

Programmatic Goods and the Key to Electoral Victory in the Regional Elections in Kulon Progo, Special Administrative Region of Yogyakarta.

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Abstract

This research examines how programmatic goods were used by candidates to win the 2017 regional elections. Furthermore, this research attempts to examine the involvement of regional-owned enterprises and the private sector in funding candidates' 'campaigns' by supporting government programmes. Deliberately or not, programmatic goods were packaged by incumbents through populist programmes. In Kulon Progo, populist programmes such as home rehabilitation assistance indirectly became 'engines' for the electoral victory of Hasto Wardoyo and Sutedjo in the 2017 regional election.

Keywords: *programmatic goods, funding of populist programmes, incumbents*

Introduction

Unlike other areas in the Special Administrative Region of Yogyakarta, the regional election in Kulon Progo exhibited an interesting phenomenon. The incumbent, Hasto Wardoyo, with his 'pro-people' programmes was predicted to win the election. When this election was held on 15 February 2017, this prediction proved accurate: Hasto Wardoyo and his running mate Sutedjo received a supermajority—85%—of votes. Meanwhile, his opponents, the pair of Zuhadmono and Iriani, received less than 15%.

This research argues that Hasto's victory in the Kulon Progo election could not be separated from the 'pro-people' programmes he implemented beginning in 2011. These 'pro-people' programmes include the Tomira (Toko Milik Rakyat, Locally Owned Stores), classless healthcare at the regional hospital, Bela Beli (buy local), and Bedah Rumah (home rehabilitation assistance).

This research argues that the several programmes implemented by Hasto while serving as Regent of Kulon Progo have emphasised programmatic goods—the receipt of material resources by beneficiaries of government programmes (Aspinall, 2014, p. 4)—presented through populist programmes. These populist programmes significantly increased popular support for the incumbent, Hasto, and his running mate Tedjo, in the 2017 regional election. More specifically, the populist programme that offered the greatest programmatic goods was the home rehabilitation assistance programme. This research will explore how this programme was formulated and then used by the incumbent as an ‘engine’ of electoral victory.

Following his first term as regent, Hasto Wardoyo contested the 2017 Kulon Progo election. In this, he was paired with his deputy for the 2011–2016 term, Sutedjo. Ultimately, this pair of candidates, backed by the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party—Struggle, PDIP), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party, PKS), Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, PAN), Partai Golongan Karya (Working Groups Party, Golkar), Partai Nasdem (Nasdem Party, Nasdem), and Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (People’s Conscience Party, Hanura), was elected to a second term.

For a time, this pair of candidates was unchallenged in the regional election. By the final day of registration, no other candidates had formally registered. From the beginning, it was predicted that Hasto would readily win the election. Despite this prediction, General Elections Commission for Kulon Progo extended the candidate registration period. Only then did an opposition candidate emerge: HM Zuhadmono and his running mate Iriani Pramestuti. They were backed by Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia Movement Party, Gerindra), Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party, Demokrat), and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party, PKB).

The parties backing Hasto and Tedjo controlled 27 of the 40

seats in the regional parliament of Kulon Progo. Meanwhile, those backing Zuhadmono and Iriani Pramestuti controlled 13 seats. The registrar for the 2017 regional election in Kulon Progo listed 332,211 voters (161,348 men and 170,863 men), who cast their votes at 937 ballot boxes spread through twelve districts (General Elections Commission of Kulon Progo).

As predicted before the election, Hasto and Tedjo emerged victorious, receiving a supermajority of votes. According to the plenary meeting of the General Elections Commission of Kulon Progo, Hasto and Tedjo received 85% of the vote, while their opponents Zuhadmono and Iriani Pramestuti received 14%.

Table 1
Voting Results in Kulon Progo Regency,
Based on Plenary Meeting of General Elections Commission

Candidate Pair	Backing Party	Votes	Percentage
Zuhadmono–Iriani Pramestuti	Gerindra, Demokrat, and PKB	36,874	14.4 %
Hasto Wardoyo–Sutedjo	PDIP, PKS, PAN, Golkar, Nasdem, and Hanura	220,643	85.6 %

Source: Data collected from General Elections Commission of Kulon Progo and other sources

According to the General Elections Commission of Kulon Progo, Hasto and Tedjo were victorious in every one of Kulon Progo's twelve districts, with particularly large victories in Kokap, Temon, Naggulan, and Sentolo districts.

Patronage and Electoral Politics

Many have argued that the 2014 legislative election was heavily tainted by the practice of money politics. The Dewan Kehormatan Penyelenggara Pemilu (Honorary Council of General Election Organisation, DKPP) and Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) described the practice of patronage (through money politics) in the 2014 legislative election as massive and brutal ("Money Politics", 2014).

A review of the literature indicates that patronage politics have long coloured elections in Indonesia (Scott, 1972; Slater, 2004; Mietzner, 2007; Tomsa, 2008; Ambardi, 2009; and Stokes, 2013). Candidates contesting presidential, legislative, and regional elections have long used patronage politics as part of their campaign strategies (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2015, p. 10). According to Shefter, patronage is a form of profit-sharing between individuals and voters, workers, and campaign activists in their search for political support (Shefter, 1994, p. 238, n.3, see also Hutchcroft, 2014, pp. 176–177). Patronage, thus, may refer to the distribution of money, goods, and services, by politicians to individuals and/or communities. Patronage may refer to politicians' distribution of money and goods, either from their own coffers (through vote buying, for instance) or from public budgets (through pork-barrel projects funded by the government, for instance). Nonetheless, there is a difference between patronage and the programmatic distribution of materials to the beneficiaries of government programmes, such as the provision of free healthcare services to the poor (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2015, p. 4)

Patronage politics are closely linked to clientelism. Patronage here refers to the distribution of material goods and other benefits by politicians to voters and supporters. Meanwhile, clientelism refers to a type of relations between politicians and voters/supporters. Clientelism refers to 'personalistic power relations' (Hutchcroft, 2014, p. 177), with material support being exchange for political support. Hutchcroft, referring to earlier writers, particularly Scott (1972), emphasises that clientelistic relations are characterised by face to face relations. Meanwhile, Hicken (2011) explains that definitions of clientelism centre around three points. First is contingency, or mutual exchange, the giving of goods or services by one party (patron or client) in direct response to the receipt of benefits from another party (Hicken, 2011, p. 291). Generally, material resources are exchanged for votes or other political forms of support. Second is hierarchy, i.e. the unequal power relations between patrons and clients. Third is repetition, the continued

practice of clientelistic exchange.

