Nation State: Journal of International Studies, December, 2022
Vol. 5(2), pp. 140 – 155.

E ISSN: 2621-735X
P ISSN: 2620-391X

Research Article

Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the
Himalayan Border?
Surwandono, Derina Faslig Silitonga
Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social Science and Political Science,
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta – Indonesia
Corresponding Email: wsurwandono@yahoo.com
Submission: 25 July 2022 | Accepted: 13 December 2022

Abstract
The development of differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has been one
of the constant factors leading to the protracted dispute in the Himalayan border. Since
the outbreak of war in 1962, recriminations and clashes between military forces have
continued along the 3,488 km disputed area. Since 1980 both parties have continued to
make efforts to resolve disputes with a fair and acceptable solution. Unfortunately, the
initiations of these peace efforts have always been deadlocked. At first, in responding to
India, China preferred to be passive. However, recently China has begun to respond with
an assertive behavior. The deployment of army troops, military equipment, covert attacks,
and massive infrastructure development was carried out by China in strategic Himalayan
border. This study explores the changing of China’s assertive strategy in the Himalayas
by employing offensive realism and using qualitative approach. This study has found that
the changing behavior of China’s is related protecting its national interests and territorial
sovereignty as well as a form of affirming the stability of China's dominance in the region.
This study's results will provide an overview that there has been a shift in China's strategy
for managing its border conflict with India.
Keywords: Dispute, Border, Foreign Policy, Assertiveness, Military.

INTRODUCTION
Diplomatic relations between China and India began in 1949 when India recognized
China as a communist country. However, this relationship started to face challenges when
India was included in a list of countries whose conflict border with China has not resolved
affairs. In a nutshell, this conflict came in the undemarcated border Line of Actual Control
(LAC), which separates the territory controlled by India and China (Kumar, 1963). Zhou
Enlai first used the term LAC in his annual letter to Jawaharlal Nehru. As time went by,
the meaning was developed to refer to the formed line after war in 1962. The disputed
area is divided into three major sectors. First, the Eastern Sector covers Arunachal
Pradesh. The middle sector covers the regions of Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, and
Sikkim. Whereas western sector covers the Ladakh region Xinjiang (Xuecheng, 2011). The
ambiguity of the LAC has triggered turmoil that resulted in hostility between India and
China (Sukman, 2017).

©Author(s) 2022. This work is licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 International License

140
5

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

Tensions of the dispute began to arise in 1954 when China claimed the Barahoti area
and protested the Indian troops. The dispute in the Barahoti region continued until 1956,
expanding China's claims to Tun Jun La and Hup Seng Khud(Ahmed, 1955). In 1962, the
peak of conflict, sparked by the actions of Chinese troops crossing the McMahon Line and
seizing mountain trails as well as cities. At that time, China was also building a road
across Aksai Chin in Indian-claimed territory. The war was marked as the peak of this
dispute for one month. More than 1,000 Indians were victims and 3,000 Indians were
taken as prisoners. On the other hand, nearly 800 Chinese military troops died. Shortly
after the war broke out, Premier Zhou Enlai of China declared a ceasefire, unofficially
withdrawn the closest border to the Chinese armies after had conquered territory
(Goldman, 2020).
Tensions came to a head again in 1967, Nathu La and Cho La's mountainous route
that connected Sikkim, was under India's protection, and the Tibetan autonomous region
in China. The tension escalated as Indian troops installed barbed wire along the border.
The clashes occurred when Chinese military units fired artillery shells into India. In this
conflict, India won by destroying the Chinese fort at Nathu La successfully. The year of
1980, became a meeting point for a shift direction as a treaty settlement and was more
representative for both parties. China and India agreed to negotiate according to clear
political lines and principles to find justice and an acceptable solution. China accepted
India's offer to resolve the dispute in stages on a sector-by-sector basis. During this period,
the two countries' military forces were still seen actively conducting surveillance and
training in the disputed areas (Chauduri, 2020).
From 1998 until 2003, a Joint Working Group was conducted between state
delegations to design instruments to assist the Line of Actual Control (LAC) area's
stability. In April 2005, an agreement was signed which regulates political parameters
and basic principles of border dispute resolution. This agreement also emphasizes the
commitment to implement the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Calm
along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China Border Territory and the 1996
Agreement on Measurement to Build Confidence in Military Fields along the Line of
Actual Control (Singh, 2011).
Since this agreement was formed, China-India diplomatic relations have gradually
improved. However, several agreements reached by the two countries as a deliberate
resolution guideline have not been effective. Disputes in the border area continue to occur,
with the two countries still firm in their respective principles. The Docklam Standoff
incident on August 28, 2017, became a momentum to mark the impasse of diplomatic
efforts on border disputes by the two countries. This incident began with the resistance of
the Indian army over the entry of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops in the
Docklam border area to build roads in the region. Protests were not only fulfilled by India
but also Bhutan, a country that has territorial rights over Docklam. The situation was
getting worse when the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a map depicting
Docklam as part of China's sovereignty. Military intervention worsened the dispute this
year. They were threatening each other until an army clash between the two countries in
the border area (Ratha, 2020).
141

