitions were smaller, their arguments drew on technical credibility and were often aligned with Kominfo's official stance. Their proximity to implementation processes further strengthened the coherence of their supportive storylines.

In contrast, the anti-ASO coalitions—seen in Cluster 2, Cluster 4, Cluster 5, and Cluster 6—were far broader and more diverse, involving legislatures, civil society groups, broadcasting and industry associations, NGOs, regional governments, and citizens from multiple provinces. These coalitions advanced societal and political critiques, including public unpreparedness, burdens on low-income households, unclear regulations, and

concerns about broadcaster losses. Because these actors represented groups more directly affected by ASO, their arguments reflected distributional concerns, equity issues, and structural policy gaps.

Cluster 3 represents a particularly important analytical finding. Despite containing many key actors—including the DPR, MPR, NGOs, regional governments, and broadcasters—it did not form a coherent coalition due to divergent storylines: while some discourses supported certain aspects of ASO, others criticized the sequencing of phases or objected to mux rental policies. The cluster illustrates that opposition to ASO was dispersed across multiple issue frames rather than unified under a shared narrative, which weakened the collective force of critical voices and created discursive openings that allowed Kominfo to maintain narrative dominance.

According to Hajer (Hajer, 1993, 2002), discourse coalitions succeed when they achieve discourse structuration and discourse institutionalization. Discourse structuration occurs when highly relevant policy actors—such as government, target publics, or interest groups—endorse certain discourses, potentially abandoning their previous positions (Hajer, 2002). This may then lead to discourse institutionalization, whereby dominant discourses are adopted by policymakers to shape policy directions (Hajer, 1993).

The analysis showed that six clusters forming discourse coalitions only reached the stage of discourse structuration. Of the six coalitions, four promoted storylines critical of ASO and its aspects, particularly free STB distribution, while two supported ASO or praised aspects of its preparation. However, none of these storylines shifted the course of ASO implementation. This was evidenced by the continued rollout of ASO, culminating in the total switch-off on August 17, 2023.

This limited impact aligns with findings by Sumirat & Eriyanto (2023), who showed that even a dominant anti-policy coalition may fail to alter policy outcomes when the state holds firm control. In the case of ASO, the state's political determination, institutional authority, and control over the regulatory process outweighed the fragmented discursive resistance.

## **Conclusion**

This study shows that the debate on Indonesia's analog switch-off (ASO) unfolded within an asymmetrical discursive field dominated by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Kominfo). As the primary policy implementer and the most central actor in the network, Kominfo consistently promoted affirmative narratives about ASO, while citizens and the House of Representatives (DPR) advanced critical discourses concerning unmet public readiness, unequal digital access, and failures in set-top box distribution. These dynamics demonstrate that large-scale techno-policy reforms are not merely administrative decisions but contested communicative processes in which state, industry, and public actors negotiate the meaning and legitimacy of infrastructural change. In this sense, the study contributes to communication policy scholarship and the political economy of media by illustrating how state-led digital transitions are debated in the public sphere and how discursive resistance is constrained when institutional power is unevenly distributed.

The findings show that six discourse coalitions emerged during the debate, yet their influence remained limited to discourse structuration. Critical coalitions were unable to reach institutionalization, largely because Kominfo occupied a structurally privileged position: it was simultaneously the dominant discourse producer and the authority responsible for implementing ASO. This dual role enabled Kominfo's preferred frame to

become the default reference for policy justification. Even though citizens and the DPR became structurally central actors, their negative evaluations did not translate into policy change. The network thus highlights the limits of counter-discourses in settings where the state holds disproportionate narrative and institutional power.

Methodologically, this study demonstrates the utility of Discourse Network Analysis (DNA) for mapping discursive struggles within media policy transitions. However, its scope is confined to the ASO moment within a broader digitalization trajectory that has unfolded over two decades. Future research should adopt a longitudinal DNA to capture evolving coalitions, dominant storylines, and shifting actor configurations from the early 2000s to the post-ASO era. Qualitative follow-up through interviews or focus group discussions with key actors—such as Kominfo, industry associations, and civil society groups—would also enrich understanding of their strategic choices and perceptions of discursive influence. Together, these approaches would deepen insight into how discourse, power, and institutional authority interact in shaping Indonesia's digital media landscape.

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