

***Fiqh Siyasa* on War and Peace in Indonesia's Post-Colonial Era: Analyzing Its Prospects and Challenges in the Sulawesi Region**

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Abstract

This research explores the interpretation and application of *Fiqh Siyasa* principles on war and peace by Islamist movements in Sulawesi, focusing on post-colonial dynamics and modern Indonesian reform. *Fiqh Siyasa* regulates state-citizen relations and interactions with non-Muslims, though its provisions on war and peace have limited contemporary application due to European colonialism and Western constitutionalism. The study traces the evolution of *Fiqh Siyasa* in Sulawesi, examining how local movements interpret these principles amid historical influences like colonial legacies, local rebellions, and conservative Islamic ideologies. Groups such as MIT, Mujahedeen KOMPAK, KPPSI, FKAWJ, MMI, FPI, and HTI exhibit diverse interpretations: some advocate for an Islamic state through *dār al-Islam*, while others promote coexistence by reinterpreting *dār al-harb*. These varied perspectives create a fragmented and context-dependent application of *Fiqh Siyasa*. The research contributes to understanding how global Islamic jurisprudential concepts adapt to regional realities, enriching discourse on Islam and state relations in modern Indonesia.

Keywords: Fiqh Siyasa; Islamist Movements; Post-Colonial; Sulawesi; War And Peace.

Introduction

Fiqh Siyasa, a branch of Islamic jurisprudence, serves as a foundational framework for understanding the complex interplay between religion and state, as well as the relationships among Muslims, non-Muslims, and Islamic governance structures. This discipline encompasses discussions on the principles of governance, interfaith relations, and the dynamics of peace and war, reflecting the multifaceted dimensions of Islamic law as it applies to societal and political contexts.¹ Despite significant shifts in constitutional systems within modern Islamic countries, the principles of *Fiqh Siyasa* remain pertinent in contemporary legal and political discourse, offering insights into the evolving relationship between Islamic tradition and modern statehood.²

In Indonesia, a nation with the world's largest Muslim population, *Fiqh Siyasa* is integral to the socio-political landscape. This is particularly evident in the Sulawesi region, where Islam's historical trajectory from its initial spread in the 17th century through periods of colonialism, rebellion, and reform has fostered a distinctive conservative ethos.³ The region's legacy includes the rise of movements advocating for the implementation of Islamic law, reflecting the aspirations of a Muslim populace that often intertwines religious teachings with ideological expressions. These dynamics underscore Sulawesi's position as a pivotal locus for understanding the manifestations of Islamism and the application of *Fiqh Siyasa*.⁴

Several radical Islamic groups in Sulawesi are the East Indonesia Mujahideen (*Mujahidin Indonesia Timur* or MIT), the Mujahedeen KOMPAK (Crisis Response Action Committee), the Enforcement of Islamic Sharia (*Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam* or KPPSI) and its paramilitary wing, Laskar Jundullah, the *Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah* Communication Forum (*Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah* or FKAJW) with its paramilitary wing, Laskar Jihad, the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* or MMI), the Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam* or FPI), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).

¹ Andrew R. March, "The Transformation of Islamic Law in Modernity," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of the Middle East*, ed. Armando Salvatore, Sari Hanafi, and Kieko Obuse (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), 319–35.

² Firman Mansir, "The Urgency of Fiqh Siyasah In Islamic Education Learning At Madrasas And Schools," *Potensi: Jurnal Kependidikan Islam* 6, no. 2 (2020): 142–54, <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.24014/potensi.v6i2.11242>.

³ Yon Machmudi, "The Re-Emergence of the Indonesian Islamic State Groups: Their Survival and Modus Operandi," *International Journal of Islam in Asia* 1, no. 2 (2021): 211–32.

⁴ Ismail Marzuki, "Diskursus Khilafah Dalam Kajian Fiqh Siyasah Klasik Dan Kontemporer," *Al-Manahij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam* 15, no. 2 (2021): 325–344, <https://doi.org/10.24090/mnh.v15i2.4159>.

This research investigates how these Islamist movements in the Sulawesi region interpret and apply the principles of *Fiqh Siyasa* concerning war and peace, particularly in the context of post-colonial socio-political dynamics and modern Indonesian reform. By examining these interpretations, the study aims to shed light on the broader ideological tensions within the Muslim community, particularly in navigating the challenges of modern nation-state dynamics.⁵ While some groups emphasize Quranic verses advocating for conflict, others promote a balanced approach that contextualizes both war and peace within Islamic teachings. This ideological diversity illustrates the ongoing struggle to reconcile traditional doctrines with contemporary realities.⁶

The primary focus of contemporary research on religion and the state in modern Indonesia revolves around the role of Islam in legitimizing the Indonesian government. Numerous studies highlight the regime's endeavors to uphold the religious foundation of the state as the cornerstone of its governance.⁷ However, despite analyses delving into the traditional role of *ulama* (Islamic scholars) and *fatwas* (religious edicts) in reinforcing this legitimacy, a comprehensive model elucidating the traditional doctrine of *Fiqh Siyasa* (or *Siyasa Shar'iyya*) as the principal mechanism for preserving the religious character of the state remains lacking.⁸

Several scholarly works underscore the historical prominence of Islamist discourse within Sulawesi society in general. Throughout history, Sulawesi has been recognized as a significant hub for hardline Islamic movements in Indonesia, dating back to the era of President Sukarno. Notably, the emergence of the Kahar Muzakkar (1921–1965) Islamic State movement in Makassar, South Sulawesi, solidified Sulawesi's reputation as a center for such movements.⁹ The historical documentation of the Islamic State Movement serves to reinforce the perception that Sulawesi stands as one of the regions in Indonesia deeply entrenched in the tradition of Islamism. Furthermore, public apprehension regarding the proliferation of Islamism in the region is heightened by the designation of several locales in Sulawesi, including Poso in Central Sulawesi and Makassar in South Sulawesi, as focal points of fundamentalism. Several incidents of religious radicalism occurring within Sulawesi itself underscore that the evolution of the tradition of Islamism in this region is not solely attributable to the influence of analogous movements at the national level, but rather reflects the nuanced

⁵ Din Wahid, “Kembalinya Konservatisme Islam Indonesia,” *Studia Islamika* 21, no. 2 (2014): 375–90, <https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v21i2.1043>.