However, as addressed before, not all forms of patronage are distributed through truly clientelistic relations. For instance, candidates may distribute goods to voters whom they have never met and whom they may never meet again. Such relations can not be considered continuous or repetitive, as these interactions are solely one-off instances. Likewise, the element of contingency may not be present where recipients do not feel pressured to choose a specific patron in elections (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2015, p. 5).

Several projects investigating Indonesian politics following the fall of Soeharto have discussed the practice of patronage, clientelism, and money politics. Generally, these studies have produced numerous terms through empirical practices. Existing studies have generally examined different subjects than the ones discussed in this article. Several have emphasised the identification of patronage politics as a force for cohesion, playing an important role in the political system. For example, Slater (2004) and Ambardi (2009) have examined the cartelisation of political parties in Indonesia with an emphasis on the distribution of material goods. Ambardi, as with Mietzner (2007), has also investigated political fundraising. Responding to criticism of his writings regarding patronage, Mietzner (2013) has also looked at the question of political party funding, seeing oligarchy and the lack of state subsidies as more important variables than parties' distribution of economic resources to their voters and supporters. Other research has examined patronage's role in political parties (for example, Tomsa, 2008).

Meanwhile, research into 'oligarchy', such as that of Robinson & Hadiz (2004; 2013), as well as Winters (2011; 2013), has argued that wealthy actors dominate Indonesian democracy and emphasised the role of patronage in politics. However, these studies have not examined mechanisms in detail. Meanwhile, not a few contemporary studies into local governance have touched on money politics, illegal fundraising, and informal relations as symptoms of corruption that connect local bureaucrats, political elites, and

business elites (i.e. Hadiz, 2010; Hidayat, 2009; Choi, 2009; 2011). Conversely, studies into political parties and electoral competition have tended to emphasise other factors, including party mechanisms and candidate figures (Mujani, Liddle, & Ambardi 2012).

Nonetheless, several studies have touched on the aspects discussed in this article. For example, Buehler (2008) has discussed the importance of ‘personal networks’ in regional elections. Studies of electoral politics have also touched on aspects of patronage and clientelism as they intersect with other phenomena. For example, Tans (2012) examined the various coalitions mobilised in regional elections and compared them across several dimensions, including their different relations and view of patronage politics. Likewise, studies by Allen (2014) and Tomsa (2014) have explicated the effects of clientelism in the fragmented party system.

Based on this above review of the literature, it is evident that detailed investigations into the mechanisms through which patronage functions in regional and general elections in Indonesia are lacking. Meanwhile, the book *Politik Uang di Indonesia* (‘Money Politics in Indonesia’)—edited by Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati (2015)—has provided a rather detailed portrait of the practice of patronage in the 2014 legislative elections. This book presents two key findings: first, the patronage politics (including programmatic goods) was a central aspect of most candidates’ campaign strategies; second, in all parts of Indonesia, most candidates relied on informal networks of brokers, many of whom were members of their campaign teams, to reach voters. Several variations in patronage occurred, including vote buying; individual provision of gifts, services, and activities; the emphasis on club good; and pork barrel projects. In this book, vote buying was understood as the systematic distribution of money/material goods by candidates to voters several days prior to the election, with the implicit expectation that recipients would vote for the candidate in return. Meanwhile, the provision of individual gifts was understood as a more systematic means of vote buying, in which candidates give various forms of individual

gifts (calendars, keychains, etc.) to voters. As with the purchase of votes through the distribution of money and other material goods, candidates often provide or fund a number of activities and services for voters, such as free healthcare. Meanwhile, the emphasis on club good is understood as the practice of patronage to benefit social groups rather than individuals, such as through the provision of equipment for prayers, sports, music, agriculture, etc. Pork barrel projects, meanwhile, are defined as government projects intended to benefit certain geographical regions. These projects tend to be characterised by public interest, the use of public funds through the regional/national budget, as well as the expectation that the public will support a specific candidate (pp. 24–28). However, this book touches little on the treatment of programmatic goods in the 2014 legislative election.

Populist Programmes in Kulon Progo

Upon beginning his first term as regent of Kulon Progo in 2011, Hasto Wardoyo immediately implemented a number of populist programmes in various fields, including healthcare, social assistance, and finance. In the healthcare sector, Hasto and his deputy Sutedjo enacted a classless hospital programme. Through this programme, recipients of state health insurance programmes (through the Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial [Social Insurance Implementation Agency, BPJS] and Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah [Regional Health Insurance, Jamkesda) were no longer required to be treated in the third-class rooms of the Wates Regional Hospital. Instead, they could receive second or even first-class facilities while incurring third-class costs. In this, Hasto—a paediatrician by profession—sought to ease and simplify healthcare provision in Kulon Progo Regency.