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

In 2020, tensions between Indian and Chinese military forces returned. This time's
escalation was caused when China sent thousands of troops to the targeted area, which is
the LAC route. During the confrontation, an Indian commander was pushed and fell into
a river canyon. This prompted hundreds of troops from the two sides to encounter a battle.
At least this clash managed to kill 20 troops. To date, no official boundaries have been
negotiated. The two countries continue to strive to assign their ambitions for the region.
In 2020, tensions between Indian and Chinese military forces were back. This time's
escalation was caused when China sent thousands of troops to the targeted area, namely
the LAC route. During the confrontation, an Indian commander was pushed and fell into
a river canyon. This then prompted hundreds of troops from the two sides to do battle. At
least this clash managed to kill 20 troops. To date, no official boundaries have been
negotiated. The two countries continue to strive to establish their ambitions for the region
(Davidson, 2020). For China, the South Asian region is essential, although its area lacks
a major geopolitical priority in some literature. The geographical location of South Asia,
which is very strategic, followed by population growth and the issue of nuclear and
terrorism, has caused this region to require a large allocation of attention. China considers
the security stability of the South Asian region as valuable for its security, especially to
maintain its economic development ambitions and prevent other external and domestic
threats from crossing borders (Freeman, 2018). South Asia is a critical area in which
Beijing aims to revise the political and security order of Eurasia and become an Asian
power. Not to mention the fact that the United States has also made South Asia a key area
in Washington's goal to build a free and open Indo-Pacific has prompted a period of
strategic competition between China and America (Adhikari, 2014).
Some of the facts above are the driving factors for China's ambitions in the South
Asian region. Recently, China has become one of the parties in the public spotlight because
of its actions and approaches. Some researchers have become more assertive, especially
since the transfer of power under Xi Jinping. Since being elected Secretary-General of the
Chinese Communist Party at the end of 2012 and then becoming president in early 2013,
Xi has made many breakthroughs in China's foreign policy. Starting from the events of
2017-2020, China's militarization strategy is more intense to be enacted. China is actively
sending thousands of troops to guard and conduct training in the border region. Some
researchers considered this to be closely related to the leadership principles adopted by Xi
Jinping. Xi has a strong notion about the military. Xi's idea is often described as "a set of
guiding principles for building a new type of people's army that dares to fight and win
wars" (建设 "敢, "). Xi's persistence with the military sector is also supported by the fact
that the Chinese Communist Party invests a large amount of budget and political capital
to build a "world-class military" by 2050 (Duchâtel, 2021).
Besides, China is also strengthening its strategy through infrastructure
development. Chinese government documents even report that China intends to build 624
border villages in the disputed Himalayan region. The perception was then widespread in
the environment. Some groups considered that Xi was implementing the same strategy as
the previous leader or assuming that Xi's plans in the Himalayas were almost the same
with the South China Sea settlement. However, people do not think that the current

142

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

approach is more assertive. Even though it creates a paradox in the international
environment, especially over the treatment of military forces against India, China still
makes militarization the central axis to defend its claim in the Himalayan border region
Himalaya (The Times of India, 2021).
Recently, Xi Jinping has become one of the figures who has become the international
community's talk. This is due to his bold leadership style and Xi's way of reversing the
direction of China's foreign policy, which is becoming open and assertive on the global
stage. Therefore, many academics have tried to explore Xi Jinping's foreign policy potion.
One of them is an article by Cabestan, In his research, Cabestan explained that Xi had
shown a strategic transformation in China's foreign policy. The strategy Xi introduced
stands in stark contrast to the mandate of the previous Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping.
Cabestan explained that China's foreign policy could be more proactive, assertive, and
aggressive. Xi called for being more active in the international environment and creating
a mutually beneficial atmosphere of cooperation, particular with developing countries.
This is evidenced by the ambition of China's participation in global governance such as
the UN, BRICS, APEC, and the G20 agenda (Cabestan, 2021).
However, it seems that Cabestan's writing does not fully describe Xi Jinping's era's
foreign policy. Instead of building a mutually beneficial and global order, what is
happening now is that China is increasingly aggressive and courageous. This statement
was proven through the research by Chang-Lio, Chang-Lio explained that new courage
had been found in China's foreign policy. This policy has recombined the well-known
historical views of China and demonstrated even more significant transformation. ChangLio also mentioned the escalation of tensions with Chinese partners in Asia. This is
because the Chinese government has placed a much stronger emphasis on the priority of
securing China's borders. China assumes maintaining a stable environment as a core
element of foreign policy in the Xi Jinping era. China believes that a regular region will
allow China to focus on its domestic resources in a solid economic foundation (Nien-chung
Chang-Liao, 2016).
As talked about China's foreign policy under Xi Jinping's leadership, several
academics said that the evidence of China's current foreign policy's courage and
assertiveness could be seen from the military position is still the central axis. This
statement is then supported by research written by Michael D. Swaine, Swaine explores
the notion of a "more assertive" Chinese stance concerning the existence of the Chinese
military or the People Liberation Army / PLA. Swaine observed some of China's actions in
deploying and maintaining several ballistic missiles across Taiwan, surveilling the US
military along China's maritime periphery, testing new weapons, and deploying troops to
safeguard regional claims. It can be concluded that this courage was present because of
the PLA's position increasingly influential in China's political system. However, the PLA,
which is declared very conservative and nationalist, is not the only interested group
behind China's current foreign policy-making (Swaine, 2012).
Although the conflict on the Himalayan border is not new in international
negotiations, this issue is still interesting to study. In practice, China has always seemed