⁶ Jamal Badawi, “Muslim/Non-Muslim Relations: An Integrative Approach,” *J. Islamic L. & Culture* 8 (2003): 23.

⁷ Azyumardi Azra, *Pergolakan Politik Islam: Dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme Hingga Post-Modernisme* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996), 10.

⁸ Syahrir Karim, “Islamisme Dan Konstruksi Gerakan Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Dan Hizb Tahrir Indonesia Di Sulawesi Selatan,” *JRP: Jurnal Review Politik* 6, no. 1 (2016): 90–118.

⁹ Muhrisun Afandi, “Gurutta and Religious Authority Contestation in Makassar,” in *Politics, Ulama, and Narratives of Nationhood: Fragmentation of Religious Authority in Indonesian Cities* (Jakarta: PPIM UIN Jakarta, 2019), 103–23.

dynamics of Islamism at the local level. Hence, it is challenging to dismiss the suspicion that the legacy of hardline Islamism persists in this region, particularly given the unequivocal acceptance of the concept of the nation-state by the Muslim community in this locale.

Despite the extensive body of research exploring the relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia, particularly the role of ulama, fatwas, and Islamist movements in legitimizing governance, there remains a notable gap in understanding the specific application of *Fiqh Siyasa* in the context of war and peace within post-colonial Islamist movements in the Sulawesi region. Previous studies have primarily focused on the historical prominence of Islamist movements in Sulawesi or the broader ideological struggles of Islamism in Indonesia. However, few have critically examined how *Fiqh Siyasa* especially its principles related to *dār al-Islam* and *dār al-harb* has been interpreted and operationalized by local Islamist groups (the MIT, the Mujahedeen KOMPAK, KPPSI, FKAJW, MMI, FPI, and HTI) in response to modern political reform and socio-religious dynamics.

This research is unique in its integration of historical, normative, and sociological frameworks to trace the evolution of *Fiqh Siyasa* interpretations within a specific regional and ideological context. By focusing on the Sulawesi region, it highlights the nuanced interplay between global Islamic jurisprudential principles and localized socio-political realities, offering fresh insights into the ideological tensions, opportunities, and challenges faced by Islamist movements advocating for Islamic law in a modern pluralistic state. This approach provides a novel contribution to the discourse on Islam, law, and governance in Indonesia, bridging theoretical understandings and practical implications of *Fiqh Siyasa* in contemporary times.

This study comprises four main discussion sections. The initial section delves into the dynamics of the relationship between Islam and the state. Subsequently, the second section explores the application of *Fiqh Siyasa* in the post-colonial era. The third section investigates *Fiqh Siyasa* concerning war and peace within the context of the concepts of *dār al-Islam* and *dār al-harb* in the Sulawesi region. Lastly, the fourth section addresses the potential opportunities and challenges associated with *Fiqh Siyasa* pertaining to war and peace (*dār al-Islam* and *dār al-harb*) in contemporary times.

This study employs a qualitative approach to provide a comprehensive understanding of the interpretation and application of *Fiqh Siyasa* in Sulawesi. The primary analytical tool is process-tracing, which examines historical causality and sequential developments to test alternative explanations and evaluate the relevance of theoretical frameworks.¹⁰ This approach is complemented by the doctrinal method of Islamic legal research within the field of *Fiqh Siyasah*, focusing

¹⁰ Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 24. Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos and Jody LaPorte, “Process Tracing and the Problem of Missing Data,” *Sociological Methods & Research* 50, no. 3 (February 12, 2019): 1407–35, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124119826153>.

on the Qur'an, Hadith, and classical jurisprudential texts. Through this dual approach, the research connects doctrinal Islamic legal theory with the empirical realities of Islamist movements in the post-colonial Indonesian context.

Data were collected through both documentary research and field-based interviews. Primary sources comprised organizational manifestos, internal communications, legal records, and archival documents, while secondary sources consisted of academic literature, policy analyses, media reports, and prior studies on *Fiqh Siyasa* and Islamist movements. Internet-based materials were also used to gather information on more recent activities. To enrich the analysis, semi-structured interviews were conducted with Islamic figures, religious scholars (*ulama*), and local leaders in Makassar, Poso, and Gorontalo, regions historically and contemporarily significant for Islamist mobilization. The interviews elicited perspectives on concepts such as *dār al-Islam* and *dār al-harb*, the role of Islamic law in a pluralistic nation-state, and the interaction between religious ideals and Indonesian political realities.

The collected data were analyzed using thematic coding and content analysis to identify recurring ideological themes, interpretive patterns, and discursive strategies. A combination of normative analysis (grounded in Islamic legal doctrine) and sociological interpretation (sensitive to historical and political context) provided a multidimensional lens. To enhance validity and reliability, the study applied triangulation by cross-checking doctrinal texts, organizational documents, and interview findings, while interpretive consistency was ensured through repeated coding cycles, field notes, and peer debriefing. This methodological integration strengthens the rigor of the study and ensures a balanced representation of both textual traditions and lived experiences.

Discussion

Patterns of Relations between Islam and the State

Fiqh Siyasa, or Islamic political jurisprudence, is a branch of Islamic law that addresses the governance and relationship between the state and its citizens under Islamic principles. It serves as a framework for Islamic regimes to manage state affairs according to Sharia, emphasizing cooperation between religious and political institutions. *Siyasa Shar'iyya*, which applies these principles, offers both theoretical and practical guidelines for Islamic governance.¹¹ Scholars like Vogel highlight how these principles can shape legislative actions within an Islamic state, offering diverse possibilities for political authority and governance under Islamic law.¹²

¹¹ Al-Atawneh Muhammad, "Religion and State in Contemporary Middle East: The Case of Saudi Arabia," *J. Islamic St. Prac. Int'l L.* 2 (2006): 28.

¹² Frank Vogel, "An Introduction to Law of the Islamic World," *International Journal of Legal Information* 31, no. 2 (2003): 353–69.