Meanwhile, the most prominent populist social programme was the home rehabilitation programme, which involved two schemes targeted at repairing dilapidated homes. The first was

a central government programme, funded through the national budget, while the second was run collaboratively by the private sector in conjunction with the regional-owned enterprises in Kulon Progo. Research conducted by Wawan Mas'udi and Nanang Indra Kurniawan in 2017 with the title "Programmatic Politics Shapes Voters Preference: Kulon Progo Election, 2017" indicated that this programme was initiated in 2011 through the collection of data on poor families and people, which was compiled in a "poverty almanac". This album contained a detailed list of the poor in Kulon Progo, including their names and addresses, as well as profiles of their homes and causes of their poverty. This information was then used by the regent to improve social solidarity and collect money to fund home rehabilitation.

Households benefiting from this programme received a subsidy of ten million rupiah, while rehabilitation efforts here handled by communities. Communities where homes were renovated were expected to establish small committees to mobilise local resources. Home rehabilitation activities were held every Sunday, and generally the regent and donors would attend and distribute their donations. Every week, four to fourteen homes were renovated. In the five years of Hasto's leadership, some 6,000 homes were rehabilitated.

Meanwhile, several economic populist programmes were developed, including Tomira and Rasda (Beras Daerah, Regional Rice). These programmes emerged as a response to the expansion of local and national minimarket franchises in Indonesia. In Kulon Progo, minimarket franchises such as Alfamart and Indomaret began to mushroom in almost every district. This situation, in which minimarket franchises came into competition with local shops and markets, created jealousy among local merchants and entrepreneurs. This was rooted primarily in the enormous capital backing them, which enabled them to acquire strategic locations, gain access to facilities, and ensure the availability of diverse products as well as maximal comfort for customers.

Seeking to improve the competitiveness of local merchants, as

well as protect local products, the regent promoted the slogan *Bela Beli Kulon Progo* (Buy Kulon Progo -Products). To improve public welfare, the regional government of Kulon Progo issued Regional Bylaw No. 11 of 2011, which sought to protect traditional markets and administer shopping centres and modern shops. Article 14, Point C, of this bylaw required franchise minimarkets and similar ventures avoid competition with the people of Kulon Progo, stating “Modern Shops that are franchises and/or branches may not be located within 1,000 m (one thousand metres) of a Traditional Market.”¹

As a consequence of this bylaw, all minimarkets located within 1,000 m were required to decide whether they would not extend their permits, shut down, or be taken over by a local cooperative. Furthermore, through this programme all shops belonging to local residents were required to sell products produced by local communities or cooperatives. To date, at least twenty local food products have been sold in such stores, including *keripik belut* (eel crackers), *stik buah naga* (dragon fruit sticks), *peyek* (rice flour crackers), and coffee. Tomira are privately owned, and have formally existed since 2011—i.e. the passing of Regional Bylaw No. 11 of 2011 and its protection of traditional markets and administration of shopping centres and modern shops.

Meanwhile, through the Rasda programme, focus was given to the consumption of rice produced within Kulon Progo, rather than abroad (i.e. outside the regency or outside Indonesia). According to Hasto Wardoyo, the Beras untuk Rakyat Miskin (Rice for the Poor)—the national government’s rice subsidy programme—was hurtful. Much of the rice used was imported from Vietnam and India, and over its lengthy storage it often began to smell. Hasto stated that the rice harvests in Kulon Progo were sufficient to meet the demands of the rice subsidy programme. Annually, Kulon Progo produced

¹ Original: Toko Modern yang berstatus waralaba dan/atau berstatus cabang tidak boleh berjarak kurang dari 1.000 m (seribu meter) dengan Pasar Tradisional.

125,000 tons of rice, while only 7,000 tons was required for the rice subsidy programme. He also identified numerous benefits of buying local rice. First, the money went to local farmers and the state-owned rice company Bulog, rather than abroad. Second, the quality of rice could be guaranteed, as could its freshness owing to the minimal distance from production centres to consumers. He also expressed an intent to propose that Bulog distribute rice produced in Kulon Progo as part of its rice for the poor programme in Yogyakarta. At the same time, he required the 8,000 civil servants in Kulon Progo to purchase rice from local farmers.

Another populist economic programme was targeted at increasing batik production in Kulon Progo. The region has its own unique batik motif, known as *batik geblek renteng*. As a result of his “buy local” programme, the local batik industry grew rapidly. Previously, the annual production of *batik geblek renteng* in Lendah District had only been 40 thousand yards. As of the time of writing, production has increased to 200 thousand yards annually. *Batik geblek renteng* has not only been the pride of local residents, but become widely used; 80,000 students, 8,000 civil servants, and 4,000 staff wear *batik geblek renteng* uniforms. As such, more than 90,000 people have become regular consumers of *batik geblek renteng*.

Programmatic Good in Populist Programmes

Budihardjo (2009) indicated that a major issue being faced in the field of housing in Indonesia is the limited availability of accessible and decent housing for the poor. This is caused not only by the inability of the poor to access decent housing, but also the lack of sufficient housing subsidy systems and mechanisms, both on the formal market and on the informal market.

To address this problem, the government must prepare targeted and functional infrastructure and policy to ensure the availability of accessible housing, as well as subsidies for the poor. This is a logical consequence of the state’s recognition of housing as a fundamental need (Santoso, 2002).

Hasto Wardoyo, as the pioneer of the home rehabilitation programme, admitted to having three goals. This home rehabilitation programme was, first, intended to eradicate poverty. Second, this programme was hoped to promote mutual support and assistance in local communities. Third, this programme was believed to reduce the practice of bribery between the business sector and bureaucracy. When developers sought to gain permission for their projects, or to access government projects, they frequently resorted to giving bribes to bureaucrats. It was hoped that, instead, the business sector would use its money to fund the programme.