143

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

ambitious to defend its territorial claims. Joshi, in his writing said that China's tough
stance on efforts to resolve border disputes with India is one of the factors in the failure of
any negotiation efforts undertaken. Joshi shows the reality of the collapse in 2005
agreement due to both parties' severe claims. China has seen it easy to spend billions of
US dollars to increase surveillance at its borders. Under Xi's leadership, China was more
ambitious to fight back and strengthen its position in the Himalayan border region.
Hundreds of military troops were deployed, Xi Jinping even prepared an infrastructure
development strategy to reinforce claims (Joshi, 2011).
From some of the studies above, it can be seen that there have been significant
dynamics in the direction of China's foreign policy. The research also touches on the factors
that influence China's increasingly assertive policies in the global sphere, including
guarding territories and border areas. In the case of border disputes in the Himalayan
region, one of the articles alludes to China's aggressive approach, which is the cause of the
failure of negotiations. Therefore, the author will analyze why China has implemented an
aggressive policy in dealing with India in the Himalayan region through the following
research. The following article will be formulated using an offensive realist approach.
METHOD AND THEORY
In this study, qualitative research methods will be used. Qualitative research aims
to describe and analyze phenomena, events, dynamics, attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions
of something from written or oral data and observable actors. Through several
descriptions, the aim is to find an explanation that will lead to a conclusion. In researching
why China's assertive strategy on the Himalayan Border? The data collection technique
used is to conduct a literature study. Through this technique, research data is obtained
through literature in books, academic journals, online bulletins, and articles on the
internet that can be accounted for academically. The research will begin by compiling basic
assumptions and thinking rules from existing data to be interpreted and used in research.
In order to answer the research question, the realist perspective has a significant
role in providing a comprehensive explanation of the international system in practice.
Realism considers that a sovereign state is an important and most influential actor in the
global environment. The normative basis of realism is national security and state survival.
This is what drives the doctrine and foreign policy of the realists. Realists have three main
distinctive points. First, Self-Help considers that no one can be trusted except their own
country, so whatever other countries do is considered a threat. Thereby, the state must
always be vigilant and enhance the military as a defense. Second, Survival considers that
the country will do anything if it takes to survive in a lawless environment of International
Relations (no single country is strong and can regulate another country). And the last one
is Statism, where the state is the sole actor in achieving national goals. The state will do
whatever it takes to achieve these goals. The roles of individuals, NGOs, IGOs are not
considered. "Leave all to your country and you will prosper"(Jackson, R. H; Sorensen,
2007).

144

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

Realism has two views to explain a country's power: Defensive realism and
Offensive realism. Defensive realism states that the state's function is to defend, not to
attack, in maximizing power. Defensive realism believes that if the shape maximizes
power too much, it will impact the creation of an alliance to match the power of a country.
Meanwhile, Offensive Realism argues that the military is not only for defense but also for
attacking to maximize capacity as long as there is an opportunity even if its army is
minimal. Therefore, they have to continue to optimize power because that is the only way
to defend the country (J.J, 2001).
In the context of offensive realism, the state tends to confront or conflict for its own
sake and maximize power. The state is considered appropriate to behave in this way to
survive in the international system. The foremost expert on offensive realism,
Mearsheimer further outlines five basic assumptions: (1) the global system is anarchic.
Anarchy, referred to in this case, leads to a lack of hierarchy or the absence of a central
authority that the state can turn to for help in an emergency; (2) offensive Realism
emphasizes that the great powers are the leading players in international politics, and
each of them has an offensive military capacity. In this case, Mearsheimer also suggests
that there is a potential for a country to be dangerous to other countries; (3) the state can
never ascertain the intentions of other countries; (4) the main goal of the state is survival.
In this case, survival is much more important than any other motive; (5) the state is a
rational actor, where the state thinks strategically and acts intentionally in the best
interest. Mearsheimer then summarizes these five basic assumptions into three general
patterns: fear, self-help, and maximizing power; and (6) power is a tool to ensure survival.
In recent times, China, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has adopted an assertive
approach to defending its many claims, including the case in the Himalayan Region. In
social psychology, assertiveness usually reflects an attitude of defending personal rights
and expressing thoughts, feelings, and beliefs in a direct, honest, and appropriate way
that does not violate the rights of others. In international relations, assertiveness can be
seen as a definite and straightforward way to defend the rights or claims of a state (Doshi,
2019). In the following research, the author will employ the realism framework,
particularly offensive realism, to analyze why China maintains an assertive strategy or
approach towards India in dealing with the Himalayan border conflict. In short, through
this approach, it can be assumed that China's assertive attitude towards India on the
Himalayan border can be seen from the indications of an increasingly massive military
contribution in policy patterns and motivation for self-defense, in this case, regional
sovereignty. In addition, this is also related to maintaining China's dominance in the
Himalayan region or even regionally. Under Xi's leadership, it can be seen that China is
getting serious about deploying its military might to regain its historical position against
countries in the region. In one report, the Foreign Affairs article argues that China's
assertiveness in several cases, including the violent confrontation with India in 2020,
directly results from President Xi's view of China's role in the world. China is also known
to formulate new laws as a ploy to turn border disputes into sovereign conflicts. Therefore,
China predicts various opportunities to maintain or increase its claims' dominance in the