Three primary paradigms describe the relationship between religion and the state. The integralistic model views religion and the state as inseparable, where the head of state holds both religious and political authority. This model is particularly seen in Shia Islam and among fundamentalist Sunni factions. The symbiotic model maintains that religion and the state are distinct yet mutually dependent, where the state supports religious practice under moral guidance. The secularistic model, by contrast, advocates for the separation of religion and state, with the state focusing solely on political authority without religious influence, as proposed by figures like Ali Abd al-Raziq.¹³

Islamic international law, which governs relations between Islamic states and non-Muslim territories, is built on key concepts such as *jihad*, *dār al-Islām* (Islamic state), *dār al-ahd* (covenant territory), and *dar al-harb* (war territory).¹⁴ These concepts define the status of non-Muslim states, with *dār al-Islām* representing areas governed by Islamic law, offering protection and religious freedom for Muslims, while *dār al-harb* refers to regions where Islamic law is not practiced, often seen as hostile to Muslim states.¹⁵ *Dār al-ahd* represents states with formal treaties with Islamic states, ensuring peaceful relations.¹⁶

The terms *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-harb*, though not explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an or Hadith, historically categorized the world into Muslim and non-Muslim territories.¹⁷ Scholars like Wahbah Al-Zuhaili critique this division, suggesting it reflects a temporary historical perspective. Al-Zuhaili advocates for categorizing countries based on peace (*dār al-salam*) and war (*dār al-harb*), emphasizing that the status of conflict should be temporary.¹⁸ In contrast, Yusuf Al-Qardawi defends the relevance of distinguishing between Muslim and non-Muslim states, supporting the use of these categories based on Sharia principles.¹⁹

The broader relationship between religion and state in Muslim-majority countries can be categorized into several models.²⁰ Countries such as Indonesia, which lacks a formal declaration of Islam as the state religion, demonstrate a unique model where religion plays a significant role in public policy despite the

¹³ Karen Lord, "Implicit Religion: A Contemporary Theory for the Relationships between Religion, State, and Society," *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 23, no. 1 (2008): 33–46.

¹⁴ Muhammad, "Religion and State in Contemporary Middle East: The Case of Saudi Arabia."

¹⁵ Eka An Aqimuddin, Neni Ruhaeni, and Nurul Chotidjah, "Dispute Settlement Between Islamic Law State and Non-Islamic Law State: An Islamic International Law Perspective," *KnE Social Sciences* 8, no. 18 (2023): 46–53, <https://doi.org/10.18502/kss.v8i18.141>.

¹⁶ Aqimuddin, Ruhaeni, and Chotidjah.

¹⁷ Nasser Ul Islam and Showkat Hussain Dar, "Contemporary Discourse on Citizenship: An Islamic Perspective," *Islamic Research* 6, no. 2 (2023): 122–28.

¹⁸ Wahbah al- Zuhaili, *Athar Al-Harb Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islami: Dirasah Wa Al-Muqaranah* (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998), 58.

¹⁹ Yusuf al- Qardawi, *Fiqh Al-Jihad: Dirasah Muqaranah Li Abkamibi Wa Filsafatibhi Fi Dhaui Al-Qur'an Wa Al-Sunnah* (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2010), 67.

²⁰ Tad Stahnke and Robert C Blitt, "The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly Muslim Countries," *Georgetown Journal of International Law* 36 (2004): 947–1078.

secular legal system.²¹ Various models, such as Stahnke and Blitt's four categories or Durham Jr. and Scharff's ten categories, illustrate the complexity of this relationship.²² Indonesia, in particular, aligns with a model of accommodation, where religious laws influence specific domains like private law and education, while the state remains secular.²³ This reflects Indonesia's unique constitutional framework that integrates religious values into governance while maintaining a pluralistic society.²⁴

***Fiqh Siyasa* in Post-Colonial Era**

Fiqh Siyasa, or Islamic political jurisprudence, is a branch of Islamic law that addresses governance and the relationship between the state and its citizens under Islamic principles.²⁵ Beyond its normative guidance, *Fiqh Siyasa* reflects a form of legal pluralism, where Sharia operates alongside or in tension with state law. It provides a theoretical framework through which Islamic regimes or Muslim-majority states negotiate the authority of religious norms in public life. *Siyasa Shar'iyya*, as the applied dimension of these principles, not only offers guidelines for governance but also illustrates the politics of law: the way in which religious authority and state authority compete, converge, or coalesce in shaping legal and political order. Scholars such as Vogel underscore how *siyasa* principles influence legislative action, showing that political authority in Islamic contexts is never merely secular but is often mediated by competing claims of religious legitimacy.²⁶

Three primary paradigms describe the relationship between religion and the state, each reflecting different constellations of authority. The integralistic model conceives of religion and the state as inseparable, where the head of state embodies both political and religious sovereignty an arrangement visible in Shi'a thought and fundamentalist Sunni factions. This model centralizes authority but also risks conflating divine law with state power, raising critical questions of legitimacy in plural societies. The symbiotic model frames religion and state as distinct but interdependent: the state secures order while religion provides moral guidance, producing a negotiated balance of authority.²⁷ Meanwhile, the

²¹ Ran Hirschl, "Comparative Constitutional Law and Religion," in *Comparative Constitutional Law*, ed. Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 422–40.

²² W Cole Durham Jr and Brett G Scharffs, *Law and Religion: National, International, and Comparative Perspectives* (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2019).

²³ Durham Jr and Scharffs.

²⁴ Alfitri, "Religion and Constitutional Practices in Indonesia: How Far Should the State Intervene in the Administration of Islam?," *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 13, no. 2 (2018): 389–413.

²⁵ Bani Syarif Maula, "Fiqh Siyasah in Indonesia's Post-Colonial Era: Between Classical Doctrines and Contemporary Practices," *El-Aqwal: Journal of Sharia and Comparative Law* 4, no. 1 (2025): 51–66, <https://doi.org/10.24090/el-aqwal.v4i1.13610>.

²⁶ Ratno Lukito, "State and Religion Continuum in Indonesia The Trajectory of Religious Establishment and Religious Freedom in the Constitution," *The Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law* 5, no. 4 (2018): 645.