Meanwhile, according to the “poverty album” of Kulon Progo, in 2015 20% of the local population, some 50 thousand people, lived below the poverty line. Many of these people lived in dilapidated homes. Similar home rehabilitation schemes were common in Indonesia. However, unlike similar programmes, in Kulon Progo this rehabilitation was not funded entirely through the national/regional/village budget, but also by non-government actors. According to the 2015 Accountability Report and the End-of-Term Accountability Report for 2011–2016, the Kulon Progo government had rehabilitated 696 homes. Interestingly, in rehabilitating these 696 homes, the programme used private funds in the amount of Rp 13.96 billion; meanwhile, Rp 6.96 billion in stimulant money was taken from the regional budget.

However, according to Hasto Wardoyo, by early 2017 the number of dilapidated homes rehabilitated had reached 1,300 homes. He stated that the majority of these were funded by the private sector, as well as *zakat* (alms) collected from civil servants in Kulon Progo.²

“Home rehabilitation, through gotong-royong (mutual assistance), has reached 1,300 homes. Much of the budget for this has come from the private sector and

² Through the Ministry of Public Works, the Indonesian central government has also initiated a home rehabilitation programme. This programme has been funded entirely through the national budget.

zakat. This amount excludes those (homes rehabilitated) by the central government.” (Interview, February 12, 2017).³

Hasto used a different term to refer to private sector funding for home rehabilitation: *gotong royong*, or mutual assistance. This money originates from several sources, including profit sharing from partners (contractors) and 2.5% of the wages of the civil servants in Kulon Progo, as well as multiple other sources (Kusuma, 2015).

Again, programmatic goods are used in long-standing patronage systems. However, this research seeks to offer new contributions related to funding. Much of the literature has identified programmatic goods as coming from government budgets (at the national, regional, and village level). However, in Kulon Progo, funding for programmatic goods has come from other sources, including the private sector (contractors), alms, and the religious organisation Baznas (Badan Amil Zakat, or Zakat Distribution Agency).

Shefter defined patronage as the individual distribution of material goods by politicians to voters, campaign workers, and campaign activists, in search of political support (Shefter, 1994, p.283). Meanwhile, Aspinall (2013, p. 2–4) identified four patronage models. First, *vote buying*, the direct exchange of money, goods, or services for votes. Second, *club goods*, the provision of material compensation to specific voter groups or communities. Third, *pork barrel*, the creation of projects for the regions backing them. Fourth, *programmatic goods*, the strategic distribution of state resources based on programmatic political, financial, and service calculations, such as poverty eradication.

Meanwhile, according to Stokes (2009, p.10), there are specific criteria for the identification of *programmatic goods*. First, the programmes being intended to address ‘things subject to public

³ Original: Bedah rumah dengan cara gotong royong ini mencapai sekitar 1.300 rumah. Anggarannya banyak berasal dari bantuan swasta dan zakat PNS. Jumlah (bedah rumah) ini di luar yang dilakukan pemerintah pusat.

debate' through the creation of new policies that can provide material benefits to certain people or classes. These may include, for instance, fertiliser subsidies for farmers, increased pensions, and scholarships for children from poor family. Second, programme goals must be formally administered, with clear criteria for the distribution of programmes and resources. Third, these criteria must be actually realised in the distribution of programmes and resources.

Referring to Stokes, this discussion explores the use of programmatic goods in the populist programmes in the policies of Kulon Progo's regent, Hasto Wardoyo.

I. Giving Material Benefits to Certain Groups

Hasto's populist programmes as regent have specifically targeted the poor residents in Kulon Progo Regency, Special Administrative Region of Yogyakarta. More specifically, the home rehabilitation has been targeted at poor residents living in dilapidated houses. Beneficiaries of the programme have received significant material resources. Although beneficiaries do not receive money directly, the Kulon Progo government allocates Rp 10 million for home rehabilitation. Generally, benefits are given in material form, i.e. cement, sand, and wood. Three sources are used for this programme and its funding. First, the Baznas of Kulon Progo, partially funded from the *zakat* collected by civil servants in Kulon Progo. Second, the wealthy entrepreneurs who are close to Hasto. Third, the Forum for Corporate Social Responsibility, consisting of regional-owned enterprises (the water company, market bank), state-owned enterprises (National Bank), and the private sector (contractors, constructors).

II. Programme Goals and Regulations

The implementation of populist programmes in Kulon Progo has been regulated through regional bylaws and regent decrees. For the collection of corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds, the

Forum for Corporate Social Responsibility was established, and its involvement in the home rehabilitation programme, was regulated through Regional Bylaw No. 22 of 2012 regarding Corporate Social Responsibility. For instance, Article 5 of this bylaw requires all companies to have CSR programmes. Meanwhile, Article 6 of this bylaw deals with the scope of CSR, i.e. to support the implementation of social welfare programmes and improve the social environment. For technical guidelines regarding the implementation of this bylaw, Hasto issued Regent Decree No. 30 of 2013.

Hasto argued that the creation of these regulations (Regional Bylaw No. 22 of 2012 and Regent Decree No. 30 of 2013) was intended to ensure a legal basis for his populist programmes. He recognised that the collection of money from regional and national enterprises, as well as the private sector, was vulnerable to corruption.

“Even when our intentions are good, our programme includes fundraising efforts that require a legal umbrella. As such, to ensure no legal problems occurred, I passed that regional bylaw and regent decree.” (Hasto Wardoyo, Interview, February 12, 2017).⁴

III. Distribution of Goods and Programmes

The implementation of populist programmes in Kulon Progo underwent a CSR process as follows. Three channels were used for planning CSR programmes: corporations’ own initiatives, government initiatives, and societal initiatives. CSR programmes that were corporations’ own initiatives have included the planning of programmes as well as the determination of target goals. Meanwhile, government initiatives have been undertaken through proposals at the neighbourhood, sub-district, and district level. Meanwhile, societal initiatives have been implemented through the submission of potential social programme beneficiaries’ names by


⁴ Original: Walau tujuannya baik. Tetapi program ini termasuk di dalamnya soal penggalangan dana harus memiliki payung hukum. Maka itu, biar tidak terjadi masalah hukum kemudian saya membuat Perda dan juga Pergub.

neighbourhood, sub-district, and district leaders to the Forum of Corporate Social Responsibility of Kulon Progo. This forum read the proposals it received and selected programme beneficiaries, thereby deciding who would benefit from social programmes (such as home rehabilitation). Accepted beneficiaries would then receive social assistance, which would be reported to the Forum. Afterwards the forum would report to the Kulon Progo government to fulfil transparency and accountability requirements. The Kulon Progo government would then file a report to the regional parliament.