145

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

Himalayan region by deploying military power with aggressive infrastructure
development ambitions.
RESULT AND ANALYSIS

China's strategy in dealing with India on the Himalayan border
The border dispute along with the 3,488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC) area is the
most complicated history between China and India. Disputes in the three sectors of the
region have sparked much political turmoil and fighting in recent decades. Treaties from
the British colonial era in South Asia are at the heart of this dispute. India believes that
it inherited a firm border from Britain, while China considers the border issue unresolved.
When the People's Republic of China took power in 1949, it abandoned all previous foreign
treaties as unequal treaties imposed on it during a century of humiliation, demanding the
renegotiation of all its borders. Over the past few years, both China and India have quickly
sought to resolve the dispute in several negotiations and agreements. Unfortunately, the
talks always end in a dead-end and fail (Thakker, 2020).
Several previous studies agree that China and India border disputes were often
marginalized in China's foreign policy priority scale in the past. This was because, at that
time, the focus of China's foreign policy was still very closely related to significant powers
such as the United States and countries off its eastern coast. Even at that time, the
fundamental interests of China's leaders were still struggling to consolidate their power
in order to pursue an agenda to improve China's position in the international sphere.
However, the above situation began to change in Mao's 1962 leadership year. Mao
reevaluated his approach in viewing the Sino-Indian border dispute by adopting a more
escalation policy. Mao's initial policy was India's confrontational Forward policy. Mao
decided that coercive action was needed to pull India's leader out of complacency. The
escalation policy starts from a light level through armed coexistence. Under the policy,
Mao instructed Chinese border troops to continue patrols within the 20-kilometer buffer
zone. Patrol forces were directed to counter Indian positions and build fire posts if they
received orders from the central to take attacks. During Mao's reign in 1965, China made
a highway in the disputed Aksai Chin region to connect Tibet with Xinjiang (Westcott,
2019).
Jiang Zemin followed Mao's approach to the China-India border dispute. During
Jiang's time, the policy embodied the development of Joint Working Group negotiations
and various trust-building measures. Jiang makes the status quo approach a priority in
his best interests. The China-India border dispute was still a significant issue when the
leadership changed to Hu Jintao. China's foreign policy started to adopt a cooperative
approach. Hu seeks to stabilize China-India bilateral relations by trying out several new
diplomatic initiatives to revitalize border negotiations. Hu designed some small
concessions and good gestures towards India. Another minor settlement was made in the
Political Parameters and Guiding Principles of the 2005 Treaty, signed during Premier
Wen's visit. China explicitly agreed to "safeguard the interests of the resident population."
At that time, the China-India border dispute under Hu's leadership was marked by an

146

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

increase in the intensity of the round of formal border negotiations. In April 2013, China
had attacked in the LAC area. A PLA paramilitary unit put up an administrative tent 19
kilo meters in the disputed area (Konwer, 2011).
Unfortunately, the initiation of the negotiation round during Hu's leadership did not
immediately resolve the border issue. Both China and India are still fighting to maintain
their claims and power in the 3 Himalayan sectors. China's approach and strategy towards
the region continued until the leadership of Xi Jinping. In the early period of his
administration, Xi was very active in reversing China's growing governance norms. Xi
seeks to develop his ideological innovations, which are essential in an aspirational struggle
for the 'China Dream' concept. Xi's vision of a rejuvenated China saw him deviate from
the conservative foreign policies of Deng, Jiang, and Hu. It takes a more assertive and
proactive role in international affairs. This proactive grand strategy is designed to address
a range of domestic and international security issues Xi has identified as a threat to China.
Xi specifically said that sovereignty, security, and development interests must be
protected in the international environment. Meanwhile, issues of political security and
social stability must be maintained in the domestic sphere. In the China-India border
dispute, Xi adopted a policy of status quo that manifested his leadership as a continuation
of negotiations with India without making significant demands or offering territorial
concessions. In addition, Xi was also adopting an escalation policy. Since late 2013, PLA
units have been massively patrolling the border area. Not a few analysts think that these
patrols are indirectly deployed to give pressure on India (Jacob, 2021).
Theoretically, it is argued that to push China's ambitions of global domination in
responding to the border issue, Xi has notably refrained and chosen to be a bit cautious in
taking risk of utilizing the military. Unfortunately, this is the opposite of what is
happening in the field. At the end of 2014, India and China had clashed in the Demchok
area. China is known for trying to change the situation on the ground by demanding a halt
to construct an Indian canal that China considers crossing borders. In 2015, clashes broke
out between Chinese PLA troops and Indian troops in the Burtse region. This happened
when Indian troops were found to destroyed a Chinese-built surveillance tower in the
patrol lane (Chauduri, 2020).
Slow yet sure, China's assertive attitude in the disputed area began to be seen
through the assertiveness of the PLA troops towards border claims. This year, the PLA
committed military reforms and established the Western Theater Command to expand its
mission scope and combat readiness. Thus, it can be seen that China employed a military
approach as the primary strategy to deal with India in the Himalayas. This provides an
implication for the number of violations that increased in 2017. This year was also seen
as the beginning of the crisis when the Indian Army blocked the construction of a road by
China in Doklam. India took this action based on the interpretation of the Bhutan-India
Friendship Agreement, which was agreed in 2007. India considers the road construction
project by China to be able to change the status quo which has security implications. China
responded by stating that India's actions violated international law (Karackattu, 2020).
Furthermore, China is known to be involved in military shows in the Eastern sector,