²⁷ Marzuki, "Diskursus Khilafah Dalam Kajian Fiqh Siyasah Klasik Dan Kontemporer."

secularistic model advocates for institutional separation, as articulated by Ali Abd al-Raziq, where political law is autonomous from religion. These paradigms exemplify the plurality of legal-political arrangements in the Muslim world, highlighting that the authority of law is not absolute but situated within broader struggles over legitimacy, identity, and sovereignty.²⁸

Islamic international law further demonstrates the entanglement of law, religion, and politics through its classical categories of *jihad*, *dār al-Islam* (abode of Islam), *dār al-ahd* (abode of covenant), and *dār al-harb* (abode of war).²⁹ These categories historically functioned as a political legal framework distinguishing relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Here again, state–religion authority is visible: the classification of territories as hostile or peaceful was both a legal designation and a political strategy. While *dār al-Islam* guaranteed protection and religious freedom under Sharia, *dār al-harb* marked territories beyond its reach, legitimizing political military responses. *Dār al-ahd* embodied negotiated pluralism through treaties and diplomacy, foreshadowing modern international law's emphasis on sovereign agreements.³⁰

Contemporary scholars reinterpret these categories in light of changing political realities. Wahbah Al-Zuhaili critiques the rigid binary of *dār al-Islam* versus *dār al-harb*, suggesting instead a framework of *dār al-salam* (abode of peace) and *dār al-harb*, thereby foregrounding peaceful coexistence as a political–legal norm.³¹ In contrast, Yusuf Al-Qardawi insists on the continued relevance of the classical division, reinforcing the authority of Sharia as the basis for international relations.³² These contrasting positions illustrate the politics of law within Islamic jurisprudence: whether law should evolve to meet pluralistic realities or remain anchored in traditional paradigms of authority.³³

The broader relationship between religion and state in Muslim-majority countries reveals diverse models of legal pluralism.³⁴ Indonesia, for example, does not declare Islam as its official state religion but integrates religious values into constitutional and legal frameworks. This accommodationist model reflects the

²⁸ Abdulmajeed Hassan Bello, “Applying Hirāba in Islamic Criminal Law to Curb Armed Banditry in the Zamfara State of Nigeria: Opportunities and Challenges,” *Mazahib: Jurnal Pemikiran Hukum Islam* 20, no. 1 (June 25, 2021): 1–42, <https://doi.org/10.21093/mj.v20i1.2959>.

²⁹ Muhammad Barizi, “Reading the Qur'an from the Contemporary Approach of Maqāṣid Al-Shari'a (A Case Study of Non-Muslim Leadership in Indonesia),” *Ulumuna Journal of Islamic Studies* 22, no. 1 (May 28, 2018): 112–32, <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v22i1.290>.

³⁰ Aqimuddin, Ruhaeni, and Chotidjah, “Dispute Settlement Between Islamic Law State and Non-Islamic Law State: An Islamic International Law Perspective.”

³¹ Tauseef Ahmad Parray, *Islam and Democracy in the 21st Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 32.

³² Farkhani Farkhani et al., “Converging Islamic and Religious Norms in Indonesia's State Life Plurality,” *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 12, no. 2 (2022): 421–46, <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v12i2.421-446>.

³³ Aqimuddin, Ruhaeni, and Chotidjah, “Dispute Settlement Between Islamic Law State and Non-Islamic Law State: An Islamic International Law Perspective.”

³⁴ Asifa Quraishi-Landes, “Islamic Constitutionalism: Not Secular. Not Theocratic. Not Impossible,” *Rutgers JL & Religion* 16 (2014): 553.

coexistence of secular law with selective incorporation of religious norms, particularly in private law, family law, and education.³⁵ Such hybridity illustrates the politics of legal pluralism, where state law draws legitimacy from religious values while simultaneously maintaining a pluralistic order that protects minority rights. Comparative frameworks, such as Stahnke and Blitt's four categories or Durham Jr. and Scharff's ten categories,³⁶ further highlight the complexity of state–religion relations. Indonesia exemplifies how law becomes a site of negotiation between religious authority and state sovereignty, demonstrating that in plural societies, law is both a mechanism of governance and an arena of contestation over identity, morality, and power.

Fiqh Siyasa on War and Peace in Sulawesi Region

Although Muslims in Indonesia are geographically situated outside the Middle Eastern heartland of Islam, their spiritual and psychological commitment to Islam is profound and dynamic, comparable to that of Muslim communities elsewhere. Similar to Muslims in other regions, the Muslim community in Sulawesi is significantly influenced by contemporary changes and developments. Additionally, the Indonesian population is inherently diverse and not a monolithic society.³⁷

However, unlike the characteristics of Islam on the island of Java, the spread of Islam in Sulawesi has been predominantly legalistic and less accommodating of diverse religious views. The narrative of Islamism has historically been strong within Sulawesi society. Historical records indicate that Islam was declared the official religion in the seventeenth century in the kingdoms of Tallo and Goa. This initiative was subsequently followed by the Bugis kingdom in Bone. Citing these historical facts, proponents of the movement to implement Islamic law in this region argue that the efforts undertaken Islamist groups are aimed at maintaining historical continuity.³⁸

Several radical Islamic groups in Sulawesi adhere to classical interpretations of *Fiqh Siyasa*, which, when examined through a contemporary lens, may appear extreme and misaligned with present-day contexts. Among these groups is the East Indonesia Mujahideen (*Mujahidin Indonesia Timur* or MIT), founded by Santoso around 2010. MIT operated in the Poso region of Central Sulawesi, pledging allegiance to the Islamic State and engaging in various militant activities. Following the deaths of key figures, including Santoso in 2016 and his successor

³⁵ Mohammad Talaat Ghunaimi, *The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach* (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012), 135-161.

³⁶ Stahnke and Blitt, "The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly Muslim Countries." Durham Jr and Scharffs, *Law and Religion: National, International, and Comparative Perspectives*.

³⁷ Wasisto Raharjo Jati, "Critical Analysis of Islamic Populism: Insights from Indonesian Perspectives," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 18, no. 1 (2024): 27–48, <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2024.18.1.27-48>.

³⁸ Wahid, "Kembalinya Konservatisme Islam Indonesia."

Ali Kalora in 2021, Indonesian authorities declared MIT disbanded in September 2022. However, remnants and sympathizers are believed to persist, as indicated by the arrest of three suspected MIT members in December 2024.

Additionally, the Mujahedeen KOMPAK (Crisis Response Action Committee), a faction that emerged from the *Darul Islam* movement, has been active in Sulawesi since 1988. Initially established to assist victims of conflict and natural disasters, the group has been implicated in funding terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah and orchestrating attacks on Christian communities.