Based on this discussion, it can be surmised that the home rehabilitation programme initiated by Hasto Wardoyo as Regent of Kulon Progo could be classified as programmatic goods. This research will also show that this programme was used by the incumbent as a means of securing re-election in the 2017 elections.

Based on data collected in the field, three schemes have been used in the *gotong royong* home rehabilitation programme: through the Forum for Corporate Social Responsibility, second through the Baznas of Kulon Progo; and third through Hasto Wardoyo directly.

Figure 1
Scheme for the Home Rehabilitation Programme



Shifts in Populist Programme Funding, from Public to ‘Private’

The use of public funds (i.e. through the national/regional budgets) for candidates’ campaign activities has been common, as noted in research by Kemitraan and Perludem. According to their report, many candidates contesting legislative and regional elections use public funds for their programmatic politics and populist programmes. This is most common among incumbents, as such candidates have the authority to design programmes, allocated budgets, and distribute resources for the purpose of campaigning and expanding their political influence.

Several non-governmental organisations have attempted to supervise the practice of budgeting and using public funds for campaigns. ICW’s observations of legislative elections between 1999 and 2009 indicate the rampant use of public funds as campaign instruments (Badoh & Dachlan, 2010). Analysis of elections in 42 regions by FITRA also found increased use of social assistance during regional elections. According to FITRA, this increased allocation of public funds is intended to draw the sympathies of voters, particularly for candidates seeking re-election.

Similar findings have been made by IBC (2012). In the 2012 Jakarta budget, some Rp 1.37 trillion was allocated for grants, showing a consistent increase from 2007, when only Rp 177 billion was allocated. As such, the allocation of money for grants experienced increases of up to 215% in the two years preceding the election (IBC, 2012).

Research into the use of government grants and social assistance by five provincial governments in Java (Banten, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, and East Java) conducted by ICW and IBC made similar findings (ICW and IBC, 2013). In Banten, there was an increase from Rp 14 billion in 2009 to Rp 340.4 billion in 2011. Meanwhile, investigation of regional budgeting in West Java saw increases in financial assistance, grants, and emergency funds from 2009 to 2013. In 2013, the amount of grants provided through

the regional budget reached Rp 1.2 trillion (excluding operational money for elementary school and junior high school students), a ten-fold increase from 2009 (Rp 120.6 billion). The highest amount of social assistance was provided in 2011 (Rp 492 billion); this amount decreased in 2012 and 2013 (ICW and IBC, 2013).

A similar phenomenon was seen with the regional budget of East Java, where grants ranged from 7% to 26% of all regional expenditures between 2009 and 2012 (ICW and IBC, 2013). In 2012, the Provincial Government of East Java allocated a significant amount of money for grants, reaching Rp 4.09 trillion, more than seven times as much as that allocated in 2009 (Rp 541 billion). Similar increases in financial assistance were also noted; in 2012, the East Java government allocated Rp 1.517 trillion, an increase from Rp 746 billion in 2009.

One case of using public funds for populist programmes was noted in East Java in 2013, which was seen as a political tool of the incumbent governor and deputy governor, Soekarwo and Syaifullah Yusuf. These programmes include Jalan Lain Menuju Kesejahteraan (Another Road to Prosperity, Jalinkesra).

The use of public funds for funding populist programmes has not only been noted in Indonesia, but also other 'democratic' countries such as Thailand (Laathamatas, 1996) and the Philippines (Alejo, Rivera, & Valencia, 1996). This practice has also been noted in Latin America, including in Mexico (Magaloni, 2006) and Brazil (Levitsky, 2007). Other countries, with 'democratic' systems and developed economies have also experienced similar problems, as shown in Japan (Scheider, 2007), Taiwan (Wang and Kurzman, 2007), and India (Wilkinson, 2007). This includes the camouflaging of this use of public funds through programmatic goods, providing a legal basis to 'shield' incumbents against the accusation that they have misused public money for elections.

Candidates have at least three goals driving such use of public funds. First, building campaign networks within certain social groups; second, increasing incumbents' popularity through populist

programmes; and third, mobilising voter support (Magaloni, 2006).

However, presently—at least in the case of Kulon Progo—there has been a shift in the funding of populist programmes and programmatic goods. Where previously populist programmes relied predominantly on public money (from national and regional budgets), in Kulon Progo such programmes were ‘funded’ by the private sector and regional enterprises. The home rehabilitation programme initiated by Hasto was different, particularly in its use of money, than similar programmes implemented by other regional leaders in Indonesia. Home rehabilitation programmes in Indonesia have generally been funded through national or regional budgets. Meanwhile, in Kulon Progo, the regional government succeeded in collecting Rp 13.96 billion from the private sector (LKP-AMJ 2011–2016). Some of the organisations that have backed this populist programme include Gapensi/Gapeksindo, Gapeknas, PT. Jaya Makmur Prayoga Sentosa, PT. Jogja Magasa Iron (JMI), PD. BPR, Bank Pasar KP, PT. Selo Adikarto, PDAM Tirta Binangun, Perum Aneka Usaha Kulon Progo, and PT. Bank BNI 46.