147

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

particularly Arunachal Pradesh and Tawang. At that time, China responded to India's
actions by conducting patrols with jets very assertively. China's response was realized by
launching two Sukhoi-27 jets. China also launched two unarmed aircraft to carry out
security and neutralization of the region. This year China reaffirmed its position by
showing its level in the military field. In addition to naval training, China also deployed a
fleet of battleships and a military parade that deployed 12,000 combat-ready troops and
600 military equipment to 100 advanced aircraft (Lidarev, 2018).
In 2020, tensions between China and India are getting higher. This time the center
of the conflict escalation occurs in the western sector. The exchange of accusations between
the two sides occurred as Beijing again opposed New Delhi's efforts to strengthen
infrastructure in the border area. Despite having been forced to withdraw, China still
insists on patrolling the border. The fighting culminated when the Indian commander was
pushed off a ridge by Chinese troops. The battle was executed using stone, iron, and other
emergency weapons. China has yet to confirm how many PLA soldiers died, but at least
20 Indians were killed. Reports from satellite images show that there may be 1,000 PLA
troops.
It is known that the PLA army has three border defence centres based in the
disputed area (Aksai Chin). The first two were taken from the 362nd Frontier Regiment
(32160部队) and located at Khurnak Fort (库尔那克堡) in the northern shore of Pangong
Lake and Spanggur Lake (斯潘古尔) in the southern. The third was located at Kongka
Pass (空喀山口) close by the Indian outpost at Gogra/Hot Springs and belonged to the
363rd Frontier Regiment (69316部队). There was a squadron of patrol boats (山顶上的国
门舰队) on Pangong Lake itself. The PLA troops also mobilized additional conventional
combat troops from the 6th Mechanized Division. The Chinese forces were even indicated
to be equipped with artillery. Indian media also reported that the deployment of Chinese
forces had spread between 1,200 to 1,500 personnel around the LAC. Another 5,000 troops
were diverted to other areas to support patrols. From the description above, it can be seen
that China is aggressively using a military approach to achieve its control goals in the
Himalayan region (Boyd, 2018).
In order to reinforce the military strategy, China is known for designing discourse
on infrastructure development in the Himalayan region. The ambition of the
infrastructure aspect dates back to 1950, when China built roads in the Himalayan region.
At that time, China needed highways and railways to solidify and consolidate control over
Tibetan territory. China's leader, Mao, ordered the PLA to build roads linking Xinjiang,
Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunan with Tibet. In recent years, the construction of these roads
and railways have spread to various parts of India, even Nepal and Bhutan. The railway
lines built were interconnected between areas in the border (Wu, 2020).
As one of the steps to secure the claimed territory, China is very ambitious in
continuing the construction of the road. In the next period, China is known to conduct the
development of strategic areas in the Docklam plateau. The PLA uses the road to narrow
access to the Chicken Neck strategic area in the Siliguri corridor. The Siliguri Corridor is
the center of the rail and highway network that connects West Bengal to the rest of India,

148

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

including Eastern regions such as Assam, Nagaland, and Sikkim. This corridor also
connects the rail network to all military formations along the LAC. According to a 2016
report, China has strengthened its construction capabilities to build air bases, cantons,
and other physical infrastructures along the border. In 2016, connectivity among border
areas occurred on land and in the air by building three airports in Shigatse, Ngari Gunsa,
and Gonggar. China even added to the reconstruction of the airport by building
underground shelters and new runways. This assertive attitude is further supported by
deploying missile batteries to the air surface and sophisticated fighter jets located above
4,274 m above sea level (Jakhar, 2020).
China's assertive stance on the border dispute with India was further emphasized
when reports from satellite observations said China had completed the construction of
villages in the border region. The structure of the village is close to the LAC from Xinjiang
to Bhutan. The development of the village was followed by the construction of 118,800 km
of highways so that the villages have direct access to asphalt and concrete roads. These
villages also have access to cellular communication networks. In October, hundreds of
people were moved to the new villages singing the national anthem and waving the
Chinese flag. A satellite image report published by Maxar Technology said that military
storage bunkers followed the village development tactic. The construction of this village is
considered China's move to show the expansion of its campaign to fortify border areas
(Myers, 2021).
In addition to affirming military use and expanding construction development in the
Himalayan Region, in the early quarter of 2022, China enacted a 'new land border' law.
The law highlights that Beijing will defend its national sovereignty, security, and
territorial integrity. China said it would take all steps to protect its interests within the
defined borders by any means, both military and economic. Another critical aspect of the
border law is that it provides a 'civil-military fusion strategy that emphasizes improving
public services and infrastructure along the border and including residents in territorial
defense (Luo, 2021). Some experts even say the law would justify China's more assertive
stance in resolving border disputes on terms it likes. This law would lead to further
militarization of the border area, which some observers interpreted as making the
negotiation process more difficult. Months before the law passed, China's Ministry of Civil
Affairs released a new set of names for 15 locations in the Indian state of Arunachal
Pradesh. The new name is used for several locations, such as residential areas, mountains
and rivers. Some observers said that this move was another Chinese attempt to increase
pressure on India for control of one of the disputed areas (Wolf, 2022).