Other notable groups include the Committee for the Preparation of the Enforcement of Islamic Sharia (*Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam* or KPPSI), which seeks to implement Islamic law in South Sulawesi through its paramilitary wing, Laskar Jundullah. The Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah Communication Forum (*Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah* or FKAJ) operates with its paramilitary wing, Laskar Jihad. Furthermore, organizations such as the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* or MMI), the Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam* or FPI), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) have also been involved in efforts to promote more rigid interpretations of Islamic governance.³⁹ Although the latter three were disbanded by the government in 2017, their former members continue to advocate for the establishment of a caliphate system. These groups tend to view outsiders negatively, disregarding their positive aspects, and frequently label other groups as heretical. Additionally, they are often involved in acts of violence. With the exception of KPPSI, most of these Islamic organizations originated outside Sulawesi.⁴⁰

The Islamist movements in Sulawesi can be identified through several patterns. First, the pattern involving the noble elite, exemplified by Sheikh Yusuf Al-Makassari (1626–1699), who successfully converted the kings of South Sulawesi to Islam. This strategic effort to Islamize the kingdom facilitated the broader dissemination of Islam throughout society. Second, the pattern led by Kahar Muzakkir (1921–1965), who pursued the Islamist agenda through rebellion against the legitimate government. Third, since the 1998 reform era, KPPSI has emerged, utilizing structural channels to implement Islamic law. Concerns about the strengthening of the Islamic movement in Sulawesi have long been a matter of attention for various groups, including regional governments.⁴¹

The views of Islamist groups in Sulawesi (the MIT, the Mujahedeen KOMPAK, KPPSI, FKAJ, MMI, FPI, and HTI) regarding the provisions of *Fiqh Siyasa* on war and peace can be observed in the national discourse on *dar al-*

³⁹ Gia Ayu Fita, Aco Nata Saputra, and Muhammad Alif Mulky, “Deteksi Dini Potensi Ancaman Dari Transformasi Organisasi Radikal Pada Masyarakat Sulawesi Barat,” *Jurnal Arajang* 5, no. 2 (2022): 147–62, <https://doi.org/10.31605/arajang.v5i2.2204>.

⁴⁰ Ahmad Faisal et al., “Sociological and Political Constraints of Islamic Sharia Enforcement in South Sulawesi Indonesia,” *Juris: Jurnal Ilmiah Syariah* 22, no. 1 (2023): 159–69, <https://doi.org/10.31958/juris.v22i1.8604>.

⁴¹ Afandi, “Gurutta and Religious Authority Contestation in Makassar.”

Islām (the abode of Islam) and *dār al-harb* (the abode of war). These groups assert that Muslims in Indonesia currently reside in *dār al-harb*, with some groups even labeling Indonesia as a *tagħbiż* (devil) country. This viewpoint arises from the belief that Muslims in Indonesia lack a government based on Islamic law and leaders who formally represent Islamic groups. Consequently, many Muslims in Indonesia advocate for the establishment of an Islamic state or the implementation of an Islamic Caliphate, the *Khilafah Islamiyah* system, as a comprehensive solution to the problems facing the ummah and the nation.⁴² For Islamists and most other conservative Muslims, Islam is both a religion and a comprehensive way of life. It is viewed not merely as a religion but as a divine instrument for understanding the world, embodying a holistic character. According to this perspective, Islam does not acknowledge a separation between state and religious affairs but instead governs all aspects of life.⁴³

However, the majority of Muslims in Sulawesi, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, as well as the majority of Muslims in Indonesia, believe that Indonesian Muslims reside in *dār al-salām* (the abode of peace). This refers to a region or country that, while not formally governed by Islamic law, nonetheless provides full protection and freedom for Muslims to practice their faith and adhere to Islamic principles.⁴⁴ According to this perspective, Indonesia and most countries that adhere to the nation-state principle can be categorized as *dār al-salām*. This is because Indonesia, like many other countries, has laws and regulations that ensure the freedom of individuals to practice their religion, including Islam. As stipulated in the Indonesian constitution, the state guarantees the freedom of every individual to worship according to their respective religions and beliefs.⁴⁵

The categorization of the world into two regions, *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-harb*, represents an outdated paradigm that, if applied today, would have numerous negative impacts on humanity and national identity. According to Bassam Tibi, this categorization divides the world into Muslim and non-Muslim areas, designated as areas of peace and areas of war, respectively. This division originated during a period when many Islamic caliphates were in decline and faced the threat of colonization and conquest by emerging European nations. Within

⁴² Ach Khoiri, “Metode Pencegahan Penyebaran Paham Islam Anti-Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia Pasca Pembubarannya Hizbut Indonesia Pada Pondok Pesantren Salaf Di Pamemasan,” *Voice Justisia: Jurnal Hukum Dan Keadilan* 3, no. 2 (2019): 1–25. Masdar Hilmy, “The Politics of Retaliation: The Backlash of Radical Islamists to the Deradicalization Project in Indonesia,” *Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 51, no. 1 (2013): 129–58, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2013.511.129-158>.

⁴³ Rosdalina Bukido et al., “Harmonization of Customary and Islamic Law in the Gama Tradition of the Muslim Mongondow Community of North Sulawesi,” *Ijtihad: Jurnal Wacana Hukum Islam Dan Kemanusiaan* 22, no. 2 (2022): 239–54, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.18326/ijtihad.v22i2.239-254>.

⁴⁴ Marzuki, “Diskursus Khilafah Dalam Kajian Fiqh Siyasah Klasik Dan Kontemporer.”

⁴⁵ Marzuki.

this framework, populations were typically divided into first-class and second-class citizens.⁴⁶

Contemporary Islamic jurists are still well-acquainted with the notion of dividing the world into Islamic and non-Islamic regions, including those with religious authority in the Sulawesi region. This concept is especially prevalent among Islamic legal experts within Islamist groups. Although not all Islamist groups share this view, some, particularly the extreme or radical factions, clearly endorse this regional division. They also reject democracy, viewing it as a concept originating from the West (non-Islamic regions). This perspective is evident among Islamist groups that emerged during the reform period, coinciding with Indonesia's democratization following the collapse of Suharto's authoritarian regime.⁴⁷

The collapse of the Suharto regime marked the beginning of a quest for religious identity among Muslims in Indonesia. Numerous radical groups emerged under the guise of freedom and democracy. However, many of these groups have undermined the foundations of democracy and a multicultural society. The Poso conflict in Central Sulawesi (1998-2001) serves as a poignant local example of how religious groups, both Muslims and Christians, engaged in fierce battles in the name of God. This conflict also illustrates the weakening of state authority and the involvement of paramilitary forces, which exacerbated the conflict, resulting in thousands of deaths and the destruction of ethnic and religious harmony in the region.⁴⁸

One of the strategies employed by groups with aspirations of establishing an Islamic state is to refine and intensify ideological thought, strengthening the drive to realize their vision. One such ideology is Salafi-Jihadism. Through interconnected jihadist organizations, Salafi-Jihadist ideology has spread across various regions of the world, including Indonesia. This ideology combines a claim to religious doctrinal purification with the use of militaristic violence as a response to social and national issues facing the Muslim community.