As the legal basis for raising funds from the private sector, the Kulon Progo government issued Regional Bylaw No. 22 of 2012 regarding Corporate Social Responsibility. This law was passed not long after Hasto first became regent in 2011. This law not only required companies to put aside part of their profits to help the poor, but also provided for the establishment of a Forum for Corporate Social Responsibility. This forum later became intensely involved in home rehabilitation programmes. In its organisational structure, the Forum is headed by Jumantoro, the Director of PDAM Tirta Binangun and a close confidant of Hasto. Meanwhile, the Forum’s secretary is Rita Purwanti Erni Widiyati, presently the director of BPR Bank Pasar Kulon Progo. Both served from 2013 to 2016.

This forum was quite successful in collecting funds from regional enterprises and private corporations. In 2015, the Forum for Corporate Social Responsibility collected Rp 706,431,420, a figure that increased to Rp 859,407,719 in 2016 (Full data in Table 2).

Table 2
Contribution of CSR Funds, 2015

No	Company Name	Total CSR
1	Gapensi/Gapeksindo, Gapeknas	233,250,000
2	PD. BPR. Bank Pasar KP	223,938,450
3	PT. Selo Adikarto	115,743,000
4	PDAM Tirta Binangun	58,500,000
5	PT. Bank BNI 46	50.000.000
6	PT. Jaya Makmur Prayoga Sentosa	5,000,000
7	PT. Jogja Magasa Iron (JMI)	20,000,000
	Total	706,431,420

Source: CSR Forum for Kulon Progo

In 2016, the amount of money collected by the Forum for Corporate Social Responsibility increased, as shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3
Contribution of CSR Funds, 2016

No	Company Name	Total CSR
1	Gapensi/Gapeksindo, Gapeknas	207,700,000
2	PD. BPR. Bank Pasar KP	292,352,475
3	PT. Selo Adikarto	163,452,704
4	PDAM Tirta Binangun	78,000,000
5	Perum Aneka Usaha Kulon Progo	17,902,540
	Total	859,407,719

Source: CSR Forum for Kulon Progo

Money collected from regional-owned enterprises and the private sector are then used to fund a number of social activities, including home rehabilitation, staple goods packages, religious programmes, and hygiene programmes. Religious programmes have included religious activities, grants for mosque callers, and religious safaris. In 2015, such religious activities drew Rp 72

million. According to data from the Forum for Corporate Social Responsibility, most of the money collected has been used for the home rehabilitation programme, reaching Rp 246,675,000 (36% of the total budget handled by the forum).

Table 4
Distribution of CSR Funds, 2015

No	Programme	Amount (Rupiah)
1	Housing Programme	246,675,000
2	Administration of Wates	143,500,000
3	Sponsorship	74,000,000
4	Religious	72,625,000

Source: CSR Forum for Kulon Progo

“Much of the corporate social responsibility money has been used to fund home rehabilitation. Although this programme has already consumed much money, we are still overwhelmed by requests for assistance with housing. We receive many proposals, much more than our available budget.” (Interview, Jumantoro, January 1, 2017).⁵

Hasto stated that he had his own reason for money from the private sector. Previously, he said that bribery was rampantly used by entrepreneurs seeking permits. To eliminate this practice, Hasto sought to have entrepreneurs use their money for the home rehabilitation programme. What did they receive in return for their contributions? Both Hasto and Jumantoro implied that there was no compensation or facilitation given to entrepreneurs who donated to the programme. Nonetheless, one civil servant in a government office handling numerous large projects indicated that companies that donated money, either directly or through corporate social responsibility programmes, received special attention in the tender or business process.

⁵ Original: Memang kebanyakan dana CSR atau TSP banyak digunakan untuk pembiayaan bedah rumah. Meski menyedot dana besar, kita masih kewalahan untuk memenuhi permintaan perbaikan bedah rumah. Sebab proposal yang masuk ke kita sangat banyak dan tidak sebanding dengan anggaran yang ada.

Aside from coming from financial contributions by the private sector and regional-owned corporations, money for the home rehabilitation programme has also come from *zakat* money distributed by Baznas. As regent, Hasto has supported this by obliging all civil servants in Kulon Progo to contribute *zakat* or otherwise make donations. According to this regulation, civil servants are expected to set aside money from their wages, based on their own abilities. “Civil servants can pay *zakat* or make contributions according to their own abilities. Some may give 2.5%, 1%, or even 0.5%. This is based on their own capacity and awareness.”⁶ (Hasto Wardoyo, Interview, February 12, 2017).

The compulsory collection of *zakat* money from civil servants enabled Baznas to collect Rp 260 million per annum. This amount was sufficient for the rehabilitation of 25 dilapidated homes. The policy was not fully supported by civil servants; according to Hasto, 60% of civil servants supported the policy, while 40% opposed it. Nonetheless, Hasto kept to his own view of the situation. He felt that civil servants had no need to oppose the programme, as the regional budget for civil servants’ wages reached Rp 625 billion per annum; for comparison, the regency’s total annual budget was Rp 1.4 trillion. As such, civil servants accounted for nearly 50% of regional expenditures, despite representing only 2% of Kulon Progo’s population.

That some civil servants opposed this *zakat* programme was confirmed by other respondents. Opponents to the compulsory *zakat* programme cited two fundamental reasons. First, there was a perception that this *zakat* policy had elements of coercion, as the *zakat* money was garnished directly from their paycheques. Second, there was concern that the *zakat* paid would be used for political purposes, namely the electoral campaign of the incumbents (Hasto and Tedjo). As mentioned previously, *zakat* money collected through

⁶ Original: PNS bisa *zakat* maupun memberikan persembahan semampunya. Ada yang 2,5 persen, 1 persen bahkan 0,5 persen. Ini sesuai kemampuan dan kesadaran mereka.

Baznas was used for several activities closely identified with Hasto, including both the home rehabilitation programme as well as several other social assistance activities.