Factors behind the Changing Pattern of China's Foreign Policy
From the previous explanation, we can see from China's approach pattern or
strategy in maintaining its existence on the Himalayan border. It can be seen that the
strategy of military deployment followed by China's infrastructure development is
currently increasingly assertive. Looking at the factors behind strategy implementation,
the realist concept can provide a comprehensive explanation. National security has driven

149

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

China's foreign policy and doctrine in defending its territory. From the perspective of
offensive realism, we can also see that China's recent assertive strategy towards India is
in its national interest in its territory or sovereignty. In the case of dealing with India,
China uses military instruments to protect its country, attack, and maximize its strength.
The military's contribution to China's policy pattern in the Himalayas is influenced,
among other things, by the leadership principles adopted by Xi Jinping. During Xi
Jinping's reign, military power was defined as having the courage to fight and win on the
ground and a foreign policy tool. At the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party in 2017, Xi Jinping even delivered a speech on how China can achieve national
rejuvenation. Xi also explained a timeline for the implementation process was setting up,
which was related to military modernization. Xi went on to say that this is meant to create
a strong military. Xi's strong view of the military is evidenced by the fact that the Chinese
Communist Party invests huge budgets and political capital to build a world-class
military. China has also carried out impressive modernization of the PLA (The People's
Liberation Army). The progress of the PLA can be seen from its improvements in
technology to personnel skills. This modernization process is also supported by a
significant increase in the calculation of China's defence spending.
Therefore, to achieve national rejuvenation, Xi also emphasized the importance of a
military force that can fight and win. The use of the military aspects has provided evidence
that China is currently using the terms coercion and force to change the status quo at the
border. The deployment of thousands of troops, armed patrols, deployment of security
equipment, and the construction of military outposts is evidence that currently, military
power is still one of China's central axes in waging its aggressive ambitions against the
Himalayan border region. Even during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese government
was still carrying out its military mission by directing the PLA to launch covert attacks
on the icy border in the Ladakh region. The clash in early 2020 that left dozens of soldiers
dead is also believed that China was involved with sufficient preparation (E. S, 2021).
As aforementioned, China's assertive military strategy is followed by massive
infrastructure development efforts in border areas. Beginning in 1950, China has built
hundreds of thousands of kilometers of highways and railroads. Recently, the ambition to
make 624 border villages has even started to be completed. The development project has
given China a strategic position and a potential offensive platform against India in the
Himalayas. Apart from increasing Beijing's influence in countries near the border, the
main goal of its ambitious expansion of infrastructure around the Himalayas is to facilitate
the mobilization of Chinese troops. It is designed to deal with scenarios in the event of a
military confrontation with India.
When analyzing the distance between India and China to the center of the LAC
sectors, India has shorter access distances than China. For example, to reach Arunachal
Pradesh, China has to cover about 2,371 km, while India only has to cover about 1732 km.
Next, for access to the Sikkim area, which is the intersection between China, Bhutan, and
India, China has to cover about 2,095 km from Beijing, while New Delhi only covers a
distance of about 1,508km. This also applies to one of the strategic areas of Ladakh. China

150

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

has to travel a distance of 2176 km from Beijing while China is only about 1023 km from
New Delhi. The figures above have shown a quite significant comparison regarding the
distance traveled by both parties to reach the disputed border area.
The comparison of distances proves that to get several strategic points in the
disputed area. China had to take longer than India to legalize the reasons behind all
efforts to build roads, railways, airports, and villages around LAC. Moreover, when viewed
geographically, the condition of the Himalayan border, especially for the Ladakh part, is
quite extreme. The high altitude followed by icy weather conditions makes it difficult for
military troops to move. Through this infrastructure development ambition, China will
facilitate China's access to deploy troops quickly in an attack scenario by India. The
construction of roads followed by the construction of logistics and fuel posts will ease the
distribution of military logistics materials when Chinese troops patrol in border areas.
China's militarized infrastructure development projects helped renew China's
expansionist strategy at strategic points of the LAC. One such ambitious project can be
seen from building a road and rail network in the Silluguri Corridor, Sikkim. The
construction of this road has proven offer China access to launch massive attacks when
the escalation of conflict with India occurs in Doklam (Chellaney, 2021).
This is also in line with China's assertive approach to building hundreds of villages
near the LAC from Xinjiang to Bhutan. In addition to strengthening military facilities, the
construction of this village is a form of China's efforts to fortify the entire southern side of
the country from Indian pressure. In 2019, the Tibetan national news website published
an article essentially saying that China's rural development ambitions around the LAC
attempt to consolidate the spirit of border development. In this case, China integrates the
region and human resources, military property, information teams, sea, and air units to
conflict and dispute mediation service stations. The construction of the information system
is aimed at carrying out border information gathering operations by the Chinese
intelligence team. The infrastructure development projects that have been carried out
regularly have multiplied the proxy of China's strategy to strengthen its pressure on both
land and maritime with India. Border villages are believed to limit the expansion of the
old military power when military operations or clashes occur. In addition, to prevent a
decrease in the strength of China's territorial claims, it is clear to give the border guard
permission to consolidate his position along the border (Westcott, 2021).
Besides some factors described above, it can be seen that the implementation of the
following assertive strategy over the Himalayas was a step for China to maintain
dominance or to maximize its power in the region. Again, this was related to external
influences in the dynamic pattern of China-India relations in the area. According to some
researchers, the China-India border dispute is becoming very difficult because the parties
involved are two Asian giants who both have ambitions to dominate the region. This
situation is also related to the involvement of external parties who are worried that it can
exacerbate the dispute that has already occurred. Although not a major geopolitical
priority, China considers South Asia a critical region. This triggered a period of strategic
competition when the United States helped made the South Asian region a key area of
open Indo-Pacific development. The US-China bilateral rivalry and confrontation have
151