This dynamic was evident in the sectarian violence that erupted in Indonesia in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Ambon became the initial flashpoint that drew the attention of Islamic groups, with some organizations choosing to support factions they perceived as religiously aligned. Laskar Jihad, under the leadership of Jafar Umar Thalib, emerged as one of the paramilitary groups that adopted a Salafi-Jihadist ideological approach. However, Laskar Jihad was not the only militia to mobilize. The Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (*Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia* or DDII) established an affiliated organization called the

⁴⁶ Bassam Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Changes* (Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991), 57.

⁴⁷ Zulfan Taufik and Muhammad Taufik, "Nagari Madani: Islamic Favoritism and Religious Freedom in Regional Development in West Sumatera, Indonesia," *Ulumuna Journal of Islamic Studies* 27, no. 2 (December 31, 2023): 692–714, <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v27i2.669>.

⁴⁸ Badrus Sholeh, "Conflict, Jihad, and Religious Identity in Maluku, Eastern Indonesia," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 46, no. 1 (2009): 71–99.

Crisis Response Committee (*Komite Penanggulangan Krisis* or KOMPAK). It was later revealed that this affiliate had connections to *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI).⁴⁹

Moreover, KPPSI in South Sulawesi has also a notable influence on the discourse regarding the rights of non-Muslims in the region. It is an organization dedicated to promoting and implementing Islamic Sharia within the local context of South Sulawesi. Its views and actions are significant because they reflect how local interpretations of Islamic law interact with the broader national legal framework of Indonesia, which is a secular state with a diverse population.⁵⁰

KPPSI aims to increase the influence of Islamic values and Sharia law in the public and governmental spheres in South Sulawesi. This includes advocating for regulations that align more closely with Islamic principles. KPPSI generally asserts that the implementation of Sharia should not infringe on the rights of non-Muslims. They argue that non-Muslims would still be protected under the law and that their religious freedoms would be respected. However, there may be certain social and legal distinctions made between Muslims and non-Muslims in aspects of public life, reflecting a more traditional interpretation of Sharia where different religious communities have different roles and responsibilities.⁵¹

The activities of KPPSI have sometimes led to tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Non-Muslims may feel apprehensive about potential restrictions on their religious practices or changes in the legal system that could disadvantage them. KPPSI leaders often assure that non-Muslims will not be forced to adhere to Islamic laws, but concerns persist about implicit pressure and the potential for social discrimination.

Indonesia's national legal framework is based on Pancasila, the state philosophy that includes belief in one God, but also emphasizes religious tolerance and pluralism. The Indonesian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and equality before the law for all citizens. In some regions like Aceh, special autonomy allows for the implementation of Sharia law for Muslims. However, South Sulawesi has not been granted similar autonomy, so KPPSI's influence is more about local regulations and societal norms rather than a full legal implementation of Sharia.⁵²

KPPSI in South Sulawesi promotes the implementation of Islamic Sharia, advocating for the integration of Islamic principles in public life and governance. While they claim to respect the rights and freedoms of non-Muslims, their initiatives have sometimes led to concerns about potential discrimination and the

⁴⁹ M. Khoirul Huda, “Mengenal Mujahidin KOMPAK: Organisasi Sayap DDII Yang Dilatih Jamaah Islamiyah,” *Islami.Co* (Jakarta, 2020), <https://islami.co/mengenal-mujahidin-kompak-organisasi-sayap-ddii-yang-dilatih-jamaah-islamiyah/>.

⁵⁰ Faisal et al., “Sociological and Political Constraints of Islamic Sharia Enforcement in South Sulawesi Indonesia.”

⁵¹ Faisal et al.

⁵² Muhamad Hisyam, “The Preparatory Committee for Implementation of Sharia (KPPSI): An Islamic Resurgence in South Sulawesi,” in *Islam in Southeast Asia: Transnational Networks and Local Contexts; Proceedings of the Symposium* (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2009), 7–34.

erosion of pluralistic values. The Indonesian national legal framework continues to act as a counterbalance, ensuring that any regional attempts to implement Sharia do not violate the constitutional rights of all citizens, including non-Muslims.

KPPSI operates with an auxiliary body that has a more militaristic orientation, known as *Laskar Jundullah* (the Warriors of God's Soldiers). Although Laskar Jundullah operates under the auspices of KPPSI, effective coordination between the two entities is lacking. Established in 2000, Laskar Jundullah emerged as a closed organization and gained prominence through its involvement in the conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Its profile was further elevated when some members were implicated in the Makassar bombing in December 2002. Laskar Jundullah was introduced publicly during a forum on the "Implementation of Sharia Law" in South Sulawesi on May 28, 2000, coinciding with the establishment of KPPSI. It was formally ratified at the South Sulawesi Muslim Congress held at the Haji Sudiang Dormitory in Makassar in October 2000. Since its inception, Laskar Jundullah has maintained an affiliation with KPPSI.⁵³

Laskar Jundullah is a paramilitary organization affiliated with KPPSI but not associated with any major Islamic mass organizations. Its name suggests that Laskar Jundullah was established to uphold sharia enforcement. This organization functions as a regional militia in South Sulawesi, purportedly with historical ties to the *dār al-Islām* movement. It has been actively involved in the conflict between Christians and Muslims in Poso Regency, Central Sulawesi. Since its inception, discussions about KPPSI have invariably been linked to Laskar Jundullah. The establishment of Laskar Jundullah was, in fact, a mandate from the First Muslim Congress held in 2000 in Makassar. This mandate was outlined in the program to form the "*Laskar Penegak Syariat Islam*" or Islamic Law Enforcement Brigade, which later became known as Laskar Jundullah. However, the existence of Laskar Jundullah has created a sense of fear among certain circles, including participants in the Islamic Ummah Congress itself. Laskar Jundullah conveys a formidable impression, leading to criticism that the Congress has instilled fear. As an autonomous body under KPPSI, Laskar Jundullah operates with independent management, and there appears to be a lack of effective coordination between KPPSI and the activities of Laskar Jundullah.⁵⁴

KPPSI, originally a purely religious movement with a mission to enforce Islamic law in South Sulawesi, appears to have evolved into a pragmatic political movement. This shift is evidenced by KPPSI's desire to request special autonomy for South Sulawesi as a strategy to implement Islamic sharia. Additionally, various acts of violence committed by Laskar Jundullah in the name of eradicating

⁵³ Bambang Karsono, "Gerakan Islam Radikal Di Sulawesi Selatan: Pola Rekrutmen Dan Pola Gerakan Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) Dan Laskar Jundullah," *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional* 4, no. 2 (2018): 231–46, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31599/jkn.v4i2.417>.