“So, every month our wages are garnished for this zakat. Aside from this garnishing, some civil servants have suspected that the zakat money taken from their paycheques is used for a political purpose. This political purpose, I mean, is the re-election campaign in the regional election. That is why not all civil servants approve of this programme. However, they can not voice their opposition explicitly.” (Civil servant Kulon Progo Regional Government, Interview, January 15, 2017).⁷

Home Rehabilitation as an ‘Engine’ of Electoral Victory

Hasto has rejected the categorisation of the home rehabilitation programme as a political project, instead describing it as being intended to overcome poverty in Kulon Progo. Nonetheless, he does not deny that electoral effects (political support) may have emerged from his populist programmes and led to his re-election as Regent of Kulon Progo. According to Hasto, he once became angry when a campaign team member suggested visiting aid recipients to remind them that they had benefited from a programme initiated by Hasto as regent. Hasto says that such an approach would have been counterproductive and potentially damaged public opinion of him as an incumbent candidate.

“If there’s any political effect (i.e. support in elections), let it happen naturally. The intent of this home rehabilitation programme is not (politics). The home rehabilitation programme is meant to help the poor gain access to decent housing.” (Hasto Wardoyo, Interview, February 12, 2017).⁸

⁷ Original: Jadi tiap bulan gaji kita langsung dipotong untuk zakat tersebut. Selain soal pemotongan itu, kalangan PNS juga mulai menduga jika zakat yang berasal dari gaji mereka digunakan untuk kepentingan politik. Politik yang dimaksud yakni untuk kepentingan kemenangan Pilkada. Maka itu tak semua PNS setuju dengan program ini. Tapi ketidak-setujuan tersebut tak disampaikan secara terang-terangan.

⁸ Original: Jika ada dampak politik (dukungan dalam pilkada), ya biar saja secara alami. Tetapi, tujuan bedah rumah itu memang bukan untuk itu (politik). Bedah rumah dilakukan untuk membantu masyarakat miskin mendapatkan rumah layak.

While serving as regent, Hasto treated this home rehabilitation programme seriously, as can be seen from his attendance at related ceremonies. Almost every week, the regent went to the field to participate in the distribution of home rehabilitation assistance. There was no ‘vulgar’ or explicit campaigning in these activities. However, within Javanese culture, it was clear that Hasto was seeking to gain support in the 2017 regional election.

“There was not statement asking us to support Pak Hasto when he participated in home rehabilitation activities. He is known for being a people’s leader. But, as Javanese people, we understood and would repay the favour.” (aid recipient, Interview, January 6, 2017).⁹

Such views were also expressed by other recipients. Generally, according to the cultural standards in Javanese society, kindness or support must be repaid with kindness or support. As such, Hasto did not need to explicitly vocalise his expectation that aid recipients would vote for him; the cultural values extant in Javanese society were sufficient.

Yes, generally... we’d already built it here, so we’d vote for him.” (Interview, as quoted in Triantini and Masnun, 2018).¹⁰

“If he were good, generally we voted for him because he provided us with infrastructure and facilities; people around here mostly voted for Pak H, as he was good and not corrupt.” (Interview, quoted in Trianti and Masnun, 2018).¹¹

Meanwhile, one youth figure from Temon Village, Temon District, stated that the area had been a basis of support for Hasto and Tedjo during the 2011 regional election, who received the majority of the village’s votes. This was later linked to the home

⁹ Original: Tidak ada bahasa minta dukungan saat Pak Hasto ikut melakukan bedah rumah. Memang dia dikenal sebagai pemimpin yang dekat dengan rakyat. Tapi gimana ya, sebagai orang Jawa, kita ngerti lah dan akan melakukan balas budi.” (aid recipient, interview, January 6, 2017).

¹⁰ Original: ... nggeh umume priipun. nggeh mriki sampun dibangun, nggeh umume milih.

¹¹ Original: Nek sing apik ki yo dipilih karena kita sudah diberi sarana dan prasarana, orang daerah sini rata-rata milih pak Hasto, wonge apik tur ndak bermasalah (korupsi).

rehabilitation programme. Over the past year, three village residents received support through the home rehabilitation programme. Ultimately, in the 2017 regional election, Hasto and Tedjo received 78.90% of votes in Temon.

A similar phenomenon was mentioned by a former hamlet chief in Hargotirto Village, Kokap District. Hasto was born in Kokap District, more specifically in Hargowilis Village, and the district had become a major basis of support for him. This informant stated that, as a result, although proposals still had to be submitted, he felt that poor residents with dilapidated homes could more readily gain access to the programme than in other districts. In the 2017 regional election, Hasto and Tedjo received almost 90% of the votes in Kokap District.

It can not be denied that the populist programmes enacted by Hasto had a significant electoral effect. Residents—not only beneficiaries—perceived him as being a people’s leader owing to these programmes. This view thus coloured their voting in the 2017 regional election (Mas’udi & Kurniawan, 2017).

Table 5:
Development Programmes and Voter Choice
(Q: Development programmes were your main consideration in voting in the 2017 regional election in Kulon Progo)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Absolutely Agree	59	29.5	30.3	30.3
	Agree	92	46.0	47.2	77.4
	Not Sure	21	10.5	10.8	88.2
	Disagree	21	10.5	10.8	99.0
	Absolutely Disagree	2	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	195	97.5	100.0	
Missing	99	5	2.5		
Total		200	100.0		

Source : Wawan Mas’udi & Nanang Indra Kurniawan, 2017

This table indicates that the populist programmes implemented by Hasto Wardoyo had a significant electoral effect during the 2017 regional election in Kulon Progo. Voters considered Hasto and his deputy, Tedjo, to have initiated numerous pro-people programmes. Even when they did not benefit directly from these programmes, voters tended to support Hasto and Tedjo in the 2017 regional election.