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

clouded cooperation in South Asia. India is one of the strategic partners chosen by the US
to offset China's influence in South Asia (Panda and Baruah, 2019).
Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy released after the Doklam standoff has
heightened China's suspicions of India. Through this cooperative relationship, India
offered that Washington would facilitate cooperation in the defense industry, arms sales,
and intelligence sharing. Washington then positioned New Delhi as a potential
strategically.[32] China looks very sensitive to the Indo-Pacific strategy coupled with the
fact that the alliance formed by the Indo-Pacific strategy has been seeking expansion of
support to some of China's potential partners. This raises China's concerns about the
existence of its power in South Asia. Since then, the US has become one of the most critical
factors in China's policy towards India. For China, the presence of US-India cooperation
can undermine the stability of border security. Thus, China increasingly emphasizes
assertive approaches in dealing with India in the Himalayas (Sun, 2020).
In the international realm, assumptions about China's strategy and approach in
border disputes with India continue to grow. particularly in Xi Jinping's leadership, this
assertive stance has emphasized China's political resolve. China is taking aggressive steps
to protect its territorial sovereignty, protect its country from India and as a step to
maintain its dominance in the region. Unlike India, China has consistently deployed
thousands of troops along with other military tools. This attitude is also supported by
efforts to develop its border infrastructure on land, air and sea over the last three decades.
In order to ensure troop mobilization, the infrastructure is used as a shield to strengthen
China's claims to its border areas. Thus, China's development maintains dominance and
resistance to pressure from India and other external parties. Despite the differences in the
national interests of India and China, China's strategy is considered as one of the triggers
on why of every attempt to reach an agreement on the Himalayan border often encounter
the failure (Ranjan, 2015).
CONCLUSION
China's diplomatic relations with India started in 1949, and began to hit a dead end
when India was included in the list of countries whose borders have not been completed
with China. The conflict in the 3,488-long region began to emerge when China expanded
its territorial claims on the border between China and India. Since the time of mutual
claims, China and India have often been involved in attacks that have claimed thousands
of lives. In response to the heated situation, the both sides-initiated dispute resolution
efforts to find common ground in 1980. Plans for dialogue and agreements continued,
unfortunately, they always hit a dead end and failed. Tensions between military forces
continued to occur until the 2017-2020 period, China-India diplomatic relations were
indicated to be at their worst. For a country, the territory is a sensitive matter regarding
the dignity and sovereignty of a nation.
At first, China's assertiveness was not too much in dealing with India on the
Himalayan border, but lately, China has become more assertive in taking a proactive
approach. From an offensive realist perspective, China's assertive strategy can be

152

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

interpreted as China's steps in protecting its national interests in territorial sovereignty,
as a form of anticipation against India and asserting China's dominance in the region.
This research has outlined some of China's assertive attitudes and actions under Xi's
leadership in the Himalayas case. First, by maximizing its military instruments, China
utilizes its military power to defend and attack. This can be seen from the increasing
violations and escalation of conflict between China and India. The military's contribution
to China's policy pattern in the Himalayas is also influenced by the leadership principles
adopted by Xi Jinping, especially related to his ambitions of national rejuvenation in
military modernization. Xi still uses military instruments to protect the security of his
region, especially from external attacks, including border issues. Second, it is carried out
through efforts to build large-scale infrastructure and follow the increase in the
aggressiveness of military instruments in border areas. In addition to building roads,
bridges, and land, sea, and air transportation, China is also known for creating hundreds
of villages on the edge of the Indian border. This infrastructure development is carried out
to facilitate access and mobilization of security forces in the event of an attack by India
and considers the disputed area to have extreme geographical conditions. Third, China
has recently enacted a new land border law which, for some observers, is interpreted as
justification for China's overall assertiveness in resolving border disputes on terms it likes.
The law highlights China's firm stance in defending national sovereignty, security, and
territorial integrity and will also lead to further militarization of border areas. This new
law is also meant to complicate the entire negotiation process in the Himalayan region
going forward.
This paper has provided an overview that China's strategy has been changing,
especially under Xi Jinping's leadership, in managing its border conflict with India. The
application of the offensive realist framework in this paper has succeeded in explaining
several reasons that have caused China under the leadership of Xi Jinping to adopt a more
assertive approach to managing its border conflicts. Given that until now border conflicts
in the Himalayan Region continue to occur and because this paper stops at explaining the
reasons for China to adopt a more assertive approach, it would be better in the following
research to discuss in more detail the impact of China's implementation of an assertive
policy in Himalayan border management. Furthermore, research can also be about how
India responds to and faces China's assertiveness in the Himalayan Region.
REFERENCES
Boyd, v. (2018) Understanding the military build-up on the China-India border (Online).
Available at: www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/06/china-india-border (Accessed:: 29 Oktober
2021).
Cabestan, J.P. (2021) ”China’s foreign and security policy institutions and decision-making Under
Xi Jinping”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 23(2).
Davidson, H.(2020) The Guardian’ Explainer: what is the deadly India-China border dispute
about?. Available www.theguardian.com/world/2020what-is-the-deadly-india-china-borderdispute-about (Accessed: 05 April 2021).