⁵⁴ Karsono.

immorality, as well as several bombings linked to KPPSI activists, have tarnished its reputation in society and undermined its efforts to uphold Islamic law.⁵⁵

The Islamist political movements that emerged in Sulawesi were frequently accompanied by violence, raising significant concerns that proved detrimental to society. These movements are typically classified as radical, promoting the political ideology of radical Islamism. Most of these radical movements aim to replace the existing government system or social order with one derived from Islam. Proponents of these movements believe that their religion is the most truthful and appropriate for Sulawesi society. Radicalism is an attitude that often leads to acts of terrorism. These groups frequently target bars, brothels, and discos, which they consider un-Islamic. Many claim their activities are in line with Islamic teachings, seeking sympathy and support from the Muslim community for their actions. Ultimately, the government disbanded these radical groups, including Laskar Jihad, FPI, and HTI.

In response to the dissolution of radical groups by the government and changes in the political landscape, FKAJW adapted its movement to be gentler and more aligned with Sulawesi society. FKAJW has expanded its network and developed programs to meet community needs. It has also made significant strides in promoting a moderate and tolerant understanding of Islam in Sulawesi. Alongside infrastructure development, FKAJW has focused on educational programs and organizing religious events to support the advancement of education and da'wah. Furthermore, FKAJW actively disseminates moderate and tolerant Islamic ideas through various media, including magazines and websites.⁵⁶

These conservative Islamic groups frequently reference the views of Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah, two renowned Muslim scholars and legal experts who acknowledge the validity of *muwada'ah* and *hudnab* agreements without specifying a time limit. According to these scholars, such agreements are permissible if they align with the Qur'an and Sunnah. Muslims are prohibited from waging war against non-Muslim countries with which they have established peace treaties, unless the non-Muslims first breach the treaty. The agreement remains lawful and valid as long as the terms are upheld by both parties, regardless of whether a time limit is specified.⁵⁷ In other words, once an agreement is reached, both parties are obligated to fulfill or implement its terms. Islamic countries are required to uphold their promises as long as non-Islamic countries do not breach the agreement. The status of safety is void if the agreement is violated, and the Islamic state may then engage in war or classify the non-Islamic country as *dar al-harb*.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Karsono.

⁵⁶ Ridhoni Mirza Nugraha and Gilang Sandhubaya, "Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'ah Communication Forum Is an Islamic Political Organizational Movement in Legal Studies," *Jurnal Cakrawala Hukum* 14, no. 2 (2023): 212–22, <https://doi.org/10.26905/ijch.v14i2.10174>.

⁵⁷ Ghunaimi, *The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach*.

⁵⁸ Aqimuddin, Ruhaeni, and Chotidjah, "Dispute Settlement Between Islamic Law State and Non-Islamic Law State: An Islamic International Law Perspective."

Radical Islamic groups in Sulawesi, like their counterparts elsewhere in Indonesia, often share similar ideological goals with extremist groups, such as the implementation of Sharia law and the establishment of an Islamic state.⁵⁹ Many Muslims in the Sulawesi region, such as Manado, have opposed the establishment of religious organizations and social groups associated with militant Islamist factions. They have also rejected the presence of Islamist leaders delivering religious sermons in their areas.⁶⁰ However, not all Islamic organizations in Sulawesi are radical, and not all radical Islamic organizations adhere to the doctrine of separating the Islamic state (*dār al-Islām*) from the infidel state (*dār al-harb*). It is important to emphasize the crucial roles played by the country's leading Muslim organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which remain the foundation of tolerance and pluralism. These organizations have adopted a moderate position in defending the nation's ethnoreligious diversity.⁶¹

Prospects and Challenges

The Qur'an does not introduce the concept of a land of peace (*dār al-Islām*) and a land of war (*dār al-harb*). This classification is neither found in the Qur'an nor identified during the time of the Prophet and his companions. It was nearly a century later, at the beginning of the Abbasid dynasty, that Muslim scholars introduced this concept. This classification was an attempt by classical Muslim scholars to contextualize and apply certain Islamic laws, thereby focusing on countries inhabited by Muslims.⁶² This fact, combined with the modern Indonesian Muslim context, has increasingly led many radical Islamic groups to recognize that the dichotomy of *dar dār al-Islām* and *dār al-harb* is no longer relevant.

Furthermore, interactions between countries today are largely driven by commercial interests, political and military collaboration, and the mutually agreed use of social space, all of which operate independently of beliefs and ideologies. Given the contemporary transformations and international dynamics, modern jurists cannot sustain a division of world law solely based on the dichotomy of "land of Islam or land of peace" and "land of war or land of infidels." Therefore, it is essential to question whether they will adhere to this outdated division or adapt to the changing times. This adaptation has significant implications for the nature of relations between Islamic states and non-Muslim governments, as well as for Muslims residing temporarily or permanently in non-Muslim territories.⁶³

⁵⁹ Dani Muhtada, "Politics, Local Governments, and Sharia By-Laws in Indonesia: Revisiting A Common Assumption," *Mazahib: Jurnal Pemikiran Hukum Islam* 17, no. 2 (January 18, 2019): 1–34, <https://doi.org/10.21093/mj.v17i2.1347>.

⁶⁰ Sumanto Al Qurtuby, "The Rise of Islamism and the Future of Indonesian Islam," *Journal of International Studies* 16 (2020): 105–28.

⁶¹ Al Qurtuby.

⁶² Julia Stephens, *Governing Islam: Law, Empire, and Secularism in Modern South Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 23.