Political Parties as Ineffective Political Engines

A number of academics have claimed that political parties are the most dominant formal entities in mobilising voters in elections, attempting to actively influence voters to back certain candidates. Supporters of this argument have included, for instance, Rodee (1967, p. 449), Bibby (1992, p. 5), and Heywood (2002, p. 254). A similar view has been expressed by Duverger (1959, p.35), who wrote that political parties, through their branches and caucuses, are involved in electoral activities such as campaign organisation. Others have investigated similar themes to those mentioned above, positioning political parties as the main instrument for political mobilisation and candidacy. Political parties are assumed to have an institutionalising organisational force by writers such as Huntington (2003), Karp and Banducci (2001, 2007), and Wielhouwer (1999). Through the political mobilisation organised by political parties, populations can be shaped into partisan voters.

Such a perspective, however, is too partial and narrow, seemingly negating other forms of political mobilisation. Hopkin, for example, has identified kinship, friendship, and economic networks as socio-political instruments necessary for establishing linkages between parties and communities (Hopkin as cited in Katz & Crotty, 2006, p. 406).

Furthermore, in electoral systems that are candidate-oriented, the roles of political parties are limited. Rather, practices of vote buying and other forms of political patronage have space to

‘play their part’ (Hicken, 2011). The fierce competition between candidates compels them to set themselves apart, such as by offering ‘concrete benefits’ to voters. Since the passing of Law No. 32 of 2004, which implemented direct elections in the country, Indonesia has used such a candidate-oriented electoral system.

In the 2017 regional election, Hasto and Tedjo were backed by a coalition of no less than six political parties: PDIP, PKS, PAN, Golkar, Nasdem, and Hanura. This coalition of six parties controlled the majority of parliamentary seats in the regional parliament; of the 40 seats available, the coalition backing Hasto and Tedjo controlled 27. However, having the backing of multiple parties could not guarantee electoral victory. This was recognised by Hasto, who did not position these parties as his main campaign engine.

As in many regions in Indonesia, the key to electoral victory lay in the candidate. As such, Hasto created an effective campaign strategy, in which he frequently met directly with voters. He believed that this door-to-door approach would be more effective in gaining voters’ support. Over the course of his campaign, Hasto could meet with voters in fifteen different areas. Although this strategy was effective, his meeting with small groups had its shortcomings, which were particularly related to the large size of Kulon Progo Regency. Different sites could be located dozens of kilometres from each other; for instance, the distance between Galur District and Samigaluh District is 80 kilometres. As such, not all parts of the regency could be reached through this campaign strategy.

It is true that political parties have an important role, but they are not entirely reliable. In fact, party activists often tell me not to rely too much on them. According to research, three campaign approaches are effective in gathering voter support: the first is door-to-door, the second is TV advertising, and involving campaign teams or volunteers.¹² (Hasto Wardoyo, Interview, February 12, 2017).

¹² Original: *Memang peran parpol penting, tetapi tidak sepenuhnya bisa diandalkan.*

As explained above, the mobilisation potential of political parties could not be relied upon completely. As such, Hasto and Tedjo established a group of volunteers who helped them socialise both the candidates and their programmes. However, Hasto recognised that this volunteer group lacked a clear structure. Generally, volunteer groups exist at every administrative level, from the regency, district, village, to hamlet. Rather than establish such a structured organisation, Hasto applied a ‘non-linear approach’, feeling that volunteer organisations work best without a structure; he argued that a formal structure would limit their movement and flexibility. Ultimately, in the 2017 regional election in Kulon Progo, Hasto and Tedjo received 85.6% of votes. Their opponents, Zuhadmono and Iriani Pramestuti, received only 14.4%.

Conclusion

Aside from Hasto Wardoyo himself, known as a populist leader, programmatic goods were created and distributed by incumbents as an effective ‘engine’ of sorts in the 2017 regional election in Kulon Progo. His programmatic politics, particularly his home rehabilitation programme, were widely recognised by the people of Kulon Progo, who perceived him and his deputy Tedjo as a “pro-people” regent and deputy regent. This brought significant results in the 2017 regional election, where Hasto and Tedjo received 85.6% of votes. Meanwhile, their opponents—the running mates Zuhadmono and Iriani Pramestuti—only received 14.4% of votes.

Interestingly, the main source of funding for the home rehabilitation programme in Kulon Progo was not public money. Generally, incumbents use money from the national/regional budgets to fund populist programmes, as they have access to these funds and the programmatic distribution of *goods*. However, Hasto used

Bahkan, orang parpol sendiri yang mengatakan pada saya agar jangan terlalu tergantung pada mereka. Berdasarkan riset, ada tiga cara kampanye yang efektif untuk mendapatkan dukungan pemilih. Cara pertama yakni door to door, kedua iklan di TV, dan (ketiga), pelibatan tim sukses atau relawan.

a different funding approach to programmatic goods, particularly in home rehabilitation programme. He collected money from three sources, namely the private sector (including contractors), regional-owned businesses, and *zakat* collected from civil servants by the Baznas of Kulon Progo. Far ahead of the election, Hasto prepared a legal basis for legislation and fundraising, namely Regional Bylaw No. 22 of 2012 regarding Corporate Social Responsibility. It was through this basis that funds were collected for programmatic goods.

This populist programme, funded through *gotong royong*, had at least three goals. First, to establish networks with and gain the support of particular social groups. Second, to increase the popularity of the incumbents, citing the success of their populist programmes. Third, to mobilise voter support.

Referring to the case of the 2017 regional election in Kulon Progo, it is apparent that patronage politics and programmatic goods significantly influenced voters' political choices. Candidates, particularly incumbents, distribute programmatic goods to gain electoral victory. The use of programmatic goods also can not be separated from the political system that emphasises candidates. As a result, political contestation becomes increasingly intense, opening space for rampant patronage.

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