153

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

Duchâtel, M. (2021) Military Options for Xi’s Strategic Ambitions (Online). Available at:
https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/publications/china-trends-military-options-xisstrategic-ambitions (Accessed: 05 April 2021).
E. S, D. & Schmall, E. (2021) China Appears to Warn India: Push Too Hard and the Lights Could
Go Out. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/28/us/politics/china-india-hackingelectricity.html (Accessed: 02 July 2021).
Freeman, Carla P. (2017) ‘’China’s regionalism foreign policy and China-India relations in South
Asia”, Contemporary Politics, 24(1), pp. 81-97.
Goldman, R.(2020) India-China Border Dispute: A Conflict Explained. Available at:
www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/world/asia/india- china-border-clashes.html (Accessed: 20 July
2021).
J.J.,M. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W.Norton& Company.
Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2007) Introduction to International Relations: Theories and
Approaches. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jacob, D. J. (2021) The China-India Border Issue in 2013: Point and Counter-Point (Online).
Available at: www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/the-china-india- border-issue-in-2013point-and-counter-point/ (Accessed: 06 April 2021).
Jakhar, P. (2020) India and China race to build along a disputed frontier. Available at:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53171124 (Accessed: 08 April 2021).
Joshi, S. (2011)” China and India: Awkward ascents, Orbis, 55(4), pp. 558-576.
Karackattu, J. T. (2020) “The Corrosive Compromise of The Sino-Indian Border Management
Framework: From Doklam to Galwan”, Asian Affairs, 51(3).
Konwer, S. (2011) “India-China Relations: Limited Cooperation and A Chequered Future”, The
Indian Journal of Political Science, 71(4), pp. 283-292.
Kumar, M. (1963) ”Sino-Indian relations 1950-59”, International Studies, 5(1-2).
Liu Xuecheng. (2011) ”Look beyond the Sino-Indian border dispute”, China Report, 47(2), pp. 149168. doi: 10.1177/000944551104700207.
Myers, S. L. (2017) Beijing Takes Its South China Sea Strategy to the Himalayas. Available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/27/world/asia/china-bhutan-india-border.html (Accessed:
08 April 2021).
Nien-chung Chang-Liao. (2016) ”China’s New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping”, Asian Security,
12(2), pp. 82-91. doi: 10.1080/14799855.2016.1183195.
Panda, J & Baruah, A. (2019) ”Foreseeing India-China Relations: The compromised context of
rapproachement”. Asia Pasific Issues.
Ranjan, A. (2016) ”India-China boundary dispute: An overview”, Asian Affairs, 47(1).
Ratha, Keshab Chandra. (2020) “Deciphering the Doklam Standoff: The Context of the Contest”,
Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, 24(2),pp. 196-215. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0973598420939685.
Scoot, David. (2008) ”Sino-Indian Security Predicements for the Twenty-First Century”, Asian
Security, 4(3), pp. 244-270. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14799850802306468.
Singh, Z. (2011)” After the hiatus: India-China border diplomacy since the 1970s, China Report,
47(2).
Sun, Y. (2020) China’s Strategic Assessment of India (Online). Available at:
https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-india/ (Accessed:: 09 April
2021).

154

Surwandono & Silitonga, D.F. (2022) “Why did China's Assertive Strategy on the Himalayan Border?”,
Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 5(2), pp. 140 – 155. Doi: 10.24076/nsjis.v5i2.820

Thankker, Aman. (2020) Sino-Indian border clashes: Implications for U.S.-India ties (Online).
Available at: www.csis.org/analysis/sino-indian-border-clashes-implications-us- india-ties
(Accessed:: 05 April 2021).
The Times of India. (2021) The Times of India’ India China aggressively building new villagages
in disputed borderlands (online). Available at:
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-aggressively building-new-villages-indisputed-borderlands-in- (Accessed: 05 April 2021).
Wesrcott, Stephen P. (2021) “Seizing a window of opportunity? The causes and consequences of
the 2020 Sino-Indian border stand-off”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs,
8(1).
Westcott, Stephen P. (2019) ”Mao, Nehru and the Sino-Indian Border Dispute: A Poliheuristic
Analysis”, 75(2), pp. 155-171.
Wu,

J. & Lee Myers, S. (2020) Battle in the Himalayas (online). Available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/18/world/asia/china-india-border-conflict.html
(Accessed: 08 April 2021).

155