⁶³ Stephens.

The reevaluation of this dichotomy by Islamic jurists will significantly influence the manner in which an Islamic state engages with non-Muslim governments, as well as the treatment of Muslims residing temporarily or permanently in non-Muslim territories. Similarly, the perception of non-Muslims by conservative Islamic groups in their regions will be affected. Additionally, government policies focused on welfare and justice have the potential to mitigate the extremist attitudes of these groups.⁶⁴

At the national level, the disbandment of extremist factions by the Joko Widodo administration has somewhat ameliorated the Islamic political climate. Moreover, the implementation of more equitable regional development initiatives has slightly diminished the call for Sharia law enforcement.⁶⁵ The government has shown responsiveness to numerous Muslim aspirations,⁶⁶ such as safeguarding the Islamic faith through legal avenues, notably by integrating Islamic principles into the drafting of a new penal code to replace the colonial-era Criminal Code.⁶⁷

Besides that, local political dynamics play a crucial role. If Islamic political movements can align themselves with influential local leaders and address the socio-economic concerns of the population, they stand a better chance of gaining support. The broader national political climate in Indonesia also affects the prospects.⁶⁸ Indonesia's political landscape is characterized by a mix of secular and religious parties, and the success of Islamic political movements in other parts of the country can impact their prospects in Sulawesi.

Organizations like the Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Sharia (KPPSI) in South Sulawesi play a significant role. Their ability to mobilize support, effectively communicate their vision, and address local issues will impact their success. However, Indonesia's secular constitution limits the extent to which Islamic law can be implemented. Movements must navigate these legal boundaries while advocating for their principles. Indonesia's diverse religious landscape means that any political movement must consider the implications of their policies on non-Muslim communities. Ensuring religious harmony and avoiding sectarian conflict is a significant challenge.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Nur'aini Azizah, Hamdi Muluk, and Mirra Noor Milla, "Pursuing Ideological Passion in Islamic Radical Group's Insurgency: A Case Study of Negara Islam Indonesia," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 13, no. 1 (2023): 1–27, <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijjms.v13i1.1-27>.

⁶⁵ Fita, Saputra, and Mulky, "Deteksi Dini Potensi Ancaman Dari Transformasi Organisasi Radikal Pada Masyarakat Sulawesi Barat."

⁶⁶ Faisal et al., "Sociological and Political Constraints of Islamic Sharia Enforcement in South Sulawesi Indonesia."

⁶⁷ Vivi Ariyanti and Supani, "Examining Muslims' Aspirations in Drafting the New Criminal Code: Analyzing Criminal Law Policy in Indonesia from a Maslaha Perspective," *Al-Manabij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam* 18, no. 1 (March 16, 2024): 37–58, <https://doi.org/10.24090/mnh.v18i1.8280>.

⁶⁸ Siti Malaiha Dewi et al., "Islamic Revivalism: Dynamics of Islamic Parties in Legalizing Islamic Law Policies in Indonesia and Malaysia," *Al-Istinbath: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 9, no. 1 (2024): 231–58, <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.29240/jhi.v9i1.8514>.

⁶⁹ Al Qurtuby, "The Rise of Islamism and the Future of Indonesian Islam."

Within the broader Islamic political spectrum, there are diverse views ranging from moderate to more conservative. This internal fragmentation can weaken the overall impact of Islamic political movements if not managed effectively. Competition between different Islamic organizations and parties for the same support base can also dilute their influence.⁷⁰ Given these factors, the prospects of Islamic political movements in Sulawesi are cautiously optimistic. The region's strong Islamic cultural foundation provides a supportive environment. However, success depends on the movements' ability to address local needs, navigate the secular-national framework, and maintain internal cohesion. Movements that adopt a moderate and inclusive approach, addressing socio-economic issues while promoting Islamic values in a way that respects the rights of all citizens, are likely to find greater success. Moreover, the ability to adapt to changing political dynamics and respond to the needs of the population will be crucial for the longevity and impact of these movements.

The prospect for Islamic political movements in Sulawesi presents a complex situation for non-Muslims in the area. While there are potential benefits, such as improved social cohesion and ethical governance, the risks include marginalization, reduced political influence, and legal and economic challenges. Moreover, the rise of Islamic political movements in Sulawesi can lead to increased tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim communities, especially if the rhetoric emphasizes Islamic identity and norms at the expense of inclusivity. Islamic political movements gaining power could lead to policies that prioritize Islamic values, potentially affecting the political representation and influence of non-Muslim communities. Non-Muslims might experience changes in interfaith dynamics, with potential shifts in societal norms and public behaviors influenced by Islamic principles. There might be a greater emphasis on Islamic cultural practices in public spaces, which could make non-Muslims feel less represented or marginalized.

Conclusion

Islamist movements in Sulawesi including MIT, Mujahedeen KOMPAK, KPPSI, FKAJ, MMI, FPI, and HTI present diverse interpretations of *Fiqh Siyasa* regarding war and peace, shaped by their distinct ideological, historical, and sociopolitical settings. Whereas groups such as MIT, MMI, FPI, and HTI pursue the establishment of an Islamic state through the framework of *dār al-Islam*, others, including KPPSI, FKAJ, and Mujahedeen KOMPAK, reinterpret *dār al-harb* to advocate coexistence and non-violence, thereby challenging the classical dichotomy between war and peace. This variation illustrates the ongoing difficulty of reconciling Islamic political thought with Indonesia's pluralistic constitutional and legal order. While earlier studies have tended to generalize Islamist movements or focus narrowly on their militancy, this research offers a novel

⁷⁰ Alexander R. Arifianto, "The State of Political Islam in Indonesia," *Asia Policy* 15, no. 4 (2020): 111–32.

contribution by demonstrating how Sulawesi's Islamist groups adapt classical *Fiqh Siyasa* doctrines into context-specific practices that reflect both doctrinal continuity and pragmatic innovation. By integrating doctrinal Islamic legal analysis with field-based perspectives, the study uncovers how juristic concepts such as *dār al-Islam* and *dār al-harb* are selectively reinterpreted to address modern challenges, producing fragmented but locally grounded applications of *Fiqh Siyasa*. This distinctive approach enriches scholarly understanding not only of Sulawesi's Islamist movements but also of the broader dynamics through which global Islamic jurisprudential principles are localized, contested, and transformed in contemporary post-colonial societies.

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